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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. The Necessity for Disarmament  with a Human Face in relation 
to Cluster Munitions 
 
For over sixty years, cluster munitions have caused civilian harm not only because of 
the wide area effect and inaccuracy of these conventional weapons during attacks in armed 
conflicts but also because of their propensity to leave a vast post-conflict legacy of 
unexploded sub-munitions. There is abundant evidence that civilian lives and livelihoods may 
not only be endangered during armed conflicts but also tampering with sub-munition duds 
may maim or kill civilians.  
Moreover, the presence of unexploded sub-munitions may render large tracts of 
agricultural and grazing land inaccessible as well as prevent or delay the return of refugees or 
Internally Displaced Persons for months, years or even decades after the end of armed 
hostilities. The dangers of unexploded sub-munitions are not confined to civilians alone. They 
have also materialised in respect of friendly troops whose advance was obstructed because 
their allies used these weapons. In addition, even clearance experts who are intimately 
familiar with all kinds of unexploded ordnance (UXO) have lost lives and limbs as a result of 
accidents with sub-munition duds. 
Originally cluster munitions were designed to attack wide-area and fast-moving targets 
like airfields or large numbers of personnel or tanks remote from concentrations of civilians. 
However, the record of civilian harm suggests that in many armed conflicts cluster munitions 
have not in fact been so used. This observation must be made despite the existence of general 
rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) with the aim of protecting those that do not or 
no longer participate in military hostilities, including the rules on distinction and 
discrimination, on proportionality and on feasible precautions. Also the adoption of Protocol 
V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) in 2003, which contains obligations of clearance regarding any type of unexploded 
ordnance, including unexploded sub-munitions, did not motivate certain states to abstain from 
using these weapons. While states within the framework of the CCW, the primary forum for 
specific IHL/disarmament rules on conventional weapons, until the present date could not 
agree on specific rules on cluster munitions, an alternative diplomatic process, the Oslo 
process, produced a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in little more than one year. 
This convention not only prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of these 
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weapons and thus, constitutes a specific disarmament treaty but also contains positive 
obligations to remedy the enduring consequences of the past use of these weapons, notably 
victim assistance or clearance of land contaminated with unexploded sub-munitions. 
The fundamental aim of this thesis is to show why for the better protection, especially 
of civilians, from the effects of cluster munitions the adoption of a specific disarmament 
treaty like the CCM with a strong humanitarian focus was indeed necessary and which 
potential the CCM holds for meeting this objective. 
This first begs the question of why the general rules of IHL and Protocol V to the 
CCW were apparently inadequate for ensuring better protection especially of civilians from 
the effects of cluster munitions? With regard to the general rules of IHL this author argues 
that the rules were partly insufficient, partly was their implementation inadequate. Concerning 
Protocol V to the CCW, this instrument simply does not deal with cluster munitions in all 
their problematic aspects. 
Secondly, why is an analysis of human rights law (HRL) relevant in relation to 
protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munitions?  This author is of the view that 
HRL is not only an additional layer to frame the issue in humanitarian terms; the arguably 
better capacity of HRL to remedy past harm incurred by individuals makes a HRL analysis 
compelling. Where comprehensive protection of individuals is the overall goal not only future 
victims from cluster munition use must be avoided but also the enduring consequences of past 
cluster munition use must be dealt with. This approach is further legitimised by the fact that 
the CCM itself expressly refers to HRL and is greatly influenced by a recent HRL convention, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), in the context of victim 
assistance. Moreover, it draws upon lessons learnt from the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-
Personnel Mines which was the first disarmament treaty containing a specific provision on 
victim assistance. 
Thirdly, why has it not been possible to conclude a specific treaty on cluster munitions 
in the forum that is primarily designed for prohibitions and regulations of conventional 
weapons, i.e. the CCW? As will be seen, within the framework of the CCW military and 
security considerations have until now prevailed over humanitarian concerns in relation to 
cluster munitions. Due to the practice of not only seeking but in practice requiring consensus 
for any decision within this framework, in particular major military powers like China, Russia 
or the United States may block any initiative contrary to their interests. 
Conversely, why was an alternative diplomatic process, the Oslo process, more 
successful at obtaining such a convention? This author supports the view that one major 
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reason for its success was that this endeavour was pursued with a humanitarian focus utmost 
in the minds of participants. Consistent with the ultimate goal of the better protection of 
civilians from the effects of these weapons, the humanitarian community, including victims of 
cluster munitions, clearance experts and civil society, had much more influence on the 
outcome of this process than in the framework of the CCW. The inclusion of this greater 
humanitarian dimension was also ensured by the kind of states that participated in the process: 
Firstly, small and middle-sized states rather than major military powers were in the driving 
seat. Secondly, the Oslo process witnessed particularly active participation by states heavily 
affected by cluster munition use such as Laos or Lebanon. Moreover, a much greater number 
of African, Asian and Latin American states participated in this process than in the framework 
of the CCW.  
In this regard, although the case of anti-personnel mines is closest to the case of cluster 
munitions in terms of similarity of the effects of the weapon systems, the nature of and the 
humanitarian motivations for the diplomatic process leading to the adoption of comparable 
disarmament conventions with the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the 2008 CCM., an in-depth 
comparison of the two cases is not the main theme of this thesis.1 Still, to the extent that the 
case of anti-personnel mines is relevant for the topic at hand, in particular for the area of 
victim assistance and for the ability to bring humanitarian concerns associated with the use of 
cluster munitions to the forefront of the international agenda, it will be part of the analysis.  
While the “disconnection between much of the academic discourse on international 
security related matters, including in disarmament, and what goes on in the negotiating 
chamber” has been lamented,2 this work attempts to remedy this gap. It draws on the practical 
humanitarian evidence and the insights gained by this author as a legal adviser to CMC-
Austria nationally and internationally in various conferences, including the Third Review 
Conference to the CCW, the Oslo, Vienna and Dublin Conference on Cluster Munitions. The 
intention is to offer in-depth academic analysis to problems faced by negotiators on the cluster 
munition issue based on these practical insights in the hope that this work may be interesting 
both for international legal scholars and practitioners. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Convergences of the two processes have been analysed within the overall broader question of what lessons can 
be learnt for other multilateral disarmament or arms control endeavours from these successful processes. See J. 
Borrie et al., “Learn, adapt, succeed: potential lessons from the Ottawa and Oslo processes for other 
disarmament and arms control challenges”, UNIDIR Disarmament Forum No. 2 (2009), at 19-26. 
2 J. Borrie, “Disarmament As Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice” in J. Borrie & V.M. Randin, 
Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice, 7, 11 (2006). 
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1.2. On Methodology and Limitations of the Topic 
 
Human security as a concept “equates security with people rather than territories, with 
development rather than arms.”3 For the fundamental presumption that disarmament serves 
the overarching goal of the better protection of individuals where there have been proven 
humanitarian problems with the use of a conventional4 combat weapon in the past, this is the 
appropriate conceptual basis.5 This approach, which marks the specific expression in the 
realm of international security of the general paradigm shift of international law from 
benefiting primarily the state to benefiting the individual, is characterised by its preventive 
instead of reactive, holistic rather than sectoral and participative rather than exclusive nature.6  
All of these characteristics provide important methodological benchmarks against 
which to analyse the cluster munition issue as a case of disarmament for the better protection 
of individuals from these weapons: Firstly, disarmament provides a more preventive approach 
towards protection of civilians from these weapons than general rules of IHL or specific 
regulations or prohibitions on use only. Secondly, as can be seen from the questions analysed 
the case of cluster munitions will be systematically analysed from both the IHL and HRL 
angle. However, this analysis is not constrained by sectoral limitations of the scope of 
application or possibilities of enforcement of these two legal regimes. Rather, these sectoral 
                                                 
3 The term “human security” was first coined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 
Human Development Report 1994 and this quote appears in the online synopsis of the report. The report uses a 
broad definition, describing “human security” as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression”, as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in 
homes, in jobs or in communities.” See United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 
1994: New Dimensions of Human Security”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/ (last visited 
20 January 2010). 
4 For gaining an initial understanding of the term “conventional weapons”, the UN Register of Conventional 
Arms may be resorted to. Under the UN Register, conventional weapons are divided into seven categories, 
notably battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack 
helicopters; warships; and missiles and missile launchers. Thus, weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons are excluded from falling under these categories. So are small arms and light 
weapons as well as cyper weaponry such as computer worms, Trojan horses, viruses or directed energy weapons 
which are capable of disrupting or destroying enemy computer systems without the use of explosives, i.e. with 
the use of beams of electromagnetic energy. However, for the present purposes, the categories to be found in the 
UN Register are sufficient to cover both the delivery systems and the explosive sub-munitions of cluster 
munitions. See UN General Assembly, Register of Conventional Arms, UN General Assmebly Res 46/36 L, 
Transparency in armaments, 6 December 1991, Annex, UN Doc. A/RES/46/36. 
5 This view is also endorsed by C. H. Ruge, “Mitigating the Effects of Armed Violence Through Disarmament: 
Counting the Human Costs” in Borrie & Randin, Disarmament as Humanitarian Action, supra note 2, at 23, 27; 
as well as K. Boyle & S. Simonsen, “Human security, human rights and disarmament”, UNIDIR Disarmament 
Forum No. 3 (2004), at 5, 11-12. 
6 W. Benedek, “Human Security and human rights interaction”, 59 (1) International Social Science Journal 7, 10 
(2008), http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121414631/PDFSTART (last visited 20 January 
2010). 
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limitations are noted as obstacles to adequate protection of civilians, mandating a more 
comprehensive, i.e. holistic approach towards the humanitarian problems associated with 
cluster munitions. Finally, the participatory character of a diplomatic process like the Oslo 
process with a particularly strong contribution from field experience by a variety of non-state 
actors, the ICRC, various UN operational agencies like the UN Mine Action Service or the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and NGOs, guarantees that normative 
outcomes adequately reflect the overarching concern for individuals. It is this evidence of 
concrete humanitarian consequences resulting from actual use of cluster munitions that 
justifies the individual-oriented approach to disarmament supported here.7  
 
1.3. Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter 2 sets the stage by giving an account of the properties, military purpose, 
history of production and use as well as the humanitarian evidence of civilian harm associated 
with past use of the weapon. The purpose is to understand that cluster munitions may appear 
in many different types; the military rationale for which they were originally developed; 
technological developments to improve their reliability; as well as the actual circumstances in 
which these weapons have been used in recent armed conflicts. A summary of the evidence of 
civilian harm gathered from past cluster munition use follows, which is to prepare the ground 
for an understanding of what humanitarian challenges the new Convention on Cluster 
Munitions must deal with. For detailing these humanitarian consequences, the section draws 
from field research by NGOs, the ICRC and UN agencies, as well as most importantly, 
testimonies of victims who served as a vivid reminder within the framework of the CCW and 
throughout the Oslo process that any international treaty on cluster munitions must strive for 
improving their plight and better protecting civilians in the future. Not only the two 
fundamental consequences, death and permanent disability of civilians during or after cluster 
munition attacks but also the socio-economic harm when agricultural and grazing areas are 
inaccessible, as well as the challenges of victim assistance and clearance are described. 
                                                 
7 This record of humanitarian evidence from actual use of these weapons in recent armed conflicts also sets the 
issue of disarmament in this area apart from other disarmament treaties like the Biological and the Chemical 
Weapons Conventions; in those contexts, not the actual use of these weapons in contemporary armed conflicts 
but other problems connected to the production, stockpiling and proliferation of such weapons seem to be more 
pressing. On the challenges facing the Chemical Weapons Convention, see, for example, R. Thakur & E. Haru 
(eds.), The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities (2006). On the 
Biological Weapons Convention, see, for example, J. Goldblat, “The Biological Weapons Convention – An 
overview, 318 International Review of the Red Cross 251-265, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jnpa?opendocument (last visited 20 January 2010).  
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Chapter 3 then marks the first step in the review of the legal status quo before the 
adoption of the CCM. It is devoted to general IHL, in particular the customary international 
law rules on distinction, discrimination, proportionality and precautionary obligations in 
attack, as well as the more specific rules relevant to the use of cluster munitions contained in 
Protocol V to the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). This analysis shall answer the 
question whether these rules are insufficient as such to prevent civilian harm or whether the 
rules were adequate but not properly implemented. The chapter also offers analysis of the 
scarce case law on cluster munition use before the Ethiopia and Eritrea Claims Commission 
and the ICTY and treats the issue of whether the rulings of these bodies were consistent in 
their legal reasoning. 
Chapter 4 as the second part in the review of the legal status quo before the adoption 
of the CCM examines how HRL applies to the consequences of the use of cluster munitions. 
It begins with structural observations on the complementary relationship between IHL and 
HRL which are designed to lay emphasis on the institutional relevance of such an inquiry. 
Subsequently, it will be discussed how the rights to life, not to be subjected to cruel and 
inhuman treatment and the right to health with the underlying determinants of food, housing 
and water may be violated by cluster munition use. This evaluation is organised according to 
the two negative temporal humanitarian dimensions of cluster munition use, civilian harm 
during and after armed conflict. In terms of the first set of problems, that of the wide area 
effect and the inaccuracy of the sub-munitions in or near populated areas, the question will be 
broached as to whether HRL may afford a remedy for victims under the rights to life and not 
to be subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment in light of relevant jurisprudence of regional 
and universal HR treaty bodies and the ICTY and what the obstacles to such enforcement are. 
The analysis pertaining to the post-conflict consequences of cluster munition use 
through unexploded sub-munitions starts off by inquiring whether it was justified by the 
European Court of Human Rights not to proceed to the merits in the case of Behrami v. 
France. That case involved a complaint under the right to life for the death of a child caused 
by an unexploded sub-munition in Kosovo for which the responsibility of France as a lead 
nation of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in this area due to its wrongful omission of clearance was 
alleged.  For want of a specific statement on the merits, it will then be examined as to what 
parallels may be drawn to environmental human rights jurisprudence to distil specific HRL 
obligations in the areas of clearance and warnings of civilians and what the shortcomings of 
applying HRL in this context are. The next subsection is intended to show to what extent an 
affected state is obliged under economic and social HRL to deal with the post-conflict 
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contamination with duds on that state’s territory and compares the HRL response with the 
specific response provided by Protocol V to the CCW. As the last of the scarce specific legal 
statements on cluster munition use by international bodies and experts, the findings of three 
reports by HRL and IHL experts on cluster munition use in Israel and Lebanon mandated by 
the UN Human Rights Council shall be commented on. Two subsections devoted to 
answering the question how the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines and the 
Convention on the Right of People with Disabilities contribute to strengthening the treatment, 
rehabilitation and inclusion of victims. 
Chapter 5 proceeds from the conclusion reached as a result of the two preceding 
chapters, namely that existing rules of IHL and HRL are inadequate to comprehensively deal 
with the humanitarian concerns emanating from the use of cluster munitions. In focusing on 
the Austrian national efforts to prohibit cluster munitions, a first part illustrates how the 
national and the international level are intertwined in the quest for specific prohibitions on 
cluster munitions. Austria was chosen as a case study neither out of patriotic or even 
nationalist sentiments of this author nor merely because of the fact that this author was closely 
involved in specific endeavours by the national NGO Cluster Munition Coalition-Austria 
(CMC-Austria) aiming at prohibiting cluster munitions; but Austria represents an ideal object 
of study, since it was one of the champions of specific prohibitions both on a national level 
with the enactment of national legislation on the prohibition of cluster munitions only as the 
second state worldwide and the international level with its membership of the core group of 
countries leading the Oslo process.  
Documenting the various national steps towards a Federal Act on the Prohibition of 
Cluster Munitions already sheds light on some of the substantive issues that were to be 
discussed and negotiated in the Oslo process with the CCM as a result. Since these national 
steps occurred in advance of some of the discussions in the Oslo process, it is justified to 
elaborate on the various developments in the Oslo process only in the next subchapter from its 
launch with the Norwegian announcement at the end of the Third Review Conference to the 
CCW until now. This subchapter provides in-depth substantive and procedural analysis of the 
Oslo process, in part based on this author personally witnessing key events of this process, 
including the Third Review Conference to the CCW, the Oslo Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions and the Dublin Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
The latter conference shall be the focus of Chapter 6 in which the assessment of the 
negotiations is structured around the major contentious areas, notably interoperability, the 
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definition of prohibited cluster munitions, transition periods, stockpile destruction, special 
user state obligations in respect of clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and 
victim assistance. Besides providing the drafting history, the outcome of the negotiations in 
these key areas, the text of the CCM as finally adopted will be evaluated. 
Finally, Chapter 7 attempts to answer the question as to what contribution the CCM 
makes to IHL and HRL and presents an outlook of the status of the CCM.  
 
 
2. General Legal Background and Factual Evidence in Relation 
to Cluster Munitions 
 
In order to prepare the ground for the subsequent analytical chapters, this chapter is 
intended to provide an overview of the legal regimes in relation to cluster munitions and the 
concrete factual evidence on which the analysis will be based. It describes what cluster 
munitions are, their military purpose as well as historical background information on their 
use, production, proliferation and in particular, elaborates on the resulting humanitarian 
problems and challenges posed by cluster munition use.  
 
2.1. General Background to Relevant Legal Regimes  
 
Since the beginning of codification efforts of the international law of armed conflicts 
(hereinafter international humanitarian law, IHL) weapons have been prohibited or regulated 
in two ways, either through specific prohibitions/regulations or more general rules. Thus, the 
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration already prohibited the use, in time of war, of explosive 
projectiles under 400 grammes weight,8 the 1899 Hague Declarations the use of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons9 (extended in time by the 1907 Hague Declaration),10 
projectiles containing asphyxiating gases,11 dum-dum bullets,12 the 1907 Hague Convention 
VIII regulates the laying of automatic submarine mines,13 and the 1925 Gas Protocol 
                                                 
8 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, 29 
November/11 December 1868 [1868 St. Petersburg Declaration], 1 AJIL Supplement 95-96 (1907). 
9 Declaration (IV:1) to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from 
Balloons, and Other Methods of Similar Nature, 29 July 1899, 1 AJIL Supplement  153-155 (1907). 
10 Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 18 October 1907, 2 
AJIL Supplement 216-218 (1908). 
11 Declaration (IV:2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, 29 July 1899, 1 AJIL Supplement 157-159 (1907). 
12 Declaration (IV:3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, 29 July 1899, 1 AJIL Supplement 155-157 (1907). 
13 Hague Convention (VIII) relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 18 October 1907, 2 
AJIL Supplement 138-145 (1908). 
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consolidated existing prohibitions on asphyxiating or poisonous gases and extended the scope 
of the prohibition to bacteriological warfare.14 
 In parallel, general principles and rules governing the use of weapons in armed 
conflict were developed. Thus, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration contains groundbreaking 
formulations of the need to reconcile the essential principles of military necessity and 
humanity as well as the rule that arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men are prohibited.15 This latter rule was subsequently reiterated by the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV,16 and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (API).17 
These two instruments also provided for the rule that the right of parties to an armed conflict 
to choose means of warfare is not unlimited.18  The 1977 API now contains the most elaborate 
formulation of general rules of IHL pertaining to weapons, most importantly the prohibitions 
of direct attacks against civilians,19 indiscriminate attacks,20 disproportionate attacks,21 and 
the obligations to take all feasible precautions in attack and against the effects of attacks.22 
While these rules reflect a fundamental concern about limiting the effects of weapons 
on civilians, it should be recalled that states were ready to negotiate specific rules on weapons 
also for other reasons but these humanitarian motives. It was the Russian concern about the 
vulnerability of its own troops to the bullets prohibited by the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
that prompted the convening of the Commission of military experts that drafted it. It was also 
Russian concern that it was lagging behind in weapon technology that led to its initiative for 
the (unsuccessful) 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conference with the primary aim of 
considering a possible reduction of the excessive armaments of all nations in the first place.23  
These are considerations of a broader strategic nature, such as the influence of specific 
prohibitions/regulations on national or alliance armaments, the maintenance of military 
capabilities or needs and costs of substitution for specific weapons, evincing security concerns 
                                                 
14 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925, 25 AJIL Supplement 94-96 (1931). 
15 See supra note 8. 
16 Art. 23 (e), Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land to Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907,  2 AJIL Supplement 90-117 (1908). 
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 
18 Art. 22, Annex to Hague Convention (IV), supra note 16; Art. 35 (1), Additional Protocol I, supra note 17. 
19 Art. 51 (2), Additional Protocol I, supra note 17. 
20 Arts. 51 (4), (5) (a),  ibid. 
21 Art. 51 (5) (b), ibid. 
22 Arts. 57 (2) (a) (ii), (b); Art. 58, ibid. 
23 F. Kalshoven, “Arms, Armaments and International Law”, 191 RdC 183, 208, 214-215 (1985). 
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for states rather than individuals.24 Such thinking is typical of “disarmament” in the sense of a 
complete elimination of armaments and armed forces or “arms control”, a term originally 
coined for limiting the arms competition rather than substantially reversing it and thus 
actually contrasted with the term of disarmament. Subsequently, however, a variety of 
measures came to be understood as “arms control”, including the freeze, limitation or 
abolition of specific categories of weapons; the prevention of certain military activities; the 
regulation of the deployment of forces; the proscription of transfers of militarily important 
items; the reduction of the risk of an accidental war; or the restriction or prohibition of 
specific weapons in armed conflict.25 Accordingly, the two terms of “disarmament” and 
“arms control” overlap where the abolition of specific categories of weapons is concerned. 
Hereinafter, the term “disarmament” shall be used. 
Most importantly, in the period before World War II (WWII), a state-centred approach 
towards disarmament did not prevent the adoption of specific prohibitions with the 
humanitarian aim of ensuring protection for individuals. On the contrary, in principle 
humanitarian concerns were recognised as one motivation for universal reduction of all types 
of armaments contemplated by the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in the 1930s, 
since the threat to civilians, a humanitarian concern, was mentioned as one evaluation 
criterion for disarmament.26 Still, the last step, the adoption of a specific disarmament treaty 
for the overarching concern of protection of individuals did not materialise. 
With the post- WWII advent of the UN Charter and the Cold War era ushered in, the 
state-centred approach towards disarmament led to a growing estrangement between the 
hitherto joint purposes of promoting state security and the protection of individuals inspiring 
specific prohibitions/regulations of use of weapons under IHL. Principles governing 
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, which can be likened to arms control, were 
subordinated to the ultimate goal of maintenance of international peace and security. This can 
be seen from the power of the General Assembly under Art. 11 of the UN Charter to consider 
general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Moreover, 
the obligation of the Security Council under Art. 26 to formulate plans to be submitted to UN 
Member States for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments was 
imposed with the overarching goal of promoting the establishment and maintenance of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 215; Id., “The Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 
Lucerne, 24 September-18 October 1974”, 6 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 77, 85 (1975). 
25 J. Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements: A Handbook, XIII (1983). 
26 Kalshoven, “Arms”, supra note 23, at 218. 
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international peace and security. Accordingly, the system of collective security originally 
envisaged under the UN Charter is based on the continued existence of national armed forces. 
These would be made available to the Security Council or for self defence. Therefore, arms 
control measures serving the maintenance of military international peace,27 and security may 
also extend to the maintenance of the status quo or even the controlled increase of armaments 
and armed forces.28 This weak stance on disarmament may be explained initially by the fact 
that the foundations of the UN Charter were laid when WWII was still ongoing; moreover, 
there was a sense that while during the League of Nations period it was believed that WWI 
was caused by the arms race before the war, after WWII, many felt that this war could have 
been avoided had the great military powers maintained a sufficient military deterrence 
capability.29  
This development was not conducive to the general protection of civilians from the 
effects of the use of conventional weapons in armed conflicts in particular, since even specific 
weapon prohibitions of use under IHL suffer from the weakness that unless the development, 
production and stockpiling of such weapons is not prohibited a real risk remains that these 
weapons will still get used in certain circumstances.30  
This is even more true for those conventional weapons that are not specifically 
prohibited by IHL but only governed by general rules of IHL which are open to divergent 
interpretations in the heat of battle. Cluster munitions are a paradigmatic example in this 
regard. While there was a specific proposal on the prohibition of the use of cluster bombs with 
anti-personnel effects on the table in the 1970s, this proposal was rejected, since the above-
described post-WWII state-centred mentality hampered specific prohibitions on weapons 
based on humanitarian concerns.  Opponents to specific weapons prohibitions/restrictions 
successfully prevented this matter of being finally more closely linked to general rules of IHL 
on conventional weapons negotiated as part of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law which resulted in the 
adoption of the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Instead, the 
                                                 
27 The term “peace” in this context may be understood as the mere absence of the organised use of force, the so 
called “negative peace”, as opposed to “positive” peace, which would require continued action on the part of 
states for maintaining the conditions for peace, including not only respect for the prohibition of the use of force 
but also the development of confidence-building measures; the promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; the enhancement of the quality of life; the satisfaction of human needs; or the protection of the 
environment. See R. Wolfrum, “Article 1” in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, Vol. I, 39, 41 (2nd ed., 2002). 
28 H. Schütz, “Article 26” in Simma et al. (eds.), UN Charter Commentary, supra note 27, at 464, 469. 
29 Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements, supra note 25, at 12. 
30 Ibid., at 89; O. Bring, “Conventional Weapons in the Future. Humanitarian Law or Arms Control?”, 24 (3), 
Journal of Peace Research 275, 277 (1987). 
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Diplomatic Conference on IHL decided that a separate conference should be convened to 
reach agreements on specific weapon prohibitions/restrictions. Had such specific rules on 
weapons formally been more closely linked to the 1977 Protocols, humanitarian 
considerations would have been paramount. However, this would have gone against the 
approach of the great military powers and states associated with the two blocs to view the 
issue of weapons as a predominantly strategic one, being guided by security considerations 
such as reciprocal balance in armaments and armed forces, costs of substitution of weapons or 
of managing stockpiles.  
The negotiated result of the two separate conferences convened under the auspices of 
the UN, the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), itself a mixed creature of 
disarmament and IHL,31 did not include any rules on cluster munitions, since the mindset of 
certain states favoured security and military over humanitarian considerations. This traditional 
security and military bias of the CCW accounts for the fact that for years not even consensus 
on a mandate to adopt specific regulations/prohibitions to comprehensively address the 
humanitarian problems associated with the use of cluster munitions could be found. As a 
result, the use of cluster munitions in armed conflicts continued to be governed by general 
rules of IHL only. 
Thus, reframing disarmament as a matter first and foremost for the protection of 
individuals in fact brings the wider concept of arms control back into line with one of the 
major motivations on which it was based in the UN Charter. In this respect, Art. 26 of the UN 
Charter expressly states that “the regulation of armaments”, i.e. arms control, shall occur for 
purposes of the maintenance of international peace and security with least diversion for 
armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.  
Respecting the letter and spirit of this provision means that disarmament must serve 
the purpose of fulfilment of HRL. This is because disarmament contributes to avoiding that 
human and economic resources will be spent on dealing with the consequences of the use of a 
weapon or on research, development and maintenance of a weapon. In turn, this means that 
human and financial resources will be freed to fulfill economic and social human rights in 
                                                 
31 See the Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 
1980, 1342 UNTS 137. On the one hand it reiterates general rules on IHL (paras. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8) such as the rule 
that the right to choose methods or means of warfare are not unlimited, the obligation to protect civilians against 
the effects of hostilities, or the prohibition of the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. On the other hand, it emphasises disarmament considerations (paras. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12) 
like the ending the arms race, pursuing every effort which may contribute to progress towards general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control or the desirability that all states become 
parties, especially the “militarily significant” ones, as well as mentions UN bodies tasked with disarmament.  
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particular, which is conducive to the programmatic demand of Art. 28 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that everyone is entitled to “a social and international legal 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.”32  
Regarding the specific example of cluster munitions, it may be argued that 
disarmament in respect of these weapons entails less probability and eventually excludes that 
these weapons will get used in the future. From this, it follows that in the future fewer and 
fewer resources should be needed for the expensive clearance of land contaminated with 
unexploded sub-munitions as well as treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care for victims 
of these weapons. As a result, the additional resources available could be used, for example, 
for investing in improving housing conditions, health care systems or education, which 
contributes to the fulfilment of human rights. 
 
 
2.2. What are Cluster munitions? Properties and Military Purpose   
 
“ ‛Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive 
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions”33 
 
 
This is the general definition to be found in the new Cluster Munition Convention 
adopted in Dublin on 30 May 2008. It encapsulates the specific properties of cluster 
munitions, a delivery system and multiple explosive sub-munitions contained therein. 
Delivery systems may consist in ground-based artillery, notably rockets/missiles and shells 
launched or fired from mortars or howitzers, in naval guns, in air-dropped bombs as well as in 
dispensers affixed to an aircraft. Once these free-falling (as opposed to precision-guided) 
rockets, shells or bombs have been launched, fired or dropped they release often hundreds of 
again free-falling explosive sub-munitions which are intended to detonate over a wide area 
prior to, on or after impact on the ground or a target. Dispensers differ from the other delivery 
systems in that they are affixed to an aircraft and release the explosive sub-munitions directly 
from there rather than being launched, fired or dropped and then opening up. The following 
graphic of an air-dropped cluster bomb demonstrates how a cluster munition works: 
 
                                                 
32 Art. 28, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN General Assembly Res 217 (III), 
Annex. 
33 Art. 2 (2), Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, Doc. CCM/77. This definition shall be subject to 
detailed comment at infra pp. 318-331. 
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© Norwegian People´s Aid, http://npaid.websys.no/1191753550/1191753649  
 
In general terms, cluster munitions were designed to be used to attack multiple targets, 
wide-area targets like airfields, industrial plants, ammunition storage houses as well as small 
or fast-moving targets like personnel, tanks or surface-to-air missile sites. Moreover, the 
original idea behind using cluster munitions was to compensate for aiming imprecisions with 
free-falling unitary munitions against single targets which could not be easily hit, since the hit 
probability is increased where a high number of free-falling explosive sub-munitions is 
delivered over a wide area.34 
Accordingly, the military value of cluster munitions is seen in the capability to deliver 
a higher number of explosives against the above-mentioned targets over a larger area within a 
shorter period of time than would be possible with conventional unitary munitions. This 
reduces exposure to enemy counter-attack as well as the number of firing platforms, 
ammunition and personnel required.35 
To fulfil these multiple purposes, a variety of explosive sub-munitions were produced 
with anti-personnel and anti-materiel capabilities. The most important feature of anti-
                                                 
34 E. Prokosch, The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel Weapons, 82 
(1995). 
35 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “A Guide to Cluster Munitions”, 2nd ed., June 2009, 
at 23, http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Guide-to-Cluster-Munitions-June2009.pdf (last visited 20 
January 2010). 
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personnel sub-munitions is fragmentation upon detonation; fragmentation is caused by the 
shattering of the metal casing of the sub-munition.36  
 
This is an example of an anti-personnel sub-munition, the air-dropped BLU-63. © DanChurchAid, Jawat Metni 
 
An anti-materiel sub-munition is characterised by a shaped charge designed to penetrate 
armour.37  
                                                 
36 O. Dullum, “Cluster weapons-military utility and alternatives”, Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt/Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment, Report 2007/02345, at 30 (2008). 
37 The charge incorporates an inverted conical liner, usually made of copper. Upon detonation the liner collapses 
into a thin metal jet which is projected forwards onto the target, giving it the capability to penetrate armour and 
other protected vehicles. See Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “Guide to Cluster Munitions”, supra 
note 35, at 10. 
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This picture shows the air-dropped M118 “Rockeye” sub-munition, an example of an anti-materiel sub-munition 
with an anti-personnel side effect, as the sub-munition casing shatters upon impact with a soft, i.e. personnel 
target. 
© UXOINFO.COM, http://www.uxoinfo.com/uxoinfo/FXTour.cfm?ID=4594&ImageUrl=phototour  
 
Increasingly, sub-munitions were produced to combine both anti-personnel and anti-
materiel effects which are known as “Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions” 
(DPICM). 
 
 
                 
 
This picture shows the rocket-launched M-77, a “Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition” (DPICM). 
© DanChurchAid, Jawad Metni 
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In order to render sub-munitions still more versatile against multiple targets, some 
sub-munitions also incorporate an incendiary element besides their anti-personnel and anti-
materiel capabilities. Where this is the case, such sub-munitions are called “Combined Effects 
Munitions” (CEM). 
 
 
Like this one, the air-dropped BLU-97. © John Rodsted, Landmine Action 
 
 
Newer generation DPICM cluster munitions also incorporate self-destruct 
mechanisms, e.g.  a back up fuse, which are designed to detonate the main charge of the sub-
munition if the sub-munition’s primary fuse fails to function upon impact. The stated purpose 
of these additional devices is to reduce the number of unexploded sub-munitions left after 
deployment. 
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This picture shows an Israeli-produced M85 sub-munition with such a self-destruct mechanism. © Simon 
Conway, Landmine Action 
 
The latest in munition technology are the so-called “Sensor Fused Weapons” (SFW). 
The technical advance of these munitions purportedly consists in the fact that the sub-
munitions include radar, infrared and/or wave sensors that may detect and engage individual 
targets, thereby approximating this to a precision-guided weapon. As soon as the ground-
based or airborne delivery system releases the sub-munitions, the fuses of the sub-munitions 
are armed and the detection sensors activated. The sensors react to certain characteristics of a 
target such as the heat that a tank emits. If the sensors detect a target that corresponds to the 
pre-programmed target characteristics, the fuse stays in the armed position and an explosively 
formed projectile is fired onto the target. In the case that the confidence level of the sensor is 
not such as to assure target detection, a self-destruct mechanism will be triggered, destroying 
the sub-munition at a given height.38 SFW typically also incorporate self-deactivation 
mechanisms; an electronic fuse, which requires an electrical power supply, allows a SFW to 
use a reserve battery which renders the munition inoperable if it fails to explode. This is 
designed to minimise the possibility of an unexploded sub-munition functioning through 
accidental or intentional handling.39  
SFW are particularly contentious weapons, for which up to now only limited 
information is available on their performance on the battlefield. Some would not even 
                                                 
38 Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “Guide to Cluster Munitions”, supra note 35, at 15. 
39 Ibid., at 17. 
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consider these munitions as cluster munitions, since it is pointed out that as opposed to the 
paradigmatic cluster munitions they are not dispersed in great numbers over a wide area but 
attack single targets; moreover, it is claimed that the sub-munitions are equipped with very 
advanced fail safe mechanisms that are likely to minimise the number of unexploded sub-
munitions left on the ground after their use.40 
 
 
This picture shows a sub-munition of this type, the German-produced SMArt 155 (Suchzündermunition für die 
Artillerie), © 2000, Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme 
 
 
 This short overview demonstrated that there are in fact many different types of cluster 
munitions, which has given rise to claims that certain types of cluster munitions pose more 
problems than others. Altogether, it is estimated that a total of 34 States have produced over 
210 different types of cluster munitions.41 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Dullum, “Cluster weapons”, supra note 36, at 12, note 1. Sensor fused weapons shall be subject to more 
detailed comment when the Oslo process leading to the adoption of a new convention on cluster munitions is 
analysed. See infra pp. 244-353. 
41 M. Hiznay, “Survey of Cluster Munitions Produced and Stockpiled”, ICRC Expert Meeting on Humanitarian, 
Military, Technical and Legal Challenges of Cluster Munitions, Montreux, 18-20 April 2007, at 23, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0915/$File/ICRC_002_0915.PDF!Open (last visited 20 
January 2010). 
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2.3. From Grimsby to Georgia: A History of Cluster Munition Use, 
Production and Proliferation 
 
 
“We cannot hope to match the communist enemy in manpower. If we wish to maintain our present 
standard of living, or anything approaching it, we cannot hope to match him in sheer weight of reserve 
materiel. We must, therefore, use our limited manpower far more effectively. And we must provide our 
soldiers with the finest weapons and equipment that the talent of our scientists and military experts and 
the ingenuity of our industrial community can produce.”42 
 
 
The first reported use of cluster munitions occurred during WWII, when the German 
Luftwaffe dropped around 1000 Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg (SD2) “butterfly bombs” on 
the East English port town of Grimsby in 1943. Packed into larger bombs containing between 
6 and 108 of these explosive sub-munitions each, they were named “butterfly bombs” because 
the cylindrical metal outer casings hinged open when the sub-munitions were activated and 
gave it the appearance of wings of a butterfly.43 An eyewitness reported  
 
“Some exploded on impact with the ground, some landed in the trees and were 
suspended by their ‛wings’ on the branches of trees, others caught on guttering, 
telephone wires, chimney stacks. It was dangerous to touch them. A young Naval 
Rating was seriously injured that night after kicking one of these bombs […]. The 
Salvation officer and I tried to help him but he died before the Ambulance arrived. The 
police and the army were put in charge of trying to make them safe. The public was 
asked to report any sighting but under no circumstance attempt to move them. Those 
on the ground had sand bags placed around them by the Home Guard, leaving a 
vantage opening for a expert rifleman to fire from a safe distance to explode it. There 
was complete terror among the population of the town for many months as these bombs 
turned up in the most unexpected places. Even to this day, it could be possible to come 
across one of the butterfly bombs.”44 
 
 
This account serves as first evidence of the post-conflict problem of unexploded sub- 
munitions that may detonate at a later stage when intentionally or accidentally handled. 
The next significant event in the history of the development of cluster munitions was 
the Korean War from 1950-1953. U.S. forces in command of the coalition authorised to use 
the UN flag, having pushed back North Korean forces and regained the 38th parallel in autumn 
1950, advanced deeply into North Korea towards the Chinese border despite Chinese 
warnings that China would intervene militarily for self-defence purposes. As these warnings 
                                                 
42 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report for 1 January-30 June 1953, at 124, quoted in Prokosch, The 
Technology of Killing, supra note 34, at 32. 
43 C. King, “The Evolution of Cluster Munitions”, ICRC Expert Meeting Montreux 2007, supra note 41, at 11; 
SD2 butterfly bombs were also used by the Germans on Soviet artillery positions in Kursk. See S. Conway, 
“Cluster Munitions: Historical Overview of Use and Human Impacts”, ibid., at 13. 
44 J. Dixon, “My Life in the Royal Navy during the Second World War”, 
http://www.carlsen.karoo.net/mainpage/4_draft.htm (last visited 20 January 2010). 
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went unheeded, the Chinese attacked UN troops on various flanks with an overwhelming 
number of personnel, causing major defeat and a hasty retreat by U.S.-led UN troops behind 
the 38th parallel.  
The lesson was that the United States needed to improve its weapons technology to 
challenge a communist enemy possessing far superior manpower. In light of the horror 
scenario to be overrun by scores of enemy soldiers conventional weapon research and 
development in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s focused on devising more effective 
means to deliver large quantities of metal fragments over a wide area within a short time.45 
 This realisation triggered the large-scale production of cluster munitions which came 
to be used massively in the armed conflicts in the “Indochinese laboratory” in the 1960s and 
1970s. The newly-developed air-dropped cluster munitions encompassed a larger number of 
smaller explosive sub-munitions which could cover a wider area and were equipped with steel 
balls on the outside of the casing to ensure enhanced fragmentation upon detonation. Different 
types of sub-munitions could be used with different types of containers. For example, the 
CBU-24 cluster bombs, each containing almost 700 BLU-26 sub-munitions which results in 
some 200,000 steel fragments killing persons in all directions over a wide area, falls in this 
category; reportedly, a total of 285 Mio. BLU-26 sub-munitions were used in Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s.46 Other explosive sub-munitions had a primary anti-
materiel capability, such as the above-mentioned “Rockeye” with an anti-personnel “fringe 
effect”.47 In addition, CEMs were used, combining anti-personnel, anti-materiel and 
incendiary effects. Finally, also artillery-delivered DPICMs were deployed from 1968 
onwards.48  
The stated targets against which cluster munitions were allegedly used by U.S. forces 
in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia included antiaircraft installations, trucks, surface-to-surface 
missiles, communication centres, radar installations, supply routes, large numbers of 
unprotected enemy personnel and light armoured vehicles.49 From this range of targets, two 
primary military tactical roles of cluster munitions may be discerned: The first is to inflict 
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damage and injury on area targets, i.e. large numbers of personnel, vehicles or military 
infrastructure. The second is to suppress enemy forces, i.e. ensuring that enemy fighters stay 
in their protected positions, put their vehicles under cover and refrain from using their 
weapons; thus, this would give the user of cluster munitions the opportunity to advance and 
use their weapons in turn.50  
Significantly, there was no debate at technical or political levels in the United States 
on possible indiscriminate effects of cluster munitions. Silence on the effects of cluster 
munition use was even deliberate to preclude a major public outcry like in the case of napalm 
use. This was despite some evidence through visits of foreign journalists to North Vietnam 
who saw first hand that cluster munitions caused civilian casualties at the time of use, since 
military targets in and around residential areas were attacked.51 However, this evidence was 
either downplayed by U.S. officials or outright rejected as North Vietnamese war 
propaganda.52 Consequently, U.S. military circles gained the upper hand and could use these 
weapons with little restraint.  
Also, it seems that the other major humanitarian problem of unexploded sub-munitions 
with the potential to cause civilian casualties long after a conflict was insufficiently 
appreciated and documented by the opponents of this weapon. This is evidenced by a proposal 
presented by certain states on the initiative of Sweden to prohibit the use of anti-personnel 
cluster munitions at the 1974 and 1976 Conferences of Government Experts on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons in Lucerne and Lugano. The ground invoked for the 
prohibition was mainly that of indiscriminately hitting combatants and civilians at the time of 
attack through the wide area effect of these munitions.53 However, this initiative was not 
supported by major military powers like the United States, its NATO allies or the Soviet 
Union. As a result, no specific regulation or prohibition on cluster munitions was adopted.54 
Thus, cluster munitions could become an established weapon system in U.S. arsenals, 
and nothing stood in the way of major proliferation to other countries. Two direct results of 
this proliferation were cluster munition use by Israel, first in 1973 against Syria and in 1978 
and 1982 against Lebanon, as well as by Morocco in the Western Sahara in the 1970s. 
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Interestingly, cluster munition transfers to Israel were subject to classified agreements 
between the United States and Israel. Their exact contents are thus not precisely known but it 
appears that the restriction was imposed on Israel only to use these weapons when attacked by 
two or more states, as in 1967 and 1973.55 This seems to rule out cluster munition use in 
armed conflict when the Israeli Defence Forces are only confronting one other party that 
operates in or around civilian residential areas as in the case of confrontations with the PLO in 
1978 and with Syria in 1982. This reflects an acknowledgement on the part of the United 
States that such use could result in civilian casualties. In the aftermath of Israel’s 1982 
incursion into Lebanon, the U.S. administration found a violation of these specific conditions 
placed on cluster munition transfers to Israel. As a consequence, it enforced a unilateral 
prohibition on further exports to Israel which was only lifted in 1988.56 
The other “superpower” during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, had also been busy 
from the beginning of the 1950s to develop its own types of cluster munitions. The Soviets 
preferred delivery systems containing heavier air-delivered cluster munitions with a greater 
capability to penetrate armour but also produced other types with anti-personnel 
capabilities.57 During their intervention in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, Soviet forces 
used cluster munitions on a massive scale, killing and injuring civilians, creating large 
numbers of refugees and destroying crops and livestock. Also large numbers of unexploded 
sub-munitions were left behind. While Indochina was the testing ground for new American 
cluster munition types, Afghanistan was the testing ground for new Soviet cluster 
munitions.58 
Also a close ally of the United States, the United Kingdom, from the 1970s produced 
its own cluster munitions, especially the type BL755. At one of the above-mentioned 
government expert conferences in Lucerne in 1974, a UK government expert stated that this 
air-dropped cluster munition, containing 147 DPICM explosive sub-munitions, was designed 
to replace high-explosive bombs on such targets as armoured and soft-skinned vehicles, 
parked aircraft, anti-aircraft batteries, radar installations, small ships and headquarters or 
maintenance areas as well as the personnel manning them. He assured the other delegates at 
the conference that the area coverage of the sub-munitions would be less than 1 hectare, i.e. 
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less than 100 x 100 metres on the ground and that the fusing of the sub-munitions was such 
that detonation on impact was guaranteed regardless of the angle at which the sub-munitions 
struck the ground.59  
Both claims were proven wrong subsequently. Firstly, it was admitted that the real 
area coverage was rather 1000 x 1000 metres, or hundred times the area claimed by the UK 
expert in 1974.60 Secondly, recent information by the UK government suggests that a certain 
number of unexploded sub-munitions will occur, as the test failure rate of the BL755 
amounted to 6%.61 Even this last figure appears to be conservative in light of other 
information on the UK’s first use of the BL755 in the 1982/83 Falklands/Malvinas armed 
conflict against Argentina where it was suggested that the failure rate under combat 
conditions was as high as 9,6 %. Moreover, it was reported that the only civilian casualties of 
that conflict were caused by the use of these weapons.62 
By the 1980s cluster munition technology formed an important component of the 
arsenals of both sides of the ideological spectrum in the Cold War, especially for NATO 
powers which feared to be overrun by large scale infantry and tank formations of Warsaw 
Pact states.63 As we can see, the basic rationale for development and production of cluster 
munitions had not changed since the U.S. trauma after the Korean War. 
The end of the Cold War did not mark the end of production and use of cluster 
munitions, as may be assumed given that one root cause of the basic fear of being subjected to 
a large conventional attack had been eliminated. On the contrary, the 1991 Gulf War marked 
the most extensive deployment of both air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions by the 
United States and their allies in Iraq since the interventions by the United States in Indochina 
and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. A total of 62,000 air-delivered Vietnam era and 
newer cluster munitions along with 100,000 DPICM artillery shells and 10,000 M-26 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets, where a twelve-tube launcher fires one 
rocket from each tube and one rocket contains 644 M77 sub-munitions,64 were used. It was 
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estimated that an overall number of 24-30 Mio. explosive sub-munitions were used.65 The 
targets on which these weapon systems were deployed included fixed targets like radar 
installations, surface-to-air missile bases, communications installations, widely dispersed 
tanks, armoured personnel carriers, Scud missile launch areas, artillery guns, as well as the 
Iraqi transportation system.66 One expert on cluster munitions, has contended that cluster 
munition use in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm was probably the best example of an 
effective use of these weapons, since cluster munition air-strikes had a demoralising effect on 
Iraqis and the ground war lasted only four days which was largely attributed to the effect of 
cluster munitions.67  
However, an official survey by the U.S. Air Force weakens that claim by conceding 
that air-delivered cluster munitions were less effective because many of the older models 
performed poorly in terms of accuracy and reliability due to bombing from higher altitudes 
than these weapons were designed for; greater patterns of dispersion and excessive numbers 
of unexploded sub-munitions resulted.68 The propensity of cluster munitions to leave behind a 
large number of duds also prompted U.S. commanders to restrict cluster munition air strikes 
during the ground war and in some instances ground advances by coalition forces were 
stopped for fear of “friendly casualties”.69 This legacy of duds also posed a major problem for 
the Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilian population at the post-conflict stage where accidents involving 
unexploded sub-munitions reportedly claimed more than 1,600 dead and 2,500 injured in the 
first two years after the end of the conflict alone.70 Assuming a conservative overall dud rate 
of 5%, unexploded sub-munitions left from this multinational enforcement operation could be 
estimated between 1.2 and 1.5 Mio. 
The end of the Cold War also did not mean that there was no prospect of cluster 
munition use in Europe. In the various armed conflicts between 1991-1999 cluster munition 
use in disintegrating Yugoslavia became a reality; from 1992-1995 the Bosnian and the 
Croatian Serbs used Orkan MLRS rockets, produced near Sarajevo and similar to the M-26 
MLRS rockets used in Iraq where each of the twelve rockets of the launcher contains 288 KB-
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1 sub-munitions.71 The most atrocious single cluster shelling occurred on 2 and 3 May 1995 
when the Krajina Serb armed group fired eight to twelve Orkan rockets on Zagreb, resulting 
in 7 dead and over 200 injured. Milan Martić, the leader of the self-proclaimed Republika 
Srpska Krajina, was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) because of these civilian casualties of 
the Zagreb bombing.72  
Finally, from 24 March to 10 June 1999, NATO member states conducted air strikes 
against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in what was termed a “humanitarian 
intervention” aimed at stopping massive human rights violations committed by the Milosević 
regime against the Kosovo-Albanians. While the overall rationale of the intervention may 
have been morally justified, some of the means employed included the use by U.S., UK and 
Dutch forces of around 1,400 CBU87, RBL755 and Rockeye cluster munitions in Kosovo 
alone, containing approximately 300,000 explosive sub-munitions.73 196 casualties, 25 during 
and 171 after Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, 8 casualties in Montenegro, 94 casualties in 
Serbia and 56 casualties in Albania as a consequence of the use of cluster munitions by 
NATO member states were confirmed. However, the real casualty figure may be much 
higher, with 300 possible victims solely at the time of use in Kosovo and well over 100 
additional casualties in Serbia.74 
Cluster munitions also became the weapon of choice of major military powers fighting 
against opponents which are perceived as terrorist threat. While the 1991 Gulf War could be 
still termed as a major symmetrical confrontation, many, if not most contemporary conflicts 
are characterised by their asymmetry between major military powers and weaker adversaries 
in terms of manpower and technology; while the adversary cannot hope for outright military 
victory, its goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible and erode the major power’s will to 
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fight.75 To be sure, most conflicts from time immemorial have exhibited some degree of 
asymmetry but the ever widening technology gap in terms of weaponry and the increasing 
involvement of non-state actors are all reasons why contemporary armed conflicts are 
predominantly of an asymmetrical nature.76 In such types of conflicts, the fundamental 
international humanitarian law (IHL) rule of distinction77 tends to be seriously challenged by 
both sides: On the one hand, the weaker party often attacks civilians or civilian objects 
directly or may place military equipment close to or in the midst of civilian residential areas 
or specifically protected locations; on the other, the technologically superior military power, 
confronted with such practices by its opponent, may feel compelled to itself lower the 
standards for fundamental IHL rules by accepting higher civilian casualties as a result of 
indiscriminate use of its superior weaponry.78  
Cluster munition use by Russian forces in the armed conflicts in Chechnya in 1994-96 
and 1999 perfectly fit these descriptions regarding the conduct of hostilities in asymmetric 
conflicts, since the Chechens lured Russian armed forces into attacking urban environments 
and the Russian armed forces responded, inter alia, by using these weapons where civilian 
casualties would be almost a guarantee.79 
The trend towards resorting to the use of cluster munitions against an adversary which 
wages its own operations from the midst of civilian areas has even exacerbated in the 
aftermath of the “9/11” terrorist attacks.  
The military intervention by the United States in Afghanistan starting on 7 October 
2001 saw extensive use of BLU-97 cluster sub-munitions (approximately 300.000) against 
Taliban military bases, frontlines, and positions in or near civilian residential areas, resulting 
once more in a large number of civilian casualties both at the time of use and the 
contamination of agricultural, grazing land, roads and irrigation at the post-conflict stage.80 
During the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States and the United Kingdom 
used more air-dropped cluster munitions from 20 March to 9 April than they did in 
                                                 
75 R. M. Cassidy, “Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of 
Asymmetric Conflict”, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003, at 13, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB125.pdf (last visited 20 January 2010). 
76 R. Geiß, “Asymmetric conflict structures”, 864 International Review of the Red Cross 757, 758 (2006). 
77 The fundamental IHL rule of distinction shall be subject to comment in Chapter 3.2. at infra pp. 55-64. 
78 Geiß, “Asymmetric conflict structures”, supra note 76, at 764-766; T. Pfanner, “Asymmetrical warfare from 
the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action”, 857 International Review of the Red Cross, 149, 
161-163 (2005). 
79 On incidents of cluster munition use during the Chechen armed conflicts, see Wiebe, “Footprints of Death”, 
supra note 60, at 142-150; Handicap International, “Circle of Impact”, supra note 71, at 84-87. 
80 Human Rights Watch, “Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the United States in Afghanistan”, 
December 2002, at 15-31, http://hrw.org/reports/2002/us-afghanistan/Afghan1202.pdf (last visited 20 January 
2010). 
 37
Afghanistan in six months, notably 1206 containing more than 200,000 explosive sub-
munitions. Coalition use of ground-launched cluster munitions even exceeded the number of 
air-dropped types with 10,782 containing approximately 2 Mio. sub-munitions. While Iraqi 
forces engaged in a host of practices in breach of IHL, i.e. the use of human shields, the abuse 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems and the location of military objectives in civilian 
residential areas, especially Coalition ground forces deployed cluster munitions extensively in 
or near populated areas, causing hundreds of civilian casualties in Iraqi major cities, including 
al-Hilla, al-Najaf, Karbala’, Baghdad and Basra.81  
In this conflict, certain technologically-improved cluster munitions were used on the 
battlefield for the first time: This included British use of the Israeli-produced L20A1 artillery 
projectile containing 49 M85 sub-munitions equipped with a self-destruct mechanism, i.e. a 
second fuse which is designed to explode the sub-munition within 15 seconds if the sub-
munition fails to explode upon impact.82 The British Ministry of Defence stated that 
commanders were operating on the assumption that the failure rate of these sub-munitions 
was below 1%.83 Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch found extensive evidence of duds 
stemming from this sub-munition in multiple areas of Basra.84 This was a first indication that 
technological fixes like self-destruct mechanisms did not function as reliably under battlefield 
conditions as producers and user states claim. 
The United States also used so-called “Sensor Fused Munitions”, the ground-delivered 
Sense and Destroy Armour Munition (SADARM), which contains two explosive sub-
munitions per delivery system; each sub-munition is equipped with a millimetre wave sensor 
and an infrared sensor. In addition, for the first time in combat, the United States used the air-
dropped CBU-97/B/105 which contains ten BLU-108 sub-munitions that include four hockey 
puck-sized “skeets”. Each of these “skeets” in turn is equipped with an array of sensors. On 
the performance of the SADARM, the U.S. Infantry reported that it had “exceeded 
expectations and became the preferred precision munitions for field artillery (FA) battalions 
and their supported maneuver commanders. Out of 121 SADARM rounds fired, 48 pieces of 
enemy equipment were destroyed.”85 With regard to the CBU-97/B/105, Human Rights 
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Watch could not find any unexploded sub-munitions when conducting an on-site visit where 
this weapon had been used.86 However, another expert reported that a humanitarian demining 
organisation had found unexploded BLU-108 sub-munitions in the area of Mosul in northern 
Iraq while acknowledging that there was no evidence of civilian casualties caused by these 
duds.87 Thus, interestingly, there is evidence that even of this allegedly sophisticated weapon, 
a number of BLU-108 sub-munitions failed. 
From this description of the first use of two types of sensor-fused weapons, the 
SADARM and the CBU-105, one may deduce that the category of sensor-fused weapons in 
itself is not homogeneous. While the latter contains an overall number of 40 bomblets, the 
former only encompasses two. Not only has the United States produced sensor-fused 
munitions. Munitions of this variety also include the German SMArt 155 (Suchzünder 
Munition für die Artillerie, English: Sensor-Fused Munition for the Artillery) with two to four 
explosive sub-munitions where each sub-munition contains one active and one passive 
millimetre wave and one infrared sensor to detect and engage single targets as well as 
electronic fail-safe mechanisms;88 or the French/Swedish BONUS 155mm artillery shells 
with two explosive sub-munitions where each sub-munition is similarly equipped with three 
infrared sensors and a laser radar to detect and engage single targets as well as with electronic 
fail-safe mechanisms.89 However, neither the SMArt 155, nor the BONUS artillery shells 
have been used in combat as of yet. 
A paradigmatic manifestation of an asymmetric armed conflict where cluster 
munitions have been used was that between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
between 12 July and 14 August 2006 in Lebanon. While it is clear that Hezbollah at least in 
some instances launched rockets from the midst of or close to civilian areas against targets in 
northern Israel,90 the IDF used approximately 4 Mio. ground-delivered and air-dropped 
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cluster sub-munitions in response.91 The majority of cluster munitions used were 1,2 Mio. 
M77 sub-munition grenades delivered by the M26 MLRS rocket system of which most were 
fired by the IDF in the final days of the conflict when a ceasefire was already imminent.92  
Israel also fired sub-munitions delivered by 155mm U.S. produced artillery projectiles, 
each carrying 88 M42 and M46 DPICM.93  
Two models of the Israeli-produced M85, equally delivered by 155mm artillery 
projectiles, one with and one without self-destruct mechanism, were also used, accounting for 
6% of all sub-munitions used; with regard to the M85 type with self-destruct mechanism, 
contrary to above-mentioned claims by manufacturers and users that the failure rate was less 
than 1%, duds from such sub-munitions were encountered in higher numbers than expected. 
As a result, post-conflict clearance efforts by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination 
Centre for Southern Lebanon (UNMACC-SL) revealed that the actual failure rate under 
combat conditions was at least 5%, if not 10%.94 Also, other experts independently found the 
actual failure rate at around 10%.95 The experience gained from Iraq and Lebanon provides 
robust evidence that the quantity of duds of allegedly very reliable cluster sub-munitions with 
self-destruct mechanisms will be significantly higher under real combat conditions than 
failure rates arrived at under ideal test conditions. 
The IDF also dropped a significant number of old Vietnam-era CBU58 bomb 
containers, each containing 650 BLU63 sub-munitions where individual container shells have 
been found indicating that the warranty of these explosives had already expired in the 
1970s.96 
On the other hand, also Hezbollah launched 118 Type-81 Chinese-produced cluster 
rockets, each containing 39 explosive sub-munitions, which amounts to 4563 explosive sub-
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munitions in total.97 While this showed the negative potential consequences of the 
proliferation of these weapons to irresponsible non-state actors the scale of use pales in 
comparison with the massive number of Israeli use of these weapons. 
As a consequence of IDF use of cluster munitions, it was estimated that up to 1 Mio. 
sub-munitions did not explode on impact, littering Lebanon with sub-munition duds that 
might explode upon the slightest movement of any person, entailing the risk of losses of lives 
and limbs until the present day.98 The contamination of agricultural land by unexploded sub-
munitions and the resulting inaccessibility of these areas have also led to severe economic 
losses where a large number of people depend on agriculture for a living.99 Unexploded sub-
munitions also blocked water supplies, access to houses and schools as well as inhibited 
rehabilitation and relief efforts.100 
The massive use of these weapons in Lebanon and the horrific consequences this 
entailed for civilian lives, limbs and lands were a triggering moment for a renewed 
consciousness of the humanitarian harm cluster munition use causes.  
Finally, during the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia over the secessionist 
region of South Ossetia in August 2008, Russia used cluster munitions of its own production, 
air-dropped RBK series bombs, containing either 60 or 108 AO-2.5. RTM antipersonnel and 
anti-materiel sub-munitions each, ground-launched Uragan rockets, each containing 30 sub-
munitions with self-destruct mechanisms, as well as at least one ground-fired Iskander 
missile, carrying 20 sub-munitions each. On the other hand, also Georgia used the Gradlar 
Multiple Launch Rocket System where each MK.-4 160 mm rocket contains 104 M-85 sub-
munitions each. Altogether, it was confirmed that Russian cluster munitions killed 12 
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civilians and injured 46, and Georgian cluster munitions killed four civilians and injured eight 
more.101  
Despite successful efforts to address the humanitarian concerns, this last case showed 
the urgency of protecting civilians from the consequences of already completed cluster 
munition use as well as future use. While already touched upon, the manifold humanitarian 
impact and challenges of cluster munition use shall be detailed in the next subsection. 
 
 
2.4.  Humanitarian Concerns 
   
“I was on my way to work that day – all medical workers were on duty every day, working extra hours. I was 
standing right across the street from the health centre, waiting to cross when the bombs fell. At first, there was 
this noise, something I’ve never heard before. And then it hit me in the leg. And then the other leg, too. I felt 
severe pain in my right leg, but I didn’t look at it. I was still standing, didn’t know what to do. There were 
detonations everywhere, cars were getting hit. I managed to cross to the other side of the street and to lie down 
behind a car. A car nearby was burning. I was in a state of shock, but I was also aware of everything that was 
happening. A woman fell down a couple of metres away from me, hit in the stomach by several fragments. My 
colleagues started coming out of the building, they were running around, looking for the injured. I was yelling, 
calling them, but they couldn’t see me. I started hitting the car in front of me with both of my hands. I tried to 
stand up; I was wearing trousers, I tried to pull them up a bit, to ease my way up. It was then that I saw it for 
the first time. I remember thinking clearly: so strange, a bare bone, no muscle tissue at all. It was my right leg. 
The other one didn’t react at all. There were many small bomb fragments in it. A green van stopped by. They 
told me later that it was a volunteer who collected the dead and the injured in the streets during the attacks. He 
tied up my leg and carried me into the van. He took me to the hospital, to the department of surgery. Then the 
burning sensation came, it was not just the leg, my whole body was burning. It was unbearable. I was hitting 
the doctor, asking him to spare me the pain, to kill me. ‘Throw me out the window!’ I remember repeating that 
many, many times. They sedated me. When I woke up the next day, my right leg was amputated. They saved the 
left leg. They had to patch it up; some of the fragments couldn’t be taken out.’ Gita shows her amputation 
without hesitation. I would show it to everyone, as many times as necessary, if only that could be a guarantee 
that something like this would never happen to anyone again.” 102 
 
I have had more than 10 operations on my left leg. It was amputated below the knee. I wear a prosthesis. Look 
at it. It hurts. Now the shrapnel has been removed, but I have wounds in my right leg also. It hurts too. The last 
surgery was two months ago and lasted two hours. I don’t know which type of weapon injured me, but I know 
that it was a weapon that comes from the sky. During the war we run away from our village. We came back 
once the war was over. When we got back I was with three other girls from my family in front of the house 
when the thing exploded. I found the thing, and I started playing with it. I didn’t know exactly what it was. I 
dropped it and it exploded. I got injured, but the other three girls weren’t touched by the explosion. I don’t 
remember what happened next. They put me in a car and drove me to the hospital. I was unconscious for 20 
days. I woke up and then fainted again and again. I was in the hospital in Sur, not in Beirut, and my parents 
were with me. When I was injured I could feel from the beginning that I didn’t have the leg anymore. I knew 
that. At the hospital I was very unhappy because I lost my leg, but apart from that everything else was ok. […] 
Cluster munitions were all around my house. I saw lots of bomblets, it was like they were all around, but now 
they have been cleared. Some people had explained to me that I shouldn’t touch anything. This was before the 
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incident. On the day of the incident I thought it was a toy, it looked like a ball. Incidents are normal; I know 
lots of kids in my situation.103 
 
 
These are just two accounts that attest to the consistent pattern of civilian injury during as 
well as after cluster munition attacks in over 40 years of use of these weapons. 
The first story is an example of civilian harm incurred by cluster munitions during 
attacks. Since the overwhelming majority of explosive sub-munitions is free-falling once 
they have been dispersed, i.e. cannot be guided towards a single target, there is a high 
probability that they will stray from the intended target and hit civilians or civilian objects. 
Apart from their unguided character and resulting inaccuracy, the wide dispersal pattern 
(footprint) of the sub-munitions delivered in the hundreds, sometimes even thousands, serves 
as an additional aggravating factor. That means that not only one or a few explosives may hit 
far from the intended target but literally hundreds or even thousands, which holds true even 
if some of the explosive sub-munitions land impact where intended. 
As has been explained above, military forces regard cluster munitions as effective 
against area targets like airfields, radar installations or surface-to-air missile sites, or against 
moving targets whose precise location cannot be easily known because of their wide 
dispersal pattern. While in open, uninhabited areas civilian casualties at the time of cluster 
munition attacks are not likely, this military rationale is in tension with the humanitarian 
concern of inflicting substantial civilian harm where cluster munitions are used in or near 
civilian residential areas. Unfortunately, from Grimsby during WWII to Georgia in 2008 
cluster munitions were used in or near populated areas. 
The second account details the other major humanitarian concern associated with 
cluster munitions at the post-conflict stage: Since many sub-munitions do not explode upon 
impact they lie in wait as de facto anti-personnel landmines and may detonate upon the 
slightest movement by any person, killing and maiming long after an attack. The reasons 
why sub-munitions become duds are manifold and include design failures, environmental 
conditions and human error. Design failures means that certain mechanical components of 
the cluster munition fail to function as intended despite routine deployment. Examples 
include mid-air collision of sub-munitions, resulting in detonations and damage to other sub-
munitions during flight, a failure of the ribbon responsible for starting the process of 
activation of the sub-munition or a faulty detonator that may have failed to initiate the main 
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explosive charge.104 Environmental factors comprise conditions of storage as well as soil and 
vegetation conditions. Poor ammunition storage practices such as exposing sub-munitions to 
extremely high temperatures, humidity or stockpiling very old types may lead to corrosion or 
degradation of the fuses.105 With regard to soil and vegetation upon impact, many fuses 
found in cluster sub-munitions are mechanical impact fuses that require a certain amount of 
impact force to activate the detonator. This amount of force may not be achieved where the 
sub-munition does not land on a hard surface but on muddy, sandy or snowy ground, 
increasing the probability of duds left behind.106 Moreover, the ribbon which sets in motion 
the detonation process of the sub-munitions may become entangled in trees and bushes, 
which may also preclude the impact needed to set off the main charge inside the sub-
munition.107 Finally, as with any weapon, even the most perfect design cannot compensate 
for human error during use, such as miscalculations of the required range and/or elevation 
for the sub-munition to arm correctly or the failure to set the projectile fuse correctly. 
Combat conditions, which often involve time pressure, tiredness, high levels of stress and 
difficult weather, still increase the potential for human error. 108 
Typically, since the metal casing of sub-munitions shatters into large numbers of 
fragments upon explosion, irrespective of whether the sub-munition detonates as intended 
during or in a dud state after an armed conflict, shrapnel may kill or severely injure a victim; 
when a fragment enters the human body, it will transfer energy to the tissue at a very high 
rate, causing the formation of large cavities which in turn will induce tissue strain and 
rupture of muscles, nerves and blood vessels.109 The probability of fatality is proportional to 
the ratio between deployed energy and body mass; since children have less body mass than 
adults, the overall damage caused by a fragment is much larger and consequently, children 
are at greater risk of succumbing to their wounds once hit.110 Among the most vulnerable 
body parts are the abdomen and the limbs which explains why many cluster munition 
victims111 undergo multiple surgery of their limbs, often rendering amputations necessary.112 
Eye injuries or deafness are also common.113 
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Children are not only the most vulnerable group to suffer death and severe injury once 
hit but especially at the post-conflict stage are among the groups most at risk to fall victim to 
exploding sub-munition duds. The main reason is that children, who are mostly less aware of 
the risks of unexploded sub-munitions than adults, feel particularly attracted to the shapes 
and colours of the sub-munitions encountered and often start playing and tampering with the 
duds until they detonate.114  
Men carrying out livelihood activities such as farming, herding animals, collecting 
wood or hunting are also amongst the most severely affected by sub-munition duds.115 For 
example, in Lebanon after the conflict in 2006, farmers went into their fields despite 
awareness of the dangers of unexploded sub-munitions out of economic necessity to save 
some of their tobacco, olive and citrus fruit harvests.116 Since the armed conflict in Lebanon 
in the summer of 2006 occurred during the peak season of the harvest, already a significant 
proportion of that harvest was lost. South Lebanon was especially hard hit by the 
contamination of agricultural fields, as agriculture makes up 70% of this area’s economy, 
with 90% of the local population dependent on it.117 An aggravating factor was that many 
farmers usually repay their debts during the harvest season between May and October to 
secure credit for the next season; as a result, due to the loss of income from the 2006 
harvests, many farmers have become more heavily indebted.118 Moreover, due to limited 
resources, professional clearance personnel in the immediate aftermath of the conflict 
focused their efforts on more heavily populated areas such as urban centres and roads rather 
than agricultural fields.119 As UNDP observed “People are forced to balance their need for 
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land with the threat of being killed or injured”.120 Where, for instance, a whole family 
depends on farming a field, a farmer may be willing to undertake considerable risks. Under 
such circumstances, it also does not come as a surprise that many farmers attempted to 
defuse sub-munition duds themselves, including by burning, throwing them at hard surfaces 
or dumping them in unused areas like ditches and ponds.121 
Another group especially endangered by unexploded sub-munitions in the immediate 
post-conflict period before large scale clearance has begun is that of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and refugees returning to their homes, since in many instances these people 
are unaware of and unprepared for the risk awaiting them.122 
The experience of clearance efforts of unexploded sub-munitions in Lebanon 
demonstrates that casualties caused by duds are not confined to civilians alone – although 
according to Handicap International 98% of the victims are civilians – but that also 
professional clearance experts are among them.123 As a former clearance expert of the 
Serbian army, who was severely injured by an unexploded BLU-97 sub-munition in Serbia 
in 2000, reminded us  
 
“In the course of just one year after the war in Lebanon had ended, 45 of my fellow de-miners, 45 
people who were trained to work with cluster munitions, became the victims of cluster munitions while 
clearing unexploded sub-munitions. This tells us that cluster munitions do not discriminate among their 
victims, and that there are no cluster bombs that can guarantee anyone’s safety; if professionals are 
getting injured, what can we expect will happen to civilians and innocent children?”124  
 
Once a cluster munition victim loses one or several limbs, the first step is to ensure 
emergency and medical care including pre-hospital care, i.e. evacuation, first aid and 
transport to a medical facility, as well as hospital care where the victim will undergo surgery 
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and recovery from treatment.125 But assistance to victims requires much more than just 
emergency and medical care. As an Iraqi cluster munition victim cautioned:  
 
“After the operation, I did not receive physical rehabilitation or any other assistance, and this is the case 
for the majority of survivors. However, it is important to start physical rehabilitation as soon after the 
operation as possible and to continue it later on to regain maximum capability of the injured limbs and 
to learn to use your changed body.”126  
 
Such physical rehabilitation includes physiotherapy and the fitting of orthopaedic 
appliances such as prostheses, orthoses, crutches, and wheelchairs in order for the victim to 
recover his/her mobility.127 This is not a one-off task, since such devices subsequently need 
to be replaced or readjusted on an ongoing basis.128 
Beyond the physical hardship that cluster munition victims face, they frequently also 
experience psychological trauma, as the following statement by a 16-year-old Afghan cluster 
munition victim illustrates:  
 
“I face all sorts of barriers, material and immaterial, that prevent my full participation in community 
life. Cluster munitions prevented me from attending school, playing with other kids, and other social 
activities. Cluster munitions destroyed my dreams. People laugh at me and have a negative attitude 
towards me. They see me as a beggar. They pity me.”129  
 
Indeed, it is a common phenomenon that victims suffer a loss of dignity and self-
esteem which is often exacerbated by a sense of being rejected by their communities due to 
their disability. In many cases, they may also not be able to resume their former work or 
attend school which contributes to their psychological problems. Hence, for many of them it 
is their greatest desire to become fully productive members of society again.130 Thus, 
medical care and physical rehabilitation must be accompanied by psychological and social 
support and by measures promoting socio-economic inclusion of victims such as vocational 
training and the creation of employment opportunities. 
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However, for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon and Vietnam, the most 
heavily affected countries in terms of casualties, national capacities are inadequate to ensure 
such comprehensive assistance to cluster munition victims. Many of these victims live in 
poor and remote rural areas where access to health care and rehabilitation services, 
sometimes even basic care is limited, such as in Afghanistan, Laos and Vietnam.131 This 
problem is aggravated where the environment in which medical and rehabilitation services 
must be delivered remains insecure.132 The health care system may be weak and may have 
even suffered more due to armed conflict, with a lack of equipment or trained staff such as in 
Iraq where insufficient resources are devoted to psychosocial support and socio-economic 
inclusion services.133 Where the governmental capacities are non-existent or stretched to 
their limits, such as in post-conflict South Lebanon, often NGO operators step in but also 
they cannot cover certain costs, including transport to and accommodation at health facilities 
which the direct victims and/or their family then have to pay out of their own pockets.134  
These costs may place a significant financial burden on the victims and their families. 
In addition, where males are the “breadwinners” their death or injury represents a great 
economic loss for their families.135 Thus, not only the person that is killed or injured by 
cluster munitions may be regarded as victim but also their families. As the Serbian wife of a 
man severely injured by cluster munitions and the mother of two underage children, 
explained,  
“I don’t know what was more difficult: To watch my husband’s torments, caused by these grave 
injuries, or my children growing up before their time. He was in the hospital when the children started a 
new school year. In addition to all the suffering and the pain, there were also financial troubles and 
uncertainty. Every visit to the hospital was painful, for me, for the children, and for their father. Instead 
of playing with other children, they were travelling all the time with me to the hospital to visit their 
father. […] They experienced prejudice and intolerance at school for years because of their father’s 
disability. I often ask myself the question, and now I am asking you, too: Who is the cluster bomb 
victim? Is it just the one innocent person, the victim him- or herself, who is certainly suffering the 
most, or are we, the ones close to that person, also suffering too? The actual number of cluster 
munitions victims is much larger than what statistics show. Whole families, whole communities are 
affected by them.”136 
 
As regards communities, it has already been shown above that cluster sub-munition 
contamination poses a considerable obstacle to access to agricultural and pasture lands, 
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especially by the poor rural population. In many affected countries where the population 
mainly depends on agriculture137 and tending animals, loss of arable and grazing land still 
aggravates pre-existing poverty, entailing income losses and inhibiting longer-term 
development.138 A particularly worrying development in many contaminated countries has 
been the upsurge of the so called “scrap metal trade” where individuals collect war waste in 
an attempt to compensate for their income losses due to lack of access to agricultural and 
grazing lands, creating one more incentive to deliberately handle sub-munition duds.139 
Under such circumstances, clearance becomes a top priority to increase the amount of 
arable land, food production and thus, development once the focus of clearance efforts can 
be shifted from the most densely populated contaminated areas.140 Generally, coordinated 
clearance efforts are essential to reduce the threat of unexploded sub-munitions for civilians. 
In order to be effective, planning for clearance should usually already begin during conflict, 
i.e. before clearance teams can even deploy to the affected areas.141 Once armed hostilities 
have ended, the emergency clearance phase begins where the objective is to remove the most 
immediate hazards for the local population, the visible sub-munition duds. This includes 
clearance of essential infrastructure like routes for refugee/IDP return and for aid delivery. 
The better the location and impact of the hazard is identified at this stage, the more effective 
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the immediate clearance efforts will be.142 For such a general threat assessments and 
technical surveys gathering information on the location of the munitions, the number, the 
type and technical specifications, the date of use, target location and description, the result of 
the strike (hits/misses), weather conditions, especially wind conditions at the time of use, as 
well as width and length of the impact area can greatly facilitate clearance of unexploded 
sub-munitions.143  
Obtaining this information may be particularly challenging where the user causing the 
sub-munition contamination is not the same as the state that exercises control over the 
affected territory at the post-conflict stage, as evidenced by the experiences from Kosovo, 
Serbia and Lebanon. While in Kosovo, NATO promptly handed over records with 
coordinates of proposed cluster munition bombing targets and the types used after the end of 
hostilities, this information was too inaccurate for effectively locating duds on the ground.144 
In contrast to Kosovo, NATO until recently did not provide any coordinates of the 1999 
strike records to Serbian authorities concerning Serbia. Only at the end of September 2007, 
more than eight years after cluster bomb use, NATO finally transferred the data which are 
needed for a technical survey the Serbian authorities planned to carry out to identify 
locations of duds as a basis of clearance strategies.145 As regards Lebanon, the user state 
Israel did not transfer any of the required information on target locations, quantities and 
types of cluster munitions used to the UNMACC until May 2009.146 Previously, it had only 
given maps to the UN with circles where Israeli forces indicated where there may be a 
concentration of unexploded ordnance but these maps were not very helpful in finding out 
about the existing contamination and planning clearance priorities accordingly.147 
Where information on possible cluster munition strike locations is not forthcoming, it 
is all the more necessary during the emergency phase to keep accurate records on who 
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conducted clearance in which locations and the number and types of duds cleared to enable 
review and follow up for subsequent planning.148  
After the immediate visible threat of unexploded sub-munitions has been removed, 
clearance action moves to the post-emergency phase, using a metal detector assisted sub-
surface search to also identify duds that may have become buried in soft ground in the 
meantime. During this phase, a system of prioritisation as to the remaining areas to be 
cleared must be developed. In deciding how to allocate priorities, technical data such as the 
nature and extent of contamination, accessibility of sites, weather conditions or ground 
cover; the group at risk, i.e. civilians, humanitarian workers, security forces, including UN 
peacekeepers; the potential value of contaminated land; as well as the international legal 
obligations to which the state is bound where clearance is conducted must be considered.149  
The prioritisation process will result in the decision that certain areas will not be 
cleared immediately. In that case, other complementary measures to reduce the risk of 
unexploded sub-munitions for the civilian population must be taken, including the marking 
and/or fencing of contaminated areas and the provision of warnings and risk education, until 
clearance is completed.  
Marking systems involve combination of signs and physical barriers that should be 
clearly visible, representing the hazard, and indicate the danger in a form that is recognised 
nationally and locally, especially which side of the marked boundary is considered 
dangerous and which safe. Durable signs of minimal value should be used, as otherwise in 
poor areas they are likely to be removed. Where the sign could be masked by vegetation or 
terrain, the use of additional physical barriers should be considered.150 Locations of markings 
and any casualties that occur despite the warning signs should be recorded as well as the 
markings maintained.151 Marking may be complemented by fencing but due to the fact that 
fencing is more expensive and in many cases will be removed by the local population it will 
be used more sparingly. For instance, fences would be erected around military installations 
or heavily contaminated sites close to densely populated areas which are not to be cleared in 
the immediate future, due, for example, to poor access to the site.152 
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On the one hand, warnings to the civilian population are usually transmitted through 
the mass media to raise awareness of the immediate threat of unexploded sub-munitions but 
also through posters, leaflets, brochures or T-shirts. On the other, risk education involves a 
longer-term process designed to create lasting awareness among the affected population and 
is provided in different environments, including in schools, among peers at work, in villages, 
in recreational settings or at home through dialogue rather than one-way information.153 In 
order to tailor warnings and risk education efforts to the specific needs of the affected 
community it is necessary to know who is primarily at risk (e.g. children or adults, males or 
females, farmers or shepherds?), where they are at risk, what the types of sub-munitions are 
that represent the risk and why they are at risk (for instance because they need to access their 
contaminated fields out of economic necessity).154 As with clearance, community liaison is 
essential for the success of warnings and risk education that must both take into account the 
needs of the community and the specific local cultural values.155   
In terms of coordinating and financing clearance and activities complementary to it, 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), a division of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, acts as a focal point in establishing and managing mine action 
coordination centres responsible for clearance of landmines and other Explosive Remnants 
of War (ERW), including unexploded sub-munitions in affected territories, planning and 
managing clearance operations and mobilising financial resources. With regard to mobilising 
financial resources, UNMAS manages the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine 
Action, established in 1994 by the UN Secretary-General to finance clearance operations and 
UNMAS coordination and advocacy services. Additional funding is provided by 
governments, international organisations, NGOs and private individuals.156  
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In terms of the significant resources that must be spent on clearance, from a 
development perspective, the following comments may be made: Firstly, since 
contamination occurs in countries that are already rather poor,157 significant financial 
resources of the international community are needed to provide an adequate response. UNDP 
has drawn our attention to the fact that sub-munition contamination negatively impacts on 
the achievement of the following UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): MDG 1, 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger due to restricted access to agricultural land, MDG 2, 
universal education due to restricted access to schools or delays in reconstructing school 
buildings after a conflict, MDG 3, gender equality, since female victims are less likely to 
receive medical care and more likely to face stigmatisation when injured or disabled and 
MDG 4, child health, as the presence of unexploded sub-munitions hampers efforts to 
decrease child mortality.158 Secondly, the fact that these resources must be mobilised for 
clearance, rehabilitation of victims and related activities also means that they cannot be used 
for other pressing development issues; this indirectly also affects the achievement of other 
MDGs, including of MDG 5 (improve maternal health) and MDG 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases). 159 
The existing humanitarian problem on the ground also reminds us that for a long time, 
the international community has adopted a reactive rather than a preventive approach 
towards the negative consequences of cluster munition use. This approach focused on  
remedying more or less successfully the effects, no matter the costs, without tackling the 
causes, i.e. preventing using these weapons at the outset. Instead, cluster munition use 
occurred for more than 60 years despite adverse humanitarian consequences each time these 
weapons were used. 
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3. Existing International Humanitarian Law relevant to 
Cluster Munitions: Prevention and Implementation Failed 
 
 
“The use of Cluster Munitions is lawful and legitimate if such use takes into account existing International 
Humanitarian Law.”160 
 
“The ICRC also believes that a new international instrument is needed to comprehensively and effectively 
address the problem of cluster munitions. […] I would like to emphasize that the ICRC does not take lightly its 
decision to call for regulation of a specific weapon. However, in our view, the severe and disproportionate 
human costs associated with cluster munitions necessitate such an approach.”161 
 
“La utilización de las municiones en racimo en conflictos recientes ha demostrado que la naturaleza propria de 
estas armas, es decir, su falta de precision aunada a sus elevadas tasas de error, hace que sus efectos sean 
desproporcionados e indiscriminados. Es evidente que las normas existentes del Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario no son suficientes para minimizar el riesgo permanente que su uso representa para la población 
civil.”162 
 
 
Cluster munitions are used in full-fledged military operations conducted between two 
or more fighting factions. The primary legal regime dealing with such situations of armed 
conflict is IHL with its overarching purpose to protect those that do not or do no longer 
participate in armed hostilities. However, as already mentioned, 98% of those suffering the 
consequences of cluster munition use have been civilians, i.e. precisely those that do not 
participate in armed hostilities. Thus, IHL apparently did not live up to its overarching 
purpose in protecting these civilians. Otherwise the humanitarian impact of the use of these 
weapons would not have been as severe. But the question arises why IHL failed: Was it 
because IHL principles and rules were insufficient in themselves to prevent this civilian 
harm or was it rather that the principles and rules were adequate but not properly 
implemented? Similarly, was civilian harm caused due to the nature of cluster munitions or 
rather through inappropriate use of these weapons? In engaging with these questions, it 
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should be stated at the outset that until May 2008 there were no rules of international law 
specifically addressing cluster munitions in a comprehensive manner but the use of cluster 
munitions – like the use of any other weapon in armed conflict – was subject to general 
principles and rules of IHL. Thus, the following analysis relates to general IHL and 
addresses the principles and rules most relevant to cluster munitions. Protocol V to the CCW 
on ERW shall also be analysed. 
 
3.1. Military Necessity v. Humanity 
 
IHL adopts a realistic stance in that it is predicated on the assumption that a certain  
amount of death, injury and destruction in armed conflict is inevitable. On the other hand, 
past practices of “Total War” according to which armed hostilities may be conducted in a 
completely unrestrained fashion have shown that there should be limits to which weapons are 
used and how they are used. 
 IHL therefore attempts to strike a complex balance between two often counterveiling 
considerations, notably military necessity and humanity. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
renouncing the use of certain explosive projectiles addressed this balance by fixing “the 
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of 
humanity” and included a first definition of the principle of military necessity, stating that 
“the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy.” 163 Translated into present-day IHL the principle of 
military necessity recognises the use of lethal military force against military objectives, i.e. 
enemy combatants and military objects, as lawful.164 The Declaration goes on to caution that 
“this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable.”165  
While this statement is restricted to soldiers alone, it encapsulates the generalisable 
rationale that where suffering, injury or destruction goes beyond what is militarily necessary, 
the infliction of such harm is forbidden by the principle of humanity. In this regard, it is also 
necessary to specify that military necessity must not be confused with mere military utility; 
this point was made by the ICRC already on the occasion of the second preparatory meeting 
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for the 1980 conference where the CCW was adopted. Accordingly, where the use of a 
weapon is essential for the security of an attacker, these security concerns outweigh 
humanitarian arguments but where the use of a weapon is only militarily useful humanitarian 
arguments may well outweigh military considerations to lead to specific prohibitions and 
restrictions of a weapon. To state otherwise would mean that there would essentially only be 
a case for the prohibition or restriction of useless weapons, depriving any such specific 
regulation of its practical effect.166 It should be remarked, however, that military necessity in 
practice is not always interpreted with concrete military scenarios in armed conflicts in mind. 
As was already mentioned supra, when taking up the issue of weapons, on the military side 
of the equation more strategic security arguments, such as the impact of specific weapon 
prohibitions/regulations on national or bloc military capabilities or the need and costs of 
substitution, inevitably come into play. Thus, in practice the lines between IHL and 
disarmament are blurred.167 
More specific IHL rules and obligations with regard to the conduct of hostilities and 
the use of any weapons, including cluster munitions, may be regarded as an emanation of the 
balance between military necessity and humanity. However, while military necessity was 
subject to a broader interpretation in practice, becoming intertwined with broader strategic 
security considerations, the notion of humanity was not endowed with a similarly broad 
meaning, resulting in a security/military bias towards the use of cluster munitions. 
This bias shall now be exposed with an examination of the rules of distinction and 
discrimination, the rule on proportionality and precautionary obligations of an attacker in 
light of the two fundamental concerns associated with these weapons, their inaccuracy and 
wide area effect during armed conflicts and their propensity to leave large numbers of 
unexploded sub-munitions thereafter. 
 
3.2. Distinction and Discrimination 
 
Among these rules, most recently laid down in the 1977 Protocol on International 
Armed Conflicts Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (API)168 and recognised in the 
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2005 study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on customary IHL169 as 
customary law applicable to all types of armed conflicts, figure most prominently the rules of 
distinction and discrimination.  
Art. 48 of API contains the basic obligation to distinguish at all times between civilian 
and military targets and to direct military operations against military objectives only. Art. 51 
of API specifies when a party to an armed conflict violates the fundamental obligation under 
Art. 48. On the one hand, Art. 51 (2) prohibits attacks exclusively directed against civilians. 
On the other, Art. 51 (4) and (5) prohibit various manifestations of indiscriminate attacks. 
Indiscriminate attacks are (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) 
those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective; (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by IHL; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Further, under 
Art. 51 (5) (a) of API an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a 
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located 
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian 
objects is singled out as a prohibited indiscriminate attack. 
The difference between attacks directed against the civilian population as such and 
indiscriminate attacks hinges upon the mens rea of an attacker. In the former case, the 
attacker intentionally directs military operations against civilian targets. Any weapon, not just 
cluster munitions, can be used intentionally to target civilians or civilian objects. Thus, the 
problem is less the weapon itself but how the attacker uses the weapon in the specific 
circumstances. 
In the latter case, an attacker might not have the intention of exclusively targeting 
civilians but shows a reckless disregard for the distinction between military and civilian 
targets.170 For example, where an attacker fires blindly into territory without any clear idea of 
the military contribution that territory makes to the enemy or releases bombs over enemy 
territory after missing the original target, such practices would violate the prohibition under 
Art. 51 (4) (a) of API of attacks that are not directed at a specific military target.171 This 
manifestation of an indiscriminate attack has in common with the prohibition of attacks 
exclusively directed at civilians that any weapon, not just cluster munitions, may be used in 
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such a way. Thus, the statement quoted by an IDF commander in the Israeli newspaper 
Haaretz on Israeli cluster rocket use “What we did was insane and monstrous, we covered 
entire towns in cluster munitions”172 points to a violation of this limb of the prohibitions of 
indiscriminate attacks; covering entire towns in cluster munitions points to the use of great 
numbers of sub-munitions. Where great numbers of free-falling sub-munitions are used in or 
near populated areas, arguably grossly inadequate efforts were made to locate individual 
targets, as in such circumstances the wide dispersal pattern of the sub-munitions makes it 
virtually impossible to distinguish between military and civilian targets. However, such 
violation of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is still inconclusive as to the nature of 
the weapon, as the scenario described above could be seen as a particularly inappropriate use 
of the weapon. 
 The analysis is more complex with regard to Arts. 51 (4) (b) and (c) of API, since 
indiscriminate methods must be distinguished from indiscriminate means of combat. While 
the notion of indiscriminate methods of combat refers to the specific way in which a weapon 
is used, the prohibition of using an indiscriminate means of combat recognises that due to its 
nature the weapon itself may not be directed at specific military targets, irrespective of the 
specific circumstances of its use.173  
In fact, the criterion for determining whether a weapon is indiscriminate by nature, i.e. 
an indiscriminate means, was subject to considerable debate already during the 1970s 
conferences in the lead-up to the adoption of the CCW: For one group of experts, the 
intended design was the only yardstick from which to conclude that a weapon would be 
inherently indiscriminate. These experts believed that except for the case of a weapon 
intentionally designed to follow a random course and at the end of its trajectory hit whatever 
object happened to be there, all conventional weapons could be used in circumstances where 
there was virtually no risk of hitting civilians. Thus, generally, the specific way in which a 
weapon was used rather than its technical properties would be the decisive factor in 
determining whether an attack was indiscriminate. The prohibition of indiscriminate weapons 
should not be extended to other weapons simply because they might have been used 
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indiscriminately in the past. Rather, the focus should be on specifically restricting such 
methods of use.174  
Other experts, basing themselves on the 1973 ICRC report on the work of 
conventional weapons experts proposed a wider concept of indiscriminate weapons to include 
both weapons indiscriminate by their very nature (intended design) and weapons whose 
normal or typical use would have indiscriminate effects.175 In the words of Kalshoven 
 
“This [latter] view has more force than may appear at first glance: past experience may in certain 
circumstances provide a sound basis for future expectations regarding the use of specific weapons, as 
much as with regard to other matters. It should be admitted, however, that the validity and persuasive 
force of such expectations will depend to a large extent on the actual conditions under which 
experience was gained, and they will have great difficulty in standing up against a sufficiently credible 
statement of changed intentions on the part of (potential) users of the weapons in question.”176 
 
This interpretation of the latter view arguably has the merit of taking into account 
actual contemporary battlefield realities as well as the implications for civilian harm, not just 
the design or use intended by producers and users.  
With regard to the actual conditions under which the experience of consistent civilian 
harm emanating from cluster munitions was gained, it will be recalled that many recent 
armed conflicts in which these weapons were used were characterised by their asymmetrical 
nature. These include the 1999 Operation Allied Force, the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, or the armed conflicts in 
Lebanon and Israel in 2006 and in Georgia in 2008. The reality of these conflicts is that 
powerful State armies increasingly encounter adversaries who intermingle with the civilian 
population. Whenever cluster munitions have been used, they have also been used in or near 
civilian residential areas as a result of the increasing asymmetrical character of contemporary 
armed conflicts. In these circumstances, the free-falling and thus, inaccurate multiple 
explosive sub-munitions combined with their wide dispersal pattern does have fatal 
consequences for civilians and civilian objects even if the weapons are primarily directed at 
military targets. There are numerous examples of such use, including in the conflicts detailed 
above.177  While it is true that all unguided munitions are incapable of being 100% accurate 
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all the time, it is submitted that cluster munitions fall into a specific category due to the sheer 
numbers of explosive sub-munitions that are delivered over a wide area.178 Finally, 
statements of changed intentions by (potential) users should be tested against their credibility 
when these weapons have always also been used in or near populated areas. 
 On the other hand, it is true that, for instance in the 1991 Gulf War many cluster 
munitions were deployed against dispersed Iraqi troops and tanks in the open desert.179 
However, here it may be argued that the 1991 Gulf War does not quite fit into the pattern of 
contemporary asymmetrical armed conflicts any more, since it involved a major traditional 
armed confrontation on the open battlefield. During the 1999 Operation Allied Force, NATO 
Supreme Headquarters Commander Major General Gertz claimed that  
 
“They [cluster munitions] are being used when talking about ‛aerial [area] targets’ such as airfields so 
we use cluster bombs on soft targets like aircraft and trucks when they are on the airfield and we detect 
them and when we can make sure there is no collateral damage and we also use those cluster munitions 
in areas where we know there are valid military targets which we cannot see because they are under the 
wood. Of course we know where they are but they cannot be attacked accurately by precise weapons so 
we use cluster bombs against those targets.”180  
 
 
On the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, it was reported that the 
United States used cluster munitions heavily on military bases in Heart. Purportedly, these 
military bases were large enough to encompass the dispersal pattern of the sub-munitions. 
Thus, there is an argument that when the explosives landed on target they would hit military 
objectives only. Also, the use of cluster munitions against Taliban and al Qaeda frontline 
troops in open areas away from civilians is consistent with the intended design of these 
weapons when assessed for its effect at the time of use.181 
                                                                                                                                                        
note 81, at 59-60, 80, 85-92. On evidence on use of cluster munitions in or near populated areas in Lebanon, see, 
for instance, Landmine Action, “Foreseeable harm”, supra note 100, at 12-15; Human Rights Council, Report of 
Alston, Hunt, Kälin and Kothari, Mission to Lebanon and Israel, supra note 90, at paras. 56-57; Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, 
10 November 2006, UN Doc. A/HRC/3/2, paras. 252-254; Human Rights Watch, “Flooding South Lebanon”, 
supra note 91, at 39-44. On use of cluster munitions in or near populated areas in Georgia, see Human Rights 
Watch, “A Dying Practice”, supra note 101, at 40-51, 57-59. 
178 Compare the example of a single unguided bomb and the CBU-87 cluster munitions which contains 202 
explosive sub-munitions per container: In the first case, a single bomb may go astray while in the second case 
202 explosive sub-munitions may impact off the intended target. 
179 Major T. J. Herthel, “On the chopping block: cluster munitions and the law of war – unexploded 
submunitions from cluster bombs”, 51 Air Force Law Review  229, 264 (2001); King, “The Evolution of Cluster 
Munitions”, ICRC Expert Meeting Montreux 2007, supra note 41, at 12. 
180 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Conference given by NATO Spokesman, Jamie Shea and 
SHAPE Spokesman, Major General Walter Gertz, 14 May 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990514b.htm (last visited 17 August 2009). 
181 Human Rights Watch, “Fatally Flawed”, supra note 80, at 21. 
 60
 Moreover, in some cases in the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom air-dropped cluster 
munitions were used against armoured vehicles, artillery or missiles. On the other hand, 
fewer of those types than in the past were used in or near civilian residential areas.182 
 In any event, the view of the first group of experts prevailed and thus, a weapon can 
only be considered indiscriminate if its intended design makes it impossible to direct the 
weapon at specific military targets in any conceivable circumstances.183 The fact that cluster 
munitions have also been used in some circumstances against military targets only, as shown 
above, speaks against the proposition that these weapons are indiscriminate in light of the 
prevailing interpretation of the prohibition of indiscriminate means of combat. Thus, cluster 
munition attacks are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the prohibition of 
indiscriminate methods of combat. On this assumption, the use of cluster munitions is 
generally not considered to violate the prohibition of a means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective under Art. 51 (4) (b) API, as was recently confirmed 
by the ICRC.184 
McCormack and other IHL experts in their 2006 Report on states parties’ responses to 
a questionnaire on IHL and Explosive Remnants of War prepared for the Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE) to the CCW called into question the way in which existing 
general rules of IHL address the legality of cluster munition attacks:  
 
“If cluster munitions were only deployed against military targets far removed from civilian areas there 
would be no argument about their relationship to the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. The fact that 
such use is theoretically possible will lead some States to continue to argue forcefully that these 
weapons are not prohibited under existing principles of IHL and should not be subject to a specific 
treaty ban. Unfortunately the hypothetical exclusive use of cluster munitions against ‛purely’ military 
targets is simply not the reality and many cluster munitions have been used in recent conflicts against 
military targets in close physical proximity to civilian residential areas.”185 
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 The problem is that the prohibition of using cluster munitions indiscriminately was 
violated whenever these weapons were used, since they were also always used in or near 
civilian residential areas rather than only in open areas with no civilian targets nearby. Thus, 
breaches of the prohibition of indiscriminate methods of combat were the norm rather than 
the exception. Evidently then, the case-by-case assessment of the prohibition of 
indiscriminate methods of combat was not sufficient to guarantee protection of civilians from 
cluster munition attacks. 
 With regard to Art. 51 (4) (c) API, the prohibition of means or methods of combat 
whose effects cannot be limited in accordance with IHL, this prohibition is meant to refer to 
weapons or tactics that, although by their design may generally be initially targeted at 
military objectives, then become uncontrollable in time and/or space.186 A paradigmatic 
example of a weapon that once launched escapes the control of an attacker is biological 
weapons.  Biological agents with the potential to spread infections may be carried far beyond 
the intended target area by natural processes of wind or drainage, by living carriers of the 
agent or may be directly transmissible from one human being to another.187 Also, the effects 
of biological weapons may last for an undetermined period of time, killing or disabling 
persons for days, weeks or months.188 
The second fundamental humanitarian problem associated with cluster munition use, 
the post-conflict legacy of unexploded sub-munitions, would also seem to fit the description 
of a weapon uncontrollable especially in time. This is because sub-munition duds which 
usually remain on the ground in large numbers due to excessive failure rates may kill and 
maim any person, whether military or civilian sometimes for years after armed hostilities 
have ended. Moreover, due to weather and terrain conditions, sub-munition duds may get 
buried and may move from where they originally land to other locations. In terms of these 
actual effects on civilians at the post-conflict stage, there is a commonality between anti-
personnel landmines and sub-munition duds, since anti-personnel landmines also lie in wait 
to kill or maim anyone long after the end of military operations and may move from their 
original emplacement by the effects of the weather.  
However, also in the case of the prohibition contained in Art. 51 (4) (c) API the 
decisive criterion for means uncontrollable in effects is whether these effects are intended by 
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producers or users of the weapon. In the light of this criterion, a legal distinction may be 
drawn between the legacy of anti-personnel landmines and unexploded sub-munitions: While 
anti-personnel landmines are designed to kill and maim long after hostilities, the same is not 
true of unexploded sub-munitions, since explosive sub-munitions were intended to explode at 
the time of attack upon impact rather than long thereafter.189  
Thus, also under this heading, the legality of cluster munition use falls to be evaluated 
under the prohibition of indiscriminate methods of combat on a case-by-case basis. 
Unfortunately, unexploded sub-munitions causing civilian victims in the distant aftermath of 
a conflict have again been a consistent pattern rather than the exception. While generally all 
kinds of munitions leave a certain amount of unexploded ordnance after their use, in the case 
of using cluster munitions this problem is aggravated by the sheer number of explosive sub-
munitions delivered as well as the high failure rates of the sub-munitions. The consequence 
of this interpretation is that bad cheap designs that would more often than not fail in real 
combat situations are not precluded. Since many fuses of sub-munitions are rather primitive 
mechanical impact fuses, employing such sensitive weapons would require even more care 
by a user. Unfortunately, this has not happened and also the prohibition to use methods of 
combat the effects of which cannot be limited in accordance with IHL has been violated 
every time cluster munitions were used. 
For a long time, states focused on presenting technical improvements of the sub-
munitions as a response to the threat of sub-munition duds. As mentioned above, already in 
1974 when explicit prohibitions on certain types of cluster munitions were discussed by 
governmental delegates, a UK military expert announced technical improvements of the then 
new UK BL 755 cluster bomb. These improvements would help to contain the risk of 
unexploded sub-munitions. However, these assurances were subsequently proven wrong in 
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the Falklands/Malvinas conflict when sub-munitions failed at a minimum rate of 9,6%.190 In 
later years, self-destruct mechanisms were propagated by producers and users as a technical 
remedy. But again, recent battlefield realities especially in Lebanon have proved claims 
wrong that such devices could prevent the humanitarian harm incurred by civilians through 
the presence of unexploded sub-munitions.191 Moreover, while clearance is a necessary 
measure to be taken in the aftermath of cluster munition use, it still cannot adequately prevent 
further casualties caused by unexploded sub-munitions. This is amply demonstrated by the 
experience of Lebanon where a well-coordinated clearance effort has been underway since 
armed hostilities ended in August 2006.192 
The use of cluster munitions in or near civilian residential areas also raises problems   
under Art. 51 (5) (a) API, the prohibition of bombardments which treats as a single military 
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, 
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects. 
The inclusion of this provision was considered necessary by the drafters of API to avoid area 
bombings heavily resorted to by British, German and Japanese forces during WWII where 
entire civilian residential areas were attacked because of individual military targets contained 
therein.193 Also Art. 51 (5) (a) API applies in a specific circumstance of use of a weapon, i.e. 
the use of weapons in areas where many civilians or civilian objects are present. Conversely, 
as cluster munitions may conceivably also be used in open, uninhabited areas in such 
circumstances no question of a breach of this rule arises. 
While the overall object and purpose of the prohibition is clear, the interpretation of 
the terms of “clearly separate and distinct military objectives” and “concentration of 
civilians” still remains to be clarified. As regards the first, the issue must be addressed as to 
how large the distance between individual military objectives must be. At the Diplomatic 
Conference leading to the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols, a few states expressed 
their support for interpreting the wording of “clearly separate and distinct” to mean that area 
bombardments required a distance “at least sufficiently large to permit individual military 
objectives to be attacked separately”.194 Still, this leaves attackers with a considerable 
discretion, as the terms “clearly separate and distinct” are subjective notions.195 Moreover, 
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implementation of the prohibition may pose problems even where military objectives are 
separate from each other, as very large individual military objectives, e.g. military bases or 
munition factory buildings, may be intermingled with smaller civilian areas.  
However, the use of cluster munitions even under such circumstances is likely to 
violate this prohibition. For instance, the CBU-87 cluster munition, the weapon of choice in 
1991 Operation Desert Storm and the 1999 Operation Allied Force, may disperse 202 BLU-
97 explosive sub-munition per cluster munition container over a mean impact area of 200 x 
400 meters.196 The analysis does not stop there, as the BLU-97 sub-munitions, like so many 
other types of sub-munitions are free-falling and thus inaccurate because they are susceptible 
to environmental conditions during their fall. This means that the sub-munitions may land far 
off the intended target, making it very probable that even small civilian residential areas 
surrounding a large military objective will be hit.  
That also comparatively small civilian areas must be taken into account is not only 
evidenced by the mention of “villages” besides cities and towns.  It is also evidenced by the 
definition of “concentration of civilians” clarified in Protocol III to the CCW which specifies 
that “concentration of civilians” means any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or 
temporary, such as inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or 
columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads.197 
The prohibition of area bombardment consequently imposes the clearest restriction on 
cluster munition use under general IHL, since it may reasonably be argued that any use of 
cluster munitions in or near civilian residential areas violates the prohibition due to the 
inaccuracy and wide-area effect of these weapons. 
 
 
3.3. Proportionality 
 
Art. 51 (5) (b) API, also considered to be a rule of customary international law 
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, states that an attack is 
indiscriminate if it may be expected to cause incidental civilian harm which would be clearly 
excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Thus, the rule on 
proportionality is part of the complex overall regime to implement the basic obligation to 
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distinguish between civilian and military targets in order to provide protection for the civilian 
population against the effects of military operations.  
In this regard, the difference between direct attacks on civilians and the other 
prohibitions of indiscriminate attacks under Arts. 51 (4) and (5) (a) API turns around the 
different states of mind of intention as opposed to recklessness of an attacker.  The 
prohibition of disproportionate attacks adds an additional layer to the other manifestations of 
indiscriminate attacks where it is difficult to evidence a reckless state of mind of an attacker. 
Recklessness would exist in extreme cases with certain means (e.g. biological weapons) or 
methods (e.g. loosely aimed missiles) but ultimately the majority of attacks leading to civilian 
losses would hinge on the assessment whether or not an attack was proportionate.198  
Kalshoven has usefully explained the relationship between the rule on proportionality 
with the other manifestations of indiscriminate attacks under Art. 51 API on a scale between 
two opposite extremes. At the one end of the scale are attacks that manifestly disregard any 
distinction, such as firing blindly into an area; such attacks would already be covered by Art. 
51 (4). At the other end of the scale are attacks on a well-defined military objective with 
precise weapons, but in the course of which some civilians happen to be too close to the 
military target and would inadvertently be killed. In such a case the loss of life of civilians 
would be unavoidable. He notes that somewhere on the scale between these poles must be the 
dividing-line separating permissible attacks on military objectives entailing acceptable 
collateral civilian harm from those prohibited attacks on military objectives entailing 
unacceptable losses to civilians.199 Interestingly, as we shall see, also Norway as the initiator 
of the “Oslo process” used the formula of a prohibition of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians.200 
However, existing IHL does not employ the notion of “unacceptable harm to 
civilians.” Rather, the rule on proportionality requires a sophisticated balancing act between 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations by weighing the expected civilian harm 
against the concrete and direct anticipated military advantage. Thus, proportionality is not 
assessed post facto between “actual civilian losses” and “actual military advantage” but 
rather ex ante at the time of an attack between the “civilian harm that may be expected” and 
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the “anticipated military advantage”.201 The wording of “may be expected” rather than 
“expected” is indeed crucial; while generally such a proportionality assessment is incumbent 
upon an attacker in the specific circumstances, this wording introduces an element of 
objective reasonableness. Otherwise it would indeed be wholly left to an individual attacker 
whether the attack will be proportionate or not.202 Accordingly, the critical issue is to 
interpret what civilian harm may be expected in light of the information available to the 
average reasonable commander at the time of attack.203 
With regard to cluster munitions, firstly, the inaccuracy and wide dispersal pattern of 
the sub-munitions during strikes may create problems under the rule on proportionality in the 
specific circumstance of use in or near populated areas. Given the experience of delivery of 
high numbers of sub-munitions in or near populated areas, it is hardly conceivable how such 
use can ever respect the prohibition of disproportionate attacks. Conversely, cluster munition 
use in isolated areas uninhabited by civilians, e.g. in a desert, may not run counter to the rule 
on proportionality at the time of attack.  
Legal difficulties under the rule on proportionality also arise in relation to the post-
conflict legacy of unexploded sub-munitions with the potential of killing and maiming 
civilians, particularly children, of preventing access to agricultural and grazing lands and 
inhibiting the return of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees.204 These are long-term 
consequences rather than immediate and short-term consequences of cluster munition use.  
Whether such long-term civilian harm must be factored in the proportionality 
assessment was subject to debate. In 2002, Greenwood in a working paper submitted to the 
GGE to the CCW presented the view that while immediate and short-term civilian harm must 
be taken into account, longer-term civilian damage cannot be part of the proportionality 
evaluation: 
 
“[I]t is only the immediate risk from ERW which can be an issue. If, for example, cluster weapons are 
used against military targets in an area where there are known to be civilians, then the proportionality 
test may require that account be taken both of the risk to the civilians from sub-munitions exploding 
during the attack and of the risk from unexploded sub-munitions in the hours immediately after the 
attack. It is an entirely different matter, however, to require that account be taken of the longer-term 
risk posed by ERW, particularly of the risk which ERW can pose after a conflict has ended or after 
civilians have returned to an area from which they had fled. The degree of that risk turns on too many 
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factors which are incapable of assessment at the time of the attack, such as when and whether civilians 
will be permitted to return to an area, what steps the party controlling that area will have taken to 
clear unexploded ordnance, what priority that party gives to the protection of civilians and so forth. 
The proportionality test has to be applied on the basis of information reasonably available at the time 
of the attack. The risks posed by ERW once the immediate aftermath of an attack has passed are too 
remote to be capable of assessment at that time.”205 
 
On the other hand, in 2006, McCormack & Mtharu in their report on Expected Civilian 
Damage & The Proportionality Equation to delegates of the Third Review Conference of the 
CCW expressed a different view: 
 
“The deliberate choice of cluster munitions on the basis of an expected dud rate which will leave 
sufficient numbers of unexploded submunitions so as to deny enemy combatants access to the target 
area may well produce an expected concrete and direct military advantage. That expected advantage is 
a mid to longer term advantage. […] Surely then, in undertaking the requisite proportionality 
assessment, the expected mid to longer term civilian damage must also be taken into account. The 
military commander must expect that some civilian residents of the target area will attempt to return to 
their villages and to re-work their agricultural plots and that incidental civilian damage will inevitably 
occur as contact is made with unexploded submunitions. […] [T]he important issue here is that the 
expected civilian damage must be taken into account – that it is unacceptable for the expected military 
advantage to be based on a longer timeframe while limiting the expected quantification of civilian 
damage only to the immediate effects of the attack itself.”206 
 
Further, McCormack & Mtharu regard it as relevant that  
“data from past conflicts helps inform the likelihood of future effects for the application of the 
proportionality assessment. Decisions about expected harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects 
from weapons likely to cause ERW ought to include consideration of the effects of such weapons in the 
past.”207 
 
 
The arguments advanced by McCormack & Mtharu have the advantage that they take 
into account field-based realities on the post-conflict actual effect of unexploded sub-
munitions on civilians and their communities. Indeed, a wealth of information both by 
humanitarian intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations is now available on 
these harmful consequences.208 This approach is reminiscent of the one taken by the ICRC 
and certain experts in the 1970s as detailed supra, notably to take past experience and thus, 
typical actual use and effects, into account when assessing a weapon’s legality.209 
With regard to the view advocated by Greenwood that long-term humanitarian 
consequences of unexploded sub-munitions are too indeterminate to be considered in a 
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proportionality assessment, admittedly, it is not certain upon launching an attack to pinpoint 
the exact moment when or whether civilians will return to an area. However, one reality from 
the aftermath of armed conflicts is that they will do so at the earliest opportunity.210 Another 
is that returnees are often a group particularly at risk of falling victim to sub-munition duds, 
since they are often unaware of the risk awaiting them.211 Moreover, a common theme of 
research into long-term humanitarian consequences of sub-munition duds was that casualties 
continue to occur where duds are inadvertently handled by those carrying out farming or 
grazing activities, since these areas are usually not treated as a matter of priority of clearance 
efforts. In addition, a particular danger is that duds are deliberately handled by children, 
especially young boys.212 In light of these post-conflict realities, this author supports the 
conclusion reached by McCormack & Mtharu that “Damage to civilian property and civilian 
deaths will inexorably flow from the use of such weapons and must be taken into account in 
the proportionality equation.”213 
Admittedly, Greenwood is right when he says that the dangers posed by unexploded 
munitions appear to have been considered rarely if at all, noting that this problem has not 
been addressed by the ICRC Commentary on Art. 51 (5) (b) API.214  
While this is true, other IHL provisions do reflect a concern for certain long-term 
civilian harm. In this regard, Art. 54 (2) API and Art. 14 of Additional Protocol II (APII),215 
constituting customary international law in all types of armed conflicts,216 provide for a 
prohibition to attack, destroy, remove or render useless foodstuffs, agricultural areas, 
drinking water installations and supply and irrigation works for the specific purpose of 
denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party. It is 
clear that only such attacks are covered by this specific prohibition that are launched for the 
specific purpose of denying them to the civilian population. Conversely, it was expressly not 
intended by the drafters to include the denial of agricultural areas and water installations for 
other purposes such as preventing the enemy from advancing or from using such areas as a 
cover.217 Accordingly, the intent must be shown to deny food and water to the civilian 
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population, which in essence is an application of the generic prohibition to use starvation of 
civilians intentionally as a method of combat.218  
Leaving the issue of the requisite mens rea aside, particularly the wording of render 
useless food and water installations demonstrates that this is a specific example where the 
attacker has to consider long-term civilian losses. With regard to the de facto equal effects of 
anti-personnel landmines on civilians, for example, it has been observed that the deployment 
of landmines in agricultural areas or in irrigation works may violate this prohibition.219  
The proposition that an attacker must take long-term civilian harm into account is also 
reflected in Art. 55 API. This rule prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare which are 
intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.  
The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion gave the following reasons for the 
importance of protecting the environment during armed conflict: “The environment is not an 
abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human 
beings, including generations unborn.”220 Thus, the very rationale for specially protecting the 
environment is that attacks on the environment may entail long-term civilian losses that 
would have repercussions for future generations. In particular, the link between long-term 
damage to the environment and the fact that unexploded ordnance, including unexploded sub-
munitions, make agricultural areas unfit for cultivation and remain dangerous to the civilian 
population has been explicitly recognised.221  
However, the threshold of “widespread”, “long-term” and “severe” may be difficult to 
surmount. Firstly, all these criteria have to be cumulatively satisfied. Secondly, “long-term” 
in this context refers to damage that will last for decades, “widespread” as encompassing an 
area of several hundred square kilometres and “severe” involves serious or significant 
disruption or harm to human life, natural economic resources or other assets.222 Therefore, 
cluster munition contamination of the environment will arguably only fall under this 
prohibition in extreme cases where the threat of unexploded ordnance persists for decades.223 
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On the other hand, if the long-term civilian harm were not part of the proportionality 
assessment, it would be possible to affect life, health and livelihood of civilian populations 
without rigorous constraint where that contamination was not inflicted on civilians for the 
very purpose of denying food and water to them or where that contamination would not reach 
the high threshold for falling under the prohibition of targeting the environment. 
 Another argument for including long-term civilian losses in the proportionality 
assessment is that such an understanding of proportionality follows from both the 1997 
Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personnel landmines and the 2003 Protocol V on 
Explosive Remnants of War. With regard to the Ottawa Convention, the first preambular 
paragraph indicates that the comprehensive prohibitions of anti-personnel landmines stem 
from the concern about long-term losses inflicted on the civilian population. It reads:  
 
“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or 
maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially 
children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”224 
 
 
If over 150 states parties to the convention recognise that anti-personnel landmines do 
cause long-term civilian harm, the argument that civilian harm equal in effect caused by 
unexploded sub-munitions is too remote to be taken into account lacks credibility.225 In a 
similar vein, the 2003 Protocol V on ERW in its preambular paragraph 1 states: “Recognizing 
the serious post-conflict humanitarian problems caused by explosive remnants of war.”226 
Again it is incongruent to argue that states parties to the CCW recognise the post-conflict 
humanitarian problem caused by ERW, including sub-munition duds but then deny that these 
post-conflict concerns must be part of the proportionality assessment. 
As regards the military side of the equation, the notion of “concrete and direct military 
advantage” must be interpreted.  A number of states give the term “military advantage” a 
broad meaning. They have stated that this refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack 
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as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of that attack.227 The rationale 
behind this broad concept of military advantage is that modern strategies of warfare are often 
based on a series of separate actions ultimately forming one military operation. What is more 
important is the sum (the ultimate military purpose) rather than its specific parts (specific 
attacks); thus, the aggregate military operation may not be divided up into too many 
individual actions.228 From this in turn it may be inferred that states take a mid- or long-term 
military advantage into account for the proportionality assessment. Such advantages may be 
characterised by the fact that they may not materialise immediately. For example, this could 
include a series of separate attacks disabling an enemy force’s command and control centre.  
More apposite to the issue at hand, McCormack & Mtharu cite to one of the reports by 
several Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council where one Israeli government 
official justified Israel’s use of cluster munitions in South Lebanon with the need to prevent 
Hezbollah fighters from returning to residential areas after the ceasefire.229 McCormack & 
Mtharu recognise that the deliberate choice of cluster munitions which will leave many duds 
as to deny the enemy access to certain areas may constitute a “concrete and direct military 
advantage”. However, that statement must still be assessed against the criteria of “concrete” 
and “direct”. The criterion of “concrete” means that there must be a sufficient degree of 
specificity, while “direct” speaks to a sufficiently close causal relationship between a military 
operation and the military advantage accruing from this operation to exclude merely potential 
or indeterminate advantages.230  
This argument is in fact only valid for defensive military operations, i.e. where 
subsequent to scattering an area with sub-munition duds the party using cluster munitions 
would not enter the strike site anymore. Conversely, in offensive military operations, the 
military advantage flowing from the use of cluster munitions may be said to be reduced by 
the fact that such use would inhibit the advance of one’s own ground forces because of the 
danger of duds remaining on the ground.231 
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Some states also interpret “military advantage” to include the security of an attacking 
state’s own forces.232 In this regard, the doctrine of “zero casualty warfare” has gained 
prominence with some. This doctrine holds that complete avoidance of casualties to one’s 
own forces is a legitimate factor in interpreting the “military advantage” and must 
accordingly have an influence on the proportionality assessment. It is true that the urgency of 
a battlefield situation may demand that more importance to the military value of the security 
of a state’s own forces is attached. However, such an interpretation of military advantage 
tends to value the lives of one’s own military more than those of the adversary’s civilians. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that such reasoning would upset the balance between 
military advantage and incidental civilian harm required by the proportionality calculus and 
that some casualties to one’s own armed forces must be accepted for avoiding excessive 
civilian losses.233 
The conclusion that long-term civilian damage must be factored in proportionality 
considerations at the time of an attack has also been supported by a number of stockpiling 
states in the context of the CCW in response to a survey on IHL and ERW which sought to 
clarify IHL rules relevant to ERW. For instance, Austria stated that  
“the application of the principle [of proportionality] is not limited to the intended effects of an attack. 
[…] [T]he effects of duds – which are inherently incidental – seem to be covered by this provision.”234  
 
Norway emphasised that military commanders must take into consideration  
“both the humanitarian concerns related to the direct impact of the munitions as well as humanitarian 
effects caused by unexploded ordnance remaining on the ground after the attack.”235  
 
Switzerland also took the view that  
 
“the proportionality assessment […] must also take into account the foreseeable incidental long-term 
effects of an attack such as the humanitarian costs caused by duds becoming ERW.”236  
 
This view was also echoed by Sweden which argued that  
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“a cluster bomb with submunitions that have a high dud rate and is used in populated areas is likely to 
create disproportionate suffering for the civilian population compared with the military advantage from 
the use of such a weapon.”237  
 
Also in the view of the Czech Republic  
“the use of munitions, which is [sic] likely to fail, might contradict this principle [of proportionality], as 
the low reliability of such munitions could cause collateral damage exceeding the lawful level by 
increasing its probability and decreasing its military effectiveness.”238  
 
On the other hand, the Russian Federation argued that it is less dangerous overall to 
deal with the consequences of improper functioning of cluster munitions and that all 
submunitions in the cluster munitions of the latest generation are equipped with self-
destruction features so that collateral effects are minimized.239 Poland put forward a similar 
view, claiming that “Submunitions are modern munitions which do not leave too many 
explosive remnants of war.”240  
McCormack and two collaborators summarised the findings of the survey on IHL and 
ERW undertaken within the framework of the CCW by acknowledging that a number of 
states considered the longer-term civilian harm to be expected to be relevant in the 
proportionality assessment but that one state had noted that this issue was still a matter of 
international debate. Responses, however, indicated the kind of information necessary to 
attackers to apply the proportionality rule properly, including the likely dud rate and whether 
the munitions contain any self-neutralising or self-destructing mechanisms.241 Here, it may 
again be recalled that a battlefield reality revealed by recent reports on the humanitarian 
consequences of cluster munition use is that the dud rate claimed by manufacturers and user 
states determined under ideal test conditions is much lower than that found as a result of real-
life combat conditions.242  Where that is the case, not only humanitarian problems arise but 
also on the military side of the equation, since the discrepancy between test and actual failure 
rates and reliance upon the former means to overestimate the military advantage if that does 
not consist in the intentional laying of de facto anti-personnel mines.243  
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At the Third Review Conference to the CCW in November 2006, Ireland and Sweden 
submitted a proposal for a preambular paragraph to be included in the Final Declaration of 
the Conference which sought to recognise both the foreseeable short and long term effects of 
ERW on civilian populations as an important factor to be considered in applying the IHL 
rules on proportionality and precautions in attack.244 
The Final Declaration of the Review Conference, adopted by consensus of all CCW 
states parties present, including major users and producers of cluster munitions like Israel, the 
United States or Russia, includes the following preambular paragraph:  
“Noting the foreseeable effects of explosive remnants of war on civilian populations as a factor to be 
considered in applying the international humanitarian law rules on proportionality in attack and 
precautions in attack.”245 
 
While the wording of this preambular paragraph does not specify long-term civilian 
harm, the fact that such a preambular paragraph was adopted makes it almost impossible, 
even for user and producer states of cluster munitions, to argue that such losses are incapable 
of being a factor in proportionality considerations. As a result, this represents a much needed 
clarification on the application of the rule on proportionality with regard to the use of cluster 
munitions, which attests to the weakness of a vague general rule to provide meaningful 
guidance in combat situations. 
 
3.4. Precautionary Obligations Imposed on the Attacker 
 
Where the legality of the use of cluster munitions is to be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis, Art. 57 of API, also considered to reflect customary international law in all types of 
armed conflicts, acquires special significance. Art. 57 of API contains important obligations 
imposed on the attacker designed to avoid indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. 
Especially relevant for the use of cluster munitions is the obligation to take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding or at least 
minimising incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects 
under Art. 57 (2) (a) (ii) of API. The term “feasible” is generally understood as “everything 
that is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances ruling at 
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the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”246 This introduces a subjective 
element to the scope of the obligation, since what is practicable or practically possible in the 
circumstances of a particular attack depends on the technological capabilities of an attacker. 
On the other hand, by also obliging an attacker to take into account humanitarian besides 
military considerations, it is equally clear that the wealth of information published by 
humanitarian organisations on probable civilian harm from cluster munition use must be a 
factor in the implementation of this obligation. Importantly, by virtue of Art. 51 (8) of API an 
attacking force is not released from compliance with this obligation even if it encounters an 
adversary armed force or group which engages in the practice of mingling with the civilian 
population to immunise certain areas from attack. Undoubtedly, such practices violate the 
prohibition of using human shields and/or the precautionary obligation of the defender to 
avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas,247 but IHL does not 
defer to reciprocity considerations in the sense that once one side violates IHL the other may 
violate IHL as well. 
 The ICRC has specified what the implementation of this obligation means in the 
context of using cluster munitions; an attacker would be required to consider the accuracy of 
the cluster munitions, the size of the dispersal pattern, the amount of unexploded sub-
munitions likely to occur, the presence of civilians in the proximity of military objectives and 
the use of alternative weapons in populated areas.248 Arguably, this obligation would also 
require a party whose cluster munition use resulted in unexploded sub-munitions to clear 
these or at least assist in their clearance.249 Apparently, these factors were not adequately 
considered in the many armed conflicts in which cluster munitions have been used. How else 
could one explain that these weapons have always been used in or near civilian residential 
areas, farmland or grazing areas? Asymmetrical armed conflict where adversaries inferior in 
technological capabilities mingle with the civilian population are also a constant feature of 
contemporary armed conflicts. 
With regard to alternative weapon choices in and around civilian residential areas, 
precision-guided unitary weapons would seem to be the better option both in terms of hitting 
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exactly the intended military objective and of avoiding civilian casualties. However, one 
drawback with unitary weapons is that they deliver a much greater amount of explosive force 
than smaller sub-munitions. Thus, through the collapse of buildings due to the more powerful 
blast caused by unitary munitions indirectly, civilians may be more endangered than by the 
direct effects of explosive sub-munitions. Still, it is doubted whether such comparisons may 
be made in light of the fact that cluster munitions were not intended for use in or around 
populated areas. Moreover, the post-conflict problem of unexploded ordnance will be far 
more serious with cluster munitions than with unitary munitions.250  
While both options have their drawbacks, it has repeatedly been argued that the 
alternative of using high explosive unitary artillery munitions instead of cluster munitions 
would actually prolong conflict, entail more civilian casualties and thus, make armed 
conflicts even less humane.251 However, the proposition that the use of unitary high explosive 
would inevitably entail more civilian harm than the use of cluster munitions reflects too ready 
an acceptance on the part of those making such claims that with unitary munitions armed 
forces will equally violate the prohibitions of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks as 
well as precautionary obligations of an attacker.252 In each case of using any weapon, 
whether unitary or cluster munitions, an attacker has to demonstrate compliance with general 
rules of IHL, otherwise these rules would be meaningless. These arguments again illustrate 
the broader security and strategy considerations on the military side and the close relationship 
between IHL and disarmament. 
In comparing more generally cluster munitions with the alternative of unitary 
munitions, it is necessary to more concretely outline the various roles for which cluster 
munitions were designed. In respect of air-dropped cluster munitions, the main military 
purpose of using cluster munitions is that of so-called close air support. Close air support 
entails supporting attacking friendly forces by engaging enemy targets in the vicinity of the 
attackers as to slow down the advance of the enemy as well as destroy its key military 
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infrastructure like communication nodes, radars, air defence systems or observation posts. 
Conversely, close air support provides opportunities for the attacker to advance themselves 
and use their weapons. However, as already mentioned, the main disadvantage of unguided 
air-dropped cluster sub-munitions is that they are inaccurate, since they are free-falling and 
susceptible to environmental conditions like wind during their fall. There are precision-
guided bombs as alternatives which avoid the problem of inaccuracy.253 
With regard to ground-launched cluster munitions, U.S. infantry officers complained 
about the fact that in order to destroy rocket-launching sites from a long distance the ground 
launched Multiple Launch Rocket Systems were the only weapon choice since the U.S. 
armed forces did not possess alternative unitary artillery with the same long-range 
capabilities.254  
Unguided artillery is inaccurate especially at mid- to long-term ranges beyond 15 km. 
It will be recalled here that one of the original purposes of cluster munitions was to 
compensate for aiming imprecision with unitary artillery munitions at long ranges, since due 
to the dispersion effect and the high number of sub-munitions it is more probable to at least 
partly hit a single target from a distance. However, this effect comes at the cost that due to 
the inaccuracy, wide dispersal pattern and the number of sub-munitions the use of cluster 
munitions also has harmful consequences on persons or objects surrounding the target. As an 
alternative, the development of special fuses which are equipped with GPS navigation and 
enable corrections along the trajectory of artillery shells or rocket has been mentioned as to 
make them more accurate than current versions. The development of such an alternative 
would be relatively cheap, since current stocks of unitary artillery would not have to be 
substituted as a whole, only the fuses have to be exchanged.255 With no such alternatives at 
present, the obligation to take feasible precautions in minimising civilian harm would still 
require that artillery is used sparingly given the high risks of inflicting excessive incidental 
civilian harm. 
With regard to defeating armoured targets in particular, DPICM cluster munitions 
were favoured by the military because of their capability to pierce through armour. However, 
main battle tanks and howitzers now incorporate soft material as a liner in the ceiling which 
minimises this destructive effect of the shaped charge of the sub-munitions. In addition, the 
introduction of explosive reactive armour that could be bolted to the exterior has made main 
                                                 
253 Dullum, “Cluster weapons“, supra note 36, at 17, 51. 
254 Human Rights Watch, “Off Target”, supra note 81, at 95-96. 
255 Dullum, “Cluster weapons“, supra note 36, at 50. 
 78
battle tanks more resistant against such munitions.256 Moreover, the penetration of the metal 
jet formed in the shaped charge to pierce armour may not destroy the target with the first sub-
munition hitting it but up to a dozen hits would be required to knock out heavy tanks. What 
has been said for artillery at long ranges can also be said more specifically for armoured 
targets, notably that once guided unitary artillery becomes available this would constitute a 
viable alternative.257 Thus, even in the case of the scenario of a major conventional attack or 
threat of an attack with high numbers of tanks cluster munitions would have a reduced 
effectiveness due to these technological advances in tank technology. 
A special case in this respect is the one of SFW the functioning of which have already 
been described above as purportedly providing a capability to accurately attack single targets 
at a distance.258 SFWs have been singled out as being the most effective option against 
armoured vehicles, more effective than both traditional cluster munitions as well as unitary 
munitions due to the size of the projectiles and their explosive force.259 It is claimed that the 
major advantage of SFWs in comparison to traditional cluster munitions lies in the fact that 
the major problems of inaccuracy and unreliability are avoided, inaccuracy because arguably 
the sensors enable engagement of single targets rather than target areas over which unguided 
sub-munitions are dispersed and unreliability because the fail-safe mechanisms incorporated 
into these modern sub-munitions are more reliable than such mechanisms contained in 
traditional sub-munitions. This is also the reason why there were such intensive discussions 
on the question whether all or some types of SFW should be excluded from a convention on 
the prohibition of cluster munitions.260   
In general, questions arise as to how “intelligent” sensors could ever be. Once the 
person in the loop has completed the aiming process and pushed the button, the sensors scan 
an area and typically react to the heat a tank, for example, emits. This means that it is 
effectively the sensors that take the final decision on whether or not to engage a target 
independent from a human being. Thus, once an attacker has fired such a weapon over a 
target area, the process of confirming and engaging an individual target or rejecting a target 
and initiating self-destruction is out of human control.  In this respect, doubts remain as to 
how the sensors will be able to reliably distinguish a tank from a civilian bus which may emit 
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the same amount of heat and may roughly be of the same size, as to the accuracy of the 
container munition in whose target area the sensors operate, how the electronic self-destruct 
or self-deactivation mechanisms have been tested, and whether these tests are better suited to 
simulating actual combat performance than tests on cluster munitions conducted in the 
past.261  
 This may especially pose difficulties in an asymmetrical combat setting in and around 
civilian residential areas where there may be many targets, including civilian objects, that 
could potentially be sensed and destroyed by the sensors. As a consequence, even with the 
use of this most modern version of cluster munitions it is at present unclear to what extent 
especially the prohibition enshrined in Art. 51 (4) (c) of API of methods of combat the effects 
of which cannot be limited according to IHL can be respected. 
Moreover, as already mentioned above, in the only instance where SFW were used on 
the battlefield, in 2003 in Iraq, the fact that a humanitarian clearance organisation did find 
unexploded BLU-108 sub-munitions stemming from the CBU-97/B/105 SFW, raises some 
doubts as to whether the electronic self-destruct mechanisms of these weapons can 
effectively counter the problem of unexploded sub-munitions at the post-conflict stage and 
thus, guarantee respect for the prohibition under Art. 51 (4) (c) of API. These dangers seem 
to caution against using these weapons as alternatives for traditional cluster munitions in and 
around populated areas. The problem is thus with SFWs that still no sufficient body of 
evidence exists from operational experience to make the case either way that the fundamental 
humanitarian concerns associated with the use of cluster munitions can or cannot be avoided. 
While certain developed states hail these weapons as alternatives to traditional cluster 
munitions they should be reminded that in respect of their procurement or development of 
SFW they are also under a customary international law obligation to determine when 
studying, developing, acquiring or adopting a new weapon like SFW whether the 
employment of this weapon would be prohibited in some or all circumstances by IHL or any 
other rule of international law pursuant to Art. 36 of API.262 In this respect, a new weapon 
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does not necessarily have to be new in a technical sense but this obligation of national review 
would, for instance, also apply to all weapons to be acquired for the first time or to all 
weapons that are modified in a way that alters its function. In such a review, not only the 
weapon’s design and characteristics but also its potential harmful effects on human health or 
the environment must be considered, necessitating a multidisciplinary approach.263  
This would require the review body to draw from information from a wide range of 
actors, not only from the military or weapon manufacturers. Potentially, this obligation would 
be of significant preventive value, as not only the declared manner in which the weapon will 
be used on the battlefield should be analysed but methods of using weapons should also be 
tested against the nature of future armed conflicts.264 Moreover, claims by manufacturers 
should be critically and independently analysed. 
The case of cluster munitions, however, shows two specific limitations of this 
obligation. Firstly, the obligation to review does not prescribe how weapons should be tested. 
The battlefield realities associated with the use of cluster munitions drastically revealed the 
discrepancy between test and combat conditions. Accordingly, considerable difficulties are 
involved to create test conditions that approximate combat reality. Secondly, there is no 
obligation to make the substantive findings of the review authority public, as the 
development of new means and methods of combat is linked to future armed forces’ 
capabilities which states are reluctant to disclose to rivals.  
However, if one considers the fundamental obligation to ensure respect for IHL in all 
circumstances then a state may arguably be under an obligation to share the results of the 
review where it is concluded that a weapon is illegal. Thus, in such cases transparency in the 
procurement or production process of a weapon would be greatly enhanced. Moreover, the 
legal basis for the review must necessarily be broad, since Art. 36 binds states parties not 
only to conduct the review in the light of API or IHL but also in the light of any other rule of 
international law. This provides an additional justification for examining cluster munition use 
under HRL.265  
While these are interesting recommendations, evidently in the process of cluster 
munition development and proliferation careful reviews were either not conducted or not 
acted upon. For too long states have not sufficiently asked themselves as to what the viable 
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alternatives to the use of cluster munitions are to ensure better respect for fundamental rules 
of IHL. Such assessment would have been required under the heading of the obligation to 
take all feasible precautions to minimise civilian harm and wrong procurement decisions, in 
the sense of stockpiling great numbers of inaccurate and unreliable weapons instead of 
procuring or developing more accurate and reliable alternatives, could have been avoided. 
Thus, care must be taken when considering SFW as viable alternatives. 
 The conclusion drawn from the analysis of general rules of IHL is that too much 
reliance is placed on whether armed forces or groups respect the prohibitions on 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on a case-by-case basis. Because of the prevailing 
interpretation of when a weapon is deemed indiscriminate by nature, i.e. only if the intended 
weapon design is such as to make it impossible to distinguish between military and civilian 
targets in all circumstances, the evaluation of cluster munition use rests on such a case-by-
case analysis in line with the prohibition of indiscriminate methods of combat. It is submitted 
that only the prohibition of indiscriminate means of combat is truly preventive as the use of 
such weapons will be prohibited in all circumstances at the outset. However, the fact that the 
prevailing interpretation of indiscriminate means of combat just resorts to the intended design 
of the weapon rather than its typical effects on the battlefield ensures that consistent actual 
battlefield experience where harmful effects on civilians are not an intended result are not 
adequately taken into account. Conversely, the prohibition of indiscriminate methods which 
has regard to how a weapon is used in specific circumstances implies that there may be 
circumstances where the use of weapon is legal. Had cluster munitions only been used in 
open, uninhabited areas there might have been a case that general rules of IHL are adequate 
to prevent civilian harm from the use of these weapons. Since that has not been the case for 
over thirty years after the adoption of API, the view already put forward by Kalshoven in 
1990 that he did not share the optimism of those who believed that “indiscriminate effects” 
provided standards that could simply be applied to existing and possible future weapons may 
be fully endorsed.266 Therefore, the problem is that general rules of IHL were too vague in 
character to provide sufficient restraint for cluster munition use. They were thus not 
sufficiently preventive and precautionary obligations of the attacker in preventing civilian 
harm in specific cases have not been properly implemented. 
A limited response is to compensate for the lack of respect of general IHL rules by 
virtue of decisions of international bodies on state or individual responsibility for cluster 
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munition use in or near civilian residential areas. However, this is mostly a reactive remedy 
and the potential deterrent effect on other armed forces or groups that are not party to specific 
proceedings is limited. With this in mind, two cases where the use of cluster munitions led 
international bodies to a decision on IHL violations shall be analysed. 
 
3.5.  The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Partial Award of 28 
April 2004 
 
Following an international armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 1998-
2000, the two states concluded a Peace Agreement in Algiers in December of 2000 which 
established under its Art. 5 a Claims Commission whose mandate is to decide through 
binding arbitration, inter alia, all claims for loss, damage or injury resulting from IHL 
violations by one government against the other, and by nationals of one party against the 
government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other.267  
Among the various claims put forward was a claim by Ethiopia that Eritrean aircraft 
had dropped cluster bombs that killed 53, including twelve school children, wounded 185 
civilians, including 42 school children, and damaged property in the vicinity of a school and 
the surrounding neighbourhood in Mekele on 5 June 1998.268 
The type of cluster munition used by Eritrea was the CB-250-K air-dropped cluster 
munition which contains 240 PM-1 explosive sub-munitions each. Upon dropping the cluster 
munition, it opens at a preset altitude and disperses the explosive sub-munitions. The cluster 
munition is unguided in the sense that once the cluster munition is dropped no longer can the 
user influence its trajectory nor the fall of the explosive sub-munitions. The explosive sub-
munitions are so-called CEMs, i.e. they combine an anti-materiel, anti-personnel and 
incendiary effect. The anti-matériel effect is achieved by a shaped charge which can penetrate 
up to 15 cm of armour, the anti-personnel effect by the pre-fragmented metal casing of the 
su-munition which shatters upon impact. Furthermore, the sub-munitions incorporate a 
zirconium ring, giving them an additional incendiary effect. On impacting the ground or the 
target, these effects are dispersed over an area of no less than 50.000 m².269 
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In the proceedings before the commission, the two states agreed that there had been 
three sorties by Eritrean aircraft armed with said cluster munitions, one of which hit Mekele 
airport and one the Ayder school approximately seven kilometres away from the airport. 
However, there was disagreement as to whether the third sortie hit the Ayder school area or 
Mekele airport, Ethiopia arguing that the third strike hit the school, which Eritrea disputed.270 
The issue was relevant in that Ethiopia argued that, “given the extreme odds against the two 
errors resulting in the bombing the same place, the Commission must conclude that the Ayder 
School and neighbourhood were deliberate and unlawful targets of those two sorties.”271 On 
the other hand, Eritrea in denying that the third strike hit the school and surroundings argued 
that it had no reasons to target civilians and that it had strong reasons to target Mekele 
airport.272 
The commission found that the third strike had indeed hit the Ayder school area and 
not the airport. Yet, it was not convinced that Eritrea deliberately targeted civilian areas since 
Eritrea had obvious and compelling reasons to concentrate its limited air power on Ethiopia’s 
air fighting capability rather than on Ethiopia’s civilians.273 It held that Eritrea’s conduct had 
to be assessed against Art. 57 of API, the essence of which it determined to be “that all 
feasible precautions to prevent unintended injury to protected persons must be taken in 
choosing targets, in the choice of means and methods of attack and in the actual conduct of 
operations.”274 
 In deciding that Eritrea had failed to take all feasible precautions as required by 
customary international law reflected in Art. 57 of API, the commission regarded the manner 
in which the airstrikes had been carried out as relevant: Since two out of the three cluster 
munition attacks did not come close to their intended target, this indicated a lack of essential 
care. Moreover, Eritrea did not take appropriate actions after the consequences of the two 
sorties hitting the school and its surroundings became known to prevent recurrence of civilian 
harm.275 
Significantly, the commission merely inferred rather than proved Eritrea’s lack of 
feasible precautions in its two cluster munition attacks from the ex post facto result that the 
attacks hit the school and surroundings rather than Mekele airport. As the commission 
acknowledged, it could not determine why the cluster munitions dropped hit the 
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neighbourhood of the school rather than the airport, since all of the information critical to that 
issue was in the possession of Eritrea which did not make that information available. Faced 
with such a dilemma, the commission considered that it was entitled to draw negative 
inferences from this uncooperative conduct by Eritrea to conclude that Eritrea had violated its 
obligation to take all feasible precautions. The commission supported this approach by citing 
to the Corfu Channel judgement by the ICJ.276  
As will be recalled, in the Corfu Channel case the problem was that the UK which 
alleged Albania’s responsibility for damages incurred by the explosion of submarine mines in 
Albanian territorial waters could not prove that the laying of the mines was directly 
attributable to Albania. However, since there were difficulties in obtaining facts that would 
point to knowledge by the Albanian authorities that mines were laid in its territorial waters by 
virtue of Albania’s exclusive control over its territory and thus, exclusive knowledge, the ICJ 
allowed the UK to have recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence that would 
support a conclusion that Albania must have known about the laying of mines.277 
The recourse to the admissibility of factual inferences in line with Corfu Channel 
would make sense if answering the question whether Eritrea took all feasible precautions in 
its cluster munition attacks depended upon information over which Eritrea had exclusive 
possession only, for example, on whether the pilots flying the sorties made errors in 
programming the computers. Eritrea only made assertions to the effect that the computers had 
been set to attack Mekele airport without making direct evidence from the pilots available or 
even naming the pilots for purposes of witness hearings. 
However, to prove Eritrea’s violation of its obligation to take all feasible precautions 
other information but the one exclusively in possession of Eritrea could have been resorted 
to. For instance, cluster munitions of the same type had been used in the Sudanese armed 
conflict since 1995 from which the harmful effects on civilians both at the time of use as well 
as at the post-conflict stage resulted.278 Moreover, the general danger of using cluster 
munitions against an airport in or around civilian residential areas already led to prosecution 
of an individual, Milan Martić, for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the ICTY in 
1995.279 Thus, the major criticism to be voiced is that the commission did not adequately take 
the characteristics of cluster munitions into account, especially in and around populated 
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areas.280 While there may have been some unpopulated space between Mekele town and the 
airport, one village is just less than a kilometre away from the airfield. Furthermore, the fact 
that the explosive sub-munitions could stray as far as around four kilometres from the 
intended target should have prompted the commission to raise the accuracy and the wide area 
effect problems of the cluster munitions used.281 
The second ground on which the comission’s award was based, Eritrea’s failure to 
take appropriate actions as a reaction to civilian harm observed with the two airstrikes to 
prevent further recurrence of such harm, represents a welcome application of Art. 57 (2) (b) 
of API which obliges military commanders to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes 
apparent that a further attack may lead to excessive civilian harm in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage. In this regard, the commission found that after the second 
strike which hit the school and surroundings despite early news reports of events at Mekele, 
neither the aircraft flying the second sortie nor the one flying the third was inspected and no 
evidence had been provided indicating any changes in Eritrean training or doctrine to prevent 
recurrence of further civilian harm.282  This signals to armed forces and groups that it is not 
enough to take all feasible precautions before an attack but also thereafter.283  
Less fortunate was the commission’s statement that it regarded Eritrea’s argument as 
valid that it had to use some inexperienced pilots and ground crew, as it did not have more 
than a few experienced personnel. In the view of the commission these facts could not be 
held against Eritrea for in these circumstances it was not “feasible” and thus, practically 
possible for Eritrea to deploy more experienced personnel.284 With respect, following such 
reasoning states would be effectively dispensed from properly training their armed forces. 
They could simply point to the lack of capabilities of their service members to avoid a 
finding that they violated their obligations to take all feasible precautions in an armed 
conflict. Such an interpretation also runs counter to some explicit provisions of API which 
provide for peace time preventive measures and even render them meaningless, for instance, 
Art. 1, the generic obligation to ensure respect for IHL and Art. 82 which provides for legal 
advisers to be made available to the armed forces at all times. 
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While the commission’s award thus appears limited due to the fact that it did not take 
into account the inaccuracy, wide dispersal pattern and the propensity of the CB-250-K air-
dropped cluster munition used by Eritrea in or near populated areas, the ICTY in the Martić 
case engaged in a detailed analysis of these factors. This case whose proceedings lasted from 
1995-2008 shall now be subject to comment in the next section. 
 
3.6.  The Landmark Martić Case Before the ICTY285 
 
In the mid-morning hours of 2 May 1995 without warning between four and six 
Orkan rockets, a cluster munition where each rocket contains 288 sub-munitions which in 
turn are equipped with 420 small steel balls, were launched by armed forces of the self-
proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) from between 47 to 51 km south of Zagreb. 
There were military targets in and around Zagreb at the time of these attacks, including the 
Ministry of Defence building in the city centre and Zagreb airport which was also used for 
military purposes and where civilian residential areas were within a distance of around 500 
m. Explosive sub-munitions hit targets in central Zagreb and the village of Plešo near Zagreb 
airport. At midday on 3 May 1995 Zagreb was again shelled with four to six Orkan rockets 
which hit locations in central Zagreb. Milan Martić, the President and Commander in Chief 
of the armed forces of the RSK ordered these attacks in the course of which seven persons 
not actively participating in the hostilities were killed and at least another 214 civilians 
injured. Most of these victims were claimed at the time of the attack but two clearance 
experts were killed and injured, respectively, due to the presence of unexploded sub-
munitions in the immediate aftermath of the attack. On 2 May, the first attack received 
massive media coverage before the second attack was launched on 3 May.286 Also four 
children were seriously injured over two months after the attacks due to tampering with 
unexploded sub-munitions caused by the shellings.287  
Thus, especially the first attack on 2 May displays the commonality with cluster 
munition attacks by Eritrea in that in both cases an intended target was an airport used for 
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military purposes but the explosive sub-munitions hit civilian residential areas off the 
military objective instead. Also, in both cases civilian residential areas were less than one 
kilometre away from the military target. 
A difference between the two cases is that the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 
Award concerned state responsibility while the Martić case before the ICTY individual 
criminal responsibility. This means that before the ICTY the mental element to decide on 
responsibility has a particular significance. As shall be shown, the mental element also 
explains why the ICTY in the Martić case considered the characteristics of the cluster 
munition used. 
Martić was initially indicted for knowingly and wilfully ordering unlawful attacks 
against the civilian population of Zagreb both on 2 and 3 May, thereby violating the laws and 
customs of war under article 3 of the ICTY Statute (Counts I and III). Alternatively, he was 
charged with command responsibility for failing to prevent these shellings (Counts II and 
IV).288 Thus, from the very beginning, the indictment was concerned with wilful attacks on 
civilians.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on article 85 (3) 
(a) of API concerning grave breaches committed in international armed conflicts specifies 
with regard to wilfully that this “encompasses the concepts of “wrongful intent” or 
“recklessness”, viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, 
accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of 
foresight is not covered, i.e. when a person acts without having his mind on the act or its 
consequences (although failing to take the necessary precautions, particularly failing to seek 
precise information, constitutes culpable negligence punishable at least by disciplinary 
sanctions).”289 Thus, the precise basis on which Eritrea was held responsible as a state by the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, the failure to take the necessary precautions would not 
suffice for a finding on individual criminal responsibility for cluster munition attacks before 
the ICTY. 
The indictment against Martić was confirmed by a single ICTY judge who issued 
several arrest warrants. Since the arrest warrant could not be executed despite reasonable 
efforts and the accused remained at large for a considerable time, the ICTY judge who had 
confirmed the indictment ordered that an ICTY Trial Chamber review the indictment in a 
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public hearing pursuant to Rule 61 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.290 In this 
regard, it is especially relevant if Martić’s armed group deliberately targeted the civilian 
population as such or if they made some attempt to direct operations at military objectives 
within Zagreb which were not hit due to the choice of the weapon. In the first case, it may be 
argued that the Martić case is just an aberration of cluster munition use since that weapon 
was used in a particularly irresponsible, i.e. deliberate manner. On the other hand, in the 
second case, the focus would be more on the weapon and if the weapon can be reasonably 
used in populated areas in a discriminate manner rather than on the specific mens rea of the 
attacker. In other words, if the latter approach were adopted it would be more difficult to 
argue that the Martić case was a simple aberration and implications for other uses of cluster 
munitions could be drawn more easily.  
The Rule 61 hearing transcripts evidence in this regard that the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) primarily focused on the fact that the Orkan rockets were chosen to 
intentionally target and terrorise the civilian population and that the attack occurred in an 
area where there were no legitimate military targets.291 This is another parallel to the 
proceedings before the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission proceedings where the applicant 
Ethiopia argued that Eritrea’s cluster munition use which resulted in civilian harm evidenced 
that Eritrea intentionally targeted civilians. 
The focus by the OTP on deliberate attacks against civilians cannot be explained by 
article 3 of the ICTY Statute itself since this provision does not contain an explicit reference 
to either deliberate attacks on civilians or indiscriminate attacks under its heading of “laws or 
customs of war”. However, not long before the 1996 Martić Rule 61 proceedings the ICTY 
in its celebrated Decision on Interlocutory Appeals in Prosecutor v. Tadić on 2 October 1995 
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established that unenumerated offences are also subject to prosecution under article 3 of the 
ICTY Statute.292 
Since the classification of the armed conflict as well as the extent to which war crimes 
are subject to prosecution both in international and non-international armed conflicts posed 
significant difficulties in the Tadić case at the stage of jurisdiction, it is understandable that 
the OTP opted for formulations of offences that are the same under treaty law and customary 
international law regardless of the nature of the conflict. In this respect, the prohibition of 
attacks against the civilian population as such provided this common denominator as it is the 
same in article 51 (2) of API, in article 13 (2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II on Non-
International Armed Conflicts (APII) as well as customary international law.293  
Yet, it must be emphasised that the OTP also contended that even assuming that there 
were legitimate military targets in downtown Zagreb that the wrong weapon was used to 
attack them. With regard to this submission the OTP put the question to expert witness Itani 
that assuming the aim of the use of Orkan rockets on Zagreb was to hit military targets 
whether then this weapon was appropriate to use; the witness answered that he would have 
used a more precise and more destructive weapon. 294 By supporting the use of a more 
destructive weapon in a populated area, this statement exposes also the weakness of the 
argument that if cluster munitions cannot be used any more then greater use of unitary high-
explosive munitions would result in more collateral damage. 
The ICTY Trial Chamber in its Rule 61 Decision of 8 March 1996 recognised articles 
51 (2) of API and 13 (2) of APII as appropriate legal bases for the charges but as opposed to 
the OTP explicitly referenced articles 51 (4) (b) and 51 (5) (b) of API and thereby endorsed 
the OTP submission that even if an attack was directed against a legitimate military objective 
an unlawful attack against civilians may have been ordered.295 As to the factual basis for the 
indictment, the Trial Chamber took note of the witnesses´ testimonies that there were no 
military targets around the locations where civilians were killed by the explosive sub-
munitions. Nevertheless, it observed that the administration building of the Ministry of the 
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Interior was allegedly hit on 2 May 1995.296 However, in determining that there were 
reasonable grounds for reconfirming the indictment the ICTY stated that  
 
“In respect of its accuracy and striking force, the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not designed 
to hit military targets but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb.”297  
 
If viewed in isolation it may be surmised that the Trial Chamber primarily upheld the 
indictment on the ground that the rocket attacks had been ordered for the purpose of 
intentionally targeting and terrorising the civilian population. Nevertheless, the quotations of 
the Tribunal of the prohibitions of indiscriminate attacks and the finding that apparently, 
there were military targets in Zagreb at the time of the attacks caution against such a narrow 
interpretation. Finally, the very fact that the Trial Chamber reconfirmed the indictment for 
wilfully attacking civilians makes it clear that the ICTY accepted that there were reasonable 
grounds for prosecuting Martić not only for intentionally but alternatively also for recklessly 
attacking civilians, i.e. hitting civilians as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks, even were 
it to be established that there was an intention to hit military targets. 
In the following years up to trial proceedings, two important developments occurred. 
Firstly, Martić finally surrendered to ICTY custody in 2002. This guaranteed full 
involvement in the further proceedings of the Defence which argued that there were indeed 
military targets in Zagreb that were the object of the attacks. Thus, the Prosecution was 
forced to devote more attention to elaborating on the meaning of wilfully attacking civilians 
even if there were military targets in and around Zagreb.  
Secondly, the ICTY in the Blaskić and Galić cases elaborated more in-depth on the 
elements of the crime of unlawful attacks on civilians. The Blaskić Trial Chamber judgement 
of 2000 where the accused was, inter alia, convicted for using home made mortars which 
were especially difficult to guide accurately exclusively against military targets stands for the 
proposition that a direct attack on civilians may be inferred from the indiscriminate nature of 
the weapons used.298 For the crime of unlawful attacks on civilians under article 3 of the 
ICTY Statute the Trial Chamber identified the following elements: (a) causation of civilian 
deaths and/or serious bodily injury within the civilian population or damage to civilian 
property; and (b) that such attacks must have been conducted intentionally in the knowledge, 
or when it was impossible not to know that civilians or civilian property were being 
                                                 
296 Prosecutor v. Martić, Decision pursuant to Rule 61, supra note 290, at 145. 
297 Ibid., at 147. 
298 Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T.Ch., 3 March 2000, at paras. 501, 512. 
 91
targeted.299 Significantly, the ICTY in its 2003 Trial Chamber judgement in the Galić case, 
which concerned continual sniper attacks on civilians in Sarajevo, ruled that “[…] 
indiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and 
military objectives without distinction, may qualify as direct attacks against civilians.”300 On 
the mens rea element of “wilfulness”, the Trial Chamber confirmed the interpretation given 
in the ICRC Commentary on article 85 API viewed above as including recklessness but 
excluding mere negligence.301 
The Second Amended Indictment of 2002, besides adding other charges for crimes 
allegedly committed by the accused elsewhere in Croatia, contained revised Counts 15 to 19 
for the Zagreb attacks, including murder as a crime against humanity and as a war crime, 
inhuman acts as a crime against humanity and cruel treatment and attacks on civilians as war 
crimes.302  
The ICTY’s jurisprudence in the Blaskić and Galić cases provided room for 
refinement of the OTP’s argument set out in its 2004 Trial Brief that Martić was responsible 
for ordering unlawful attacks on civilians even if the attacks had been aimed at legitimate 
military targets within Zagreb they were an inappropriate and unlawful choice of weapon 
due to the wide dispersal pattern of the sub-munitions and the inability to distinguish between 
civilian and military targets in populated areas.303 For the crime of unlawful attacks against 
civilians, the OTP identified the following elements: (i) an attack resulted in civilian deaths 
and/or serious civilian injury; (ii) the perpetrator knew or should have known the civilian 
status of the persons killed or seriously injured; and (iii) the attack was wilfully directed 
against civilians. Moreover, an indiscriminate attack could substantiate an allegation that the 
attack was in reality directed at civilians.304 This interpretation is in line with the Blaskić and 
Galić judgements and represents a conscious effort of the ICTY to make violations of the 
prohibitions of indiscriminate attacks punishable for all types of armed conflict under article 
3 of the ICTY Statute under the heading of “direct attacks against civilians”.305  
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Thus, the OTP focused more on the contention that even if there had been military 
targets in Zagreb through the use of cluster munitions still unlawful attacks were committed. 
This was necessary to prevail over the Defence which argued that indeed the attacks had been 
intended on military targets in and around Zagreb.306 Against this background, the 2007 Trial 
Chamber judgement shall be assessed. 
The Trial Chamber first outlined the law relevant to Counts 15-19, ordering murder 
both as a war crime and crime against humanity, other inhuman acts, a crime against 
humanity, cruel treatment, a war crime and the war crime of attacks on civilians. As for 
murder the required objective element is death of persons not actively participating in 
hostilities caused by an act or omission. In addition, direct or at least indirect intent must be 
established. “Indirect intent” is understood as knowledge that death was a probable 
consequence of the perpetrator’s conduct.307  
Both “Other inhumane acts” and “cruel treatment” require proof of firstly, an act or 
omission causing serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or constituting a serious 
attack on the human dignity of the victims.308 The required mens rea is the same as for 
murder, i.e. at least indirect intent, the knowledge that cruel treatment or inhumane treatment 
was a likely (synonymous to probable) consequence of the act or omission.309 The only 
difference between the two relates to the status of the victims: While the Trial Chamber 
noted that for inhumane acts as a crime against humanity proof of combatant status hors de 
combat is not sufficient, the war crime of cruel treatment merely requires that the victim did 
not actively participate in hostilities.310  
Finally, the crime of attacks on civilians has in common with the three others that a 
direct attack on civilians resulted in death or serious bodily injury of civilians.311 In this 
                                                                                                                                                        
Appeals Chamber judgement in the Galić case confirmed this interpretation. See Prosecutor v. Galić, 
Judgement, Case No. IT-98-29-A, A.Ch., 30 November 2006, at para. 132.  
306 Interestingly, the Prosecution did not pursue further evidence that it had presented at the Rule 61 hearing as to 
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310 Ibid., at paras. 51-56, 79. 
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 93
regard, the Trial Chamber was consistent with jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Blaskić and 
Galić judgements that “a direct attack against civilians can be inferred from the 
indiscriminate character of the weapon used.”312 Significantly, the judges cited to the Galić 
Appeals Chamber judgement of November 2006 in which the objective elements were 
specified that they could take into account to determine whether an attack was in fact 
directed against civilians. These elements include the means and methods used, the status of 
the victims, their number and the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have 
complied with its precautionary IHL obligations.313  
The ICTY’s approach of inferring from certain factors, including the failure to take 
the feasible precautionary obligations upon attack, a direct attack against civilians seems to 
be at odds with the approach by the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission which was not 
prepared to hold that Eritrea’s failure to take feasible precautions indicated a direct attack on 
Ethiopian civilians. As will be recalled, the claims commission held that due to the fact that 
Eritrea had good reasons to concentrate its limited air combat capabilities on the adversary’s 
air fighting capabilities and due to the fact that Eritrean forces had limited experience with 
using the cluster munitions at issue, no such direct attack had taken place.  
However, the seemingly divergent approaches by the two bodies on this point may be 
understood against the background that the claims commission had to evaluate state 
responsibility and the ICTY individual criminal responsibility. In the claims commission’s 
approach the issue of the mental element is taken into account in identifying whether the 
proper basis for state responsibility is that of direct attacks on civilians under Art. 51 (2) of 
API requiring intentional targeting of civilians or the failure of precautionary obligations 
under Art. 57 of API which does not require a showing of intentional targeting of civilians. 
This approach is consistent with the general rules of IHL. On the other hand, the ICTY’s 
specific stance is to merge deliberate attacks against civilians in accordance with Art. 51 (2) 
of API and indiscriminate attacks pursuant to Arts. 51 (4), 57 of API under the heading of 
direct attacks against civilians which merely requires the showing of recklessness as a 
common mens rea as opposed to deliberation and thus deviates from the general rules of 
IHL. As has been noted above, this deviation was a conscious attempt by the ICTY in 
specifying what conduct could fall under Art. 3 of its Statute as violations of the laws and 
customs of war. 
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With regard to mens rea in Martić, the difference between the other three crimes and 
attacks on civilians is that the indirect intent that needs to be established requires that the 
attack is launched in the acceptance of the possibility of civilian harm rather than knowledge 
of the probable consequences.314 
When examining how the Trial Chamber applied the law to the facts of the case, the 
focus shall first be on the crime of attacks on civilians, since the threshold of proof regarding 
the intent is the lowest compared to the other crimes charged. At the outset, the Trial 
Chamber found it established that Martić had ordered the shelling by noting, inter alia, that 
in his capacity of President of the RSK he led decisions of the Supreme Defence Council as a 
matter of his constitutional authority and the decision to shell Zagreb had been taken by 
Martić and the RSK armed group Main Staff General Čeleketić alone rather than the whole 
Supreme Defence Council.315  
For proving that the Orkan rocket attacks caused death to civilians, the Trial Chamber 
extensively relied on the testimony of Branko Lazarević, head of the Zagreb police 
department of on-site investigations at the time. Lazarević compiled extensive reports based 
on on-site investigations of the locations where the explosive sub-munitions struck as well as 
on forensic medical evidence. He found that five people were killed on 2 May and two on 3 
May.316 The detailed testimony of some of those injured serves as evidence of the kind of 
injuries cluster munition victims sustain: For instance, Mina Žunac, wounded on 2 May, 
suffered serious injuries in her right leg, making amputation of a part of the right foot 
necessary. She also had a fracture of her right knee, hip and fist and sustained head injuries. 
Her head was full of shrapnel and she continues to have over 45 pieces of shrapnel in her leg. 
As a result of these injuries sustained, Ms Žunac underwent at least ten surgeries.317 This is a 
concrete illustration of amputation of limbs as the aforementioned frequent consequence of 
cluster munition use as well as the need for multiple surgeries in the aftermath of such use.318  
Sanja Risović, another victim, who was wounded on 3 May, had a total of eleven 
operations on her back and her hand and up to 2007 had to spend three weeks in 
rehabilitation each year. Her injuries and the time she had to devote to their treatment have 
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severely impacted on her ability to work and to care for her daughter.319 This in turn shows 
that not only the injured person itself is affected but also relatives that are dependent on the 
victim.  
Among the evidence of death and injuries caused by the Orkan rocket attacks were 
also the two police officers and bomb disposal experts Ivan Markulin and Ivica Pukšec, who 
died and sustained serious injuries, respectively, when they were trying to defuse unexploded 
sub-munitions left behind after the attacks.320 Thus, the Trial Chamber also took into account 
death and injuries caused by the second fundamental concern associated with the use of 
cluster munitions, the presence of unexploded sub-munitions that may kill and maim any 
person at the post-conflict stage. This also amounts to a recognition that injuries caused to 
clearance professionals is relevant evidence for finding unlawful attacks on civilians, since 
the clearance activity cannot be interpreted as direct/active participation in hostilities. 
With regard to the question of whether from these casualties it followed that the 
Orkan rocket attacks amounted to unlawful attacks on civilians the Trial Chamber noted the 
arguments put forward by the Defence that there were military targets in Zagreb at the time 
of the attacks, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, Zagreb airport 
which also had a military purpose and the Presidential Palace. Significantly, the judges did 
not generally dispute that these objects constituted military targets. In fact, they relied on 
testimony that for instance, the Ministry of Defence complex included military facilities and 
institutions.321 The Trial Chamber also responded to evidence put forward by the Defence 
that the Ministry of Defence, the Presidential Palace and the airport, all military targets, were 
hit; by stating that only the airport was hit and by further noting that two police buildings 
received damage caused by the attacks, one can infer that the ICTY recognised that there 
were in fact military targets in Zagreb at the time of the attacks.  
However, the judges ruled that “the presence or otherwise of military targets in 
Zagreb is irrelevant in light of the nature of the M-87 Orkan.”322 Therefore, the tribunal was 
not prepared to hold that there were no military targets in Zagreb whatsoever and on that 
basis conclude that an unlawful attack on civilians had been perpetrated. Rather, it indicated 
that the nature of the cluster munitions used would be decisive in finding an unlawful attack 
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on civilians. Thus, one may observe here that the ICTY as opposed to the Eritrea Ethiopia 
Claims Commission regarded the characteristics of the cluster munition used in the specific 
circumstances of using it in and around civilian residential areas as decisive.  
On the M-87 Orkan rocket, the Trial Chamber found, relying heavily on the testimony 
of artillery expert witness for the Prosecution, Jožef Poje, that  
 
“[t]he M-87 Orkan is a non-guided projectile, the primary military use of which is to target soldiers and 
armoured vehicles. Each rocket may contain either a cluster warhead with 288 so-called bomblets or 24 
anti-tank shells. The evidence shows that rockets with cluster warheads containing bomblets were 
launched in the attacks on Zagreb on 2 and 3 May 1995. Each bomblet contains 420 pellets of 3mm in 
diameter. The bomblets are ejected from the rocket at a height of 800-1000m above the targeted area 
and explode upon impact, releasing the pellets. The maximum firing range of the M-87 Orkan is 50 
kilometres. The dispersion error of the rocket at 800-1000m in the air increases with the firing range. 
Fired from the maximum range, this error is about 1000m in any direction. The area of dispersion of 
the bomblets on the ground is about two hectares. Each pellet has a lethal range of ten metres.”323  
 
 
These are important findings as to the design and function of cluster munitions like 
the Orkan rocket. Firstly, the ICTY described the components of cluster munitions, a 
container or delivery system, in this case a rocket, each containing 288 KB-1 explosive sub-
munitions. In this regard, Jožef Poje specified that twelve rockets are contained in a launcher 
which is mounted on a truck, enabling the user to effect individual launches or launches of 
all twelve rockets in short intervals of two, four or six seconds; that means that no less than 
3456 explosive sub-munitions (288 x 12) can be launched at the press of a button. The 
tribunal also accurately observed that at a certain altitude the container (here: the rocket) 
opens and disperses the 288 KB-1 explosive sub-munitions which upon impact are designed 
to explode on the ground over an area as large as two hectares (20000 square metres). 
Importantly, the judges also emphasised that the Orkan rocket is unguided, which means, 
again in the words of expert Poje that “[a]t the moment when the rocket propulsion engine 
ceases to work, then the flight is […] a free flight. As of that moment, we can no longer 
correct or adjust its trajectory.”324  
With regard to the primary military purpose of the Orkan found by the Trial Chamber, 
notably to target soldiers and armoured vehicles, it is important to add their original intended 
use against such targets in open, uninhabited areas. The first effect (anti-personnel effect) is 
achieved through the release of the little metal pellets welded onto each bomblet, creating a 
fragmentation effect which makes it possible to kill dispersed soldiers, the second through a 
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shaped charge which can pierce up to 6cm of armour.325 Emphasising the original military 
purpose of cluster munitions to attack dispersed troops and armour in open, uninhabited 
areas would have brought an even sharper contrast to the conclusion by the Trial Chamber 
that “the M-87 is an indiscriminate weapon, the use of which in densely populated areas, 
such as Zagreb, [as opposed to open, uninhabited areas] will result in the infliction of severe 
casualties.”326  
In concluding that the M-87 Orkan was incapable of hitting specific targets, the ICTY 
not only drew upon the character of the cluster rocket as a non-guided high dispersion 
weapon but also upon the fact that the rockets had been launched from the maximum of its 
range, i.e. around 50 kilometres from Zagreb, resulting in a dispersal error of about 1 km in 
any direction.327 However, the range from which the Orkan was launched in the specific 
instance did not exceed the maximum range from which targets with this multiple-rocket 
launcher could be hit, as these rockets were designed to be launched from a range of up to 50 
km.328 An expert on cluster munitions who has extensively written on these weapons since 
2000, proved in this context that eight of the actual twelve rockets launched performed as 
well as could be expected given that they fell within the dispersal error of about 1 km from 
the nearest military target.329 Moreover, even within the probable target area when the 
weapon is used as designed there were civilian targets in the immediate vicinity of single 
military targets. Thus, irrespective of the fact that the rockets were used from the extreme of 
their intended range that does not change, it only further aggravates, the fundamental 
characteristics of cluster munitions that they are incapable of hitting specific military targets 
intermingled with densely populated civilian residential areas. This is a landmark conclusion 
by the ICTY with implications for all instances of cluster munition use to date, since they 
have always been used in or near densely populated areas, including in Eritrea’s use of 
cluster munitions against Ethiopia referred to above.  
As for the required mens rea of “wilfulness” the Trial Chamber concluded that by 2 
May 1995, the effects of firing the M-87 Orkan on Zagreb were known to those involved.330 
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This author submits that the evidence to prove the mental element was thin, even 
contradictory. While one witness testified that “persons who are familiar with these artillery 
pieces knew that they were intended for targeting wider areas and not points, and that as such 
they could entail a lot of casualties”,331 another stated that it would have been easy to 
conclude what the consequences of using the Orkan would be but allowed for the possibility 
that not everyone is familiar with the consequences of using this weapon.332  
However, other evidence could have been resorted to, since the same Orkan rockets 
were already used by the Krajina Serbs before the Zagreb bombing, for example in Zaton in 
January 1993 and in Gospić in 1993 when two men and one woman were injured as a result 
of KB-1 sub-munitions.333 Significantly, Martić had held various posts in the RSK 
government since 1991, first Minister of Defence, then from June 1991 until 1994 Minister 
of the Interior. In the latter capacity, he directed the training of paramilitary police that 
became part of the RSK armed group and was member of the Supreme Defence Council 
from April 1993 which took all important military decisions.334 From this, it could have been 
concluded that already in 1993, the effects of the Orkan rockets used by the RSK armed 
group were known to Martić. 
The evidence for establishing “wilfulness” for the attack on 3 May was much stronger 
because of the extensive media coverage on casualties from the rocket attack of 2 May.335 
This is another commonality with the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission Award, since the 
failure to prevent recurrence of civilian harm from previous cluster munition use despite 
knowledge of the harm also contributed to the decision on Eritrea’s responsibility in that 
case. 
Since the Trial Chamber reiterated previous ICTY jurisprudence analysed above that a 
direct attack on civilians may be inferred from the indiscriminate character of the Orkan 
rocket, it was able to conclude that Martić wilfully made the civilian population of Zagreb 
object of the attacks on 2 and 3 May 1995 and that he thus incurred individual criminal 
responsibility for the war crime of attacks on civilians.336 
With regard to Count 15, murder as a crime against humanity, the judges held that due 
to the characteristics of the M-87 Orkan and the large-scale nature of the attack the shelling 
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also constituted a widespread attack directed against the civilian population of Zagreb. The 
Tribunal also had no problem in finding that all seven deaths were caused by the Orkan 
rocket attacks and that due to the nature of the cluster rockets he was aware that death was a 
probable consequence of these attacks. The accused could only be convicted of a crime 
against humanity in relation to six of the seven persons killed, since Ivan Markulin, the police 
officer and bomb disposal expert, could not be termed a “civilian” for the purposes of crimes 
against humanity. On the other hand, Markulin´s death formed the basis for a finding of 
Martić´s responsibility besides the death of the other six persons under Count 16, murder as a 
war crime in accordance with article 3 of the ICTY Statute because Markulin was not taking 
an active part in hostilities.337  
The fact that the Trial Chamber held that the launch of eight to twelve Orkan rockets 
(i.e. 3456 explosive sub-munitions at most) in densely populated areas, which entailed seven 
deaths, may be sufficiently widespread to amount to a crime against humanity already in 
1995 is another landmark conclusion of the 2007 judgement. Significantly, expert witness 
Poje testified that because of their high dispersion pattern multiple-barrel rocket launchers in 
general are unsuitable for firing on targets in populated areas, not only the Orkan but others 
too.338 Accordingly, Poje did not only confine his findings to one type of MLRS, the Orkan 
cluster rocket but indicated that MLRS systems dispersing explosive sub-munitions more 
generally will display the same incapability of hitting specific targets in populated areas.  
Therefore, the conclusions concerning the Orkan multiple-launch rocket system may 
equally be applied to the M-26 MLRS system when used in or near populated areas. The M-
26 MLRS may fire up to 12 rockets at a time from a range of up to 32 km (thus less than the 
Orkan rocket´s range of up to 50 km). Each M-26 cluster rocket contains 644 M-77 dual 
purpose improved conventional sub-munitions (as opposed to 288 DPICM in the Orkan). 
Compared with the Orkan rocket where 3456 explosive sub-munitions may be used at the 
press of a button, a user of the M-26 may disperse 7728 explosive sub-munitions at the press 
of a button. The sheer number of sub-munitions that may be dispensed from the M-26 is thus 
more than two times higher than with the Orkan rocket. This makes it reasonable to assume 
that the dispersion pattern will be similar to sub-munitions released by an Orkan rocket 
despite the fact that the M-26 is only suitable for use from shorter ranges.    
Therefore, where the launching of eight to twelve Orkan rockets into populated areas, 
entailing a large number of civilian casualties, amounts to a crime against humanity, there is 
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a strong case that the use by the United States and Israel of M-26 cluster rockets equally was 
a crime against humanity. 339 Reportedly, U.S. ground forces used such cluster rockets in 
Iraqi populated areas in 2003,340 and especially Israel used no less than 1800 M-26 cluster 
rockets, i.e. 1800 x 64 M-77 explosive sub-munitions, equating to almost 1,2 Mio. explosive 
M-77 sub-munitions in the last three days during hostilities with Hezbollah in 2006.341  
Finally, another landmark conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber was that the use 
of cluster munitions with wide area effects in densely populated areas which results in 
persons not actively participating in hostilities seriously injured, may constitute cruel 
treatment punishable as a war crime under article 3 ICTY Statute and upon satisfaction of the 
general requirements, inhumane acts punishable as a crime against humanity under article 5 
ICTY Statute.342 The prohibition of subjecting persons to cruel or inhuman treatment forms 
part of the prohibition of torture and cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment under both 
HRL and IHL.343 This ruling is a first reminder that the use of cluster munitions not only 
poses problems under IHL but also under the complementary regime of HRL.344 
The findings of the Trial Chamber were upheld by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. For 
purposes of this discussion, Martić stated inter alia that the Trial Chamber erred when it held 
that the M-87 Orkan was an indiscriminate weapon. In contrast, he argued that it was a 
precise weapon, even from a long distance.345 He supported this statement with a different 
expert report than the one on which the Trial Chamber finally relied and a memorandum from 
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the United Nations Military Observers which concluded that the dispersal error would be an 
ellipse of only 180m x 165m rather than 1000m x 1000m.346 Martić also emphasised that the 
targets aimed at were large and similar weapons have been used by many armies in the recent 
past. Moreover, he doubted the expert witnesses’ expertise and rebuked the Trial Chamber 
for failing to consider that apart from the Orkan rocket, the Krajina Serb armed group only 
had the more powerful Luna rocket system at its disposal.347 Finally, Martić challenged the 
Trial Chamber judgement on the grounds that it did not take into account Croatia’s own 
precautionary obligations to protect its civilian population against the effects of military 
operations under Art. 58 API and that it wrongfully held that the attack constituted a 
widespread attack against the civilian population.348   
On the alleged precision of the Orkan rocket, the Appeals Chamber held that the basis 
for finding the different dispersion error relied on by the Defence had not been sufficiently 
revealed. This would have been necessary in view of the fact that the dispersion pattern 
depends on a number of factors, including the firing range. More fundamentally, the Appeals 
Chamber was not prepared to accept that a dispersion error of 180m x 165m would make the 
finding that the Orkan rocket was incapable of hitting specific targets unreasonable.349 The 
implication is that the ICTY adopts a strict stance on errors in accuracy of artillery weapons 
used in populated areas. This makes the statement on the insufficient accuracy of the Orkan 
rocket in populated areas generalisable for other cluster munitions, as virtually all cluster 
munition types ever used have some dispersion errors, which makes it probable that a high 
number of sub-munitions lands far off an intended target. Consequently, there is zero 
tolerance for using cluster munitions in populated areas and the Appeals Chamber endorsed 
the Trial Chamber’s approach to disregard the presence of military targets in Zagreb at the 
time of the attacks.350  
In this context, the Appeals Chamber also dismissed the argument that many armies 
used similar weapons in the recent past as irrelevant.351 It is submitted that it did rightfully so, 
as the mere fact that cluster munitions have been used in recent armed conflicts is of no 
relevance for the inquiry whether the use of the Orkan rocket was lawful in the circumstances 
of the Zagreb bombing. It may be added that this statement would have weakened the 
position of the Defence, not strengthened it, as the use of similar cluster munitions in 
                                                 
346 Ibid., at para. 250. 
347 Ibid., at para. 239. 
348 Ibid., at para. 239-240. 
349 Ibid., at para. 250. 
350 Ibid., at para. 251. 
351 Ibid. 
 102
populated areas has always entailed civilian casualties and thus, was always unlawful in such 
circumstances. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected Martić’s challenges of the expertise of the expert 
witnesses on whose testimony the Trial Chamber heavily relied, as he had not pointed to any 
specific lack of expertise or error.352 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber explicitly addressed the argument that opponents to 
any specific rules on cluster munitions frequently tend to make, that in relation to the 
alternative of using more powerful unitary weapons cluster munition use in populated areas 
would still be a preferable option. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument 
that relatively speaking, the Orkan was the appropriate weapon choice, as the alternative of 
using the larger and more powerful Luna unitary rocket system would potentially have been 
still worse in terms of civilian casualties. The judges found that whether the Krajina Serbs 
had another artillery system at their disposal was irrelevant as regards the inquiry whether or 
not the Orkan rocket was indiscriminately used in the circumstances at hand.353 The 
implication is that the statement that were one to prohibit cluster munitions because they are 
an indiscriminate method of combat in populated areas something else even more 
indiscriminate will be used instead will not be accepted as a matter of IHL. 
On the allegation that the Trial Chamber failed to take the lack of respect by Croatia 
of its precautionary obligations as a defender into account, the Appeals Chamber had no 
difficulty in rejecting this submission. It held that it was one of the pillars of IHL that its 
provisions have to be applied in all circumstances, citing to the obligation to respect and 
ensure respect for IHL enshrined in common Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions as well as 
Art. 1 of API. Thus, one side could not claim that its obligations would be diminished or non-
existent just because the other side does not respect all of its obligations.354 Again, this 
statement of principle is important in light of the record of use of cluster munitions that these 
weapons have been used to a large extent in asymmetrical armed conflicts where the defender 
frequently mingles with the civilian population or positions itself in the midst of civilian 
objects. However, under IHL considerations of reciprocity have receded to the 
background.355  
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Finally, the Appeals Chamber also confirmed the Trial Chamber’s on the shelling of 
Zagreb as a widespread attack against the civilian population, by noting that Martić did not 
challenge the high number of civilian casualties caused by the bombing and did not object to 
the fact that of the purported military targets, only one was hit.356 
In short, the 2007 and 2008 Martić judgements reached fundamental conclusions with 
regard to the first fundamental problem associated with cluster munition use, their wide area 
effect with harmful consequences for civilians in populated areas. Perhaps the most 
important signal it sends is that the use of cluster munitions in areas where military targets 
are intermingled with civilians and civilian objects – circumstances all too present in 
contemporary armed conflicts – is generally unlawful under IHL. It is this fundamental and 
generalisable statement that sets this judgement apart from the award by the Eritrea Ethiopia 
Claims Commission which only took into account whether the specific conduct by the 
personnel using cluster munitions evidenced a lack of feasible precautions rather than raising 
the more fundamental question whether cluster munitions can be lawfully used in and around 
populated areas at all.  
However, even these judgements constitute a missed opportunity, since more 
attention, especially by the OTP could have been devoted to the second humanitarian 
problem of cluster munition use, the problem of deaths and injury at the post-conflict stage 
as a result of tampering with landmine-like sub-munitions that were left unexploded. In this 
respect, the Trial Chamber expressly included one dead and one seriously injured police 
officers among the victims on the basis of which it held Martić responsible for cruel 
treatment under article 3 of the ICTY Statute.  
While these were casualties occurring in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on 2 
and 3 May, as was observed above, already in 1996 the OTP presented evidence of four 
children that were severely injured in Zagreb as a consequence of tampering with 
unexploded sub-munitions from the May attacks over two months afterwards. However, it 
did not pursue this issue any further.357 Indeed, it would have been easy for the ICTY to 
establish a causal link between these injuries and the use of the Orkan rockets in May, since 
                                                 
356 Prosecutor v. Martić, Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 255. The Appeals Chamber also 
approved of the Trial Chamber’s treatment of the mens rea, i.e. that the effects of the M-87 Orkan were known 
to Martić. Ibid., at para. 256. 
357 It appears that this was not a conscious decision but that the OTP was confident that focusing on the 
immediate casualties resulting from the 2 and 3 May attacks would already provide a sufficient basis for a 
conviction in this case. See Wiebe, “For Whom the Little Bells Toll”, supra note 189, at 44, fn. 207 (citing to an 
e-mail received from Alex Whiting of the Prosecution team in the Martić case). 
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large numbers of duds were recovered,358 Zagreb had never been shelled with cluster 
munitions before and the incident occurred close to a site of an earlier explosion on 3 
May.359 Thus, the objective elements for the crimes of attacks on civilians and cruel 
treatment would have also been satisfied in respect of these post-conflict casualties.  
With regard to the required mens rea, the OTP would have had to prove that Martić 
acknowledged as a possibility or knew of the probability, respectively, of civilian injury 
through the presence of duds months after cluster munition use. Evidence exists from which 
the mental element could have been established, since as specified above, the Krajina Serbs 
had used Orkan rockets in Croatia already before 1995.  In this respect, it is noteworthy that 
five people were killed and seven injured from unexploded sub-munitions stemming from 
Orkan rocket use by the Krajina Serbs between 1 January and 14 July 1993 in Zadar, Muc, 
Sibenik and Sukosan. In 1994, one boy was killed by an unexploded sub-munition.360 
 Including long-term post-conflict casualties through unexploded sub-munitions in the 
conviction for unlawful attacks on civilians and/or cruel treatment would have been an 
important recognition that such casualties are also a possible and even likely consequence of 
cluster munition use. Had the Trial Chamber resorted to the four long-term casualties in 
holding Martić responsible it would have strengthened the view endorsed in 2006 by state 
parties in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference to the CCW that such long-
term civilian harm must indeed be considered by an attacking force in complying with its 
obligation to conduct a proportionality assessment before launching an attack. Unfortunately, 
it missed this opportunity but nevertheless both the OTP and the Trial Chamber are to be 
credited for prosecuting and convicting, respectively, Martić on the basis of cluster munition 
use in civilian residential areas.  
However, the more fundamental opportunity was missed subsequently in the context 
of cluster munition use by NATO member states during “Operation Allied Force”. The 
controversial decision by the OTP not to investigate cluster munition use and other alleged 
war crimes in this context cannot but leave a bitter aftertaste of selective justice. In the next 
section, this author argues that there were no good legal reasons in not investigating cluster 
munition use in the former Yugoslavia by NATO member state individuals while 
                                                 
358 Mario Petrić, Chief of the Anti-Explosives Department of the Zagreb police, testified at the 1996 Rule 61 
Hearing that altogether 1599 unexploded sub-munitions were cleared. See Prosecutor v. Martić, Transcript of 
the Rule 61 Hearing, supra note 287, at 90. 
359 Ibid., at 45. 
360 Handicap International, “Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions”, November 2006, 
at  23,  http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/Fatal_Footprint_HI_report_on_CM_casualties.1.pdf (last visited 
21 January 2010). 
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investigating and prosecuting the head of the Krajina Serbs for the same conduct in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
 
3.7.  The Failure of the ICTY OTP to Prosecute NATO Member 
States Individuals for Cluster Munition Use in Operation Allied Force   
 
As reported supra,361 U.S., UK and Dutch armed forces extensively used air-dropped 
cluster munitions during the 1999 NATO “Operation Allied Force” whose objective was to 
stop massive human rights violations committed by the Milosević regime against Kosovo-
Albanians. These instances of cluster munition use also resulted in a great number of civilian 
casualties. Since the competence of the ICTY includes prosecution of persons irrespective of 
their nationality for serious IHL violations committed on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 on an open-ended basis, alleged war crimes by NATO member states 
individuals in 1999 undeniably fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.362 It did not come 
as a surprise, therefore, that the ICTY Prosecutor in fact received numerous requests during 
Operation Allied Force to commence investigations into alleged war crimes perpetrated by 
NATO member states. As a result, the ICTY Prosecutor established a Special Review 
Committee which had the task of advising her on whether or not there was a reasonable basis 
to proceed with investigations against NATO member states individuals. This Special 
Review Committee issued a Final Report in June 2000 in which it recommended to the ICTY 
Prosecutor not to commence any investigation into alleged war crimes in relation to the 
NATO airstrikes.363 While the Prosecutor is not bound by these recommendations she 
decided to follow the advice of the Review Committee: She concluded that although some 
mistakes were made by NATO she was satisfied that there had been no deliberate targeting of 
civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during the air campaign.364 
                                                 
361 See supra p. 35. 
362 Compare Art. 1 of the ICTY Statute which states: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.” See UNSC Res 
827 of 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827. 
363 Final Report by the NATO bombing Review Committee, supra note 177. The Final Report has been fiercely 
criticised by commentators. See, for example, N. Ronzitti, “Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
acceptable?”, 840 International Review of the Red Cross 1017 (2000); P. Benvenuti, “The ICTY Prosecutor and 
the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, 12 (3) EJIL 503 
(2001); A. Massa, “NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion?”, 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law 610 (2006). 
364 President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
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The Review Committee Report addressed the issue of cluster munition use by NATO 
member states armed forces in the following manner: 
 
“Cluster bombs were used by NATO forces during the bombing campaign. There is no specific treaty 
provision which prohibits or restricts the use of cluster bombs although, of course, cluster bombs must 
be used in compliance with the general principles applicable to the use of all weapons. Human Rights 
Watch has condemned the use of cluster bombs alleging that the high “dud” or failure rate of the 
submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster bombs converts these submunitions into 
antipersonnel landmines which, it asserts, are now prohibited under customary international law. 
Whether antipersonnel landmines are prohibited under current customary international law is debatable, 
although there is a strong trend in that direction. There is, however, no general legal consensus that 
cluster bombs are, in legal terms, equivalent to antipersonnel landmines. It should be noted that the use 
of cluster bombs was an issue of sorts in the Martić Rule 61 Hearing Decision of Trial Chamber I on 8 
March 1996. In that decision the Chamber stated there was no formal provision forbidding the use of 
cluster bombs as such (para. 18 of judgment) but it regarded the use of the Orkan rocket with a cluster 
bomb warhead in that particular case as evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack the 
civilian population because the rocket was inaccurate, it landed in an area with no military objectives 
nearby, it was used as an antipersonnel weapon launched against the city of Zagreb and the accused 
indicated he intended to attack the city as such (paras. 23-31 of judgment). The Chamber concluded 
that “the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not designed to hit military targets but to terrorise the 
civilians of Zagreb” (para. 31 of judgment). There is no indication cluster bombs were used in such a 
fashion by NATO. It is the opinion of the committee, based on information presently available, that the 
OTP should not commence an investigation into use of cluster bombs as such by NATO.”365 
 
The analysis by the Review Committee is objectionable on three grounds: Firstly, the 
Review Committee did not analyse how general rules of IHL relate to the use of cluster 
munitions despite emphasising that in the absence of specific treaty prohibitions or 
restrictions on cluster munitions these weapons must be used in compliance with general 
principles of IHL. In other words, it did not bother to identify the prohibitions of 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks nor the obligation to take all feasible precautions 
and the extent to which these general rules can be respected with regard to cluster munition 
use as examined in the preceding Chapters 3.1 to 3.4.366  
Secondly, in the view of this author, the committee misconstrued Human Rights 
Watch’s legal assessment of the problem of unexploded sub-munitions. However, Human 
Rights Watch never claimed that unexploded sub-munitions are legally equivalent to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 7 August 2000, at para. 192, UN Docs. 
A/55/273-S/2000/777. 
365 Final Report by the NATO bombing Review Committee, supra note 177, at para. 27. 
366 A side point concerns the difference between general rules and general principles of IHL which was not 
clarified by the Review Committee. The already cited recent report by McCormack and others clarified this 
distinction in that military necessity and humanity were identified as general principles guiding the behaviour of 
parties to an armed conflict whereas these general principles have been given more specific content by the more 
specific prohibitions of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks and the obligation to take all feasible 
precautions upon attack. Violations of the specific rules may constitute war crimes and may lead to individual 
criminal responsibility. Thus, these specific rules are much more than vague principles lacking real content 
where states may hide like behind a convenient smokescreen. See McCormack et al., “Report on IHL & ERW”, 
supra note 164, at 8. 
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antipersonnel mines. Human Rights Watch stated that the high dud rate of explosive sub-
munitions de facto rather than legally turns these weapons into antipersonnel landmines. In a 
1999 report on NATO member states’ use of cluster munitions in the then FRY, Human 
Rights Watch emphasised that sub-munitions may kill and maim civilians despite, and 
antipersonnel landmines because of their design.367 This evidences that Human Rights Watch 
was well aware of the fact that the standard under the general prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks and the specific prohibitions under the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel 
Mines is the weapon’s intended design rather than its actual effects.368 Therefore, cluster 
munitions are not equivalent to antipersonnel mines in legal terms. Aside from grounding this 
conclusion in the prevailing design-based as opposed to an effects-based approach, treating 
cluster munitions separately from antipersonnel landmines is also warranted since cluster 
munition use results in the additional problems of inaccuracy and wide area effect at the time 
of use. 
Thirdly, the case distinguishing between NATO cluster munition use and the Martić 
case was unduly selective. This is especially true when the most notorious incident of cluster 
munition use by NATO member states in the Serbian city of Niš is compared with the facts in 
the Martić case.  
At 11:20 am on 7 May 1999 at least two NATO member states air-dropped CBU-87 
cluster bombs, each containing 202 BLU-97 sub-munitions hit two of the locations most 
frequented by civilians in Serbia’s third largest city of Niš, around the market place and the 
city hospital, around 2km from each other. The alleged target was the military airport about 4 
km from the city centre. The Review Committee confirmed that at least 13 civilians were 
killed, seven in the vicinity of the market place, and another seven in two streets near the 
hospital. 27 civilians were seriously wounded and there are hospital records indicating that 
30 others received some medical treatment as a result of this attack.369 The Committee 
assumed a figure of 60 injured.370 Additionally, as many as 70 others reportedly received 
                                                 
367 Human Rights Watch, “Ticking Time Bombs”, supra note 65. 
368 Art. 2 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention states: “Anti-personnel mine means a mine designed to be exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons” 
(emphasis added). See 1997 Ottawa Convention, supra note 224. While there was some debate on whether anti-
personnel landmines should be prohibited on the basis of their design only or on their actual effects also the 
former view finally prevailed. See S. Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Vol. I: The Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction 116-118 (2nd edn., 2005). 
369 According to orthopaedic surgeons in Niš main hospital, cluster sub-munition fragments caused severe 
injuries, i.e. wide devastation of soft tissues and bones including neurovascular destruction, resulting in a high 
number of amputations. See Handicap International, “Circle of Impact”, supra note 71, at 80.  
370 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the NATO bombing Review Committee, supra note 177, at para. 9. 
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some first aid but were sent home without any medical record kept. NATO officials 
expressed regret about civilian casualties and attributed them to a technical malfunction of 
the cluster bombs used causing them to land wide off target. 
Five days later, at 2:55 pm on 12 May 1999, another densely populated suburb of Niš, 
Duvanište, was hit with BLU-97 submunitions stemming from NATO member state aircraft. 
Again, the purported target was the airport about 7km away from this suburb. No civilian 
was killed but thirteen were injured.371 
The Orkan cluster rocket attacks on Zagreb in 1995 and the CBU-87 cluster munition 
attacks on Niš in 1999 reveal the following commonalities: Firstly, as in the case of Zagreb 
there were indisputably military targets in and around Niš. NATO officials alleged that the 
attack was aimed at the airport which was used for military purposes; it is recalled that one 
of the military targets in Zagreb was also the airport that was at least partly used for military 
purposes.372 Of the military targets against which the cluster munition strikes had allegedly 
been directed, the sub-munitions strikes in the vicinity of Zagreb airport came even closest of 
all the strikes to the intended object.  
Secondly, civilian residential areas were nearby the individual military targets: In the 
case of Zagreb airport, Plešo village was around 500m away from the airport.373 The Niš 
suburb of Medoševac is only 150m from Niš airfield.374  
Thirdly, concerning the weapons and the way they were used, compared with the 
Orkan cluster rocket attacks on Zagreb, also the CBU-87 is a cluster munition which consists 
of a delivery system (here: an air-dropped bomb) and explosive sub-munitions encompassed 
by the container. This bomb container as in the case of the Orkan rocket opens at a certain 
altitude and disperses the 202 BLU-97 explosive sub-munitions which upon impact are 
designed to explode on the ground over an area of between 243 x 121m (around 2,9 
hectares),375 and 200 x 400m (around 8 hectares).376 Thus, the dispersal pattern of the 
explosive sub-munitions by one CBU-87 is even larger than for the Orkan rocket (2 
hectares). The discrepancies in the estimated sizes of the dispersal pattern of the explosive 
                                                 
371 Norwegian People´s Aid, “Yellow Killers”, supra note 102, at 22-25. 
372 Prosecutor v. Martić, Testimony of Ivan Mikulčić, Transcript of Trial Chamber Hearings, Case No. IT-95-11-
T, 14 June 2006, at 5610. 
373 Ibid., at 5608. 
374 Agence France Presse, “Sorrow and rage in Niš, as NATO raids kill 15”, 7 May 1999, http://www.bulgaria-
italia.com/fry/nisHospital.htm (last visited 21 January 2010). 
375 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “A Guide to Cluster Munitions”, First Edition, 
November 2007, at 11, http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Guide-to-Cluster-Munitions-
Nov2007.pdf (last visited 21 January 2010). 
376 Major General Chuck Wald, Transcript of U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing, 14 May 1999, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=542 (last visited 21 January 2010). 
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sub-munitions resulting from CBU-87 use may be explained by the differences between the 
main impact area of a cluster munition strike and the entire perimeter that may be covered by 
a strike, since there may well be “stray” sub-munitions that fall wide off the main impact 
area.377 Like the Orkan rocket, the CBU-87 is unguided, i.e. once the bomb is dropped the 
flight is a free flight and as of that moment, the user can no longer control the trajectory of 
the bomb.378  
While the 288 KB-1- sub-munitions are DPICM with an anti-armour and anti-
personnel effect, the 202 BLU-97 explosive sub-munitions dispensed by the CBU-87 are 
even CEM. In both cases, the anti-armour effect is achieved by a shaped charge but the 
BLU-97 sub-munition may penetrate more than 20 cm of armour,379 whereas the KB-1 sub-
munition can only penetrate 6 cm of armour. With regard to the anti-personnel effect, upon 
impact, one BLU-97 sub-munition is designed to shatter into approximately 300 steel 
fragments at extremely high speed, making it possible to cause human injury up to a distance 
of about 150m in any direction where the sub-munition falls.380 Assuming a mean impact 
area for the BLU-97 sub-munition of 200 x 400m the actual impact area where persons can 
be killed may even be as large as 350 x 550m (around 19,25 hectares).381 On the other hand, 
the lethal range of the pellets that are dispersed by a KB-1 sub-munition upon impact and 
accounting for the anti-personnel fragmentation effect can only kill within a perimeter of 10 
metres. Since the BLU-97 can cover a much wider area through fragmentation than the KB-1 
sub-munitions, it follows that the actual dispersion pattern may be much larger in the case of 
the BLU-97 sub-munitions than in the case of the KB-1 sub-munitions.  
In terms of the accuracy of targeting unguided munitions like air-dropped cluster 
munitions, it may be observed that the U.S. Air Force already noted in respect of the 1991 
Operation Desert Storm that bombing sorties from medium to high altitudes of above 15.000 
feet (around 4.500 m) contribute to greater targeting inaccuracies because of the greater 
distance to the target and the resulting greater difficulties to accurately identify the objects on 
the ground.382 With regard to Operation Allied Force in 1999, the Review Committee 
instituted by the ICTY OTP generally acknowledged that at least part of the air campaign 
                                                 
377 Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death”, supra note 278. 
378 This was admitted by Major General Wald in the U.S. Department of Defence briefing quoted above in the 
following words: “The weapon then free-falls to a certain attitude, and it opens up. […] Then once it opens up, 
it´s not very high above the ground, […] and then it goes into a pattern that is about 200x400 meters.” See Wald, 
U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing, supra note 376. 
379 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “Guide to Cluster Munitions”, supra note 35, at 12. 
380 Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death”, supra note 278.  
381 Ibid. 
382 U.S. Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, supra note 68, at 161-162. 
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had been conducted at an altitude above 15.000 feet, resulting in targeting problems.383 The 
sub-munitions dispersed are more likely to land further off target, the longer they are in the 
air and the more they are susceptible to environmental conditions like wind during their fall. 
Where the great distance from which the Orkan rocket was launched contributed to 
increasing its inaccuracy, the equivalent can be seen from dropping the air-delivered CBU-
87 from medium to high altitudes, aggravating the accuracy problems with these area 
weapons.384  
Further, both Zagreb and Niš were targeted with cluster munitions at times when it 
could be assumed that a large number of civilians would be out on the streets, increasing the 
probability of civilian casualties.  
Finally, the number of civilian deaths at 13 or 14 in Niš as a result of sub-munitions 
straying far from the intended target on one day is (about) twice of the number of seven 
civilian deaths occurring through cluster munition use on Zagreb on two days. If one 
assumes the figure given by  the ICTY Review Committee to be correct, the number of 60 
injured civilians on one day in Niš is also strikingly similar to the 54 injured on 3 May 1995 
in Zagreb which, as shall be recalled, in the initial indictment against Martić formed a count 
separate from the attack of 2 May. 
With regard to the differences between the two cases, it must first be emphasised that 
the Trial Chamber in the Rule 61 Decision in the Martić case did find that it was reasonable 
to believe that the main reason why the Orkan rocket was used was to attack and terrorise the 
civilian population deliberately. However, as noted above, it also reconfirmed that there was 
a reasonable basis to assume that an unlawful attack against civilians had been wilfully 
ordered. Thus, the Trial Chamber also accepted the alternative argument by the OTP that 
even if the intended purpose of Orkan rocket use had been to hit military targets in Zagreb it 
was still not the appropriate weapon choice. Moreover, while enumerating the characteristics 
and circumstances of use of the Orkan rockets, the Review Committee seemed to rely 
primarily on the indications of intent by Martić to terrorise civilians in Zagreb without 
discussing the other points enumerated, especially that the Orkan rocket, just like the CBU-
87 is inaccurate even where there is some attempt to hit military targets. Therefore, the 
interpretation of the Martić Rule 61 Hearing Decision by the Review Committee appeared 
                                                 
383 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the NATO bombing Review Committee, supra note 177, at para. 56. 
384 See in this sense Dullum who explains that “When dropped from a distance or from high altitudes, an 
unguided bomb is inherently inaccurate due to errors in the aircraft attitude [the speed, roll and dive angle of the 
aircraft] and position of the drop, and of [to! sic] atmospheric effects” (emphasis added). Dullum, “Cluster 
Weapons”, supra note 36, at 51.  
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unduly restrictive. Furthermore, the quote according to which the use of the Orkan rocket 
was not intended to hit military objectives was unduly selective. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor 
decided to follow this and other recommendations not to investigate allegations of serious 
IHL violations committed by NATO member states officials. 
The Review Committee’s distinguishing NATO member states cluster munition use 
from cluster munition use in the Martić case appears even less tenable in light of the 2007 
and 2008 judgements. First and foremost, the Trial Chamber in the Martić case assumed that 
there were military targets in Zagreb at the time of attack. This effectively removed the scope 
of a finding that the Orkan rocket was evidence of a deliberate attack on civilians. Then, the 
issue moves to whether there was reckless use of the Orkan rocket on Zagreb to conclude that 
an unlawful attack on civilians had been perpetrated. Thus, it seriously undermines the 
element on which the Review Committee´s distinction between the Martić Rule 61 decision 
and NATO cluster munition use rested, since in both cases (Zagreb and Niš) military targets 
were present at the time of the attacks.  
Decisive for the Trial Chamber´s conclusion, endorsed by the Appeals Chamber, that 
Martić ordered an unlawful attack on civilians were the consequences of the nature of the 
Orkan rocket when used in civilian residential areas and the accused’s knowledge of the 
problematic characteristics of this weapon in these circumstances 
Comparing the analysis of the Trial Chamber in the Martić case with regard to the 
crime of unlawful attacks against civilians, firstly, there is no doubt that NATO authorities 
ordered cluster bombings, since NATO officials admitted in press conferences that cluster 
munitions had been used and civilian casualties caused as a result of the wide area effect of 
the CBU-87s.385 Secondly, as noted above, by relying on previous ICTY jurisprudence, 
especially on the 2006 Galić judgement, the 2007 and 2008 Martić judgements stand for the 
proposition that a direct attack on civilians may be inferred from the nature of the Orkan 
rocket as inaccurate high-dispersion weapon, resulting in indiscriminate attacks in populated 
areas.  
                                                 
385 See, for example, NATO Major General Gertz´s statement at a news briefing on 8 May 1999: “NATO has 
confirmed that the damage to the market and clinic was caused by a NATO weapon which missed its target. This 
strike was directed against Nis airfield utilising cluster munitions. […] Once again of course civilian casualties 
were never intended and NATO regrets the loss of life and injuries inflicted. […] We were using cluster bombs 
on the Nis target because, as I already mentioned, cluster bombs are used in aerial [sic: area] targets where we 
know that collateral damage could not occur, and it would be speculation if I would continue on the reason why 
some of the clusters obviously did go astray, maybe because of a technical malfunction or they could have been 
inadvertently released.” NATO Daily Briefing, Operation Allied Force, 8 May 1999, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/nato_briefing_5-8.html (last visited 21 January 2010). 
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The factual comparison between the Orkan rocket and the CBU-87 suggests that the 
same argument may also be made with the CBU-87 used in Niš. Here, NATO officials 
claimed that the sub-munitions landed far off the intended target because of a technical 
malfunction of the weapon. This seems to imply that conversely, if the weapon had worked 
as designed civilian harm could have been avoided. However, even in that case civilian 
casualties would have been likely, since the nearest Niš suburb is only 150m from the airport, 
the intended target. Thus, even if the sub-munitions had fallen precisely in the area of the 
target, the reach of the sub-munition fragments upon impact would have been exactly 150m 
beyond the outer limits of that area, making civilian casualties reasonably probable. 
Moreover, precise targeting is likely to be precluded due to the unguided nature of the CBU-
87, a problem that exacerbates the higher the altitude from which the bomb containers are 
dropped.  
The final crucial element in determining whether the OTP should have investigated 
cluster munition use by NATO member states officials, especially for the incident in Niš, is 
that of mens rea, i.e. whether NATO member states personnel could be said to have 
knowledge of the possibility that civilian victims in populated areas would result due to the 
wide dispersal pattern of the CBU-87.  
Such knowledge can indeed be imputed to NATO personnel and officials. 
Significantly, NATO member states used cluster munitions, especially CBU-87s before the 
attack on Niš.386 Moreover, despite a reported internal directive by then U.S. President 
Clinton to cease the use of cluster bombs after the Niš incident, BLU-97 sub-munitions again 
hit civilian residential areas in Duvanište, over 7 km far off the intended target of Niš airport 
on 12 May 1999, seriously injuring three and wounding ten others, all of whom received 
medical treatment.387 The fact that NATO personnel again targeted Niš with CBU-87s a few 
days later despite the 7 May incident sheds significant doubt on whether NATO member 
states officials and personnel complied with their precautionary IHL obligations which may 
                                                 
386 For instance, on 10 April 1999, cluster munition use was confirmed in the area between Podujevo and 
Kursumlija on the Serbian-Kosovo border which claimed five civilians dead and three injured near the villages 
Merdare and Mirovac. On 13 April 1999, one clearance expert was killed on Mount Kopaonik in southern Serbia 
when trying to defuse a BLU-97. On 17 April 1999, fragments from a stray sub-munition killed one three-year-
old girl. The sub-munition was was intended to hit Batajnica airfield in the west of Belgrade, about three 
kilometres away and another person was injured. On 28 April 1999, the airfield in Golubovci near Podgorica in 
Montenegro was the intended object of two CBU-87 strikes but BLU-97 sub-munitions fell a few kilometres 
away from the airfield into nearby villages where one civilian was killed and three wounded. On 3 May, a public 
transport bus and a car were hit in north western Kosovo, resulting in seventeen killed and at least 43 injured; 
cluster bomb remains were documented for this attack. See Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO 
Air Campaign”, February 2000, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/ (last visited 21 January 2010); 
Norwegian People’s Aid, “Yellow Killers”, supra note 102, at 26, 33. 
387 Norwegian People’s Aid, “Yellow Killers”, supra note 102, at 25. 
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be resorted to as an element of inferring a direct attack on civilians for the purposes of 
individual criminal responsibility in line with the 2006 Galić Appeals judgement on which 
the Trial Chamber in the Martić case relied. 
Therefore, there would have been a reasonable basis for an investigation by the OTP 
into NATO member states use of cluster munitions against the FRY for at least unlawful 
attacks on civilians under article 3 of the ICTY Statute.  
While the decision by the ICTY OTP to follow the recommendation by the Review 
Committee not to investigate into cluster munition use by NATO member states against the 
FRY cannot be reasonably defended on legal grounds compared with the investigation, 
prosecution and conviction for cluster munition use in the Martić case, it is abundantly clear 
that the OTP acted in this way due to political constraints. After all, the very existence of the 
ICTY is dependent on the good will of the UN Security Council, especially the permanent 
members. An investigation into cluster munition use by NATO member states armed forces 
would have meant to investigate against U.S, possibly also UK and Dutch nationals, US and 
UK nationals being nationals of permanent members of the UN Security Council.  
Moreover, it may be argued that at the time the Review Committee was established 
(mid-May 1999) Operation Allied Force aimed at stopping massive human rights violations 
by the Milošević regime against Kosovo-Albanians was still ongoing; announcing an 
investigation into war crimes allegedly committed by NATO member states armed forces 
might have effectively precluded further military action for accomplishing this essentially 
humanitarian purpose. However, this last argument fails to convince both for legal and 
political reasons: Firstly, a fundamental proposition on which IHL rests is that it binds any 
party to the armed conflict irrespective of the underlying motive behind using armed force, 
however laudable that motive might be (i.e. humanitarian intervention). The character of 
humanitarian law (jus in bello) is thus fundamentally different from the rules relating to the 
legality of the use of force (jus ad bellum) where the underlying purpose for using armed 
force comes into play, and it must remain different, since otherwise protection of vulnerable 
individuals under IHL would be dependent on whether he/she is a national of an “aggressor 
state” or a state militarily intervening for humanitarian purposes.  
Secondly, even if the specific motives of a “humanitarian intervention” were to be 
taken into account the question arises whether the use of cluster munitions is suited to achieve 
such humanitarian purposes. After all, most of the casualties that occurred through cluster 
munition use were not Serbian military and political authorities but civilians. As evidenced, 
among those affected were also civilians from a state not even party to the conflict, i.e. 
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Albania. Significantly, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, set up at the 
behest of then Swedish Prime Minister Persson and endorsed by former UN Secretary-
General Annan for the purpose of evaluating international legal and political issues relating to 
Kosovo, recommended in its report that “cluster bombs should never be used in any future 
undertaking under UN auspices or claiming to be a ‘humanitarian intervention’.”388 
Therefore, not only the general rules of IHL have been inadequate but also the 
enforcement of these rules after the fact since examples are scarce and where there has been 
enforcement like in the context of the ICTY it only occurred on a selective basis.389 However, 
especially the ICTY judgements in the Martić case at least contain important clarifications as 
to how the general rules of IHL relate to the use of cluster munitions.  
Not least because of the serious challenges to the general IHL rules by the use of 
cluster munitions in the 1999 Operation Allied Force by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, in the 2001/2 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan by 
the United States and the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States and the United 
Kingdom, states parties to the CCW adopted more specific rules with a bearing on cluster 
munitions contained in the 2003 Protocol V to the CCW on ERW.390  
However, as shown in the next Chapter, also this specific convention is inadequate in 
dealing comprehensively with the problems raised by the use of cluster munitions. 
 
3.8. The 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War: Specific 
Rules Inadequate to Deal With the Cluster Munition Problem 
 
The notion of ERW refers to any explosive munitions that have been fired, dropped or 
otherwise delivered during military operations but have failed to explode as intended. In the 
words of Protocol V on ERW to the CCW, ERW comprise unexploded ordnance as well as 
                                                 
388  Among the most prominent members of this independent expert commission were notably Justice Richard 
Goldstone of South Africa, serving as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR from 1994-1996, Professor 
Richard Falk, one of the most eminent U.S. scholars on international humanitarian law, and Michael Ignatieff, 
one of the most eminent scholars of international relations who has published a seminal work on the NATO 
bombing in Kosovo, winning the Orwell Prize for political non-fiction in 2000, and worked with the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on preparing the report Responsibility to 
Protect. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “The Kosovo Report”, 2000, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm (last visited 21 January 2010). 
389 It should be acknowledged that the Orkan rocket was also used by the Bosnian Serbs on several occasions 
between 1992 and 1995 in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, like on the towns of Livno, the UN safe area of 
Bihaç and a refugee camp south of Tuzla. Serbian forces reportedly also used cluster munitions during the 
NATO air campaign but it is unconfirmed whether there are still unexploded sub-munitions stemming from this 
use. All these instances have also not been subject to prosecution by the ICTY but it seems that the two instances 
examined here claimed the highest number of victims during attacks. See Handicap International, “Fatal 
Footprint”, supra note 360, at 22, 26. 
390 Protocol V to the CCW, supra note 226.  
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abandoned explosive ordnance. Unexploded ordnance is defined as “explosive ordnance that 
has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use and used in an armed conflict. It 
may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to 
do so.” Abandoned unexploded ordnance means explosive ordnance that has not been used 
during an armed conflict and that has been left behind by a party to a conflict, irrespective of 
whether the explosive ordnance has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for 
use.391 
The first thing to note about the scope of Protocol V is that unlike the previous four 
protocols to the CCW, it does not regulate or prohibit a particular weapon but applies to any 
explosive conventional munition that may result in ERW. Thus, it may be incongruent to 
suggest that this is a treaty specifically regulating cluster munitions. However, by generally 
addressing the post-conflict impact of unexploded ordnance it also speaks to the fundamental 
problem of cluster munitions to leave large numbers of unexploded sub-munitions which may 
endanger civilians long after their use. In that sense, Protocol V more specifically addresses 
cluster munitions than the general rules of IHL.  
Certainly prompted by the experience of the 1999 Operation Allied Force where 
unexploded sub-munitions claimed a great number of civilian victims, the ICRC and NGOs 
such as Landmine Action, Human Rights Watch, Handicap International and the Mines 
Advisory Group took the initiative in 2000 in addressing the post-conflict problems of 
unexploded ordnance other than antipersonnel landmines as a general category. In its 
proposals to the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 Review Conference 
to the CCW, the ICRC called for the negotiation of a new treaty on ERW which should 
enshrine the fundamental principle that the users of failed munitions should be responsible for 
clearance or at least assist clearance by the territorial state. The very rationale behind this 
proposal was that traditionally only the territorial state had clearance obligations. 
 Moreover, a specific element proposed by the ICRC was also a prohibition on the use 
of cluster munitions against military objects located in concentrations of civilians.392 That the 
ICRC considered it necessary to propose such a prohibition for a new treaty on ERW again 
speaks volumes on compliance by armed forces with the general IHL prohibition to treat as a 
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located 
in concentrations of civilians under Art. 51 (5) (a) of API. While throughout 2001 with the 
Second Review Conference to the CCW and 2002 with further meetings of governmental 
                                                 
391 Ibid., Arts. 2 (2), 2 (3), 2 (4). 
392 See Maresca, “History and negotiation of Protocol V”, supra note 249, at 819. 
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experts to the CCW the momentum grew to develop a new treaty on clearance of ERW, the 
sharing of information to facilitate clearance and risk education and the provision of warnings 
to civilians, views among CCW states parties remained divided whether specific regulations 
or prohibitions on cluster munitions were warranted.  
The fundamental rationale put forward by the ICRC to enshrine the principle of user 
state responsibility for clearance of unexploded ordnance was endorsed by a number of 
delegations and organisations, since clearance is often difficult if the affected state was not a 
party to the conflict and does not have information on the type of munitions used and on their 
location. 393 On the other hand, already then, China, Pakistan, Russia and the United States 
voiced their reservations about specific rules on cluster munitions; especially Russia and the 
United States believed that the existing general rules of IHL were adequate to deal with 
cluster munitions and that better implementation of the existing rules rather than new rules 
was needed.394 At the end of 2002, CCW states parties endorsed negotiation of a new protocol 
on generic post-conflict remedial measures to reduce the risks of ERW and on exploring 
whether the negotiations could also deal with measures to improve the reliability of munitions 
in areas such as manufacturing, handling and stockpiling of munitions. On the other hand, 
separate from the negotiations, CCW experts would discuss preventive measures aimed at 
improving the design of munitions, including cluster munitions, and the implementation of 
existing IHL principles on ERW.395 It must be emphasised here that decision-making within 
the framework of the CCW has traditionally been governed by consensus. Therefore, the 
opposition of literally only one state party to the CCW suffices to prevent a decision from 
being taken. This aspect is also important for understanding why it was impossible for the 
CCW states parties to take specific measures on cluster munitions subsequently and why an 
alternative diplomatic process, the “Oslo process”, emerged for the negotiation of a 
convention prohibiting cluster munitions.396 
The 2003 Protocol V as finally adopted corresponded to the CCW decisions on the 
scope of the negotiating mandate outlined above. In fact, it is the only protocol to the CCW 
with a Preamble which affirms the two major objectives of the negotiations, notably the need 
to conclude a Protocol on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to 
minimise the risks and effects of ERW and the willingness to address generic preventive 
                                                 
393 Ibid., at 826-827. 
394 Ibid., at 821. 
395 Ibid., at 822. 
396 Chapter 5.2. infra pp. 244-353. 
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measures for improving the reliability of munitions through voluntary best practices.397 The 
Preamble thus already makes clear that the protocol is a mix between legally binding 
obligations and non-binding voluntary best practices. This is the first major inadequacy of 
Protocol V in dealing with cluster munitions, since the legally binding part only refers to post-
conflict reactive rather than preventive measures before or at the time of use. Accordingly, 
Protocol V does not address the first major humanitarian problem emanating from the use of 
cluster munitions, notably the inaccuracy and the wide dispersal pattern of the explosive sub-
munitions at the time of use, especially when used in or near populated areas. The voluntary 
best practice approach taken by Art. 9 of Protocol V in combination with Part 3 of the 
Technical Annex to Protocol V only concerns production, stockpiling, transport, training of 
personnel and transfer in relation to all types of explosive ordnance, including cluster 
munitions but contains no provision on the use of cluster munitions.398 
As has been noted above, the definition of ERW comprises both unexploded but also 
abandoned ordnance which are the principal situations when explosive munitions become a 
risk to civilians at the post-conflict stage. The most important post-conflict measures for the 
protection of civilians that Protocol V imposes on states parties are related to ERW clearance. 
Clearance obligations were up to then limited to the removal of landmines.399 Art. 3 
(2) of Protocol V enshrines a general obligation of states parties and parties to an armed 
conflict on marking and clearance, destruction or removal of ERW other than mines as soon 
as feasible after the cessation of hostilities. Art. 3 (3) outlines the various stages of clearance 
of ERW: firstly, a survey and threat assessment must be made, then priorities for clearance 
must be identified before the actual marking and clearance begins for which resources must 
be mobilised. These measures were expressly based on the experience gained by clearance 
organisations reflected in the International Mine Action Standards which states parties must 
take into account by virtue of Art. 3 (4). The clearance process shall also be facilitated by the 
obligation contained in Art. 4 to the maximum extent possible and as far as practicable to 
record, retain and transmit information to the party in control of the territory and to civilians 
on the use of explosive ordnance or abandonment of explosive ordnance. Art. 5 imposes on 
states parties and parties to an armed conflict the obligation to take all feasible precautions to 
protect civilians from ERW, which may include warnings, risk education, marking, fencing 
                                                 
397 Preamble, paras. 2, 3, Protocol V, supra note 226. 
398 See ibid., Art. 9, Protocol V and Part 3, Technical Annex. 
399 See Arts. 3 (2), 5 (2) (b), 10, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, 35 ILM 1206 (1996); Art. 5, 1997 Ottawa Convention, supra note 
224. 
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and monitoring of affected territory.400 Thus, Art. 5 of Protocol V specifies the meaning of the 
general obligation under Art. 57 of API to take all feasible precautions in minimising civilian 
harm. 
Perhaps the most innovative provisions of Protocol V impose special obligations on 
the user of explosive ordnance which may be different from the state which has territorial 
control over the areas affected by ERW in the aftermath of armed conflict. These special 
obligations reflect the awareness that in such circumstances, which were present in Kosovo, 
Serbia and Lebanon for example, clearance for the territorial state of unexploded ordnance, 
including unexploded sub-munitions, may prove particularly challenging. In this context, Art. 
3 (1) provides that in cases where a user of explosive ordnance which has become ERW, does 
not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, after the cessation of active hostilities, 
provide where feasible, inter alia technical, financial, material or human resources assistance 
[…] to facilitate marking and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war. 
 Art. 4 (2) adds the obligation on user states without delay after the cessation of active 
hostilities and as far as practicable, subject to the user’s legitimate security interests, to make 
available to the party in control of the affected territory information on the use of explosive 
ordnance to facilitate rapid marking and clearance.401 Part 1 of the Technical Annex to 
Protocol V specifies the type of information which should be transmitted by a user state: the 
general location of known and probable unexploded ordnance; the types and approximate 
number of explosive ordnance used in targeted areas; the method of identifying the explosive 
ordnance, including colour, size and shape and other relevant markings, as well as the method 
of safe disposal of the exploded ordnance. 
However, as innovative and far-reaching as these special obligations appear at first 
sight, their likely impact on the ground is subject to some fundamental limitations. Firstly, 
Art. 1 (4) provides that Arts. 3, 4, 5 and 8 of the protocol apply to ERW other than existing 
ERW as defined in Art. 2 (5). Art. 2 (5) makes it clear that existing ERW means unexploded 
ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance that existed prior to the entry into force of this 
Protocol. Therefore, the scope of the special user obligations is limited as these obligations do 
not deal with the already existing problem on the ground, i.e. only apply to future ERW and 
do not apply retroactively. In fact, Protocol V only entered into force in November 2006 and 
thus, provided that the states involved are parties to the Protocol, could only bind a user after 
                                                 
400 Legally non-binding best practice elements of warnings, risk education, marking, fencing and monitoring of 
ERW affected areas are contained in Part 2 of the Technical Annex to Protocol V. 
401 Arts. 3 (1), 4 (2), Protocol V, supra note 226. 
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that date.402 With regard to already existing ERW, the protocol only contains the weak 
obligation under Art. 7 that each state party in a position to do so shall provide assistance in 
dealing with this existing ERW contamination, as far as necessary and feasible. 
Secondly, even where Protocol V entered into force for a state the user state 
obligations under Art. 3 (1) and Art. 4 (2) are qualified by the wording of “feasible” and “as 
far as practicable, subject to legitimate security interests”, respectively. This gives user states 
still significant discretion in the fulfilment of these obligations and thus, weakens the practical 
effect of these provisions. Also Art. 7, which is on its face already a weak obligation of 
assistance with the existing ERW problem is qualified in that it only applies to states parties 
“in a position to do so” and only “as far as necessary and feasible”. In this respect, a 
commentator has even gone so far as stating that Protocol V “is replete with so many 
qualifiers that virtually all key provisions are essentially voluntary in nature, not 
compulsory.”403 Moreover, the content of the data to be transmitted to a territorial state and its 
civilian population under Art. 4 (2) does not form part of legally binding information 
requirements anyway.  
Therefore, Protocol V on ERW is not adequate in addressing the challenges posed by 
cluster munition use, since it does not speak to the problems of cluster munitions at the time 
of use, obligations to deal with the post-conflict problem of unexploded sub-munitions fail to 
provide a remedy for existing ERW and the obligations that will arise for states parties in the 
future are worded in a weak manner. In the end, neither general nor more specific rules of 
IHL were adequate to comprehensively tackle the fundamental humanitarian problems 
associated with cluster munition use before the adoption of the new Convention on Cluster 
Munitions in May 2008. 
It should be noted that IHL is not the only international legal regime applicable to the 
use and consequences of the use of cluster munitions. The problems that cluster munitions 
                                                 
402 This is the reason why, even assuming that the relevant user states were already states parties to Protocol V, 
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403 See S. Goose, “Cluster Munitions in the Crosshairs: In Pursuit of a Prohibition”, in J. Williams, S. Goose & 
M. Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy and Human Security (2008), at 217, 
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raise must also be evaluated within the framework of human rights law complementary to 
IHL for the already above-mentioned reasons.404 Fundamentally, there is a practical 
institutional relevance to this inquiry. While IHL does not provide for a general possibility of 
individual redress for victims of violations, such a possibility exists under HRL treaties such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the American Convention on Human Rights.405 
Victims of IHL violations have increasingly resorted to individual HRL complaints before 
international human rights bodies like the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.406 In view of these institutional advantages 
of HRL over IHL, the parameters of the relationship between these two legal regimes in the 
context of cluster munition use shall be subject to examination in the following Chapter. 
 
 
4. The Use of Cluster Munitions as a Human Rights Problem 
4.1. The Complementarity Between IHL and Human Rights Law 
“How can a government defend that it is necessary to spend more money to protect their citizens against 
undefined military attack than to guard them against omnipresent enemies of good health and other real threats 
to human security on a daily basis?”407 
 
The applicability of IHL generally presupposes the existence of an armed conflict. 
However, in an armed conflict the application of HRL is not excluded. This can already be 
seen from the derogation provisions contained in certain HRL conventions: For instance, 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides for the 
                                                 
404 See supra p. 11. 
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407 Boyle & Simonsen, “Human security, human rights and disarmament”, supra note 5, at 11. 
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possibility to derogate from certain rights in time of public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation.408 Even more explicitly, Art. 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)  recognises the possibility of derogation in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, provided that derogation measures are not inconsistent with 
its other obligations under international law.409 Hence, HRL is generally also applicable in 
armed conflict. Otherwise the insertion of derogation provisions would have been 
superfluous. The proposition for taking HRL into account in armed conflicts is further 
strengthened by the fact that HRL instruments typically provide in relation to civil and 
political rights that certain rights are non-derogable in times of armed conflict. In this regard, 
both the ICCPR and the ECHR include the prohibitions of arbitrary killings, torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or slavery among the non-derogable rights. 
However, the non-derogability of the right to life is further qualified under the ECHR by 
providing under Art. 15 (2) that “lawful acts of war” are an exception to this non-derogable 
character of the right to life.410 
On the other hand, it may also be argued that IHL recognises that the legal regime of 
HRL must be taken into account in armed conflict by virtue of the “Martens Clause”,411 
which reads in its most modern version in Art. 1 (2) of API as follows:  
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants 
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”412 
 
It is clear that one purpose of the Martens Clause is to state that even where there are 
no express conventional IHL rules certain conduct might still not be lawful under customary 
international law. However, this would only amount to a reaffirmation that customary 
international law continues to apply alongside international treaty law and would deny any 
independent legal effect to the Martens Clause. But there are good reasons for those views 
ascribing a greater legal importance to the Martens Clause in that the clause should at least be 
understood as a guiding interpretative principle of IHL in cases of doubt where existing IHL 
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rules are not sufficiently rigorous or precise.413 The very wording of the clause suggests not 
only “established custom” but also “considerations of humanity” and “dictates of public 
conscience” as yardsticks against which the protection of persons in armed conflict must be 
measured. With regard to both “considerations of humanity” and “dictates of public 
conscience” it has been emphasised that the enormous impact of human rights must influence 
their interpretation.414  
Thus, in principle it may be deduced from both IHL and HRL that one regime 
recognises that the other may also be applicable in the respective general scope of application. 
However, how the two relate to each other must still be clarified in a particular case. 
The ICJ had the opportunity to consider the issue of the relationship between IHL and 
HRL in two Advisory Opinions and one contentious case. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion the ICJ recognised that in principle HRL continues to apply in the event of an armed 
conflict. However, the court held that whether the use of a certain weapon in warfare was 
“arbitrary” and therefore violated the right to life under Art. 6 of the ICCPR had to be 
determined by reference to IHL as the lex specialis to HRL.415 While the court’s analysis of 
the relationship between IHL and HRL in this advisory opinion was confined to the right to 
life, in the 2003 Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ considered more generally that the protection 
of the ICCPR does not cease in time of armed conflict, save by virtue of the possibility of 
derogation in respect of certain rights. The ICJ also confirmed the lex specialis character of 
IHL in relation to HRL during armed conflict. As to the relationship between IHL and HRL, 
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the court merely gave general guidance by stating that some rights may be exclusively matters 
of IHL, others exclusively matters of HRL, yet others matters of both IHL and HRL.416 This 
dictum was reaffirmed by the ICJ in its 2005 judgement in the contentious case of Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda which dealt with IHL and HRL violations by Uganda in 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) territory both as a matter of occupation and more 
generally.417  
These general observations do not provide any indication as to how the lex specialis 
maxim should be interpreted nor how to ascertain which of the three possible scenarios 
controls in a specific situation. However, where both IHL and HRL regulate the particular 
situation at hand it can be said that they apply simultaneously unless there is a conflict 
between the two legal regimes. In the case of conflict the lex specialis principle becomes 
relevant.418 Structural differences exist at the outset between IHL and HRL in that IHL with 
its regulation of non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) explicitly also binds non-state 
armed groups while HRL treaties only explicitly bind states. While in recent years 
commentators such as Clapham took pains to show that non-state armed groups are also 
bound by HRL,419 the fact remains that HRL treaty bodies generally only have the 
competence to examine alleged HRL violations by states. In that sense, from an institutional 
point of view the overlap between IHL and IHL with regard to a NIAC can only arise in the 
case of the use of cluster munitions by the armed forces of a state. Conversely, in international 
armed conflicts such an overlap and thus, the application of the lex specialis principle would 
generally arise, since by definition this situation involves armed hostilities between two or 
more states. 
As regards the content of the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali the 
International Law Commission recently elaborated on the meaning of this interpretative tool. 
Most importantly, application of this principle does not mean that the lex specialis completely 
displaces the more general rule but that the more specific rule is to be applied primarily since 
it is better suited to the context in which it operates. On the other hand, the more general rule 
                                                 
416 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 
9 July 2004, 2004  ICJ 136, at paras. 105-106. 
417 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 2005 ICJ para. 216 (Judgement, 19 
December). 
418 Commission on Human Rights, Report on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of 
Disappearances and Summary Executions of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7, 22 
December 2004, at para. 50. 
419 See e.g. A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 271-299 (2006). 
 124
is thereby not extinguished and continues to give direction to the interpretation and 
application of the more specific rule.420 
An analysis of the complementarity between IHL and HRL with particular regard to 
the use of cluster munitions must be informed by the humanitarian impact of cluster 
munitions both during and after armed conflict. Thus, during armed conflicts the use of 
cluster munitions would primarily be governed by IHL, since IHL as the lex specialis is better 
equipped to deal with the specific context of the conduct of military operations in armed 
conflicts than HRL without however, forgetting to pay due regard to the values of “public 
conscience” and “humanity” embodied both in IHL and HRL.  
At the post-conflict stage when sub-munition duds may continue to endanger lives, 
limbs and livelihoods, military operations will have ended. Since the application of IHL with 
regard to using weapons like cluster munitions depends on the existence of general military 
operations, i.e. an armed conflict,421 there is prima facie no case for resorting to IHL for post-
conflict civilian harm. Inasmuch as there is no more state of emergency, HRL will primarily 
govern in such a situation but the general protection of human beings under HRL was recently 
supplemented by Protocol V to the CCW on ERW. In this regard, Protocol V may even be 
regarded as lex specialis to general measures states would be required to take under HRL for 
the protection of civilians from the dangers of unexploded sub-munitions. 
Beyond the general HRL framework, recently attempts were made to particularly 
address the plight of persons with disabilities which include cluster munition victims through 
one of the most recent HRL treaties, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The adoption of this convention was inspired by the fact that for the disabled 
access to existing HRL protection must be improved in light of their specific needs. The 1997 
Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines constitutes an important precursor to this treaty 
where a provision on victim assistance was inserted into a disarmament treaty for the first 
time. The remainder of Chapter 4 is an attempt to draw a comprehensive picture as to what 
HRL has to say in terms of cluster munition use. 
While specific rules on victim assistance contribute to relieving the plight of cluster 
munition victims, it is argued that HRL generally is also inadequate for comprehensively 
tackling all the humanitarian problems resulting from cluster munition use. 
                                                 
420 International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-eighth session to the General Assembly, UN 
Doc. A/61/10 (2006), at 409; Hampson & Salama, Relationship between human rights and international 
humanitarian law, supra note 405, at para. 57. 
421 This is true for the context of the conduct of hostilities relevant for the present topic. In other contexts, such 
as the treatment of detained persons, applicability of IHL remains relevant after the close of general military 
operations. 
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4.2. The Right to Life and its Application to Cluster Munition Use 
During Armed Conflict 
 
The preceding analysis already suggests that the issue whether a person’s right to life 
in an armed conflict has been violated primarily has to be answered by IHL as lex specialis to 
HRL. IHL is the specific regime dealing with armed conflict, since this is an exceptional 
situation already recognised by the HRL derogation provisions where a general level of 
violence and death are tolerated. Embodied in this idea is the point of departure of IHL that 
there is a category of persons that lawfully participate in hostilities and that may be lawfully 
killed or injured.422 This point of departure is also based on the rationale that IHL rules should 
not unduly obstruct armed forces in their attempt to strike down rebellions or to win an 
international armed conflict. On the other hand, persons that do not participate in hostilities 
enjoy general protection from the dangers of military operations.423 Thus, there is a specific 
obligation for those engaged in military operations in an armed conflict to distinguish between 
military and civilian targets.424  
This fundamental obligation is further specified in the rules of IHL most relevant to 
the use of cluster munitions examined in supra Chapter 3, i.e. the prohibitions of 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks and the obligation to take all feasible precautions 
to minimise civilian harm.425 The practical consequence of the interpretation of these rules is 
that unless it can be shown that these rules were violated in a specific case there is a 
presumption that military operations are lawful. In terms of cluster munition use, this has 
already been demonstrated for the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.426 As shown above, 
with regard to the problem of civilian losses during armed conflict as a result of the 
inaccuracy and wide area effect of explosive sub-munitions, the response of IHL has 
traditionally been not to regard cluster munitions as an indiscriminate means of combat 
prohibited in all circumstances but depending on the specific circumstances of use as an 
indiscriminate or lawful method of combat. Thus, unless it can be shown that the use of 
cluster munitions was indiscriminate in the specific circumstances their use is lawful even if 
civilian losses are incurred. Moreover, implementation of the precautionary obligation to 
                                                 
422 This idea is reflected in the notion of military objects that may be lawfully attacked in accordance with Art. 
52 of API which constitutes customary international law for all types of armed conflicts. See Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 169, at 29-32. 
423 Art. 51, Additional Protocol I, supra note 17; Art. 13, Additional Protocol II, supra note 215. 
424 Art. 48, Additional Protocol I, supra note 17. 
425 See supra pp. 55-82. 
426 See supra pp. 55-64. 
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minimise civilian harm is dependent on the technological and thus, subjective military 
capabilities of an attacker, i.e. whether more precise weapon alternatives have to be used.  
Viewed in this sense, the application of IHL as lex specialis to HRL to the use of 
cluster munitions in military operations during armed conflict means that what constitutes a 
violation of the right to life in armed conflict is heavily qualified by excluding a priori that 
such a violation may occur against specific categories of persons. 
 However, the ulterior motives of using military force have no bearing on whether the 
right to life as specifically articulated by IHL was violated; therefore, it is irrelevant whether 
civilian harm results from a “benevolent” humanitarian intervention or a “malevolent” 
aggression.   
On the other hand, a right to kill and injure for certain categories of persons like under 
IHL is alien to HRL. Instead, HRL seeks to avoid death and injury to any person from the 
outset, regardless of their status and on a non-discriminatory basis. It follows that under HRL 
obligations like the IHL obligation to distinguish between civilian and military targets are 
unknown. If state agents use deadly force HRL would likely be violated unless the state can 
demonstrate that it acted on recognised grounds of law enforcement, including self-defence or 
defence of others, preventing the escape of a person from lawful arrest or quelling a riot or 
insurrection, as the ECHR explicitly confirms in its Art. 2 (2).427 Therefore, HRL is based on 
the reverse presumption compared to IHL that the use of lethal force is unlawful and only 
recognises the use of lethal force in exceptional situations while IHL generally accepts such 
force in the event of an armed conflict.428  
The contrasting of the rules of IHL on distinction, discrimination, proportionality and 
precautionary obligations with the right to life under HRL demonstrates that the two regimes 
differ considerably in scope at first sight when it comes to evaluating the legality of military 
operations, including the use of cluster munitions by armed forces of states. This would 
suggest that due to the lex specialis character of IHL and the fundamental rationale of these 
rules not to obstruct military victory there would be no place for the application of HRL in 
this context.  
However, such a simple conclusion would not adequately take into account that only 
HRL provides for individual redress for victims of violations. But difficulties remain; as 
Doswald-Beck recently emphasised, the HRL bodies generally only have the competence to 
                                                 
427 See Art. 2 (2), European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 409; Guerrero v. Colombia, Human 
Rights Committee, 31 March 1982, Communication No. R. 11/45, UN Doc. A/37/40, Supp. No. 40, at para. 
13.2. 
428 This also implies that HRL is concerned with ulterior motives for using lethal force in contrast to IHL. 
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resort to provisions of the treaties which created them.429 Theoretically, in principle it may be 
a problem not to have the competence to directly apply IHL in light of the different results 
that HRL could yield in terms of evaluating the legality of military operations. This is 
especially true of the divergent interpretations in which lethal force can be used against 
military objectives. Were one to apply HRL this would only be possible where the limited 
law-enforcement goals can be invoked while under IHL this would be generally possible. 
Hence, a true HRL approach to combat operations during an armed conflict is likely to be 
resisted by armed forces, since it would create a burden to practically eliminate all civilian 
casualties which may hinder the effectiveness of military operations to overpower the 
adversary.430 
However, it is submitted that to begin with, at least in the practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with regard to NIAC this problem has not arisen. This is 
most evident from the cases of Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia,431 and Isayeva v, 
Russia.432 Both of these cases involved the use of heavy combat weapons by Russian armed 
forces against civilian convoys among which were allegedly Chechen rebels in October 1999 
when there was undeniably a NIAC in Chechnya.433 The ECtHR considered whether the 
planning and execution of the military operations in question showed the requisite care in 
order for the use of lethal force to be proportionate to the aim pursued to suppress armed 
rebels.434 The court determined that in both cases Russia violated its positive obligation to 
take appropriate care to ensure that risks to the lives of civilians are minimised, inter alia, by 
the Russian forces’ choice of weapons: In the Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva case, the 
                                                 
429 L. Doswald-Beck, “The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the 
answers?”, 864 International Review of the Red Cross 881, 882 (2006). The only exception in a human rights 
case was the Abella case in which the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights directly resorted to IHL. 
See Abella, supra note 406. Interestingly, the ECHR would theoretically provide a basis for the ECtHR to 
directly resort to IHL to interpret the scope of the right to life during armed conflict. This is because of Art. 15 
(2) ECHR which states that no derogation shall be made from the right to life, “except in respect of deaths 
resulting from lawful acts of war.” Thus, where a state invokes a derogation under Art. 15, the ECtHR would 
have to assess whether deaths resulted from such lawful acts. However, no such derogation has ever been made. 
430 P. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, 135-137 (2006). 
431 Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, European Court of 
Human Rights, Judgement, 24 February 2005. 
432 Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 406. 
433 The applicants and the third party submissions explicitly referred to the existence of a NIAC calling for the 
application of common Art. 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Court in both cases recognised the 
exceptional character of the situation prevailing in Chechnya at the time while noting that no derogation under 
Art. 15 had been made. While the government pleaded the exception under Art. 2 (2) (a) ECHR, i.e. justification 
of the use of force in defence of any person from unlawful violence, the Court said that in principle this was a 
situation which could include the deployment of armed units equipped with combat weapons to regain control 
over territory and to suppress an illegal armed insurgency. In Isayeva, the Court even characterised the situation 
as “conflict.” See Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 406, at para. 180. 
434 Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, supra note 431, at paras. 171, 182; Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 
406, at 180-181. 
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weapons causing the civilian losses were 12 S-24 non-guided air-to-ground missiles where on 
explosion each missile bursts into several thousand pieces of shrapnel and impacts on a radius 
exceeding 300 metres delivered by SU-25 aeroplanes.435  In the other case, the weapons in 
question were heavy free-falling unitary high-explosion air-dropped FAB-250 and FAB-500 
bombs with a damage radius exceeding 1000 metres each.436 While these constitute unitary 
weapons, these missiles and bombs share many of the characteristics of cluster munitions 
especially when used against military targets intermingled with large concentrations of 
civilians. All these weapon systems are unguided, burst into significant quantities of metal 
fragments and may kill and injure persons over a wide area.  
The review of this ECtHR jurisprudence shows that despite the fact that respect for the 
right to life under HRL is generally subject to more stringent conditions than under IHL when 
it comes to interpreting the ECHR with regard to the conduct of military operations in a NIAC 
the reasoning is almost identical as in IHL.437 That is to say, whether the use of lethal force by 
the armed forces of a state is justified will be evaluated on the basis of feasible precautions 
undertaken by the attacker in the choice of means and methods of combat. Moreover, the 
commonalities between the high explosive unitary weapons used in the Chechen cases and 
cluster munitions in terms of endangering civilians especially where military targets are 
intermingled with civilian targets also suggests that the ECtHR would be equally able to find 
a violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of the ECHR in similar circumstances. 
Under the individual complaints procedure pursuant to the American system of human 
rights, there would equally be no room for the argument that a HRL body would interpret the 
conduct of military operations, including the use of cluster munitions, differently under HRL 
from IHL. This is because in the case most relevant to the present topic, Abella v. Argentina 
(Tablada),438 which inter alia involved an allegation under the right to life that government 
armed forces had used prohibited incendiary weapons in response to an attack by non-state 
                                                 
435 Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, supra note 431, at para. 195. 
436 Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 406, at para. 190. 
437 One can extend this observation of an approximation in the application of standards by the ECtHR even to 
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precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted against an opposing group with 
a view to avoiding and, in any event, to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life.”Ergi v. Turkey, App.  No. 
66/1997/850/1057, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement, 28 July 1998, at para. 79. 
438 See Abella v. Argentina, supra note 406. 
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armed actors of a military base, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights directly 
applied IHL in order to evaluate whether the right to life under Art. 4 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) had been violated.439  
However, the approach of the commission to directly apply IHL for finding a violation 
of the ACHR has been strongly criticised by legal commentators.440 Moreover, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the Las Palmeras case determined in response 
to opposing pleadings by the commission and the respondent government that it had no 
competence to apply IHL directly.441 
On the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the subsequent 
Bámaca-Velásquez case, which involved the capture and execution of a rebel leader during 
the NIAC in Guatemala took a more nuanced approach. The IACtHR, after finding that there 
was a NIAC, held that although it did not have competence to hold a state responsible for 
violations of international treaties other than the ACHR, it could observe that certain conduct 
that violates the ACHR also violates other international treaties such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. Moreover, IHL treaties may be taken into consideration as elements for the 
interpretation of the ACHR.442 While the respective approaches reveal inconsistencies 
between the commission and the court, one may nevertheless discern the likely tendency that 
both will interpret the right to life under HRL with regard to the conduct of military 
operations in a NIAC not inconsistent with IHL. 
The other two HRL bodies, before which individuals can bring a complaint alleging a 
violation of the right to life during an armed conflict, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, have so far not taken the existence of 
an armed conflict into account or have not been confronted with complaints for HRL 
violations during armed conflict.443 However, the HRC gave some indication as to how it 
would apply the right to life to military operations during armed conflicts in the context of its 
General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general obligations imposed on states parties to 
the ICCPR. In this respect, the HRC stated that 
                                                 
439 Ibid., at paras. 157-171, 186-188. 
440 See e.g. L. Moir, “Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System”, 25 Human Rights Quarterly 182, 195 
(2003); L. Zegveld, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and international humanitarian law: A 
comment on the Tablada case”, 324 International Review of the Red Cross 505, 509 (1998). 
441 The case concerned the execution of six unarmed civilians by Colombian police. Las Palmeras, Judgement on 
Preliminary Objections, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 4 February 2000, Ser. C, No. 67, at paras. 33-
34. 
442 Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note 406, at paras. 207-209. 
443 In this regard, the HRC views in the case of Guerrero v. Colombia where government agents killed innocent 
civilians in the execution of extraordinary measures against rebels, generally arose out of a NIAC. However, the 
existence of a NIAC had no bearing on the reasoning of the HRC. See Guerrero, supra note 427. 
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“the Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international 
humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of 
international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of 
Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”444  
 
As has been observed, this statement by the HRC is not as clear as the ICJ’s dicta in 
respect of the lex specialis character of IHL in relation to HRL during armed conflict.445  
In the specific context of derogations, the HRC noted in its General Comment No. 29 
that Art. 4 (1) of the ICCPR requires that no measure derogating from the provisions of the 
Covenant may be inconsistent with the state party’s other international obligations, 
particularly IHL. Moreover, in deciding on the legality of the derogation in question the 
committee has the competence to take a state party’s other international obligations into 
account although it is not the function of the HRC to find violations by a state party of other 
international treaties.446 However, this General Comment is also not helpful with regard to the 
right to life, since this right is not subject to derogation. Still, a combined reading of these two 
General Comments enables the conclusion that the HRC would take IHL into account for 
determining whether ICCPR rights were violated during armed conflict but it would not apply 
IHL directly.  
This then is an approach not so radically different from the treaty bodies under the 
ECHR and ACHR. Concluding Observations of the HRC in response to the submission of 
states parties reports provide specific evidence where the HRC resorted to IHL to interpret 
what constituted an arbitrary deprivation of life, thus echoing the approach of the ICJ. For 
instance, in its 2003 Concluding Observations on Israel, the committee took IHL concepts 
into account, in particular the specific practice of using human shields during military 
operations which according to the HRC often resulted in arbitrary deprivation of the right to 
life. Thus, the use of human shields, a specific IHL violation447 was used by the HRC to 
interpret the scope of Art. 6 of the ICCPR.448 Further, in its 2007 Concluding Observations on 
Sudan, the HRC was explicitly concerned about widespread and systematic serious human 
                                                 
444 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, at para. 11. 
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446 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 31 August 2001,  UN 
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447 See Art. 23, Geneva Convention III, supra note 343; Art. 28, Geneva Convention IV, supra note 343; Art. 51 
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448 The HRC also took the existence of an armed conflict in the occupied territories into account in respect of the 
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persons directly participating in hostilities were targeted. However, in its specific recommendation, the HRC 
called on Israel to exhaust all measures to arrest terror suspects before resorting to deadly force, which will be 
impractical to implement during ongoing armed hostilities. See Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, at paras. 15,17.  
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rights violations particularly in the context of the armed conflict in Darfur, inter alia, attacks 
against the civilian population.449 Accordingly, also here the HRC took the existence of a 
NIAC into account and used “attacks against civilians” as an IHL concept to find a violation 
of Art. 6 of the ICCPR. 
While the concern that HRL bodies may evaluate cluster munition attacks in the 
context of a NIAC substantially differently under HRL than under IHL appears thus 
unfounded, an evaluation under HRL through the lens of the right to life has the added benefit 
of filling some of the gaps in IHL as regards an investigation of cluster munition attacks after 
the events in question.  
As the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions 
emphasised, particularly in NIAC IHL does not impose an obligation to investigate and 
prosecute alleged unlawful killings in the conduct of military operations. On the other hand, 
the “grave breaches” regime in relation to an IAC, most notably where indiscriminate attacks 
are launched in the knowledge that such attacks will cause excessive civilian harm, obliges 
states under customary international law to criminally prosecute at least their own nationals or 
crimes allegedly committed on their territory.450 
HRL especially fills the gap in relation to NIAC in that it generally requires states to 
conduct a prompt, thorough and effective investigation after allegations of violations of the 
right to life as part of their general positive obligation to ensure the right to life to 
individuals.451 In the Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva case, the ECtHR spelled out the 
modalities required for such an investigation in great detail: A state confronted with 
allegations on unlawful killings in an armed conflict must initiate an investigation out of its 
own motion. Such investigation must be independent in the sense of lacking, for all practical 
intents and purposes, institutional and hierarchical connection with those implicated in the 
events. The investigation must be effective as to be capable of leading to a determination of 
whether or not the force used was justified in the circumstances and to the identification and 
                                                 
449 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Sudan, 29 August 2007, UN Doc. 
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450 Art. 85 (3), Additional Protocol I, supra note 17. Even for states not party to Additional Protocol I, this 
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punishment of responsible individuals. This would require securing evidence in relation to the 
incident, including witness testimonies, forensic evidence or an autopsy into the cause of 
death. Moreover, it is implied that an investigation be initiated promptly and be rendered 
public as to prevent any appearance of tolerance on the part of the state authorities of possibly 
unlawful acts.452 Also for criminal prosecutions in relation to “grave breaches” committed in 
an IAC, these modalities generally constitute a welcome specification. 
Importantly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary 
executions emphasised that the obligation to investigate as part of the obligation to ensure the 
right to life entails more than criminal prosecution; states are also bound under HRL to 
undertake systematic supervision and periodic investigation necessary to prevent recurrences 
of violations, in particular to identify institutional shortcomings that allowed unlawful 
conduct in military operations during armed conflict to occur.453 It should be recalled that IHL 
on IAC also provides for the generic obligation to ensure respect for its rules which includes 
measures already taken during peacetime to prevent violations of IHL during armed 
conflict.454 Moreover, as observed above, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in 
evaluating Eritrea’s responsibility for a cluster munition attack hitting Ethiopian civilians 
stated that the obligation to take all feasible precautions in minimising civilian harm would 
have required Eritrea to prevent the recurrence of further civilian harm by inspecting the 
aircraft flying the respective sorties or changing the training and doctrine of the Eritrean 
armed forces. Observance of the obligation to conduct non-criminal investigations imposed 
by HRL would arguably have enabled Eritrea to respect its precautionary obligations in 
preventing further civilian harm. In this sense, the obligation under HRL reinforces IHL 
precautionary obligations. 
However, a decision on the merits of an individual complaint by a HRL body based on 
the right to life for the consequences of cluster munition use during an IAC encounters one 
major obstacle which is present under HRL but not IHL, notably jurisdiction. A common 
feature of HRL treaties is that states are only obliged to respect and ensure the human rights 
of individuals subject to their jurisdiction.455 It will be recalled that state jurisdiction generally 
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means the extent of a state’s right to regulate conduct through legislation (jurisdiction to 
regulate), through its courts to regulate legal differences between individuals (jurisdiction to 
adjudicate) or regulate conduct by taking executive action (jurisdiction to enforce). While 
states regularly decide themselves on the limits of their own jurisdiction, international law 
poses limits on a state’s jurisdiction so as to not impinge on another state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction. Therefore, a sufficiently close link is usually required to justify one state’s 
exercise of jurisdiction where this could conflict with other jurisdictions.456 
What establishes such a link to bring individuals within the jurisdiction of a state is 
still contested. In an IAC, one of the states involved will usually operate outside its own 
territory. While HRL bodies have accepted that a state’s effective control over territory other 
than its own and authority and control over an individual detained abroad could place 
individuals affected by their conduct under that state’s jurisdiction,457 significant uncertainties 
remain as to whether this also extends to individuals affected by the conduct of military 
operations outside the territory of a state. The level of control by a state over the foreign 
theatre of hostilities will typically be less than in a situation of occupation. 
The ECtHR was confronted with the question of the extent of its jurisdiction in 
extraterritorial military operations during IAC most prominently in the case of Banković and 
Others v. Belgium and 16 other NATO member states.458 The case arose out of the aerial 
bombardment by NATO member states of a television station building in Belgrade during the 
1999 Operation Allied Force which resulted in civilian deaths. Significantly, NATO member 
states armed forces did not exercise any effective control over Serbian (then FRY) territory 
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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1139174 (last visited 21 January 2010). 
457 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Israel, supra note 448, at paras. 11, 15; Saldias 
de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, Views of 29 July 1981; 
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979, Views of 29 
July 1981; Coard v. United States,  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Decision of 29 September 
1999, Case No. 10951, 123 ILR 156-189 (2003); Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, European Court of 
Human Rights, Judgement on Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995.  
458 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, App. No. 52207/99, European Court of Human Rights, Grand 
Chamber Decision on Admissibility, 12 December 2001, 123 ILR 94-117 (2003). 
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but only controlled the airspace above. On the issue of the extent of its jurisdiction in such a 
case, the court stated that it only recognised jurisdiction under Art. 1 of the ECHR  
“when the respondent state, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants 
abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally exercised by that 
Government.”459  
Applicants’ main submission was that the obligation under Art. 1 of the ECHR to 
securing Convention rights to individuals under a state’s jurisdiction could be divided and 
tailored to the specific extraterritorial act in question.  
However, the court explicitly rejected this argument, since that would be  
“tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, 
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought 
within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.”460  
 
Thus, the decision of the court signals that airstrikes performed by states outside their 
territory during an IAC do not result in bringing the victims of such airstrikes within the 
jurisdiction of these states.461 This then effectively removes the civilian victims of the use of 
air-dropped cluster munitions in or near populated areas during an IAC from the scrutiny of 
the ECtHR.  
The ECtHR in Banković also regarded the then FRY, which was not a state party to 
the ECHR at the time, as outside of the legal space (espace juridique) of the states parties to 
the ECHR, a multilateral treaty operating in an essentially regional context not designed to be 
applied throughout the world.462 This notion of the espace juridique would add an additional 
limiting factor to the extent of the court’s recognition of state jurisdiction under Art. 1 of the 
ECHR, as such jurisdiction would only be accepted where its exercise takes place on another 
state party’s territory. Following such reasoning, the use of cluster munitions by the United 
Kingdom in Iraq, for example, would also not be accepted as an exercise of jurisdiction, since 
Iraq is not a state party to the ECHR, which is significant because most of the instances of 
cluster munition use occurred in interventionist IAC far away from the territory of the states 
parties to the ECHR involved. 
                                                 
459 Id., at para. 71. 
460 Id., at para. 75. 
461 Byron, “A Blurring of the Boundaries”, supra note 405, at 871; M. Gondek, “Extraterritorial Application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?”, 52 Netherlands 
International Law Review 349, 372 (2005). 
462 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 458, at para. 80. 
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However, this last obstacle to ECtHR jurisdiction was effectively removed by the later 
judgement in the case of Issa v. Turkey463 which concerned the alleged arrest, torture and 
murder of several shepherds while Turkish armed forces were conducting military operations 
against Kurds in Northern Iraq. Here, the Court was prepared to accept that the applicants 
could have been under Turkey’s jurisdiction in the territory of Iraq.464 
The court also reaffirmed the threshold of “effective overall control” but significantly 
added that  
“[m]oreover, a State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms 
of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State´s 
authority and control through its agents operating […] in the latter State.”465 
 
 The recognition of a jurisdictional extraterritorial ground on account of a state’s 
authority and control over persons constitutes a reversal of Banković. There the Court had 
only affirmed jurisdiction besides effective control over territory in respect of activities of 
diplomatic or consular agents abroad.466  
Moreover, the Court expanded the notion of “effective overall control” in an 
interesting manner by stating that as a consequence of ad hoc military operations on the 
ground a state could be considered to exercise temporarily effective overall control of a 
particular portion of territory even if on the facts of the case it was not satisfied that this 
threshold was crossed.467 For the determination whether Turkey exercised authority and 
control over the applicants the Court considered proof of Turkish troop operations in the 
precise area where the killings allegedly took place essential.468 
It is interesting to consider if the Issa judgement provides any support for the 
proposition that the ECtHR could assert jurisdiction over a case involving an extraterritorial 
                                                 
463 Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement, 16 November 
2004. 
464 The same holds true for the case of Öcalan v. Turkey where not only jurisdiction was upheld for the 
extraterritorial detention of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish authorities in Kenya, also a State not party 
to the ECHR, but Turkey also incurred responsibility for these extraterritorial acts. See also E. Roxstrom, M. 
Gibney & T. Einarsen, “The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western 
Human Rights Protection”, 23 Boston University International Law Journal 130 (2005); R. Wilde, “Legal ‛Black 
Hole’? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights”, 26 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 739, 792-796 (2005). 
465 Issa v. Turkey, supra note 463, at para. 71. 
466 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 458, at para. 73; J. Cerone, “Human Dignity in the 
Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and 
Peace Operations”, 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1447, 1491 (2006); Gondek, “Extraterritorial 
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights”, supra note 461, at 374; R. Opie, “Human Rights 
Violations by Peacekeepers”, New Zealand Law Review 1, 28 (2006). 
467 Issa v. Turkey, supra note 463, at paras. 74-75. 
468 Ibid., para. 76. The Court finally was not convinced that it had been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the 
Turkish military had operated in the precise area where the killings allegedly took place. 
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use of cluster munitions during an IAC. The combination of the relaxation of the “effective 
overall control” criterion together with the reinvigorated standard of “authority and control” 
over persons would point in this direction. However, it is submitted that the factual basis on 
which the complaints in this case rested involved the detention of the affected persons before 
killing them. Thus, the question remains open whether the court would be prepared to hold 
these criteria to be established where a person is killed in the course of the conduct of 
hostilities in an IAC without prior detention.  
Elements of the ECtHR’s judgement in the case of Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia469 
where applicants were arrested at their homes in Tiraspol by security personnel of the de facto 
regime of Transdniestria and subsequently sentenced to death and long terms of 
imprisonment, respectively, on account of politically charged offenses against the pro-Russian 
regime on Moldovan soil, may now provide support for the proposition that jurisdiction can 
be divided and tailored according to extraterritorial  conduct.  
In that case, violations by Russia as well as Moldova of applicants’ rights to life, to be 
free from torture and not to be arbitrarily deprived of freedom were alleged; applicants 
submitted that Transdniestria was effectively controlled by Russia and Moldova had failed to 
discharge its positive obligations under the Convention despite having lost de facto control 
over Transdniestria. The Court accepted that the acts complained of fell under the jurisdiction 
of Russia by virtue of its significant military influence and its military, economic and political 
support of the de facto regime in Transdniestria outside its own territory.470 Significantly, the 
Court in the following passage also held that applicants continued to remain under the 
jurisdiction of Moldova,  
“The Court considers that where a Contracting State is prevented from exercising its authority over the 
whole of its territory by a constraining de facto situation, such as obtains when a separatist regime is set 
up, […] it does not thereby cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
over that part of its territory temporarily subject to a local authority sustained by rebel forces or by 
another State. Nevertheless, such a factual situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction in that the 
undertaking given by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State´s positive obligations towards 
persons within its territory.”471  
 
Thus, the Court did in fact recognise by the wording “reduces the scope of 
jurisdiction” that jurisdiction may be divided and tailored in accordance with the actual 
control exercised. The last proposition constitutes a reversal of the earlier Bankovic dictum 
                                                 
469 Ilascu v. Moldova & Russia, App. No. 48787/99, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 8 July 
2004, at para. 333. 
470 Ibid., at paras. 314-316, 392. 
471 Ibid., at para. 333. 
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where the Court rejected precisely this possibility, which shows that the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR remains incoherent. 
The restrictive stance taken by the ECtHR towards affirming its jurisdiction for the 
conduct of military operations in IAC also seems to be at odds with the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR). As opposed to the ECtHR in 
Banković, the IACommHR in Salas and Others v. United States of America472 upheld its 
jurisdiction in respect of the conduct of air and ground military operations by United States 
armed forces during the invasion of Panama in 1989 which caused large numbers of civilian 
deaths, injury and destruction of property.  
Further, in Alejandre v. Cuba,473 where Cuban military aircraft shot down two 
unarmed civilian aircraft with missiles, the IACommHR stated that  
“In analyzing the facts, the Commission finds that the victims died as a consequence of direct actions of 
agents of the Cuban State in international air space. [emphasis in the original] The circumstance that the 
facts occurred outside the Cuban jurisdiction does not restrict nor limit the Commission's competent 
authority ratione loci, for, as has already been indicated, when agents of a State, whether they be 
military or civil, exercise power and authority over persons located outside the national territory, its 
obligation to respect human rights, in this case the rights recognized in the American Declaration, 
continues. In the opinion of the Commission, there is sufficient evidence to show that the agents of the 
Cuban State, despite being outside its territory, subjected to their authority the civil pilots of the 
"Hermanos al Rescate" organization.”474 
 
This shows the different stance taken by the commission especially with regard to 
aerial bombardment, as it seems that the Inter-American Commission would be prepared to 
hold that those conducting extraterritorial military operations during an IAC, including the use 
of cluster munitions, come within the authority and control of the attacker.475 
With regard to the HRC, it is difficult to discern from its scarce jurisprudence if it 
would be prepared to affirm its jurisdiction, however, certain general trends may be observed. 
It has been suggested that the cases of Saldias de Lopez and Celiberti de Casariego v. 
Uruguay,476 which both involved abductions and ill-treatment of individuals from Argentina 
and Brazil, respectively, stand for the proposition that the intentional killing of civilians 
during a brief incursion would also be sufficient to establish a relevant jurisdictional link.477 
However, it is unclear whether this would only apply to the practice of targeted killings like 
                                                 
472 Salas v. United States, supra note 406. 
473 Alejandre and Others v. Cuba, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Decision on Admissibility of 
29 September 1999, Case No. 11589, 104th Session, Doc. No. OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104. 
474 Ibid., at para. 25. 
475 Byron, “A Blurring of the Boundaries”, supra note 405, at 880. 
476 Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, supra note 457; Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 457. 
477 Byron, “A Blurring of the Boundaries”, supra note 405, at 868. 
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by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories discussed above,478 or whether this would 
also apply to large-scale combat operations where there is typically not the same level of 
control over individuals. Evidence that the ICCPR may also be applied by the Human Rights 
Committee to the latter scenario can be derived from some Concluding Observations, 
including on Italy,479 Norway and Poland, where these states all accepted that the Human 
Rights Committee would have jurisdiction in respect of extraterritorial conduct of their armed 
forces in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Thus, one may conclude somewhat 
tenuously that the Human Rights Committee might affirm its jurisdiction for civilian harm 
resulting from cluster munition use during an IAC.  
Still, this review of human rights jurisprudence indicates that the application of HRL 
to civilian victims of cluster munition use during an IAC encounters the significant obstacle 
of jurisdiction. In contrast, IHL provides for a generic obligation to respect and ensure respect 
for IHL in all circumstances, especially during an IAC.480 With regard to this obligation it is 
generally recognised that there are no territorial limits to this obligation, as it is inherent in the 
very notion of an IAC as an armed conflict between two or more state armed forces that at 
least one state involved in such a conflict will operate outside of its own territory. Therefore, 
states take this obligation with them wherever their armed forces are engaged in military 
operations.481  
Therefore, while HRL may be applied to extraterritorial use of cluster munitions 
during an IAC, IHL governing this type of conflicts seems to be better equipped to deal with 
that situation. However, as stated supra, no general remedy for individual victims under IHL 
exists.482 A traditional way to circumvent this problem is that the victims’ state of nationality 
                                                 
478 See supra pp. 130-131. 
479 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Italy, 24 April 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5, at para. 3, Human 
Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Concluding Observations: Norway, 25 April 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5, at para. 6; Human Rights 
Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations: Poland, 2 December 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL, at para. 3. 
480 Common Art. 1, Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 343; Art. 1 (1), Additional Protocol I, supra note 17. 
With regard to NIAC, this obligation is applicable to the extent of the applicability of common Art. 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. See L. Boisson Chazournes & L. Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions revisited: Protecting Collective Interests”, 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67-87 (2000), 
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481 Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, supra note 430, at 121; Boisson Chazournes & 
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respect and ensure respect in common Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions with Art. 1 of the ECHR to secure 
Convention rights  to everyone within their jurisdiction in rejecting applicants’ submission that this obligation 
could be divided and tailored in a manner proportionate to the level of control exercised. See Banković and 
Others v. Belgium and Others, supra note 458, at para. 75. 
482 To a certain extent, Art. 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court can be regarded as an 
attempt to fill this gap, as it contains an express possibility for victims of international crimes to claim reparation 
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claims compensation on the ground of diplomatic protection in proceedings against the state 
whose armed forces inflicted death and injury on their nationals in the conduct of military 
operations in an IAC. This recently occurred, for example, in the Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo case483 before the ICJ where the Democratic Republic of Congo 
claimed compensation for breaches of IHL and HRL from Uganda resulting from, inter alia, 
combat operations entailing civilian harm during an IAC and the court found both violations 
of Arts. 48 and 51 of API and Art. 6 of the ICCPR to be established. Still, this traditional way 
of claiming violations on behalf of victims that are a state’s nationals is subject to the 
discretion of that state and states do not frequently espouse the claim of their nationals against 
another state. 
Where HRL bodies have explicitly affirmed their jurisdiction concerning civilian 
losses as a result of combat operations – and this only goes for the IACommHR – they have 
applied IHL directly. Thus, in contrast to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the right to life in 
NIAC where the court has attempted to adapt IHL concepts (of precautionary obligations) to 
HRL norms with essentially the same result, the IACommHR has avoided to translate IHL 
into human rights-based language. Again, it is submitted that there are good practical reasons 
for adopting this approach, since armed forces in full-fledged combat operations will find it 
rather unrealistic, for example, to affect an arrest of an adversary combatant before killing 
him/her. Besides, as Rowe has pointed out, training of IHL has been internalised by soldiers 
since at least the beginning of the 20th century and has thus historically a high acceptance; the 
same cannot be said of HRL which is a much younger branch of international law.484 The 
backdrop of a proposition to overcome the lex specialis interpretation in relation to IHL and 
HRL may thus well be ill-advised. However, the above-mentioned Martens Clause which 
calls for humanitarian considerations to be taken into account where IHL rules are not 
sufficiently rigorous and precise would have resulted in an interpretation of IHL that gives 
more weight to humanitarian concerns in relation to military considerations. This is a 
common denominator between IHL and HRL embodied in the Martens Clause. Unfortunately, 
one has to repeat here that this has not occurred and cluster munitions have always been used 
in and near civilian residential areas.  
                                                                                                                                                        
for harm suffered which includes violations of the obligations under IHL to distinguish between civilian and 
military targets and the obligation not to cause disproportionate civilian casualties in military operations against 
lawful military targets. See Art. 75, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 
3. 
483 Armed Activities, 2005 ICJ judgement, supra note 417, at paras. 205-220. 
484 Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, supra note 430, at 114-116. 
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While the right to life in respect of the use of cluster munitions is governed by the 
specific IHL rules of distinction, discrimination, proportionality and precautionary 
obligations, no specific rules exist with regard to the prohibition of cruel or inhuman 
treatment. The next Chapter will discuss the overlap of this prohibition under IHL and HRL in 
the specific context of cluster munition use and draw from jurisprudence of the ICTY which is 
particularly instructive. 
 
4.3.  The Right not to be Subjected to Cruel or Inhuman Treatment 
and its Application to Cluster Munition Use During Armed Conflict 
 
 
The prohibitions of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is contained in a 
plethora of HRL treaties and instruments, including in Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in Art. 6 of the ICCPR, in Art. 37 (a) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and in regional HRL conventions.485 In addition, specific HRL conventions aiming at 
preventing and prosecuting acts of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment were 
adopted, most notably the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment on a global level.486 
Also under IHL these prohibitions are well-established: To begin with, common Art. 3 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,487 which reflects a “minimum yardstick” and “elementary 
considerations of humanity” irrespective of the nature of an armed conflict,488 and applies to 
any person not actively participating in military hostilities, prohibits cruel treatment and 
torture as well as outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment. Other specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions reiterate these prohibitions 
for specific contexts.489Art. 75 (2) (a) (ii) and (b) of API and Art. 4 (2) (a) and (e) of APII, 
which were designed to supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, also prohibit torture and 
                                                 
485 Art. 5 (2), American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 455; Art. 3, European Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 409; Art. 5, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217. 
486 Torture Convention, supra note 343. Specific regional HRL treaties on torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment include the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman, Degrading 
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488 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 ICJ 14, at 
para. 218 (Judgement, 27 June). 
489 Art. 12 (2), Geneva Convention I, supra note 343 (torture); Art. 12 (2), Geneva Convention II, supra note 343 
(torture); Art. 17 (4), Geneva Convention III, supra note 343 (physical or mental torture or any other form of 
coercion); Art. 87 (3), ibid. (torture or cruelty); Art. 89, ibid. (disciplinary punishment that is inhuman, brutal or 
dangerous to the health of a prisoner of war); Art. 32, Geneva Convention IV, supra note 343 (torture and any 
other measures of brutality). 
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outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. In addition, 
torture and humiliating and degrading treatment constitute war crimes in both IAC and NIAC, 
inhuman treatment a war crime in IAC, and cruel treatment in NIAC.490 If the specific 
requirements under international criminal law are fulfilled, torture, causing serious bodily or 
mental harm and other inhumane acts intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health may even amount to genocide or crimes against 
humanity.491 
Like the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment is non-derogable under HRL in states of emergencies, including armed 
conflicts.492 It is also generally recognised that the prohibition of torture in particular forms 
part of jus cogens, i.e. a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law of the same character.493 There is even some 
authority for the proposition that also the prohibitions of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment have attained such a character.494 
However, unlike in the case of the right to life where there are truly specific norms in 
the context of armed conflict by virtue of the rules on distinction, discrimination, 
proportionality and precautionary obligations, there is generally no meaning of the substantive 
content of torture, cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment independent under IHL from that 
under HRL; the only essential difference is structural in that IHL may bind non-state armed 
groups as well as state actors while under HRL, as already argued above, the extent to which 
non-state actors are bound by its obligations is still not as well-settled. In this respect, under 
HRL the explicit requirement that torture and other ill-treatment must have been committed 
with specific involvement of a state organ may be dispensed with under IHL to take the 
reality into account that such acts may also be committed in a NIAC where by definition one 
                                                 
490 See, for example, Arts. 8 (2) (a) (ii), 8 (2) (b) (xxi), 8 (2) (c) (i), 8 (2) (c) (ii), ICC Statute, supra note 483. 
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Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 4 
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494 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, supra note 493, at para. 8; M. Byers, “Conceptualising 
Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, 7 Nordic Journal of International Law 211, 213-215 (1997). 
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of the parties will be a non-state actor.495 Thus, Art. 1 (1) of the CAT requires the intentional 
infliction of severe pain or physical or mental suffering for a prohibited purpose such as 
obtaining information, a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion or any 
discrimination “by, or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence” of a state 
organ; in contrast, IHL requires for an act to constitute torture only the intentional infliction of 
severe pain or physical or mental suffering for a prohibited purpose.496 
With regard to the distinction between torture on the one and cruel and inhuman 
treatment on the other hand, one undisputed distinguishing element is the specific purpose 
which is required for torture but not for cruel and inhuman treatment.497 This is most relevant 
for the specific context of the use of cluster munitions. In this regard, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture has persuasively shown that a situation of particular powerlessness of 
the victim vis-à-vis the perpetrator is a precondition for finding one of the specific purposes 
required for torture. Such a situation of powerlessness is typically given where the victim is 
deprived of his/her personal liberty. Conversely, the intentional infliction of severe suffering 
for law enforcement purposes such as effecting the lawful arrest of a person, preventing the 
escape of a person or quelling violent demonstrations or riots never amounts to torture, since 
the specific purpose as a constitutive element is lacking. Such conduct may be even lawful or 
constitute cruel or inhuman treatment, depending on whether the force used was 
proportionate, i.e. not excessive to the aim pursued. Among these other, generally lawful 
                                                 
495 See, in this sense, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, T.Ch. judgement, supra note 493, at paras. 470-497; C. Droege, “ 
‛In truth the leitmotiv’: the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in international humanitarian 
law”, 867 International Review of the Red Cross 515, 526 (2007). 
496 See, for example, Elements of Crimes to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court for Arts. 8 (2) 
(a) (ii) and 8 (2) (c) (i), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-
68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf  (last visited 28 October 2009). 
497 Prosecutor v. Delalić,  supra note 308, at para. 442; Elements of Crime to the ICC Statute, supra note 496, 
for Arts. 8 (2) (a) (ii)-1, 8 (2) (a) (ii)-2, 8 (2) (c) (i)-3 and 8 (2) (c) (i)-4; M. Nowak, “What Practices Constitute 
Torture?: US and UN Standards”, 28 Human Rights Quarterly 809, 818, 824-828, 830 (2006) (with further 
references). 
On the other hand, the approach of certain HRL bodies and the ICTY differ from the approach of the Human 
Rights Committee and the Elements of Crime under the ICC Statute on the question whether another 
distinguishing element between these various manifestations of prohibitions of ill-treatment is the intensity of the 
pain or suffering inflicted: While the ECtHR, the IAComm and IACtHR as well as the ICTY take the stance that 
the infliction of torture requires a higher level of suffering, the Elements of Crimes for the ICC Statute foresee 
“severe” pain or physical or mental suffering with regard to both prohibitions. The Human Rights Committee 
and the current UN Special Rapporteur for Torture also do not regard the severity of suffering inflicted as 
distinguishing element. In any event, the suffering inflicted on civilian victims would appear to attain even the 
higher threshold required by the ECtHR, the IAComm and IACtHR. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
5310/71, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement, 18 January 1978, paras. 167-168; Loayza-Tamayo v. 
Peru, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgement, 17 September 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 57; 
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgement, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, T.Ch., 2 November 2001, at para. 161; Elements of 
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visited 21 January 2010). 
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purposes, the UN Special Rapporteur also explicitly listed the use of force by the military in 
case of armed conflict.498  It follows that the scope of the prohibition of torture is restricted to 
detention or a similar situation of direct factual power and control over a victim while the 
scope of the prohibition of cruel or inhuman treatment is not so restricted.499 Significantly, in 
the conduct of military operations during an armed conflict through which civilians are 
seriously injured, such detention-like control by the perpetrator will typically be absent.  
However then, if the difference between a lawful use of force and an unlawful use of 
force constituting cruel or inhuman treatment falls to be evaluated on the basis of whether 
such use of force was proportionate once again one encounters divergences between IHL and 
HRL which are similar as for the right to life argued above; this is because the notion of 
proportionality has a different role under both branches of international law: While under 
HRL the proportionality test would be applied to any person irrespective of his/her particular 
status in relation to the ultimate motive of the use of force, under IHL proportionality only 
comes into play with regard to civilians or persons not directly participating in hostilities in 
relation to a specific military objective in order to implement the specific IHL rule of 
distinction. Moreover, the rules on the conduct of hostilities under IHL are inherently inspired 
not only by humanitarian considerations but also by military necessity. It is in this context that 
relevant jurisprudence of the ICTY which was confined to victims that had not directly 
participated in hostilities must be understood. 
This jurisprudence confirms for the specific context of armed conflict that the 
prohibition of cruel or inhuman treatment may be violated in case of the use of certain 
weapons where there is no factual detention-like control over the victim on the part of the 
perpetrator. In Prosecutor v. Galić, both the Trial and the Appeals Chambers concluded that 
widespread and systematic sniper, artillery and mortar attacks against civilians in Sarajevo 
between 1992 and 1994 entailed the defendant’s individual criminal responsibility for 
“inhumane acts” as a crime against humanity. 500 On the specific elements for “inhumane 
acts” the Trial Chamber noted that it was necessary to show that the impugned act or omission 
caused serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constituted a serious attack on human 
dignity and that the conduct in question was performed intentionally; with regard to intent, 
                                                 
498 Nowak, “What Practices Constitute Torture?”, supra note 497, at 821. 
499 Ibid., at 832-835; Nowak, “Challenges to the Absolute Nature of the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-
Treatment”, supra note 497, at 676-679. Also see the definition of “torture” under Art. 7 (2) (e) of the ICC 
Statute: “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the 
custody or under the control of the accused.” See Art. 7 (2) (e), ICC Statute, supra note 482. 
500 Prosecutor v. Galić, Trial Chamber Judgement, supra note 300, at para. 599; Prosecutor v. Galić, Appeals 
Chamber Judgement, supra note 305, at paras. 154-159.. 
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this requirement is already satisfied where the perpetrator was reckless, i.e. he/she knew that 
the conduct was likely to cause such injury, suffering or attack on human dignity.501  
The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Strugar case held that the accused was responsible for 
cruel treatment. Significantly, not the mistreatment of persons in detention but serious 
shrapnel injuries of persons not actively participating in hostilities requiring long-term 
medical treatment as a consequence of the shelling of Dubrovnik in December 1991 where the 
perpetrators did not have detention-like control over the victims were at issue.502 With regard 
to the specific case of cluster munitions, as already mentioned above, the Trial Chamber 
judgement in the Martić case in line with this previous jurisprudence crucially added that the 
use of cluster munitions in densely populated areas, resulting in persons not actively 
participating in hostilities and civilians seriously injured, respectively, violates the prohibition 
of cruel or inhuman treatment. Importantly, detention-like control over the affected civilians 
was absent.503 At present, however, it is unclear how HRL bodies would apply the prohibition 
of cruel or inhuman treatment to the use of cluster munitions during armed conflict since no 
such complaint has been brought to date under any individual complaints procedure. 
However, no case like against Martić would usually arise before a HRL body, since Martić 
was the supreme commander over a non-state actor in respect of which a HRL body would 
not have any jurisdiction.504 
As the analysis of the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel or inhuman 
treatment under HRL during armed conflict suggests, HRL like general rules of IHL are 
inadequate to deal with the specific humanitarian consequences of cluster munition use during 
armed conflict especially in or near civilian residential areas. Firstly, the arguably more 
stringent standards under HRL may not necessarily come into operation since IHL constitutes 
the lex specialis, such as in the case of the right to life. Secondly, the main advantage to 
consider situations of armed conflict under HRL that individual victims have an international 
remedy for HRL violations is reduced by the fact that where such cases have arisen the 
respective HRL body has interpreted the rights at stake either consistent with IHL or by 
applying IHL directly. In many situations of IAC, HRL will not provide any remedy to 
victims either, since unlike IHL HRL presupposes that violations have to be committed under 
                                                 
501 Prosecutor v. Galić, Trial Chamber judgement, supra note 300, at paras. 152-154. 
502 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-T, T.Ch. II, 31 January 2005, at paras. 260-276. 
503 Prosecutor v. Martić, Trial Chamber Judgement, supra note 286, at para. 471. 
504 The question of violations of HRL by non-state actors has arisen only in an indirect manner, e.g. in expulsion 
cases where it was held that states were barred from deporting an individual facing threat of torture or ill-
treatment by non-state actors. See, for instance, Elmi v. Australia, Committee Against Torture, 25 May 1999, UN 
Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998. 
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the respondent state’s jurisdiction; this hurdle will prove in many cases too high to surmount 
for victims. In NIAC, individual HRL remedies will also be inadequate, since the respective 
HRL bodies can only decide on complaints against states, but not non-state actors. 
 
4.4. The Right to Life and its Application to Post-Conflict Casualties 
due to Unexploded Sub-munitions 
 
 
As regards the protection of civilians from the after-effects of unexploded 
submunitions that may as de facto landmines kill and maim those that intentionally or 
accidentally disturb duds, IHL traditionally did not add any rules other than the preventive 
general obligations imposed on an attacker to avoid such post-conflict civilian harm in the 
first place.  
However, HRL as such is applicable. In this respect, Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR makes 
it clear that states parties are not only under an obligation to respect but also to ensure 
Covenant rights to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. More 
specifically, the HRC in its General Comment on the right to life under Article 6 of the 
Covenant recognised that the obligation to protect the lives of people on its territory extends 
to protection from general threats to human life, such as armed conflict and life threatening 
illness.505 In principle, the HRC also extended the obligation to protect individual lives to 
dangers emanating from nuclear waste.506  
Thus, undoubtedly, the territorial state also has positive obligations to protect the lives 
of people living under its jurisdiction. Chapter 2 supra already gave some indication of what 
concrete measures would be required to protect the right to life when a state is faced with 
post-conflict sub-munition dud contamination of its territory, notably clearance of unexploded 
sub-munitions, marking and/or fencing of contaminated areas and risk education.507  
Within the ECHR system, there would have been the opportunity for the ECtHR to 
precisely spell out these positive obligations under the right to life (Art. 2 of the ECHR) in the 
Behrami case.508 Already the study Explosive Remnants of War: Cluster Bombs and 
                                                 
505 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: The right to life, 16th Session, 30 April 1982, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Add.1, at paras. 2,5; M. Nowak, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 
123 (2nd ed., 2005). 
506 Nowak, CCPR Commentary, supra note 505, at 124. 
507 See supra pp. 48-51. 
508 Behrami & Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 
Admissibility Decision, 31 May 2007, 46 ILM 746 (2007). Note that another case was jointly decided with 
Behrami, notably the case of Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, App. No. 78166/01 which involved the 
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Landmines in Kosovo by the ICRC 509 detailed the circumstances of the particular incident 
forming the basis for the application in that case:510 There it was reported that a group of boys 
aged between 10 and 16 years went to a hilltop near two villages south of Mitrovica.511 Upon 
finding two unexploded BLU-97 sub-munitions left as a legacy of the 1999 Operation Allied 
Force by NATO member states one of the boys threw it to another whereupon the bomblet 
exploded, killing one Behrami brother and severely injuring the other. The BLU-97 bomblet 
is especially attractive to children because of its bright yellow colour and size not larger than 
a soda can.512  
The applicants of the complaint under Art. 2 of the ECHR argued that France as the 
lead nation of KFOR in the area around Mitrovica at the time had failed to mark and/or clear 
such unexploded sub-munitions which it knew were present at the site of the incident. This 
case was the first one ever where victims of unexploded sub-munitions invoked a human 
rights remedy for the post-conflict harm incurred by the use of cluster munitions. The 
difficulty in this case was fundamentally that France was part of the international presences in 
                                                                                                                                                        
alleged unlawful detention of the applicant by KFOR troops. Since this other case has no bearing on the subject 
matter at hand, the analysis here will only concentrate on Behrami. But see for a broader analysis of the 
implications of this joint decision on the ECtHR jurisprudence and general international law with regard to peace 
support operations numerous scholarly commentaries, including P. Klein, “Responsabilité pour les faits commis 
dans le cadre d’opérations de paix étendue du pouvoir de contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: 
quelques considerations critiques sur l’arrêt Behrami et Saramati”, 53 Annuaire français de droit international 
43-64 (2008); G. Hafner, “The ECHR Torn between the United Nations and the States: the Behrami and 
Saramati Case”, in A. Fischer-Lescano et al. (eds.), Frieden in Freiheit = Peace in liberty = Paix en liberté: 
Festschrift für Michael Bothe zum 70. Geburtstag, at 103-121 (2008);  M. Milanović & T. Papić, “As bad as it 
gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law”, 
58 (2) ICLQ 267-296 (2009); H. Krieger, “A Credibility Gap: the Behrami and Saramati Decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights”, 13 (1-2) International Peacekeeping 159-180 (2009); A. Breitegger, 
“Sacrificing the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights on the altar of the effective 
functioning of peace support operations”, 11 (2) International Community Law Review 155-183 (2009); P. 
Boudeau-Livinec, G. P. Buzzini & S. Villalpando, “International Decision: Behrami & Behrami v. France; 
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway: ECHR judgment on applicability of European Convention on Human 
Rights to acts undertaken pursuant to UN Chapter VII operation in Kosovo”, 102 AJIL 323-331 (2008); K. 
Mujezinovic Larsen, “Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test”, 
19 (3)  EJIL 509-531 (2008); A. Sari, “Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: 
The Behrami and Saramati Cases”, 8 Human Rights Law Review 151-170 (2008); C. Laly-Chevalier, “Les 
operations militaries et civiles des Nations Unies et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Cour. eur. 
dr. h., gde ch., decision du 31 mai 2007, Behrami et Saramati)”, 40 (2) Revue belge de droit international 627-
661 (2007); P. Palchetti, “Azioni di Forze Istituite o Autorizzate dalle Nazioni Unite Davanti Alla Corte Europea 
dei Diritti dell’Uomo: I Casi Behrami e Saramati”, 90 (3) Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 681-704 (2007). 
509 Maslen, “Explosive Remnants of War”, supra note 73, at 11. 
510 That the incident reported in the ICRC study was in fact the same as the one that formed the basis for the 
Behrami case was confirmed by the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (AIRES), one of the 
advisers for applicants in the Behrami case, in an e-mail to this author dated 19 October 2007. 
511 Maslen, “Explosive Remnants of War”, supra note 73, at 11. 
512 The CBU87 containing this sub-munition was the cluster munition type predominantly used in Kosovo in 
Operation Allied Force, to an overwhelming extent by US but also by Dutch troops, as already detailed at supra, 
p. 29. See also Moyes, “Cluster Munitions in Kosovo”, supra note 73, at 10. In this particular case, this author 
has no knowledge on whether the unexploded BLU-97 which caused the incident stemmed from US or Dutch 
use. 
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Kosovo, notably KFOR and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since only 
Council of Europe member states can be parties to the ECHR and before the ECtHR rather 
than international organisations (IOs) like NATO or the UN, before even examining the 
merits, the ECtHR had to decide “whether this Court is competent to examine under the 
Convention … States’ contribution to the civil and security presences which did exercise the 
relevant control of Kosovo.”513 Thus, the central preliminary issue concerned whether the 
requirements of Art. 1 of the ECHR were fulfilled which states that the “High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … 
this Convention.” If the question of jurisdiction ratione personae was not enough, also an 
issue of jurisdiction ratione loci arose, since the alleged violation by France took place 
outside of France’s own territory. 
On these questions, applicants submitted firstly that KFOR, not UNMIK, was the 
relevant entity to turn to in the first place and secondly, that the alleged omission of French 
KFOR soldiers was neither attributable to the UN nor to NATO but to France as the 
individual Troop Contributing State (TCS) and state party to the ECHR. In the view of the 
applicants, KFOR was responsible for clearance of unexploded sub-munitions, since it had 
been aware of the unexploded ordinance and controlled the site. Moreover, NATO initially 
dropped the cluster bombs. If the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) in 
Kosovo had the overall responsibility in coordinating the clearance efforts, KFOR retained 
responsibility for supporting this effort which was critical for the success of these 
operations.514 KFOR conduct was not attributable to the UN since KFOR troops were not 
under UN command and personnel did not have any UN immunities. Nor was it attributable 
to NATO, in the applicants’ view, as the KFOR troops, for instance, were directly answerable 
to their national commanders who decided on the waiver of immunity of KFOR troops while 
the UN Secretary-General so decided for UNMIK personnel; the rules of engagement were 
national or individual TCS national claim offices had been set up.515 
In contrast, France argued that its status of a “lead nation” of a multinational brigade 
and its consequent control of a sector in Kosovo could detach it from its international 
mandate. These multinational brigades were commanded by an officer of the lead nation. 
However, the latter was commanded by the Commander of KFOR who was in turn 
commanded, through the NATO chain of command, by the UN Security Council (UNSC). 
                                                 
513 See Behrami v. France, supra note 508, at para. 71. 
514 Ibid., at para. 73. 
515 Ibid., at para. 77. 
 148
The resolutions of the UNSC formed the legal basis for NATO to form and command KFOR. 
The respondent did not provide any more specific arguments with regard to clearance other 
than merely referring to the division of responsibility to that effect by UNSC Resolution 1244 
between KFOR and UNMIK but concluded that acts of national contingents could not be 
imputed to a State but rather to the UN which exercised overall effective control of the 
territory.516 
The UN also intervened in this case as a third party, first pointing out that the general 
division of responsibilities of the international presences in Kosovo was left to be concretised 
and agreed upon in their daily operational realities. While it acknowledged that by the time of 
the incident the formal overall coordination for clearance was with UNMACC, there remained 
a residual responsibility by KFOR to identify, mark and report on the location of CBU sites. 
Accordingly, UNMIK’s responsibility for clearance was dependent on accurate information 
on locations of unexploded sub-munitions and, since UNMIK was unaware of the location of 
the unmarked BLU-97s causing the incident in the present case, it took no clearance action.517 
The court dispensed with the issue of jurisdiction ratione loci rather swiftly, stating 
that KFOR and UNMIK had effective control over Kosovo and exercised the public powers 
normally exercised by the government of the then FRY.518 Thus, the Court accepted even 
under the most restrictive test elaborated on in Banković that the conditions for extraterritorial 
applicability of the ECHR were satisfied. 
However, the major stumbling block remained in the form of jurisdiction ratione 
personae which involved a decision whether it was France as an individual state that would 
have omitted marking and/or clearance or whether it was rather UNMIK or KFOR. In dealing 
with this question, the ECtHR adopted the following structure in its decision: Firstly, it 
established which entity, KFOR or UNMIK, had a mandate to clear, noting that the parties to 
the proceedings held different views on this matter. Secondly, it inquired whether the failure 
to clear could be attributed to the UN. Finally, the ECtHR examined whether it was competent 
ratione personae to review any conduct found attributable to the UN.519 
On the first question, the ECtHR ruled that UNSC Resolution 1244 provided UNMIK 
with the mandate for supervising clearance as of the date that it could take over 
                                                 
516 Ibid., at paras. 83, 92. Note that also a number of third TCS made submissions to the court. Among them was 
the United Kingdom which stated more specifically concerning clearance that responsibility was that of the UN 
Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC). UNMACC being an agency of the UN, any allegation about 
clearance could not engage the responsibility of the ECHR state party France.  See ibid., at para. 113.  
517 Ibid., at para. 119. 
518 Ibid., at para. 70. 
519 Ibid., at para. 121. 
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responsibilities for that task. The court found that UNMIK took over responsibility from 
KFOR by October 1999 and thus, before the date when the incident in the present case 
occurred (March 2000). It dismissed the arguments by applicants as well as the UN; whether 
NATO had dropped the cluster bombs in the first place or KFOR had failed to secure the site 
and provide information thereon to UNMIK was considered irrelevant by the ECtHR, as this 
would not alter the mandate of UNMIK.520 
Did the ECtHR appropriately attach importance only to the legal mandate to clear? 
This author would answer this question in the negative since it would seem very odd to 
attribute an omission to an entity which had no factual power or possibility of acting in a 
particular situation, i.e. a close link to the specific omission in question. Not only is the legal 
mandate not sufficient to answer that question in a satisfactory manner but this sort of inquiry 
is also necessary in view of the legal standard of “effective control” for attributing conduct 
either to a state or an IO or to one of at least two IOs. This standard is codified in Art. 6 of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations which reads: 
 
“The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed 
at the disposal of another organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter 
organization to the extent that the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.” 
 
 
While this draft provision was worded with traditional UN peacekeeping missions in 
mind, “effective control”, i.e. who gives the orders or may effect change of conduct in a 
particular situation, has proven as the relevant yardstick of attributing conduct across the 
different scenarios of peace support operations. To begin with, in classical peacekeeping 
operations contribution agreements between the TCS and the UN Secretary-General regularly 
have the effect of placing national contingents within the command structure of the UN.521 
Thus, in principle the UN has effective control over conduct of the individual peacekeeper 
and it is the UN, not the individual TCS that was regularly held responsible for wrongful 
conduct by the peacekeepers.522  
Conversely, in UN Chapter VII-authorised military operations, national contingents 
are regularly not placed under UN command and thus, the individual TCS may effect changes 
                                                 
520 Ibid., at paras. 125-126. 
521 M. Bothe, “Peacekeeping” in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. 
I, 687-688, 690-691 (2nd edn. 2002). 
522 See UN practice in relation to the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC), the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and others cited by the International Law Commission in 
International Law Commission, Report on its Work of its Fifty-Sixth Session to the UN General Assembly, UN 
Doc. A/59/10 (2004), at 110-112. 
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of conduct. It follows that TCS and not the UN have accepted responsibility for wrongful acts 
committed by its soldiers.523 Finally, there may be cases where states provide forces in 
support of a UN operation not as an integral part thereof but where operational command and 
control serves to distinguish conduct by the TCS from that of the IO.524  
Thus, it is submitted that the standard of “effective control” helps to systematise the 
various scenarios in which the relationship between TCS and an IO or between various IOs 
may arise and constitutes customary international law given relevant UN and TCS practice 
together with pertinent UN official statements as opinio juris. The upshot of this is that this 
standard seeks to attribute conduct to the entity which has the factual power or possibility to 
effect change of conduct. 
The operational challenges of cluster munition clearance attest to the sensibility of this 
factual approach rather than only confining the analysis of attribution to a reference to the 
abstract mandate. In this regard, the importance of detailed and accurate information on 
cluster munition strike areas for being able to effectively plan and coordinate clearance efforts 
has already been emphasised.525 Only inaccurate information to that effect had been received 
by NATO in March 2000 when the Behrami incident occurred. Moreover, KFOR assumed 
humanitarian clearance tasks without reporting back on its efforts to UNMIK. In contrast to 
the view of the ECtHR these facts are relevant in answering the question whether UNMIK 
was capable of fulfilling its mandate in the absence of adequate knowledge of the particular 
strike site. Who, if not NATO which dominated KFOR and whose member states United 
States or the Netherlands had dropped the sub-munitions at issue, could have had knowledge 
of individual strike sites? And how could UNMACC, i.e. the UN, have had effective control 
over the alleged omission without having such knowledge? In the light of this, it is submitted 
that the ECtHR should have appraised these facts in its examination.  
Since the Court did not do so and concluded on the basis of the legal mandate of 
UNSC Res 1244 only that UNMIK was the responsible entity for clearance, it was easy to 
hold in a next step that UNMIK conduct is attributable to the UN.526 UMMIK under the terms 
                                                 
523 The paradigmatic example that comes to mind here is Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 authorised 
by UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990). Also see the practice in relation to the United States with regard 
to the UN-authorised operation in Korea from 1950-53, as well as in relation to the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) in Somalia. See G. Gaja, Second report on responsibility of international organizations, 2 April 2004, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, at paras. 32-33. 
524 Report of the Secretary-General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United Nations 
Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United 
Nations Peace Forces headquarters, 20 September 1996,UN-Doc. A/51/389, at paras. 17-18. 
525 See supra pp. 48-49. 
526 Behrami v.France, supra note 508, at paras. 142-143. 
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of SC Res 1244 is a subsidiary organ of the UNSC with the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General at its head;527 accordingly, UNMIK is embedded into a UN institutional 
structure in much the same way as the classical UN peacekeeping operations. 
However, even had the ECtHR incorporated these facts into his analysis and held that 
the clearance failure was KFOR’s conduct, in light of its further examination of attribution in 
relation to KFOR conduct it would still have concluded that this omission was attributable to 
the UN. It will be recalled that the Court held KFOR to be “under the ultimate authority and 
control” of the UN Security Council, in fact adopting a different test than the customary 
international law test of “effective control”, which has been identified by many scholarly 
commentators as the major flaw in the decision.528  
The Behrami case signals that in circumstances where the UN is involved in clearance 
efforts it will be hard to single out wrongful omissions by individual states parties of the 
ECHR. Since this was the first case ever to involve victims of unexploded sub-munitions 
before the ECtHR, it may be considered a lost opportunity to clarify the positive obligations 
under the right to life incumbent upon those with effective control over a territory to mark 
and/or clear unexploded sub-munitions. 
While there is thus no HRL treaty body jurisprudence that would explicitly speak to 
the issue of concrete positive measures in case of sub-munition contamination, such as 
marking or clearance of unexploded sub-munitions to protect the right to life, the judgement 
by the ECtHR in the Öneryildiz case529 where environmental risks led to the death of 
individuals may still provide some useful indications in this respect.  
This case concerned the death of nine members of applicants’ families who lived in 
slums surrounding a rubbish tip in Istanbul. Applicants alleged that the Turkish authorities 
had not done all that could have expected of them to prevent the death of their relatives 
caused by a methane gas explosion occurring in the rubbish tip. The court held that under 
Article 2 of the ECHR there was a positive obligation on States parties to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction in the context of any activity, a 
fortiori where dangerous industrial activities such as the operation of waste-sites are at 
                                                 
527 That only UNMIK has the status of a subsidiary organ of the UN is confirmed by operative paragraph 6 
where the UN Secretary-General is requested to appoint, in consultation with the UN Security Council, a Special 
Representative to control the implementation of the civil presence. See Op. para. 6, UN Security Council Res 
1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1244. 
528 See Behrami v.France, supra note 509, at 132-141, and the scholarly writings listed in supra note 508. 
529 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 30 November 
2004. 
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issue.530 Specifically, this positive obligation entailed such preventive operational measures as 
were necessary and sufficient to protect those individuals.531 A preventive measure in this 
context that the Turkish government should have taken was the technical measure to timely 
install a gas-extraction system in the rubbish tip to avoid the deadly methane gas explosion.532 
Another practical preventive measure emphasised by the court was the necessity to provide 
affected residents with information on the risks associated with the waste-dump.533 The 
decisive factor for the court to state that Turkey had to comply with these positive obligations 
under Article 2 of the ECHR and to conclude that these obligations were violated was that 
Turkish authorities knew or ought to have known of the real and immediate risk to the 
inhabitants.534 
The Öneryildiz case reveals interesting parallels with the case of territories of ECHR 
state parties that are contaminated with sub-munitions. Where a rubbish tip according to the 
court already gives rise to positive obligations of the territorial state to prevent dangers to the 
lives of those under that state’s jurisdiction this must be true a fortiori for the dangers to 
individual lives emanating from cluster munition remnants. Thus, this would suggest that in 
the case of sub-munition contamination of a state this would impose on the affected state the 
positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect the lives in a similar 
vein as spelt out in the Öneryildiz judgement. In the specific circumstances, such preventive 
operational measures under Article 2 of the ECHR would precisely entail the appropriate 
technical measures of marking and clearance of unexploded sub-munitions to prevent this 
hazard from materialising, i.e. killing and maiming of individuals. Moreover, it would be 
incumbent on the affected ECHR state party to provide information to those being 
immediately at risk of falling victim to cluster munition remnants.535  
However, these positive obligations have their limits in that the territorial state simply 
cannot prevent incidents with unexploded sub-munitions where it had no possibility to know 
of their precise location. Thus, this obligation is only violated by the territorial state if it knew 
or ought to have known of the real and immediate risk for specific individuals under its 
jurisdiction. As was elaborated on supra,536 very specific information is required for sub-
munition clearance. In the absence of such information, locating the actual strike sites will be 
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impossible and the territorial state will neither be capable of engaging in effective marking 
and clearance efforts nor providing specific information to those living in the vicinity of the 
actual strike sites.  
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that cluster munitions have been used 
predominantly in IAC recently (e.g. 1999 in Kosovo, 2001 in Afghanistan, 2003 in Iraq and 
2006 in Lebanon) where the user state(s) will often not be the same as the one that has 
jurisdiction and control over a territory affected by unexploded sub-munitions at the post-
conflict stage.  
In such situations, the discharge of the obligation to protect the right to life by the 
territorial state depends in particular on whether the user furnishes information on the likely 
locations of sub-munition duds. This would make a compelling case for imposing specific 
obligations on the user(s) of cluster munitions to assist the territorial state with marking and 
clearance at least by providing detailed information on sub-munition strike sites. However, as 
useful as such an obligation would be, it will find a limitation in the aforementioned 
jurisdictional obstacle imposed by HRL treaties. On the other hand, leaving the territorial state 
entirely alone in its fate is not a satisfactory solution either.  
To a limited extent, Protocol V on ERW to the CCW already discussed above has the 
potential of remedying this gap in the future as it imposes such an obligation on users of 
cluster munitions causing sub-munition dud contamination on a territory they do not control at 
the post-conflict stage to facilitate marking, clearance, removal or destruction of ERW, 
including cluster munition remnants, by making strike information available to the territorial 
state.537 As noted supra, under its Art. 5, Protocol V also imposes complementary obligations 
on the territorial state of warnings, risk education to the civilian population, marking, fencing 
and monitoring of affected territory. Thus, this establishes Protocol V as lex specialis as it can 
be considered an attempt to flesh out particular obligations compared to the general HRL 
framework.  
But the fundamental weaknesses of this Protocol have already been noted and need not 
be reiterated here. Besides the uncertainty whether Protocol V can be effectively 
universalised, suffice it to say here that the practical effect of this Protocol has been limited so 
far; the obligations it imposes are not applicable retroactively and thus, could not be resorted 
to as a remedy for the already existing problem on the ground. Moreover, in the future, the 
potential of Protocol V would especially depend on how far states parties are prepared to go 
                                                 
537 See the discussion of Protocol V supra pp. 114-120. 
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in its implementation. The effectiveness of Protocol V depends on whether states parties will 
make frequent use of the many qualifications contained in the Protocol to essentially 
circumvent their obligations. In any event, not only the obligation to protect the right to life 
calls for specific measures of clearance as well as marking, risk education and warnings to the 
civilian population, as will be shown in the next section. 
 
4.5.  Unexploded Sub-munitions at the Post-Conflict Stage, the Rights 
to Health with the Underlying Determinants of Food, Housing, Water, a 
Healthy Environment and Specific Childrens’ Rights  
 
Obliging a state to protect individuals on its territory from a deadly hazard that 
unexploded sub-munitions littering the landscape represent also evidences the close 
interrelationship between the right to life and Art. 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).538  Art. 12 (1) of the ICESCR imposes on 
states parties the obligation to recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. As the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) emphasised in its General Comment on the right to health: “[…] the 
right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in 
which people lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as 
food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and 
healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment.”539 This shows the close connection 
of the right to health with a number of other rights under the ICESCR. These rights include 
Art. 7, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which 
inter alia imposes an obligation on states parties to ensure in particular safe and healthy 
working conditions; as well as Art. 11, the right to an adequate standard of living with its 
components of ensuring adequate food, clothing and housing. The CESCR has also derived 
principally from Arts. 11 and 12 of the ICESCR the right to water which obliges states parties 
most importantly to ensure affordable access of individuals to water free from hazards for 
drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation and personal and 
household hygiene.540 
                                                 
538 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
539 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, 11 August 2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, at para. 4. 
540 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 
January 2003, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, at para. 12. 
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The contamination of water installations, such as sanitation or irrigation canals, 
agricultural and pastural land as well as houses or work places with sub-munition duds makes 
these areas inaccessible for use. This is incompatible with the enjoyment of these vital 
determinants of the right to health, including the right to live in a healthy environment and the 
rights to just and favourable conditions of work, food, housing and water. However, also the 
obligations of the territorial state under the ICESCR are subject to inherent limitations. This 
follows from the general obligation of states parties under Art. 2 (1) of the ICESCR according 
to which the fulfilment of obligations must only be progressively realised and is conditioned 
by the availability of resources. Usually, in the aftermath of armed conflicts the resources of 
the territorial state will be stretched to their limits. Still, the CESCR has made it clear that 
“available resources” do not only comprise resources within the affected state but also those 
available through international cooperation and assistance.541 In this context, one can also 
understand the CESCR’s demand that states have an obligation to provide humanitarian 
assistance to affected states in times of emergency.542 The contamination of a state’s territory 
with sub-munition duds can well be taken to constitute a humanitarian emergency, as is 
illustrated by the situation on the ground in Lebanon at least one year after the guns fell silent 
there in the summer of 2006. Protocol V on ERW to the CCW again provides an interesting 
mirror provision to this obligation to co-operate to provide humanitarian assistance. By virtue 
of Art. 8, Protocol V imposes on states in a position to do so an obligation to provide 
assistance for marking, clearance, removal, destruction of ERW, including cluster munition 
remnants as well as risk education through the UN system, other international, regional or 
national organisations, the ICRC, NGOs or on a bilateral basis. Such outside assistance seems 
to be generally justified in relation to an affected state; as a matter of fact, the affected state 
where unexploded sub-munitions remain on its territory after a conflict finds itself in an 
aggravated position to ensure the rights discussed above to its population and in the majority 
of cases did not cause this problem by using cluster munitions in the first place. 
The aggravation of the territorial state’s capacity to fulfil its positive obligations in 
respect of the rights to life and the aforementioned economic, social and cultural rights 
becomes especially clear when having regard to the fulfilment of childrens’ rights where a 
state is confronted with sub-munition contamination: As children are among those most at risk 
of death or injury due to tampering with unexploded sub-munitions, such contamination 
                                                 
541 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations, 14 December 1990, UN Doc. E/1991/23, at para. 13. 
542 Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on the right to health, supra note 539, 
at para. 40. 
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gravely impacts on the enjoyment of a number of  child-specific rights enshrined in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), to date the most widely ratified human rights 
treaty. This includes most prominently the inherent right to life of the child with the explicit 
positive obligation to ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of 
the child under Art. 6 of the CRC. Moreover, since the presence of unexploded sub-munitions 
creates a high risk for children to suffer death and severe injury, the position of territorial 
states to fulfil the right to health of its children, in particular under Art. 24 (2) of the CRC to 
diminish child mortality and to ensure the provision of necessary assistance and health care to 
all children, is severely prejudiced. Also, how could one possibly ask a territorial state where 
as a result of sub-munition contamination the number of severely handicapped children is on a 
dangerous rise to adequately fulfil the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for 
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development pursuant to Art. 27 of the 
CRC? The specific right of children to rest and leisure and to engage in play and recreational 
activities under Art. 31 of the CRC is also likely to undergo a serious retrogression in an 
environment where such activities can simply be fatal. Accordingly, in such an environment, 
again an obligation of the territorial state to clear unexploded sub-munitions with all 
complementary measures such as marking, risk education and warnings to the civilian 
population would arise to prevent such retrogression in the enjoyment of these rights.  
While human rights treaty monitoring bodies have not specifically examined cluster 
munition use to specifically reaffirm these obligations, the UN Special Procedures with a 
mandate from the UN Human Rights Council have. Their findings shall now be subject to 
comment in the next section. 
 
 
4.6.  The UN Special Procedures on the Use of Cluster Munitions in 
Lebanon and Israel 
 
The UN Special Procedures have specifically examined cluster munition use during 
the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. One structural reason for this is the 
different origin and scope of the respective mandates of the UN Special Procedures. While 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies were established as judicial or quasi-judicial bodies 
under a specific human rights treaty, the UN Special Procedures owe their existence to the 
UN Charter directly under the commitment of “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights”. Therefore, human rights treaty monitoring bodies have less flexibility in interpreting 
their jurisdiction, as this jurisdiction is generally limited to the respective human rights treaty. 
 157
Where allegations arise that also pertain to IHL, some effort must be made to confirm that the 
human rights treaty monitoring body has jurisdiction. Secondly, the mandates of UN Special 
Procedures consist of broad phenomena or country situations. Examples of the thematic 
procedures relevant to the issue include extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions rather 
than the rights to life or due process under the ICCPR or torture as a phenomenon at large 
rather than only the respective human right to be free from torture under the ICCPR or the UN 
Convention Against Torture.543 
 With regard to weapons in particular, UN Special Rapporteurs have broached this 
issue on various occasions. For instance, already in the 1980s, the then UN Special 
Rapporteur on Afghanistan addressed the use of booby-traps, i.e. objects that looked like toys 
in the shape of pens or small animals, and anti-personnel mines as part of his mandate to 
formulate proposals to ensure protection of human rights of all residents before, during and 
after the withdrawal of all foreign forces. He thus included a section on human rights in the 
armed conflict prevailing at the time and concluded that such use violated common Article 3 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.544 In another report on Afghanistan, the same Special 
Rapporteur reported on high-altitude bombardments with bombs “containing 40 individual 
rockets which explode 24 hours after deployment,” which may well have been cluster 
munitions.545  
At the beginning of the 1990s various human rights experts commissioned by the UN 
Commission of Human Rights referred to landmines in specific country situations as 
violations of specific human rights. Thus, in 1992 the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan 
stated that the “problem of mines remains one of the main concerns as it is closely linked with 
the right to life.” He went on to report that the Afghan government for the first time handed 
over Soviet mine field plans to the United Nations.546 It follows that in the very similar case 
to unexploded sub-munitions, notably landmines, the importance of having information on the 
location of such weapons was emphasised under the right to life. 
                                                 
543 Cf. P. Alston, J. Morgan-Foster & W. Abresch, “The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its 
Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the ‛War on Terror’ ”, 19 (1) EJIL 
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544 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/55, 
19 February 1985, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/21, at paras. 23, 99, 107-109, 175. 
545 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/55, 
17 February 1986, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/24, at para. 86. 
546 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. 
Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1991/78, 17 
February 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/33, at para. 39. 
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 Another report dating from 1994 on the human rights situation in Iraq included an 
entire section on the problem of landmines in the Kurdish territory in the northern part of the 
country. It reported on the overall scope of the problem and the circumstances in which 
casualties occurred. Most importantly, the Special Rapporteur made specific reference to an 
IHL instrument, notably the original Protocol II to the CCW and explicit standards that mines 
should not be used indiscriminately, against the civilian population, or laid without record of 
their location. He concluded that  
 
“the specific standards articulated by the Convention [the CCW] derive from three customary principles 
of international humanitarian law: (a) that the right to adopt means of warfare is not unlimited; (b) that 
unnecessary suffering is prohibited; and (c) that non-combatants are to be protected. Insofar as 
landmines appear to have been placed by Iraqi troops in areas outside the war-zone without adequate 
protection for civilians, and inasmuch as it does not appear that the laying of the minefields was 
adequately recorded […] the Government of Iraq may be in violation of customary international 
humanitarian law.”547  
 
This shows the flexibility of the UN Special Procedures which enables them to 
explicitly refer, without more, to IHL alongside HRL, and the contribution that UN Special 
Procedures on human rights can make to the development of international law.548 
 Finally, a report of the same year by the then Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the human rights situation in Cambodia emphasised that the laying of mines 
threatened the right to life, food, health, and limiting the freedom of movement throughout the 
country. The report specifically recommended to the government of Cambodia to develop 
adequate services for the rehabilitation, care and training of handicapped and disabled, 
including victims of landmines. However, the report did not stop there but called on the 
Commission on Human Rights to “urge all States Members of the United Nations to adopt 
laws and strict practices to police the manufacture, supply and export of land-mines 
(particularly anti-personnel) many of which have been, and are being, installed in Cambodia 
with devastating consequences for the human rights of individuals injured and for the human 
rights of all in a society which is thereby destabilized”; to recommend to the government of 
Cambodia “that it consider drafting appropriate legislation to ban and make illegal and 
punishable by law the important as well as the use of mines in Cambodia”; to call upon other 
UN Member states to assist with the removal of mines; and to “urge the Secretary-General to 
                                                 
547 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Iraq, submitted by Mr. Max van 
der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Commission resolution 
1993/74, 25 February 1994, UN-Doc. E/CN.4/1994/58, at para. 108.  
548 Cf. D. O’ Donnell, “Trends in the application of international humanitarian law by United Nations human 
rights mechanisms”, 324 International Review of the Red Cross 481-503 (1998), 
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convene an international conference for an urgent review of the Convention on Prohibitions 
and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980 to ban the manufacture, 
supply and export of anti-personnel mines.”549 Therefore, a human rights expert mandated by 
the Commission on Human Rights specifically recommended further legal developments in 
prohibitions relating to landmines on a national and international level.550 
 On cluster munition use during the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 
2006, three different reports by UN-mandated experts were published, two of them by already 
existing UN Special procedures and the third by an ad hoc Commission of Inquiry.551 The 
first of these reports by four UN human rights experts, notably the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 
the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs and the Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing, has the major advantage compared to the other two reports 
that its findings and legal analysis are based on country visits to both Israel and Lebanon. In 
contrast, the other two reports are based on missions to Lebanon only. This entails that the 
first report may be considered more balanced and impartial than the other two since it 
considered evidence submitted from both sides to the conflict.552 The other two differ from 
each other inasmuch as the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food would have 
permitted him to visit both Lebanon and Israel. However, in the specific case the Rapporteur 
did not receive a positive response to his request to visit Israel.  In contrast, the perception of 
partiality of the Commission of Inquiry was due to the inherent flaw of its mandate provided 
by the Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 which called upon three experts of IHL and 
HRL to only investigate the Israeli side of the conflict.553 
At the outset, the report of the four UN experts outlined the main objectives of their 
mission broadly as involving (i) the assessment under international human rights and 
                                                 
549 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Michael 
Kirby, on the situation of human rights in Cambodia submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
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humanitarian law as covered by the respective mandates, the impact on the civilian 
populations of the armed conflict that affected Lebanon and northern Israel (ii) an advice to 
the authorities on fulfilling their responsibility to protect and assist affected civilians in 
accordance with their human rights obligations; and (iii) recommendations to UN agencies 
and other relevant actors on how to best address the protection needs of the people 
concerned.554 Accordingly, consistent with the earlier practice of UN Special Procedures the 
experts also resorted to IHL in their analysis. 
 Under the heading of “protection of the civilian population during the conflict” the 
experts stated that despite Israel’s declared goal of conducting hostilities in accordance with 
IHL, the actual practice fell short in various respects, including the reckless, perhaps even 
deliberately reckless, use of cluster munitions. The justification for discussing such classical 
IHL violations was because of the impact of these violations on human life, housing, health 
and internal displacement.555 
 In doing so, the experts devoted one entire section of the report to the use of cluster 
bombs in southern Lebanon, citing the “massive use by the IDF of cluster munitions and the 
ongoing impact of unexploded sub-munitions (bomblets) on the civilian population” as 
“principal concern.”556 Of the two fundamental problematic characteristics of the use of 
cluster munitions, they emphasised in particular the post-conflict effect of unexploded sub-
munitions. In their words, the unexploded bomblets were “small, often difficult to spot and 
highly volatile.”557  
The experts did engage with the military reasons given by the Israeli side, particularly 
with the argument that cluster munitions were the most effective weapon against Hezbollah 
rocket launching sites. They accepted in principle that this would constitute a valid reason for 
using these weapons, since their damage radius covers a wide area and thus is able to 
neutralise mobile rocket launchers.558 Accordingly, the wide area effect of cluster munitions 
was primarily viewed as part of the abstract military effectiveness of attacking large mobile 
targets. However, as no information was provided by the Israeli authorities to substantiate this 
claim in the concrete circumstances, this abstract rationale was not accepted.  
Significantly, the experts concluded that regardless of whether the military arguments 
provided by the Israeli government were sound, the use of cluster munitions in any event was 
                                                 
554 Human Rights Council, Report by Alston, Hunt, Kälin & Kothari, supra note 90, at para. 2. 
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inconsistent with principles of distinction and proportionality. This conclusion was made on 
the basis of the long-term effects of unexploded sub-munitions of which “Israel could not 
reasonable have been ignorant.” In contrast, “the long-term effect on the civilian population 
should have been obvious” to Israel.559  
Evidence of the fact that Israel must have known of the propensity of sub-munitions to 
fail in large numbers can be seen in the acknowledgement by one government official that 
cluster munitions were used in part to prevent Hezbollah fighters from returning to the 
villages after the ceasefire.560 If the long-term military advantage of preventing Hezbollah 
fighters from returning to the villages may be ensured by unexploded sub-munitions, surely 
then Israel cannot argue that the same effects on civilians cannot be part of any reasonable 
proportionality calculation at the time of the attack. This argument had a direct impact on the 
expert opinion expressed by McCormack and Mtharu to delegates of the Third Review 
Conference to the CCW, since these IHL experts cited the argument by the UN human rights 
experts approvingly in favour of the proposition that mid- to longer-term consequences of 
ERW, including unexploded sub-munitions, must be taken into account when an attacker 
engages upon the required proportionality assessment between the anticipated military 
advantage and the expected civilian harm.561 
In their recommendations, the human rights experts called upon Israel to provide 
accurate strike data of its use of cluster munitions, including the grid references of the targets 
and to cooperate fully in the programme to eliminate the remaining unexploded bomblets.562 
This recognises the importance of user state assistance to the affected state. Of course, the UN 
Special Procedures are well-equipped to address such specific demands to individual states as 
these recommendations are of a legally non-binding character. 
On the other hand, they recommended that the Lebanese government should develop, 
in cooperation with the international community, a comprehensive strategy to assist IDPs and 
returnees, including urgently addressing the protection challenge of access to livelihoods, in 
particular in farming areas affected by UXO.563 This constitutes a reaffirmation of the 
division of responsibilities between the affected territorial state and the international 
community in particular with regard to economic, social and cultural rights in the specific 
context of the right to food for IDPs and returning refugees in the post-conflict emergency 
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phase in Lebanon prevailing in the latter half of 2006. The international community, for its 
part, was called upon to significantly increase funding for the UNMACC in Southern 
Lebanon to more expeditiously complete the destruction of unexploded ordnance, including 
sub-munitions. 
Most importantly, however, like their counterpart at the beginning of the 1990s in 
respect of antipersonnel mines, the experts urged the relevant bodies, including the Meetings 
of States Parties to the CCW and the Ottawa Convention, to add cluster munitions to the list 
of weapons banned under international law.564 This recommendation provides again 
indication that the human rights experts primarily viewed the post-conflict problem of 
unexploded sub-munitions as problematic, as the Ottawa Convention was mentioned; hence, 
the post-conflict effects of unexploded sub-munitions were apparently likened to 
antipersonnel mines. However, as shown above, while this is true on a factual level it is not 
accurate as a statement in terms of the law. Thus, any new international prohibition of cluster 
munitions could not possibly be adopted within the framework of the Ottawa Convention. 
With regard to the other two reports, it must be asked whether the specific flaws in 
these reports to only investigate one side would play out in the particular case of cluster 
munition use during that conflict. Here, three observations may be made to argue that despite 
the flaw of perceived partiality, the Commission of Inquiry’s and the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food’s findings would still be relevant.  
Firstly, the Commission made a conscious attempt to take into account the conduct of 
Hezbollah as far as possible in evaluating the legality of IDF actions. This is apparent from 
the statement by the Commission that an inquiry into the conformity with IHL of the specific 
acts of the IDF in Lebanon requires that account also be taken of the conduct of the opponent 
and that it was not entitled to investigate the actions by Hezbollah in Israel (emphasis in the 
original).565 Conversely, this would allow consideration of Hezbollah actions in Lebanon as 
far as it was relevant to assess the legality of Israeli cluster munition use.  
As the treatment of cluster munition use shows, the Commission took the probable 
military rationale to interdict repeated Hezbollah rocket firings into account.566 Still, it 
concluded that cluster munitions were used indiscriminately and that their use was excessive 
and not justified by military necessity.567 
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Secondly, the problem of partiality seems to be mitigated somewhat because the report 
by the four human rights experts which did investigate both sides and where the allegation of 
partiality cannot be raised as easily, explicitly referred to the necessity for an in-depth analysis 
of the issue whether the fact that the majority of cluster munitions were used in the last 72 
hours of the armed conflict would indicate an intention to inhibit or prevent the return of 
civilians and a reckless disregard for the predictable civilian casualties.568 Thus, where a 
conceivably more impartial investigation raises such a possible conclusion and requests 
clarification by the Commission of Inquiry the findings of the Commission in this regard “that 
these weapons were used deliberately to turn large areas of fertile agricultural land into “no 
go” areas for the civilian population”569 cannot be simply dismissed as lacking impartiality. 
More fundamentally still and related to this point, the authority of some of the findings 
and conclusions on cluster munition use by the Commission and the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food are reinforced by the fact that the report by the four human rights experts had 
some findings and conclusions in common with the other two reports. In this context, both the 
report by the four humans rights experts and the Commission urged to add cluster munitions 
to the list of banned weapons under international law.570 Moreover, all three reports called 
upon Israel to hand over full details of its cluster munition use to Lebanon to facilitate 
clearance of unexploded sub-munitions.571 All three reports also devoted some attention to the 
problem of accessibility of agricultural areas as a result of unexploded sub-munitions in 
southern Lebanon.572 
Thirdly and finally, both the Commission and the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food report contained observations of a more general character on the characteristics of cluster 
munitions that would go beyond the specific situations in Lebanon and Israel. As the 
Commission remarked,  
 
“The particular military use of these munitions lies in the wide area the munitions can cover. It provides 
the military with a very effective weapon against targets such as troops in the open or in defensive 
positions, artillery batteries, and concentrations of vehicles or tanks. However, the inherent area 
coverage of cluster munitions calls for clear separation between military targets and civilians or their 
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property otherwise the latter will suffer the indiscriminate consequences of their use. Account must also 
be taken of the known failure rates of such ammunition which can result in excessive and 
disproportionate harm to civilians after the conflict. Although there are ongoing efforts to ban cluster 
munitions, for example under the umbrella of the Conventional Weapons Convention, unfortunately 
there is no prohibition under international humanitarian law on their use at present. The key issue in 
relation to the law and their use by the military rests on the known wide dispersal pattern of the cluster 
munitions on the ground and hence the fact that they cannot be targeted precisely. As a result it is often 
difficult, if not impossible, for the military to discriminate between military and civilian objects when 
the weapons are used in or near populated areas. The pertinent issue therefore is how the munitions are 
used.”573 
 
 The report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food included the following 
statement on the general legality of using cluster munitions: 
 
“[U]sing cluster munitions in populated civilian areas, given the injuries and suffering that it will cause 
and given the effects that do not discriminate between military and civilian objectives, is likely to result 
in many violations of international humanitarian law. The dispersal of unexploded bomblets from 
cluster bombs also raises other serious concerns, not only as to their immediate effects on civilian life, 
but also in relation to the after-effects in terms of damage to agricultural fields, as well as life and 
civilian infrastructure.”574 
 
Based on serious examinations of specific factual situations which derive directly from 
the authority of the Human Rights Council that in turn derives its authority directly from 
states, these general observations may be considered important contributions to international 
discussions on the use of these weapons as such irrespective of specific instances of use. 
 In this respect these statements together with the call for a specific international 
prohibition on cluster munitions added to the growing momentum for such a normative 
response within the CCW and the Oslo process in the latter half of 2006. That actors with a 
human rights agenda took up the issue of an international prohibition of cluster munitions also 
attests to the fact that the grounds for such a prohibition were increasingly framed in 
humanitarian terms. 
In line with this agenda, also a more comprehensive response must be adopted as to 
deal with the existing problem already created by the use of cluster munitions rather than only 
prevent future civilian suffering. One important aspect of this reactive approach is to provide 
assistance for the existing victims of cluster munition use. 
An important precedent for obligations on the part of the territorial state to assist 
victims is enshrined in Art. 39 of the CRC. According to that provision, states parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social 
reintegration of child victims of armed conflict. This provision will be brought more often 
                                                 
573 Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 177, at paras. 254-255. 
574 Human Rights Council, Report by Ziegler, supra note 99, at para. 12. 
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into operation than would be the case without the deadly hazard of unexploded sub-munitions 
on an affected state’s territory; the particular additional considerable needs of cluster munition 
victims have already been noted in Chapter 2.4. supra, including emergency and medical care, 
physical rehabilitation and psychological and socio-economic support.575 The impact on 
childrens’ human rights was confirmed by the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon which 
viewed the fact that children continued to be victims of unexploded sub-munitions not only as 
a clear violation of IHL but also as “a blatant violation of one of the core principles of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the right to life (art. 6 of the CRC).”576 The report also 
emphasised the necessity to provide special awareness sessions, i.e. risk reduction education, 
to children regarding the danger of unexploded sub-munitions, as well as reaffirmed states 
party obligations under the right to life to provide access to health facilities, especially for the 
disabled. In this context, also Art. 39 of the CRC was specifically invoked. While Art. 39 of 
the CRC contains specific obligations of states under whose jurisdiction child victims reside 
until recently, no such standards tailored to the specific needs of cluster munition victims 
existed. 
Significant developments have occurred in the area of victim assistance recently with 
the adoption of the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines and the adoption of the 
2006 CRPD which shall be analysed in the following sections. Interestingly, a human rights 
approach towards these victims has been more and more recognised while this has been less 
the case with the prevention of new victims through clearance and related measures just 
discussed.577  
 
4.7.  The 1997 Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines: a First 
Breakthrough on Victim Assistance 
 
                                                 
575 See supra pp. 45-48. 
576 Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 177, at paras. 283-284. 
577 But this human rights approach has more and more centred on the state under whose jurisdiction victims live 
at the post-conflict stage. This has the drawback of not focusing on the potential responsibility of the user state, 
whose legal responsibility may be incurred, since these post-conflict consequences of cluster munition use may 
amount to violations of general IHL. Because of this internationally wrongful act, the user state owes full 
reparation to the affected state and its individuals, including restitution. This would require precisely marking 
and clearance to re-establish the situation that existed before the internationally wrongful act by the user and also 
rehabilitation of victims. However, enshrining such responsibility may not be advisable on a political level. 
Indeed, during the negotiations of the new Convention on Cluster Munitions, specific obligations imposed on the 
user to assist the affected states with marking, clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants as well as 
with the provision of victim assistance was on the table but such obligations were finally only included in a 
watered down fashion or not at all. 
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The 1997 Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines contains two references to assistance to 
mine victims. The first can be found in Preambular para. 3 which provides: 
 
“Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social 
and economic reintegration of mine victims,” 578 
 
Moreover, Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention states that: 
 
“Each State party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and 
social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance 
may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national 
organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral 
basis.”579 
 
As is widely known, the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines was 
adopted outside the traditional forum of the CCW in light of the perceived inadequacy of the 
CCW to deal comprehensively with the severe landmine crisis that had reached extraordinary 
proportions in the 1990s. To many, nothing less than a comprehensive prohibition of the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines could tackle the grave 
humanitarian problems resulting from massive use of these weapons on a global scale. This is 
why Canada announced at the close of the First Review Conference in May 1996 where 
Amended Protocol II to the CCW was adopted which represented a regulation rather than 
prohibition of anti-personnel mines that Canada would host an international meeting with a 
view to adopting a total prohibition of anti-personnel mines later that year. The International 
Strategy Conference Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines was finally held in 
Ottawa in October 1996 and at the end of this conference, then Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy challenged states to conclude an international convention completely 
prohibiting anti-personnel mines by the end of 1997. This announcement set the stage of what 
became known as the “Ottawa process”, an unprecedented humanitarian disarmament process 
with the specific feature of a close collaboration between small- to medium-sized like-minded 
states, the ICRC, UN agencies and civil society, organised in the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL), which resulted in the successful adoption of the Ottawa Convention, 
also known as the Mine Ban Treaty in September 1997.580 
                                                 
578 Preambular para. 3, 1997 Ottawa Convention, supra note 224. 
579 Art. 6 (3), ibid. 
580 The ICBL and Jody Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later in 1997 to specifically honour civil 
society contribution to the drafting of the Mine Ban Treaty and the unique partnership between civil society and 
states in multilateral disarmament efforts. On the negotiating history of the convention, see Maslen, Commentary 
on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 22-44; S. Maslen & P. Herby, “An international ban on anti-
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 While the worldwide suffering of mine victims was the fundamental motivation 
behind drafting this treaty, surprisingly, a specific provision on victim assistance was absent 
from the draft treaty text before the final negotiations in Oslo in September 1997. At the 
beginning of negotiations, Norway put forward a proposal on assistance to mine victims 
which sought to impose an obligation for each state party in a position to do so to provide 
assistance for the rehabilitation of mine victims and to provide information to a database to 
that effect.581 However, rehabilitation according to this proposal only included limited aspects 
of victim assistance, surgery, the supply of prosthetic devices, physiotherapy and 
psychological counselling;582 on the other hand, the proposal for an obligation to provide 
information to a database was useful in that such an explicit obligation would allow states 
parties to understand the challenges faced in terms of the needs of mine victims. Civil society 
and in particular organisations specialising in victim assistance were not content with the 
limited scope of the provision thus proposed and advocated for the inclusion of an obligation 
to also assist victims with their social and economic reintegration.583  
 It is submitted that such an obligation merely constitutes a specification of a territorial 
state’s fulfilment of its HRL obligations to protect the rights to life and economic and social 
rights of the people residing under its jurisdiction for the specific group of victims of 
landmine explosions. The finally adopted text of Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention quoted 
above then incorporates a reference not only to provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation but also for the social and economic reintegration of mine victims. The very 
inclusion of this provision can be regarded as a landmark achievement, since the Ottawa 
Convention is the first disarmament treaty to contain such humanitarian obligations on victim 
assistance.584 Especially because of this provision, it is legitimate to call this treaty “a unique 
mix of arms control based on humanitarian concern.”585 
                                                                                                                                                        
personnel mines: History and negotiation of the ‛Ottawa treaty’ ”, 325 International Review of the Red Cross 
693-713 (1998), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPJN (last visited 22 January 2010). 
581 See Norway, Proposal to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on Anti-Personnel Mines, 1 September 1997, Doc. 
APL/CW.5, referenced in Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 190. 
582 See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 190. 
583 Ibid. 
584 S. Bailey & T. Channareth, “Beyond the Rhetoric: The Mine Ban Treaty and Victim Assistance”, in 
Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 143. Subsequently, a provision on victim 
assistance was inserted by virtue of Art. 8 (2) of the 2003 Protocol V on ERW to the CCW which is worded in 
an identical manner but for the generic category of explosive remnants of war covered by the Protocol. This 
already extends the scope of victim assistance to those directly and indirectly injured through cluster munition 
remnants. Since Art. 8 (2) of Protocol V is identically worded as Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention, the 
comments in relation to the latter shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the former.  
585 S. Goose, M. Wareham & J. Williams, “Banning Landmines and Beyond”, in Williams, Goose & Wareham, 
Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 2. 
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However, the link between the obligation on victim assistance and especially the 
affected state’s obligations under HRL does not become immediately apparent from this 
provision nor the text of the Ottawa Convention as a whole. Firstly, no reference whatsoever 
to HRL is found either in the Preamble or the operative provisions of the treaty. As shall be 
seen later on, the link with broader HRL concerns, especially with the human rights of 
persons with disabilities, was only recognised at a later stage. Secondly, the wording of Art. 6 
(3) imposes the obligation to provide victim assistance to “Each State Party in a position to do 
so.” It remains to be clarified which states parties are meant by this provision. Naturally, one 
would turn to the territorial state as being the primary addressee of this obligation, since from 
a practical perspective the affected state will be most likely the one to know best what is 
required to assist its own victims. Subsequently, this interpretation was explicitly endorsed by 
the mine action community, for example the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining which stated that the primary responsibility for assistance to victims lies with the 
national government.586 Here then, the above-mentioned problem arises that in affected states 
vital capacities and infrastructure to assist their own victims are lacking in which case outside 
assistance to the territorial state is needed.587 As a result, the wording of “in a position to do 
so” significantly qualifies the obligation of a territorial state to assist its own victims in that it 
cannot be considered absolute and its fulfilment takes into account the respective capacities of 
mine-affected states.588 In circumstances where there is a lack of capacity of the affected 
state, also other states parties would be bound by the obligation to provide assistance to 
victims.589  This follows from the context of Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention which is 
embedded in Art. 6 entitled “International cooperation and assistance” as well as the explicit 
possibility for states parties under Art. 6 (7) (e) to request assistance in the elaboration of a 
national demining programme to determine assistance to victims.  
However, a provision that the state whose armed forces used anti-personnel mines in 
the first place has a special responsibility in assisting the affected state is lacking. Indeed, this 
                                                 
586 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining brings together mine action experts with a view, 
in partnership with states, IGOs and NGOs, to increasing the performance and professionalism of mine action. 
This includes providing operational assistance, disseminating knowledge, improving quality management and 
standards, as well as supporting instruments of international law. On victim assistance see, Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “The Role of Mine Action in Victim Assistance”, July 2002, at 14, 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Role_MA_in_VA.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
587 Ibid. 
588 See, in this sense, Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 194-195; Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “The Role of Mine Action in Victim Assistance”, supra note 
586, at 14. 
589 See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 195. 
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would not be a far-fetched proposition, since these consequences of anti-personnel mine use 
amount to violations of general IHL, most importantly the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks. Because of this internationally wrongful act, the user state in accordance with the law 
on state responsibility owes full reparation to the affected state and its individuals. This is 
confirmed by Art. 91 of API, providing for compensation by a state whose armed forces 
violated IHL.590 That the duty to make full reparation also includes non-monetary forms of 
reparation such as rehabilitation of victims may be confirmed by the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
adopted by the General Assembly in 2005.591 Victim assistance would then be a remedy based 
on secondary norms of state responsibility rather than a primary obligation. However, 
proposals to enshrine such a specific user state responsibility implying a previous 
internationally wrongful act were not accepted during negotiations on the Ottawa 
Convention.592 The obligation laid down under Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention may thus 
not be understood as being a secondary obligation based on an internationally wrongful act by 
the user state but rather a primary obligation primarily imposed on the territorial state. 
The parallels between the final version of Art. 6 (3) of the Ottawa Convention and 
HRL obligations, especially in the area of economic and social rights are striking; as argued 
above, the obligations of a territorial state in this area are also qualified by the caveat of the 
availability of resources and subject to progressive realisation. Moreover, available resources 
also comprise those that a state can have recourse to by virtue of international cooperation and 
assistance. But the fact remains that this link to HRL was not explicitly recognised when 
adopting the Ottawa Convention. The convention also does not define the scope of the term 
“victim”, nor what “care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration” precisely 
entail.  
It was therefore left to the implementation stage to clarify these matters and to flesh 
out what specifically was required of states parties to meet their obligations under Art. 6 
(3).593 A first culmination of these efforts occurred with the 2004 First Review Conference to 
                                                 
590 Legal scholars recognise, in contrast to certain states’ jurisprudence, that Art. 91 of API, which is modelled 
after Art. 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, creates an individual right to invoke the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing state. See, for example, L. Zegveld, “Remedies for victims of violations of international 
humanitarian law”, 851 International Review of the Red Cross 506-507, 512 (2003) (with further references). 
591 UN General Assembly Res 60/147 with Annex, 21 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147. 
592 See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 167-168, 170. 
593 That implementation phase began when the treaty entered into force in March 1999 and the first annual 
meeting of states parties foreseen by Art. 11 of the Ottawa Convention was held in Maputo, Mozambique only 
two months later in May 1999. On the basis of a President Paper, states parties agreed in the Maputo Declaration 
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the Ottawa Convention in Nairobi where a detailed Final Report noted the remaining 
challenges and a formalised set of understandings were agreed to by states parties, the latter 
commonly known as the “Nairobi Action Plan”.594  
Among the most important clarifications in the Final Report was the general 
acceptance that the definition of “victim” comprised “those who either individually or 
collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine 
utilization.”595 This definition makes it clear that not only the person directly injured by a 
landmine explosion is considered a victim but also families and entire communities who also 
suffer from the socio-economic impact of landmine incidents and contamination.596 
Moreover, the reference to “impairment of fundamental rights” also recognises that victim 
assistance is part of a broader context in states’ fulfilment of their HRL obligations toward 
these victims. This broader context is further expressed in the following terms:  
 
“Victim assistance does not require the development of new fields or disciplines but rather calls for 
ensuring that existing health care and social service systems, rehabilitation programmes and legislative 
and policy frameworks are adequate to meet the needs of all citizens – including landmine victims. […] 
Furthermore, the impetus provided by the Convention to assist mine victims has provided an 
opportunity to enhance the well-being of not only landmine victims but also other persons with war-
related injuries and persons with disabilities. Assistance to landmine victims should be viewed as a part 
of a country’s overall public health and social services systems and human rights frameworks. […] The 
                                                                                                                                                        
at the end of the meeting to set up an inter-sessional work programme with a view of engaging in focused 
informal discussions among all interested parties, i.e. all interested governments, international and non-
governmental organisations on key areas of implementation, including victim assistance. This inter-sessional 
work programme was to be carried out by Standing Committees with each committee concentrating on one key 
area of implementation. See First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Maputo Declaration, 7 
May 1999, Doc. APLC/MSP.1/1999/L.6, at paras. 16-17. The establishment of a Standing Committee on Victim 
Assistance as well as the further annual meetings of states parties represented significant steps to gain an 
implementation-orientated understanding of the abovementioned undefined terms and the scope of states parties’ 
obligations in the area of victim assistance. 
594 See Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Part II: Review of the Operation and 
Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction: 1999-2004, Part III: Ending the Suffering Caused By Anti-Personnel Mines: 
Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009, Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, 9 February 2005, Doc. 
APLC/CONF/2004/5.  
595 Ibid., at 27, para. 64. 
596 As for the scope of who may be considered a “victim”, the proposition that not only the direct victim but also 
family members may fall under the definition of  “victim” already had a precedent in HRL treaty law, notably in 
Art. 14 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture. This provision entitles victims of an act of torture to redress and 
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of death 
of the direct victim, also the victim’s dependants shall be entitled to compensation. However, mutatis mutandis, 
what has been said above on the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy is also valid here. 
This is because victim assistance constitutes a remedy based on secondary norms of state responsibility rather 
than a primary obligation. See Art. 14, Convention Against Torture, supra note 343. 
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States Parties have come to recognize that victim assistance is more than just a medical and 
rehabilitation issue – it is also a human rights issue.”597 
 
The placing of victim assistance in the broader context of the fulfilment of HRL 
obligations is an important concept which also paved the way for addressing the specific 
needs of landmine and other war-related victims within the framework of efforts to negotiate 
the CRPD, a HRL instrument designed to better implement the human rights of disabled 
people. The link to then already ongoing efforts at negotiating this HRL convention is 
explicitly recognised by the Nairobi Review Conference Final Report.598 
 At the same time, states parties agreed on the fact that many mine-affected states are 
not in a position to afford adequate care and rehabilitation services as well as economic and 
social assistance to their populations, including mine victims and recognised that capacity-
building in this regard must also be set against the general background of development and 
underdevelopment.599 This arguably stresses the importance of outside assistance for mine-
affected states while states parties also recognised that “the ultimate responsibility for victim 
assistance rests with each State Party within which there are landmine survivors and other 
mine victims.” In addition, 23 states parties were singled out as being particularly concerned 
with the fulfilment of the territorial state’s victim assistance obligations due to the high 
numbers of landmine victims in those states.600 
 The Final Report also made a significant contribution to develop better 
specifications as to what concrete actions are required to live up to the obligation to provide 
victim assistance. Six key areas were identified to guide states parties in the implementation 
of Art. 6 (3): understanding the extent of the challenge faced; emergency and continuing 
medical care; physical rehabilitation, including physiotherapy, prosthetics and assistive 
devices; psychological support and social reintegration; economic reintegration; and the 
establishment, enforcement and implementation of relevant laws and public policies.601 When 
compared with general HRL standards, especially in the area of economic and social rights, it 
becomes clear that the principles of victim assistance made in the Nairobi Action Plan 
constitute nothing but guidance on concrete implementation of such rights for the specific 
group of landmine victims.  
                                                 
597 Ibid., at 27-28, paras. 65, 66, 68. 
598 Ibid., at 33, para. 84. 
599 Ibid., at 28, para. 67. 
600 Ibid., at 33, para. 85. 
601 Ibid., at 28-33, paras. 69-86. 
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Understanding the extent of the challenges faced refers mainly to the development of a 
sophisticated data collection system in relation to landmine victims. This is a crucial element 
to identify both the number and the specific needs of landmine victims with a view to 
allocating the often limited resources available. From the Nairobi understandings it can be 
derived that only at the beginning of the 21st century the international community developed a 
standardised tool for data collection, the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) but even where this standardised tool is used by affected states parties by far not all 
casualties are reported or recorded, in particular in countries where ongoing conflicts were/are 
raging, in remote areas or where the resources are simply lacking.602 Arguably, the 
convention was a catalyst for leading to this coordinated action which was until then lacking. 
This was a serious obstacle to delivering assistance to victims but it would be a far cry to 
claim that all obstacles have already been removed. As a consequence under Action No. 34 of 
the Nairobi Action Plan, states parties pledged to do their utmost to develop or enhance 
national mine victim data collection capacities.603  
In terms of general economic and social rights, from a reading of the above-cited 
General Comment No. 14 by the CESCR on the right to health, with regard to the right to 
prevention, treatment and control of diseases, the CESCR emphasised that this refers to 
individual and collective state efforts to, inter alia, using and improving data collection on a 
disaggregated basis.604 
Emergency care has a profound impact on the recovery of mine victims. The 
challenges identified by the Final Report include that adequately trained staff, medicines, 
equipment and infrastructure are available to deliver especially emergency but also ongoing 
medical care as well as the problem of access to remote mine areas and related difficulties in 
transporting such services to such areas.605 As a response, Action No. 29 of the Nairobi 
Action Plan calls on states parties to establish and enhance health-care services needed to 
respond to immediate and ongoing medical needs of victims.606  
Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics concern primarily the provision of 
physiotherapy and the supply of prosthetic appliances and assistive devices, such as 
wheelchairs and crutches. Also here the challenges noted include adequately trained 
rehabilitation staff, including doctors, nurses, physiotherapists and orthopaedic technicians in 
                                                 
602 Ibid., at 29, para. 71. 
603 Ibid., at 100. 
604 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on the Right to Health, supra note 
539, at para. 16. 
605 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 29, paras. 72-73. 
606 Ibid., at 99. 
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sufficient numbers and the necessary infrastructure to transport victims to these services, as 
well as an effective coordination between the relevant ministries and at national, regional and 
international levels to ensure an increase in the quality of services and the number of 
individuals to which they are delivered.607 Action No. 30 of the Action Plan translates this 
into increasing national physical rehabilitation capacity.608 
These are specifications of the demands made by the CESCR that public health and 
health-care facilities, goods and services, must be available in sufficient quantity, must be 
physically and economically accessible on a non-discriminatory basis, culturally acceptable, 
as well as scientifically and medically appropriate.609 
In order to provide psychological support and ensure social reintegration the Nairobi 
Action Plan emphasised the usefulness of community-based peer support groups, associations 
for the disabled, sporting and recreational activities and professional counselling. Importantly, 
reference to participation of mine victims in designing programmes for purposes of social 
inclusion was also made. This is crucial information in understanding the specific needs of 
mine victims. Clearly, nobody else than other victims can fully understand the extent of the 
suffering faced by a victim and victims themselves should be integrated in decision-making as 
to assistance programmes since they themselves know what their needs are.610 In this regard, 
Action No. 31 emphasised that states parties should develop capacities to meet the 
psychological and social support needs of mine victims with a view to achieving treatment on 
a par with those for physical rehabilitation and in this process, engage and empower also mine 
victims, their families and communities.611  
For direct victims, their families and communities, economic reintegration is the 
highest priority. The Nairobi Final Report defines “economic reintegration” as “assistance 
programs that improve the economic status of mine victims in mine-affected communities 
through education, economic development of the community infrastructure and the creation of 
employment opportunities.”612 The rationale behind economic reintegration is that victims’ 
potential to become again productive members of society who do not remain on the sidelines 
is fully exploited. These efforts must also be seen against the background of development 
efforts in relation to entire communities.  
                                                 
607 Ibid., at 30-31, paras. 74-75. 
608 Ibid., at 99. 
609 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on the right to health, supra note 
539, at para. 12. 
610 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 31, para. 76. 
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For example, the ICRC Orthopaedic Programme in Afghanistan has not only focused 
on physical rehabilitation but developed tools for economic reintegration, including education 
for disabled children in public and private schools and home tuition for those too severely 
disabled to attend public schools where the home teachers are themselves disabled persons; 
vocational training for disabled teenagers; employment and training only for disabled adults 
in the orthopaedic programme with the result that orthopaedic centres became centres for 
disabled managed by peers; as well as micro credit schemes. The last initiative was 
particularly successful for the economic reintegration of landmine victims: Interest free loans 
are provided to victims for the purpose of starting their own small businesses in areas such as 
agriculture, livestock breeding or handicrafts. Once the business is up and running, the loan 
must be refunded after a certain time period and is available for fellow disabled who would 
like to follow this example with a view to constantly increasing the number of disabled 
entrepreneurs.613  
In addition, victims have been involved in the clearance process of their own 
communities. The humanitarian UK-based clearance NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in 
particular has consistently adopted a “local demining” approach: Poor amputees and other 
victims are trained by experienced personnel in all aspects of demining. Once they have 
acquired the necessary expertise they are paid competitive salaries like other MAG employees 
for demining activities in and around their own communities.614 
The benefits of this “local demining” approach are manifold: Firstly, it ensures that the 
human beings thus trained regain a sense of self-esteem which is the guiding motivation 
behind all economic reintegration efforts. Secondly, especially the inclusion of women serves 
the objective of providing such assistance on a non-discriminatory basis to a particularly 
vulnerable societal group. Thirdly, this approach increases ownership and participation of 
local communities and increases local capacities in demining rather than creating new 
dependencies on assistance by staff from developed countries and is thus also suited to 
accomplish the broader goal of economic development of poor rural areas. Action No. 33 of 
                                                 
613 See A. Cairo, Panel on Economic Reintegration in Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International 
Affairs, Assisting Landmine Survivors: A Decade of Efforts, Symposium, Austrian Defence Academy, 12 
February 2007, at 25. This symposium was held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the 
1997 Ottawa Convention, specifically the Vienna Conference on Anti-Personnel Mines which had taken place in 
February 1997. 
614 In Cambodia, for example, national staff currently constitutes 99% of the overall MAG demining capacity. It 
is particularly noteworthy that out of the national staff, 38% are women and 7% amputees. Another example is 
the Lao PDR where 35% of all MAG staff are female with two all-female demining teams.  See Mines Advisory 
Group, “Eliminating the legacy of conflict: Annual Review 2008”, at 14-15, 20-21, 
http://www.maginternational.org/silo/files/annual-review-2008.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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the Nairobi Action Plan accordingly commits states to actively support the socio-economic 
reintegration of mine victims by providing education, vocational training and developing 
sustainable economic activities and employment opportunities in mine-affected communities 
and to integrate these efforts in a broader economic development context.615 The mention of 
not only physical but also “mental” health in Art. 12 (1) of the ICESCR confirms the 
relevance of psychological support as an element of victim assistance. Since the CESCR also 
recognises that the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that 
promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life,616 the link of social reintegration 
coupled with psychological support for landmine victims as well as economic reintegration 
for fulfilling the right to health of landmine victims is established. 
Finally, laws and policies in the area of victim assistance mean the promotion of 
effective treatment, care and protection of all disabled persons, including landmine victims. 
This includes, inter alia, pensions that are adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of 
living, legislation and plans of action to improve specific services for victims as well as to 
ensure their equal participation in society.617 The demand to adopt relevant national laws and 
policies illustrates the wider HRL context in which victim assistance came to be understood, 
notably to ensure de facto/substantive equality rather than only formal equality for disabled 
persons in relation to other members of society. This HRL context is explicitly recognised by 
Action No. 33 of the Nairobi Action Plan which calls on states parties to ensure that national 
legal and policy frameworks effectively address the needs and fundamental human rights of 
mine victims.618 
The requirement of victim assistance that effective treatment, care and protection be 
afforded by the affected state through national legislation and action plans matches the 
obligation to fulfil the right to health which requires states to take appropriate legislative, 
administrative measures and to adopt a national health policy in a participatory and 
transparent process based on measurable indicators and benchmarks.619 The emphasis on a 
participatory and transparent process is also reiterated by the Nairobi Final Report which 
mentions certain principles that should guide victim assistance efforts among which are 
                                                 
615 See Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 100. 
616 Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on the right to health, supra note 540, 
at para. 4. 
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618 Ibid., at 100. 
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at paras. 36, 43-44. 
 176
national ownership, non-discrimination of victims, empowerment of victims, and 
transparency and efficiency.620 
With regard to the context of international cooperation and assistance in which Art. 6 
(3) of the Ottawa Convention is embedded, one further parallel may be drawn in light of the 
fact that the CESCR stated that states other than the territorial state also have certain 
obligations towards the territorial state; in particular, the CESCR emphasised that it is 
incumbent upon states parties and other actors in a position to assist to provide international 
assistance and cooperation, especially of an economic and technical nature, which enables 
developing countries to fulfil their obligations under the ICESCR.621 In the same vein, Art. 6 
(3) of the Ottawa Convention imposes the obligation to provide victim assistance on each 
state party in a position to do so, including states parties other than the affected territorial 
state. This obligation on other states already follows from the general obligation under Art. 2 
of the ICESCR according to which states parties undertake to take steps for the progressive 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights not only individually, but also through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical.  
Therefore, one may conclude by stating that in the implementation phase of the 
Ottawa Convention states parties made it clear that the provision on victim assistance under 
Art. 6 (3) is nothing but a concrete effort at implementing the economic and social rights of 
one particular vulnerable societal group, notably landmine victims. This provision was 
revolutionary and enabled lessons to be learnt in providing victim assistance that are equally 
relevant for cluster munition victims since the suffering of landmine and cluster munition 
victims is comparable. The realisation that this specific endeavour must be placed in the more 
general context of implementing the fulfilment of especially the economic and social rights of 
these persons was also important, since it paved the way for the participation of landmine 
victims and other war victims, including cluster munition victims as constituency of the 
largest minority worldwide, disabled persons, in the negotiations leading to the adoption of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which shall be analysed in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
                                                 
620 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 28, para. 68. 
621 Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on the right to health, supra note 539, 
at para. 45. 
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4.8.  The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A 
Cross-Fertilising Tool for the Implementation of Assistance to Mine, 
Cluster Munition and Other Victims 
 
 
For a long time, disability has not been recognised as a HRL issue but as a medical 
and charity issue just as victim assistance under the Ottawa Convention only came to be 
viewed as a broader HRL issue in the context of the implementation of that treaty. The 
concept of viewing disability as a medical and social welfare concern rather than a HRL issue 
had the effect to locate the problem of disability within an individual’s physical, sensory, 
intellectual, psychosocial or other impairment that needs to be corrected by medical 
intervention to adapt the individual to mainstream society. As a result, disabled persons were 
treated as objects but not as subjects of rights with specific entitlements under HRL, resulting 
in their marginalisation from mainstream society.622 This is reflected in HRL itself, since no 
specific convention on disabled people existed.623 
Accordingly, even governments otherwise open to human rights concerns for a long 
time did not realise the need for a specific convention with a view to ensuring implementation 
                                                 
622 On the other hand, disability advocates from the mid-1960s have attempted to challenge this predominant 
attitude towards disabled people by developing a “social model” of disability. This social model seeks to locate 
the problems relating to disability not within the individual concerned but rather in the external social 
environment which has constructed physical (such as high curbs or the lack of specific facilities like elevators to 
facilitate access to buildings), legal (such as legislation denying disable people the right to vote or to adopt 
children) and social barriers (such as in the general attitude of people towards disabled fellow citizens) that 
prevent disabled people from participation and inclusion in mainstream society. See, for example, A. Lawson, 
“The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New Era or False Dawn?”, 34 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 563, 571-573 (2007); R. Kayess & P. French, “Out of the 
Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 8 Human Rights 
Law Review 1, 5-8 (2008); J. White & K. Young, “Nothing About Us Without Us: Securing the Disability 
Rights Convention” in Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 241, 243-244. 
623  Instead, in general HRL conventions disabled persons would only be covered by the general catch-all phrase 
of “other status”. See Art. 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25; Art. 2 (2), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 538; Art. 2 (1), International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, supra note 343. Still, Art. 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights enshrines the 
right to social security for disabled persons. Moreover, of the specific thematic HRL conventions, none but the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child contains specific provisions on disabled persons. Art. 2 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child explicitly prohibits discrimination on the ground of disability. Moreover, Art. 23 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child contains a specific provision on mentally or physically disabled 
children who have the right to special care and, subject to available resources, to assistance designed to ensure 
that the disabled child has effective access to and receives education, training, health care services, rehabilitation 
services, preparation for employment and recreation opportunities conducive to the achievement to social 
integration and individual development. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3. 
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of existing human rights in relation to disabled persons. Only gradually did the recognition 
sink in that this was a “huge gap in international human rights law.”624 
An important statement of principle on how existing HRL should be implemented in 
relation to disabled persons was made by the CESCR in its 1994 General Comment No. 5 on 
Persons with Disabilities. Significantly, the CESCR clarified that discrimination on the 
ground of disability is covered by the generic phrase “or any other state” and specified that 
“disability-based discrimination may be defined as including any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference, or denial of reasonable accommodation based on disability which 
has the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of economic, 
social or cultural rights.”625 The CESCR also emphasised that states parties to the ICESCR 
would be required to take measures specifically tailored to the needs of persons with 
disabilities, in particular legislation, to undo existing discrimination and reduce structural 
disadvantages. Such measures serve the objectives of full participation and equality and 
would mean to give preferential treatment to persons with disabilities, which is not considered 
discriminatory by allocating additional resources for achieving these purposes.626 This 
underlines the key feature of HRL as a remedial regime that aims at removing the cause for 
structural inequalities in the treatment of human beings of the past and thus lays the 
groundwork for providing more de facto equality in the future. Understood in this sense, the 
truly revolutionary character of the 1997 Ottawa Convention through inclusion of a specific 
provision on victim assistance is again revealed, since unlike other disarmament conventions 
this treaty is not only designed to prevent the use of prohibited weapons and thus, new victims 
in the future but also adds this remedial aspect of HRL by recognising that the needs of 
existing victims have not been adequately received attention in the past. Indeed, this aspect, as 
was argued above, has only been exploited to its full potential at the implementation stage but 
it is an important recognition to improve the institutional framework in which assistance to 
victims is delivered.  
The General Comment also analysed specific rights under the ICESCR and how they 
should be implemented in respect of persons with disabilities, including the rights to work, 
social security, protection of the family, to an adequate standard of living, health and 
                                                 
624 White & Young, “Nothing About Us Without Us” in Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 242. 
625 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 5: Persons with disabilities, 9 
December 1994, UN Doc. E/1995/22, at para. 15. 
626 Ibid., at paras. 9, 18. 
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education.627 However, also these useful specifications did not lead to the issue of rights of 
persons with disabilities to receive adequate implementation and gain further visibility on the 
international agenda.628 A landmark study conducted under the auspices of the United Nations 
entitled “The current use and future potential of United Nations human rights instruments in 
the context of disability” published in 2002 concluded after examining 27 state party reports 
to the ICESCR that fewer than half of the reports analysed mentioned either a policy or 
specific measure aimed at inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities, the term 
“right” was seldom used in this context and that no reference was made either to the UN 
Standard Rules or to General Comment No. 5.629  
It was only in December 2001 that the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the 
initiative of Mexico which called for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee “to consider 
proposals for a comprehensive and integral international convention to protect and promote 
the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.”630 There is of course a semantic difference 
between “considering proposals for a convention” and “beginning to negotiate a convention”. 
Accordingly, the first two meetings were devoted to getting clarity on the issue of the Ad Hoc 
Committee’s mandate but at the third meeting a Working Group was established to prepare a 
draft treaty text as basis for negotiations.631  
The negotiations were characterised by an unprecedented involvement of civil society 
in the negotiations for a HRL convention adopted under the auspices of the UN.632 They also 
led to the emergence of a more diverse civil society coalition with participation of some 
                                                 
627 Ibid., at paras. 20-35. 
628 Lawson, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, supra note 622, at 577; 
Kayess & French, “Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, supra note 622, at 
14. 
629 G. Quinn & T. Degener, “Human Rights and Disability: The current use and future potential of United 
Nations human rights instruments in the context of disability”, United Nations, 2002, at 130, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HRDisabilityen.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
630 Op. para. 1, UN General Assembly Res 56/168, 19 December 2001, UN Doc. A/RES/56/168. 
631 For a full account of all meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, see 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/uncontrib-ohchr2.htm (last visited 22 January 2010). 
632 After the first meeting it was agreed that not only civil society organisations with consultative status to the 
UN would be admitted, and that all civil society organisations would have the right to make oral interventions 
and submit written material. Furthermore, the Working Group preparing draft treaty texts would also include 
civil society members. While disability rights organisations had already worked together for considerable time 
within the UN system, loosely organised as the International Disability Alliance, this group works in a rather 
isolated fashion from other mainstream human rights organisations. Seven disabled people’s organisations 
formed this alliance, including Disabled People’s International, Rehabilitation International, the World Network 
of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, the World Blind Union, Inclusion International, the Deaf Blind Federation, 
and the World Federation of the Deaf. See White & Young, “Nothing About Us Without Us” in Williams, Goose 
& Wareham, Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 246-247, 251; J. E. Lord, “NGO Participation in Human 
Rights Law and Process: Latest Developments in the Effort to Develop an International Treaty on the Rights of 
People with Disabilities”, 10 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 311, 315 (2004); Lawson, “The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” supra note 622, at 588. 
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NGOs that had been vocal members of the ICBL on assistance to victims in the successful 
Ottawa process aimed at prohibiting anti-personnel mines. Landmine Survivors Network 
(now renamed into Survivor Corps), a U.S. NGO, and Handicap International, a French NGO 
are particularly noteworthy; the former, for instance, made an effort to involve other players 
from the landmines campaign and the mainstream human rights community traditionally not 
so much engaged on disability issues such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or 
Save the Children. In addition, it raised awareness with UNMACCs and Ottawa Convention 
states parties, encouraging them to get involved in this process.633 This engagement 
contributed to applying some lessons learnt from the ICBL campaign for civil society action 
in the negotiations of the CRPD; for instance, the strength of the ICBL had been to reunite a 
vast array of human rights, humanitarian, religious and veteran groups under the common 
umbrella of eliminating landmines from the face of the earth. In a similar vein, the 
involvement of organisations other than those traditionally working on disability issues meant 
to broaden the spectrum of civil society advocates and led to the formation of the International 
Disability Caucus which became the main coordinating branch for civil society in this 
process. Certain lessons learnt from the landmines campaign were also successfully brought 
into the disability campaign.634 
The final outcome of the negotiations, the 2006 CRPD635 was to a great extent inspired 
by the contributions of the International Disability Caucus. There is no scope here for an 
exhaustive analysis of every single provision of this treaty. For present purposes, the potential 
of this treaty for reinforcing the victim assistance provision of the Ottawa Convention and for 
inspiring other efforts to assist war victims, including cluster munition victims, shall be 
explored. This examination is undertaken especially in view of the fact that, as mentioned 
above, the Nairobi Review Conference Final Report recognised that victim assistance must be 
seen as part of the overall national human rights framework.  
It is worth enphasising again that the insertion of a victim assistance provision in the 
Ottawa Convention was revolutionary from the perspective of a disarmament treaty. 
                                                 
633 White & Young, “Nothing About Us Without Us” in Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 252-253.  
634 For example, pre-meeting workshops to prepare advocates for upcoming negotiations and to help them in 
their lobbying efforts nationally, regionally and internationally. Also, Daily Bulletins were prepared during the 
negotiations where governments participating in the negotiations were praised for good and reprimanded for bad 
interventions, also this being a “name and shame” technique employed successfully during the landmines 
campaign. See ibid., at 247, 252-253. 
635 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, UN General Assembly Res 
61/106, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106. The Convention entered into force on 3 May 2008 in accordance with Art. 45 
(1) of the Convention on the thirtieth day after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. 
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However, the character of the CRPD as a HRL convention places beyond dispute that the 
taking of positive measures by a state to assist victims of armed conflict, including cluster 
munition victims, is nothing but an issue of promoting, protecting and ensuring the full and 
equal enjoyment of all human rights they already have by virtue of their inherent dignity.636  
Still, it must be understood that the CRPD only applies to the person directly injured 
by landmine or sub-munition explosions by virtue of the definition of persons with disabilities 
as “those who have long-term physical, intellectual or sensory impairments which in 
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on 
an equal basis with others.”637 On the other hand, as was shown above, the term “victim” 
entitled to assistance under the Ottawa Convention also covers family members of direct 
victims as well as entire communities in which survivors live.638 
What certainly has the potential to spur renewed and more systematic efforts to assist 
victims is the recognition underlying the CRPD that persons with disabilities face attitudinal 
and environmental barriers which hinder their full and effective participation in society. This 
observation is aggravated by the fact that the majority of them live in conditions of poverty.639 
Where this is the prevailing state of affairs, mine or cluster munition-affected states will 
hardly have a basis for arguing that victim assistance is already provided in an adequate 
fashion in these states.  
One important provision in the tradition of a HRL convention devoted to a specific 
vulnerable group which has the potential of eliminating attitudinal barriers is Art. 8 of the 
CRPD.640 This provision obliges states parties inter alia to raise awareness among society 
regarding and foster respect for the rights of persons with disabilities and to combat 
stereotypes by conducting public awareness raising campaigns, including teaching respect for 
the rights of persons with disabilities in educational curricula and encouraging the media to 
show respect for disabled people. It is submitted that the ultimate purpose of establishing 
                                                 
636 Compare Art. 1, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ibid. 
637 See ibid. 
638 However, contrast the understanding of who has rights under the CRPD with the definition of “victim” in the 
other most recent HRL convention, the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. Under Art. 24 of that treaty, “victim” means the disappeared person and any individual 
who has suffered harm as a direct result of an enforced disappearance. However, also here the rights of victims 
may be understood as specific remedies for the violation of primary rights. Thus, victim assistance is not 
regarded as a primary obligation in and of itself. See Art. 24, International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/61/177. 
639 See Preamble, paras. e, k, t, v, Art. 1, ibid. 
640 Compare Art. 5 (a), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, which obliges states parties to take all appropriate measures to “modify the 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” 
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HRL frameworks for specific groups of people is to change the place of these groups in 
societies for the better. But such change will only prevail in a sustainable manner if the 
attitude of all societal sectors is favourable to this change. As a practical matter, state 
authorities will have to undertake efforts like awareness-raising to gain support for the cause 
of reversing discriminatory social practices in relation to certain groups in the past. If 
implemented, these obligations would contribute towards better understanding the needs and 
support of mine and other war victims among the non-affected sectors of society in which 
they live.  
General principles which should guide all further implementation are to be found in 
both frameworks: The general principles enumerated in Art. 3 of the CRPD overlap and 
complement the principles spelt out in the Nairobi Final Report which should guide victim 
assistance efforts. The principles of individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s 
own choices, independence of persons and full and effective participation and inclusion in 
society under the CRPD matches the principle of empowerment of victims emphasised in the 
Nairobi Final Report.641 The principle of non-discrimination features in both the Disability 
Rights Convention and the Nairobi Final Report.642 Equality of opportunity and accessibility 
as general principles under the Disability Rights Convention serve to underline the ultimate 
human rights-inspired goal of victim assistance.643 As noted by the Nairobi Final Report in 
relation to emergency and continuing medical care as well as physical rehabilitation and 
assistive devices, states parties to the Ottawa Convention faced a major challenge in relation 
to the accessibility of such services because of the remoteness of certain rural residential 
areas.644 The emphasis of the Nairobi Final Report on a gender perspective is reiterated by the 
general principle of equality between men and women in the Disability Rights Convention 
and by Art. 6 which specifically deals with women with disabilities. 645 
The demand by the Nairobi Final Report to view victim assistance as a human rights 
issue and to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to it reinforces the idea to 
regard mine and other war victims as a specific subgroup of persons with disabilities. The 
                                                 
641 Art. 3 (a) (c), Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635; Final Report of the First 
Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 28, para. 68.  
642 Art. 3 (b), Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635; Final Report of the First 
Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 28, para. 68. 
643 Art. 3 (e) (f), Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. 
644 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 30, paras. 73, 75. 
645 Art. 3 (g), Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635; Final Report of the First 
Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 28, para. 68.  
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general context of development that both the Nairobi Final Report and Action Plan stress that 
victim assistance must occur in is also taken up by Art. 32 CRPD. This provision commits 
states parties to implement national efforts to realise the human rights of persons with 
disabilities by international cooperation through international development programmes that 
are inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities. 
With regard to the six areas of victim assistance identified in Nairobi, the CRPD 
relates to these areas as follows: Firstly, the necessity to collect data on mine victims to 
understand the extent of the challenges faced has as its equivalent Art. 31 (1) of the Disability 
Rights Convention which imposes on states parties the obligation to collect statistical and 
research data to enable them to formulate and implement policies in accordance with the 
convention. Under Art. 31 (3), states parties shall also be responsible for disseminating these 
statistics and ensure their accessibility to disabled persons in a similar way as Action No. 34 
of the Nairobi Action Plan calls on states parties to the Ottawa Convention to ensure full 
access to the data collected. The CRPD adds to victim assistance in this regard the above-
mentioned retroactive human rights perspective. According to Art. 31 (2) the information 
collected shall not only be used to address future-orientated policies and programmes but also 
to identify and address the barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising their rights. 
As described already in Chapter 2.4., this is relevant for mine or cluster munition victims as it 
is relevant for other persons with disabilities, since they often suffer from being rejected by 
their communities due to their disability.646 Thus, the CRPD will reinforce victim assistance 
under the Ottawa Convention in that it addresses the root causes, i.e. the social and physical 
barriers that contributed to inadequate efforts to provide victim assistance to date. 
Secondly, Art. 25 (b) of the CRPD obliges states parties to provide health services 
specifically needed by persons with disabilities, including early identification and intervention 
and services designed to minimise and prevent further disabilities. This is but a more general 
expression of appropriate trauma surgical treatment and first-aid that mine and other war 
victims require in terms of emergency and ongoing medical care. Such treatment has a 
profound impact on the prospects of their immediate and long-term recovery.647 In addition, 
Art. 25 (c) of the Disability Rights Convention specifically responds to the challenge of 
problems related to the proximity of services to remote rural areas identified by the Nairobi 
Final Report by committing states parties to provide such health services as close as possible 
                                                 
646 See supra p. 46. 
647 See Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 29, para. 72. 
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to people’s own communities, including in rural areas.648 On the other hand, Art. 25 of the 
Disability Rights Convention also contributes to achieving the objective proclaimed in 
Nairobi that victim assistance efforts should be mainstreamed into a state’s overall human 
rights framework, including in its general health care system. This is because it requires states 
parties to provide the same range, quality and standard of general health care and programmes 
as to other persons on the basis of free and informed consent of the person with an 
impairment. 
With regard to physical rehabilitation and assistive devices, the Nairobi Final Report 
and Action Plan emphasise the ultimate goal of full reintegration. This translates in Art. 26 (1) 
of the CRPD into full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life. The challenge noted in 
Nairobi to increase, expand access to and ensure the sustainability of national physical 
rehabilitation capacities is taken up by Art. 26 (1) of the CRPD which binds states parties to 
organise, strengthen and extend comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation services and 
programmes, for instance in the area of health.649 Moreover, both the Nairobi Final Report 
and Action Plan demanded that states parties increase the number of trained rehabilitation 
specialists most needed by mine victims, including doctors, nurses, physiotherapists and 
orthopaedic technicians.650 Art. 26 (2) of the CRPD responds to this demand by obliging 
states parties to promote the development of initial and continuing training for professionals 
and staff working in habilitation and rehabilitation services. The provision of prosthetic 
appliances and assistive devices, including wheelchairs or crutches, is covered by Art. 26 (3) 
of the CRPD which imposes the obligation on states parties to promote the availability, 
knowledge and use of assistive devices and technologies designed for persons with 
disabilities.651 Fundamentally, also in this area a particular challenge remaining for states 
parties to the Ottawa Convention according to the Nairobi Final Report is to ensure access to 
transportation to these services. The CRPD in this regard makes it clear that states parties 
shall provide these rehabilitation services in such a way that these are available to persons of 
disabilities as close as possible to their own communities, including in rural areas.652  
Prosthetic appliances and assistive devices are even covered by a separate provision of 
the CRPD: Art. 20 enshrines the specific right of personal mobility of persons with 
disabilities which can be seen as a specific extension of the right to liberty of movement. Most 
                                                 
648 Ibid., at 30, paras. 73, 75, Action No. 30, at 99. 
649 Ibid., at 30, para. 75. 
650 Ibid., at 30, para. 75, Action No. 30, at 99. 
651 Ibid., at 30, para. 74. 
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importantly, states parties to the CRPD under Art. 20 (b) shall facilitate affordable access to 
quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technologies and forms of live assistance, shall 
provide training in mobility skills to affected persons and specialist staff as well as encourage 
producers of such devices to take into account the specific mobility needs of disabled persons. 
 In this regard, the CRPD again adopts a more fundamental structural approach which, 
if it is adequately implemented, would improve the surrounding circumstances in which mine 
or cluster munition victims live. Art. 9 of the CRPD requires states parties to take steps, 
including the identification and elimination of barriers to participation in all aspects of life, to 
ensure that persons with disabilities are able to access the physical environment, i.e. buildings, 
roads, transportation and other indoor as well as outdoor facilities like schools, housing, 
medical facilities or workplaces.  
Also in the victim assistance area of psychological support and social reintegration are 
there significant overlaps between the Nairobi Final Report and Action Plan and the CRPD: 
Action No. 31 identified the achievement of high standards and support on a par with those 
for physical rehabilitation. In developing national capacities to meet psychological and social 
needs direct victims, their families and communities must be engaged and empowered. That 
psychological support must be seen on a par with physical rehabilitation of victims is 
confirmed by Art. 26 (1) of the CRPD which refers to comprehensive rehabilitation and the 
overall objective that persons with disabilities shall attain not only full physical, but also 
mental, social and vocational ability, thus recognising that all these aspects are interrelated.  
Furthermore, programmes and services must be performed in such a way that they 
support participation and inclusion in the community and all aspects of society.653 The 
Nairobi Final Report emphasised the causal relationship between psychological support and 
social well-being which is taken into account by inter alia community-based peer support 
groups, associations for the disabled, sports activities or professional counselling.654 The 
relevance of peer support groups is reflected in Art. 26 (1) of the CRPD which explicitly 
mentions peer support among the effective and appropriate measures to promote 
independence, full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and full inclusion and 
participation in society. Sports activities form part of Art. 30 of the CRPD which enshrines 
the right of persons with disabilities to participate in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport. 
A two-track approach is pursued here, since states parties to the CRPD must take appropriate 
measures to promote participation of disabled persons in mainstream sporting activities as 
                                                 
653 Ibid.  
654 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 31, para. 76. 
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well as to ensure opportunities for persons with disabilities to organise, develop and 
participate in their own disability-specific sporting events.655 
Art. 27 of the CRPD on the right to work and employment speaks to the issue of 
economic reintegration of victims. This includes, in particular, the obligation to promote 
opportunities for self-employment, entrepreneurship, the development of cooperatives and 
starting one’s own business: Micro-credit schemes described supra,656 which aim at 
increasing the number of entrepreneurs among mine or other war victims would fall into the 
opportunities mentioned here.657 Art. 27 (1) (k) enjoins states parties to promote vocational 
and professional rehabilitation programmes for persons with disabilities; this would mean to 
promote economic reintegration programmes such as those implemented by the ICRC 
Orthopaedic Programme in Afghanistan referred to supra,658  which, in adopting a policy of 
positive discrimination, only provided employment and training for disabled adults with the 
result that orthopaedic centres became centres for disabled managed by peers.  
The stance of positive discrimination taken by the ICRC in practice is reaffirmed in 
Art. 27 CPRD by expressly providing for the possibility to include affirmative action 
programmes, incentives and other measures to promote the employment of persons with 
disabilities in the private sector.659 The reference to affirmative action reiterates in the specific 
context of work and employment the general provision found under Art. 5 (4) of the CRPD 
that specific measures necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of persons with 
disabilities shall not be considered discrimination.660 However, the formulation of permissible 
positive discrimination in the disability rights context differs from the other contexts in that it 
is not subject to the qualification that these measures must be discontinued when the 
                                                 
655 Art. 30 (5), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. 
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objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.661 This arguably 
recognises that certain persons with disabilities due to their permanent disability are also in 
need of long-term positive discrimination. While positive discrimination is thus not 
prohibited, among prohibited discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction on 
the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”662 is also the denial of “reasonable accommodation”. This concept is 
central to the Convention in that it requires to make necessary and appropriate individualised 
modification and adjustments so as to enable the specific individual to exercise his/her rights 
on an equal basis with others. Art. 5 (3) also contains a specific obligation on states parties to 
ensure the provision of reasonable accommodation, which may require states parties to ensure 
that practices are changed (e.g. accommodating persons with diabetes by allowing them work 
breaks to inject insulin), money spent on additional equipment, support or improved physical 
access (e.g. ramps for wheelchairs to access buildings).663 This obligation is reiterated for the 
context of work and employment under Art. 27 (1) (i) of the CRPD. Generally, the CRPD 
emphasises the inclusion of disabled persons in the open labour market more than victim 
assistance efforts which arguably seem to be still very much focused on providing special 
opportunities for mine victims. The CRPD can therefore help to inform a more long-term and 
sustainable strategy for the creation of employment opportunities of mine and other war 
victims. 
Finally, where the Nairobi Action Plan calls upon states parties to the Ottawa 
Convention to ensure that national legal and policy frameworks effectively address the needs 
and fundamental human rights of mine victims, the CRPD enshrines the general obligations to 
adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for implementing the 
human rights of persons with disabilities; to take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation to modify or abolish discriminatory laws, regulations, customs or practices; and to 
take the protection and promotion of disabled peoples’ human rights into account in all 
policies and programmes.664  
                                                 
661 Compare Art. 5 (4), Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635, with Art. 1 (4), 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 660, and Art. 4 (1) Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 639. 
662 Art. 2 (3), Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. 
663 Kayess & French, “Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, supra note 622, at 
9, fn. 36; Lawson, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, supra note 622, 
at 598. 
664 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 100, Action No. 
33; Arts. 4 (1) (a) (b) (c), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. 
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Again, the CRPD has the potential of complementing victim assistance efforts in that 
it does not only commit states parties to adopt forward-looking legislation but also to get rid 
of legislation that may have promoted discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities, 
including mine victims, in the past in the sense of corrective justice. Importantly, the CRPD 
lays down a complementary obligation to closely consult with and actively involve persons 
with disabilities in developing and implementing legislation and policies concerning them.665 
This generic obligation serves to mainstream in a national context what Action No. 38 of the 
Nairobi Final Report provides in terms of ensuring effective integration of mine victims in the 
work of the Ottawa Convention,666 since especially victims themselves are in the best position 
to know what their particular needs are and what measures will be required to address those 
needs. 
In terms of implementation, the CRPD adds mechanisms that may assist in monitoring 
victim assistance both on the national as well as the international level, on which the Ottawa 
Convention was silent. On the national level, states parties to the CRPD shall designate one or 
more focal points and coordination mechanisms within the government for disability matters 
as well as maintain, strengthen, designate or establish one or more independent mechanisms 
along the lines of national human rights institutions such as national human rights 
commissions and ombudspersons.667 In the view of this author, the designation of particular 
bodies with responsibilities regarding persons with disabilities has several benefits: Firstly, 
the relevant expertise is concentrated in specified institutions. Secondly, responsibilities in 
this field are clearly allocated, since the challenges may be daunting where competencies on 
persons with disabilities is spread over a multitude of governmental departments. Thirdly, 
such institutions may serve as good sources of information on the state of play regarding 
implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities, including victim assistance, within a 
state. 
On the international level, a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is 
intended to fulfil classical tasks of a HRL treaty body, which firstly includes consideration of 
                                                 
665 Art. 4 (3), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. This outcome is a direct 
result also of the process leading to it, since – as mentioned above – disability rights advocates played an 
unprecedented prominent role in the negotiations of the CRPD, with “nothing about us without us” being their 
rallying cry. See White & Young, “Nothing About Us Without Us” in Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning 
Landmines, supra note 403, at 247. 
666 Final Report of the First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 594, at 101, Action No. 
38. 
667 Arts. 33 (1) (2), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 635. 
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and the issuing of suggestions and general recommendations to states parties’ reports.668 
Conversely, while the Ottawa Convention also requires states parties to submit compliance 
reports under Art. 7, victim assistance is not among the matters to which the reporting duties 
extend.669 Like the CRC, also the CRPD contains an obligation on states parties to make their 
reports to the treaty-monitoring Committee widely available to the public: This obligation has 
the purpose of increasing knowledge among the general public of the state’s obligations under 
the treaty and thus, to promote implementation of the rights contained therein.670  
Importantly, Art. 37 of the CRPD provides that the Committee in its relationship with 
the states parties shall have regard to ways in which national capacities for the 
implementation of the rights of the Convention may be increased, thus emphasising the 
overall objective of interaction between states parties and the Committee. Moreover, an 
Optional Protocol to the CRPD was adopted on the same date as the convention which adds 
two more enforcement mechanisms, notably an individual complaints procedure and in case 
of grave or systematic violations of the CRPD, an inquiry procedure which may include 
country visits, i.e. fact finding, with consent of the state party concerned.671 Thus, in case 
mine, cluster or any other war-related victims claim to be victim of inadequate assistance 
efforts by the state party to the CRPD, they may bring a complaint before the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which may result in the Committee adopting a view 
finding a violation of the victim’s right; potential examples of violations which mine or 
cluster munition victims could vindicate include the lack of any measures to address problems 
of accessibility of emergency and ongoing medical care as well as physical rehabilitation, the 
exclusion of child victims of mine or sub-munition explosions from the general education 
                                                 
668 Art. 35 of the CRPD provides for an initial reporting obligation within two years after the entry into force of 
the convention for a state party, with subsequent reports being due every four years. Art. 36 of the CRPD 
outlines the specific mandate of the Committee in relation to state party reports. 
669 Although a proposal was submitted by Landmine Survivors Network (now Survivor Corps) during the 
negotiations, this proposal failed to evince the necessary support. Subsequently, states were encouraged to 
voluntarily report on victim assistance but this reporting has remained piecemeal. See Maslen, Commentary on 
the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 217; Survivor Corps, “Connecting the Dots: Victim Assistance and 
Human Rights in the Mine Ban Treaty, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities”, May 2008, http://www.survivorcorps.org/NetCommunity/Document.Doc?id=17 (last visited 
22 January 2010). 
670 Compare, Art. 44 (6), Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 623; S. Detrick, A Commentary on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 42 (1999). In addition, Art. 36 (4) of the CRPD 
requires states parties in light of the general spirit of the convention to facilitate access to the suggestions and 
general recommendations relating to these reports. 
671 See Arts. 1, 6, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 
2006, UN General Assembly Resolution 61/106, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106. In this respect, the competencies of 
the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities are very similar to those which the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW enjoys. Compare 
Arts. 1, 8, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 6 October 1999, 2131 UNTS 83. 
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system, the lack of steps to ensure access by victims to affordable prostheses or other assistive 
devices or the failure to remedy physical barriers to public infrastructure or workplaces. 
Importantly, individual complaints by mine or other victims will typically involve violations 
of economic and social rights but are not restricted to these, since the CRPD is strongly rooted 
in the recognition that all human rights, civil, political or economic, social or cultural are 
interrelated and to be enjoyed on an equal footing.672  
The foregoing analysis demonstrated that victim assistance may be seen as common 
denominator bringing two legal regimes closer which (at least) in practice seemed to be quite 
distant from each other, disarmament, focusing on national security concerns and human 
rights, focusing on the well-being of individuals. While in the realm of disarmament, making 
provision for dealing with the already existing consequences of using a weapon was 
revolutionary, such a provision can only be interpreted as a specific expression of 
implementing existing HRL. Since disarmament is understood here as a normative response in 
light of the failure of existing IHL to prevent civilian victims of anti-personnel mines, the 
approximation between disarmament and HRL also implies a growing convergence between 
IHL and HRL in the area of victim assistance.  
Still, this does not mean that each regime does not have its own particular advantages 
and disadvantages in relation to the other: The primary advantage of the CRPD lies in the fact 
that it has a broad scope of application applying not only to victims of specific weapons but 
all victims, regardless of the cause of their impairment, and that it furnishes victims with the 
possibility to bring individual complaints before an international body in case of inadequate 
provision of victim assistance. Moreover, the CRPD has the potential of addressing victim 
assistance in a broader context in a more systematic fashion which includes dealing with 
structural factors contributing to inadequate past action in this regard.  
On the other hand, provision for victim assistance in a disarmament treaty like the 
Ottawa Convention relating to a specific weapon will remain relevant because of the broader 
definition of victims, not only including victims but also families and entire communities 
entitled to assistance. At the same time, this weapon-specific approach means that such 
provisions should also be extended to other weapons. In this regard, the victim assistance 
                                                 
672 Other Optional Protocols connected with specific thematic conventions that provide for an individual 
complaint procedure for economic and social rights include the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
The issue of an individual complaints procedure to the main instrument on economic, social and cultural rights, 
the ICESCR, was finally settled with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICSECR by virtue of UN 
General Assembly Res 63/117 on 10 December 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
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provision contained in Art. 8 (2) of Protocol V on ERW has the advantage of dealing with 
post-conflict remnants of any conventional weapons except anti-personnel mines, including 
cluster munitions. However, this still does not address those persons victimised through the 
indiscriminate use of cluster munitions in or near civilian residential areas during armed 
conflict.   
Thus, despite the great amount of headway made in improving the plight of victims of 
anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions through cross-fertilising effects of the CRPD this 
has not remedied all gaps in relation to cluster munition victims and there is still a need for 
more specific provisions on a national and international level from a HRL perspective as there 
is a need for such norms due to existing inadequacies in IHL. Efforts at establishing specific 
law shall now be analysed in the next sections, culminating in an in-depth analysis of the 
negotiation and significance of the new Convention on Cluster Munitions.  
 
 
5. National and International Approaches to Enshrine Specific 
Norms on Cluster Munitions 
 
5.1. Austria: From a Parliamentary Resolution to a Federal Act on the 
Prohibition of Cluster Munitions673 
 
 
The impact of NGOs and civil society organisations in the area of disarmament on 
conventional weapons has become increasingly crucial for shaping and changing government 
positions both on a national and international level in order to establish specific norms on 
certain weapons. This was true for NGO and civil society involvement in the Ottawa process 
leading to a ban on anti-personnel mines in 1997 and this was also true for NGO and civil 
society involvement in the international process aiming at a prohibition on cluster munitions. 
In fact, it can be argued that meaningful progress in disarmament regarding these weapons 
cannot be made any more without incorporating a strong humanitarian dimension.674 
 Therefore, legal and political developments on a national and international level 
regarding cluster munitions cannot be fully appraised without shedding light on the 
                                                 
673 This chapter represents an extended version of the drafting history of the Austrian Federal Act on the 
Prohibition of Cluster Munitions published by this author in 12 Austrian Review of International and European 
Law (2007). All translations from original German documents are by this author. 
674 R. J. Mathews & T. L. H. McCormack, “The influence of humanitarian principles in the negotiation of arms 
control treaties”, 834 International Review of the Red Cross 331-352 (1999), 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPTY (last visited 22 January 2010); J. Borrie, “Tackling 
Disarmament Challenges”, in Williams, Goose & Wareham, Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 263, 264. 
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collaborative relationship between governments, Members of Parliament (MPs) and 
NGOs/civil society organisations. In fact, the national and international levels are closely 
intertwined, as developments on the one level may have a cross-fertilising effect on the other. 
The case of Austria provides an excellent example in this regard, since the international role 
of Austria as one of the leading states behind the conclusion of an international prohibition on 
cluster munitions also heavily influenced national legal developments. What follows is an 
analysis of these developments, in particular the various stages finally leading to the adoption 
of a national law prohibiting cluster munitions in Austria.675 The analysis of the Austrian 
national context precedes that of the international process leading to the CCM, as much of the 
substantive debate in this context occurred prior to similar discussions and negotiations on the 
international level. In this sense, the discussion of the national context is well suited to 
prepare the ground for an examination of the issues in the international diplomatic process 
called “Oslo process”. 
While the slogan “individuals can make a difference” more often than not may be 
considered a hackneyed stereotype, it quite accurately describes NGO involvement in Austria 
on the issue of cluster munitions. For more than five years it was a single Austrian NGO 
called Austrian Aid For Mine Victims (AAMV) directed by a single person, Judith Majlath, 
which has been consistently engaged in national campaigning with Austrian government 
officials and Members of Parliament (MPs) as well as awareness raising activities.676 After 
successfully campaigning in Austria against anti-personnel mines as the Austrian Section of 
the ICBL, she and others already in 1999677 realised that something must also be done against 
the grave consequences for civilians resulting from the use of cluster munitions.  
Thus, interestingly, the idea to focus on cluster munitions in national campaigning 
efforts was actually born on the international level as a result of exchanges with NGO 
colleagues from other countries. These first reflections in Maputo finally culminated in the 
foundation by AAMV together with other NGOs and international civil society organisations 
of the international civil society network of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) in the 
Hague in 2003.678 The founding call of the CMC made clear that international and national 
efforts to effectively protect civilians from the harmful consequences of cluster munitions are 
                                                 
675 This analysis is based, in part, on an insider perspective of this author who was for some time closely 
involved in the Austrian national NGO campaign for a ban on cluster munitions. 
676 Hungarian-born Judith Majlath, an English antiques arts dealer based in Vienna and London, founded AAMV 
in 1995 after a journey to Laos. 
677 In 1999, the first meeting of states parties to the Ottawa Convention in Maputo took place. 
678 The CMC now comprises around 300 civil society organisations from more than 80 countries. For 
information concerning the CMC, visit http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/ (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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closely intertwined; the CMC first and foremost called for “no use, production or trade of 
cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have been resolved.”679 This launch of an 
international civil society network also provided an additional impetus for channelling 
national campaign efforts. The promotion of national measures that will reduce or eliminate 
civilian harm from cluster munitions are inherent in the wording “no use, production and 
transfer until their humanitarian problems have been resolved”, which shows the close 
interrelationship between national and international efforts.680 
As a result, AAMV (later renamed AAMV/CMC-Austria which shall be used 
hereinafter) intensified its efforts of national campaigning with Austrian government official 
and MPs as well as awareness raising activities since 2003. 
The first visible impact of these activities was a request for a parliamentary resolution 
submitted by Green Party Member of Parliament (MP) Ulrike Lunacek and Social Democrat 
(SPÖ) MP Walter Posch on 22 December 2004.681 
In this request, the Austrian National Council (Nationalrat) was  
 
“requested that the Austrian government be called upon [in a parliamentary resolution] to play, once again, a 
leading role on the issue of cluster munitions and cluster bombs (just like in the case of anti-personnel mines 
in the Ottawa process) and to take the following steps:  
 
1) to promptly ratify Protocol V [on Explosive Remnants of War] to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW); 
2) to declare a unilateral Austrian moratorium in respect of the use, production, development, stockpiling 
and transfer of cluster munitions and cluster bombs; 
3) to actively support the establishment of a new Protocol VI − specifically on cluster munitions −within 
the framework of the CCW; 
4) to expand the Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (BGBL 13 I/1997) in 
scope to cover cluster munitions, since unexploded cluster bombs or cluster munitions, respectively, 
function as duds de facto like anti-personnel mines.”682 
                                                 
679 Pax Christi Netherlands, Conference Report, International Launch Conference, 12-13 November 2003, The 
Hague, at 41 (on file with the author). 
680 A later updated CMC call made this even clearer. It called for ensuring the success of an international process 
establishing an effective prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable civilian harm as well as 
promoting national measures that would reduce or eliminate civilian harm from cluster munitions in advance of 
an international process being completed. 
681 Under Austrian Constitutional Law, parliamentary resolutions, while non-binding on the government, 
constitute an important parliamentary tool by which the Austrian MPs of the National and Federal Council (the 
two Austrian parliamentary chambers Nationalrat and Bundesrat) may express their wishes on the way the 
Austrian government conducts its foreign policy. The relevant provision of the Austrian Federal Constitutional 
Law (B-VG), Art. 52 (1) reads as  follows: “The National Council and the Federal Council are entitled to 
examine the administration of affairs by the Federal Government, to interrogate its members about all subjects 
pertaining to execution, and to demand all relevant information as well as to ventilate in resolutions their wishes 
about exercise of the executive power.” (emphasis added). An English translation of the Federal Constitutional 
Law is available at http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.pdf (last visited 22 
January 2010). 
682 Request by MPs Mag. Ulrike Lunacek, Mag. Walter Posch and Colleagues concerning an Austrian Initiative 
on the Prohibition of Cluster Bombs and Cluster Munitions, No. 499/A (E) XXII. GP, 22 December 2004, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXII/A/A_00499/fname_033168.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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Significantly, this first request proceeded from the similarity between anti-personnel 
mines and unexploded cluster munitions as becomes clear by item 4. In this regard, it also 
mentions the Ottawa process leading to a prohibition of anti-personnel mines in the umbrella 
coupled with the demand that the Austrian government, like in the case of the Ottawa process, 
play a similar leading role on cluster munitions. One could possibly assume that it is implicit 
in this comparison that a similar process between like-minded states and civil society as in the 
case of the Ottawa process leading to a ban on anti-personnel mines could lead to a ban on 
cluster munitions. However, this assumption was not made explicit in this request, since under 
item 3, the Austrian government is called upon to actively support the establishment of a new 
international treaty on cluster munitions but it fails to suggest that such a convention could be 
adopted within international fora other than the CCW. Still, this request may be called 
progressive, since item 2 contains an appeal to the Austrian government to declare a 
comprehensive moratorium on all types of cluster munitions, including their use, production, 
development, stockpiling and transfer. 
The demand under item 4, to expand the Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of Anti-
Personnel Mines in scope to also cover cluster munitions, while addressed to the Austrian 
government with the best of intentions, may be termed less fortunate. This is because it fails 
to fully appreciate the differences between anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions: Anti-
personnel mines and cluster munition share common effects in that unexploded cluster 
submunitions de facto function like victim-activated anti-personnel mines at the post-conflict 
stage. On the other hand, as already described supra,683 cluster munitions display differences 
in effects in comparison to anti-personnel mines when they do function as designed in view of 
their inaccuracy and wide dispersal patterns at the time of attack. Therefore, such an 
expansion of the pre-existing Anti-Personnel Ban Act would not have addressed all 
problematic aspects of cluster munition use. Instead, in view of the differences between anti-
personnel mines and cluster munitions, a separate law on cluster munitions is generally 
needed.684 
Parliamentary debate on this SPÖ/Green Party request was postponed throughout the year 
2005 in order to arrive at a position based on consensus among the government parties on the 
one (Austrian People´s Party, hereinafter: ÖVP, and Alliance for the Future of Austria, 
hereinafter: BZÖ) and the opposition parties (SPÖ and Green Party) on the other. Finally, the 
                                                 
683 See supra p. 107. 
684 This has been the position that has been argued later, since March 2007, by AAMV/CMC-Austria. 
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request submitted by MPs Lunacek and Posch failed to attain the required majority in the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council on 5 July 2006.685 Rather, ÖVP and BZÖ 
MPs submitted a request for a parliamentary resolution on their part in which the Austrian 
government was called upon to actively support the adoption of a new CCW Protocol and to 
take technical and other measures to restrict cluster munitions with a failure rate higher than 1 
%.686 
On 11 July 2006, AAMV/CMC-Austria organised a briefing hosted by the SPÖ and 
the Green Party in Parliament.687 The briefing included speakers from AAMV/CMC-Austria, 
the ICRC, foreign NGOs Handicap International and Landmine.de as well as the Austrian 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. It certainly served to provide awareness of the 
humanitarian consequences related to these weapons and to understand commonalities and 
differences of positions of the various stakeholders present. While there was general 
acknowledgement of the humanitarian concerns related to cluster munition use, there were 
differences of opinion as to how to most effectively address these concerns. One divergence 
of views revolved around the issue of whether an international restriction which only 
concerned a lowering of the sub-munition dud rate to less than 1 % would be adequate on the 
international level. While the ICRC and NGOs did not consider this an adequate solution, the 
governmental representatives expressed support for this approach, since in their view it was 
neither politically realistic nor militarily desirable to go further at that moment in time. The 
effectiveness of an international ban on cluster munitions advocated by the NGO and ICRC 
representatives without the participation of key user and producer states such as the United 
States, Russia and China was also doubted by the government representatives. 
However, this argument may be challenged on the ground that the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines was also adopted as a result of efforts 
between like-minded middle and small-sized states and international civil society. Secondly, 
although the Ottawa Convention until the present date has neither been signed nor ratified by 
the United States, Russia or China, nevertheless at least in part, these states de facto comply 
with at least some of its norms. For instance, China has an export moratorium on 
antipersonnel mines in place since 1996, has not laid any new minefields in many years and as 
                                                 
685 Austrian National Council, Report by the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Request No. 499/A (E) by MPs 
Mag. Ulrike Lunacek, Mag. Walter Posch and Colleagues concerning an Austrian Initiative on the Prohibition of 
Cluster Bombs and Cluster Munitions, No. 1608 of the Supplements to the Stenographic Protocols of the 
National Council, 5 July 2006, http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXII/I/I_01608/fnameorig_066724.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
686 Ibid. 
687 This section draws from the personal notes by this author who witnessed the briefing in person. 
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a result of the export moratorium also production significantly decreased.688 Russia has not 
made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994;689 the United 
States has prohibited any transfers of antipersonnel mines since 1992 and use has not been 
substantiated since Operation Desert Storm in 1991.690 Thus, it may be argued that such a 
treaty actually does make a difference even without participation of certain major powers. 
Thirdly, from a humanitarian perspective, it is better to start binding small and middle-sized 
states to more stringent obligations than to wait until all major powers are on board and then 
to bind all states to watered down obligations. In the view of the author, this focus on an 
urgent humanitarian approach sets the Mine Ban Treaty and the later concluded Convention 
on Cluster Munitions apart from traditional mere disarmament treaties like the Convention on 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This particular argument was to be finally put to rest 
soon as we shall see in the analysis of the development of Austria’s international position. 
From a military point of view, it was stressed that retaining cluster munitions was 
crucial for maintaining Austria’s capacity to engage in peacekeeping and crisis management 
operations within international frameworks such as the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), since such operations could also involve more robust combat operations. It shall be 
recalled that the ESDP comprises the implementation of the so-called “Petersberg tasks” 
mentioned under Art. 17 (2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). These “Petersberg 
tasks” foresee humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping tasks, as well as more robust combat 
operations for crisis management, referred to as peacemaking, which means peace 
enforcement in this context.691 This particular argument about maintaining Austria’s capacity 
of participating in international operations was to recur at various stages until the early 
autumn of 2007, as shall be commented on further infra.692 
                                                 
688 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Country and Area Reports: China”, Landmine Monitor Report 
2008, http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/china.html (last visited 22 January 
2010). 
689 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Country and Area Reports: Russia”, Landmine Monitor Report 
2008, http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/russia.html (last visited 22 
January 2010). 
690 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Country and Area Reports: United States of America”, 
Landmine Monitor Report 2007, http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2007/usa.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
691 These tasks are named “Petersberg tasks” after the Petersberg Conference near Bonn where the Foreign and 
Defence Ministers of the Western European Union convened in 1992 to decide on the tasks of this alliance. The 
term “peacemaking” was chosen instead of “peace enforcement” to avoid constitutional legal problems for 
Germany. See H. Neuhold, “The European Union at the Crossroads: Three Major Challenges”, in P. Fischer, 
M.M. Karollus & S. Stadlmeier (eds.), Die Welt im Spannungsfeld zwischen Regionalisierung und 
Globalisierung: Festschrift für Heribert Franz Köck 253, at 256-257, n. 6 (2009). 
692 See infra pp. 214-231. 
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One day after this briefing, on 12 July 2006, parliamentary debate on the request 
submitted by the ÖVP and the BZÖ revealed fundamental differences in position between the 
government and opposition parties. In their statements both SPÖ and Green Party MPs 
referred to specific information on cluster munitions provided by the NGOs at the briefing the 
day before and regretted that it had not been possible to arrive at a common position on the 
prohibition of all types of cluster munitions, including those with an allegedly low failure 
rate.693 These statements attest to the fact that information provided by humanitarian 
NGOs/civil society organisations may have a great impact on MPs and may trigger 
parliamentary action.  
However, at this stage, this information had not yet convinced the governmental 
parties, as is revealed by the statements of ÖVP, BZÖ MPs as well as the then State Secretary. 
These statements emphasised the need for the realistic solution of proceeding in a first step to 
reduce the failure rate of the explosive sub-munitions rather than aiming at the remote goal of 
a total prohibition, especially without the participation of the major military powers China, 
Russia and the United States.694  
 Finally, the ÖVP/BZÖ request was adopted as a parliamentary resolution by majority, 
with the SPÖ and Green opposition voting against. It read as follows: 
 
“The Austrian Federal Government is requested, 
1. to transmit Protocol V on the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to the Austrian National 
Council for ratification as speedily as possible as soon as the legal requirements are fulfilled and all 
authentic versions of the treaty text required for ratification are available; 
2. to continue to actively support the establishment of a CCW-Protocol on cluster munitions and cluster 
bombs or any other adequate international legal instrument, since cluster bombs and cluster munitions 
with a high failure rate may have similar effects and humanitarian consequences as anti-personnel 
mines; 
3. to declare − through the adoption of national legislation or in any other adequate manner − if needed, 
also unilaterally − that Austria is neither developing nor producing, transferring, stockpiling, nor using 
cluster bombs and cluster munitions with a high failure rate.”695 
 
Since the resolution as adopted only supports international and national measures in 
relation to cluster bombs and cluster munitions with a high failure rate, it certainly came as a 
disappointment to the ban advocates AAMV/CMC-Austria, the SPÖ and the Green Party. 
                                                 
693 The statements referred hereinafter are all available at Austrian National Council, Stenographic Protocols of 
the 158th Session of the National Council of the Republic of Austria, XXII. GP (legislative period), 12 July 2006, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00158/fname_069221.pdf (last visited 22 January 
2010). See Statement by MP Walter Posch (SPÖ), at 182-183; Statement by Ulrike Lunacek (Green Party), at 
185-186. 
694 See ibid., Statement by State Secretary Hans Winkler, at 187-188; Statement by MP Markus Fauland (BZÖ), 
at 192-193; Statement by MP Walter Murauer (ÖVP), at 198. 
695 Austrian National Council, Parliamentary Resolution of 12 July 2006, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXII/I/I_01608/fnameorig_066725.html (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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However, it contained the important addition that the Austrian government was requested not 
only to actively support a new international convention on cluster munitions within the CCW 
but also “any other adequate international legal instrument”. Importantly, this was to enable 
Austria to support the adoption of an international convention outside the CCW. This crucial 
wording was inserted as a result of intense lobbying efforts by AAMV/CMC-Austria. 
It was a macabre coincidence that on the very same day, the armed conflict between 
the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah erupted in Lebanon and Northern Israel with both 
parties to the conflict using cluster munitions, as was already detailed supra.696 In this 
context, most importantly, the fact that sub-munitions of the type M 85 with the allegedly 
reliable self-destruct mechanism failed in far greater numbers than claimed by producers who 
had assured that the failure rate would be less than 1% served to actively undermine the 
approach just taken by the majority of the Austrian National Council.697  
The grave humanitarian impact of cluster munitions on civilians in Lebanon certainly 
increased the momentum to urgently take steps on the international level. From 6 to 17 
November 2006, states parties to the CCW met for the Third Review Conference to the CCW 
in Geneva. Austria was at the forefront of efforts to achieve a negotiating mandate for a new 
international treaty on cluster munitions within the CCW. It was in an initial group of six 
states that advocated such a mandate and was instrumental in efforts to increase the number of 
states in favour of a negotiating mandate of the CCW for a new international treaty to thirty 
until the end of the conference.  
The statements of Austrian diplomats revealed a strengthened national position. The 
parliamentary resolution of 12 July 2006 only sought to prohibit cluster munitions with high 
failure rates. Therefore, it only focused on the post-conflict problem of cluster munitions 
leaving unexploded submunitions but it did not adequately address the wide area effect of 
cluster munitions during armed conflict. However, the statements of Austrian diplomatic 
representatives revealed a strengthened national position by emphasising that “Recent events 
have again shown that, in addition to the question of the reliability of such weapons, specific 
rules need to be established addressing their use during conflict situations […].”698 This 
                                                 
696 See supra pp. 38-40 with references. 
697 See supra p. 39. 
698 Statement by Markus Reiterer, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament on the 
Issue of Cluster Munitions, 8 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5EEDA6435A3DF914C12572200069B1FD/$file/CCW
+CONF.III+MCII+AUSTRIA.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010); Statement by Wolfgang Petritsch, Permanent 
Representative of Austria to the Conference on Disarmament on the Issue of Cluster Munitions, 13 November 
2006, 
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constituted a clear acknowledgement of the humanitarian problems associated with cluster 
munitions during armed conflict. Still, the statements contained the following caveat: “This is 
not a proposal for a total ban on cluster munitions.”699 Therefore, this caveat made clear that 
at that stage, Austria was still not prepared to ban all types of cluster munitions. 
The proposal of the group of about thirty states which included Austria failed to 
achieve the required consensus as a result of opposition of major military powers like the 
United States, Russia and China at the end of the conference. This outcome prompted Norway 
to press forward and announce its readiness to lead a process outside the framework of the 
CCW which should start in Oslo in early 2007. For Austria’s support of this new process, the 
above-mentioned wording of the Austrian parliamentary resolution where the Austrian 
government was requested not only to actively support a new international convention on 
cluster munitions within the CCW but also to support “any other adequate international legal 
instrument” had now acquired vital significance. Austria’s support of this new process also 
laid to rest the position advocated earlier according to which international efforts to alleviate 
civilian harm resulting from cluster munition use must include the major user and producer 
states. 
The Review Conference also provided an opportunity for AAMV/CMC-Austria to 
exchange ideas with international NGO colleagues on campaign strategies on a national level. 
As a result of such exchanges, especially parallels between the national situations in Austria 
and Norway were identified. Norway had a stockpile of a variant of M85 of essentially the 
same type as Austria.700 Like Austria, Norway also had a national policy in place according to 
which cluster munition stockpiles had to have a failure rate per sub-munition of less than 1%. 
The rationale behind this policy was the confidence by the Norwegian government that its 
existing stockpiles of M 85 type sub-munitions met this requirement. However, a serious blow 
was dealt to this confidence in late 2005 for the first time when parallel tests conducted in 
Norway of British and Norwegian stockpiles of those kinds of sub-munitions showed failure 
rates of more than 1%. New tests in Norway were ordered to conclude whether or not the 
Norwegian stockpile complied with the self-imposed 1% limit. Until that was conclusively 
established, the Norwegian government declared a temporary unilateral moratorium on all 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.onug.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4490CD0C4F68A995C125722E005FB1D5/$file/10+Au
stria.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
699 Ibid. 
700 These artillery-delivered cluster munitions are called Deutsches Modell (DM) 642 which contain 63 DM1383 
sub-munitions and DM 662 with 49 DM1385 sub-munitions, the latter being essentially the same as M85 sub-
munitions with self-destruct mechanisms. These sub-munitions are both German Rheinmetall licence 
productions of Israeli Military Industries’ M85 sub-munitions.  
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types of cluster munitions in its arsenals, including those with an alleged failure rate of less 
than 1% in June 2006. The tests conducted in autumn 2006 established an overall average 
failure rate of just over 1%.701 After these tests, Norway decided to extend its own 
moratorium on all types of cluster munitions, including the M 85 sub-munitions in November 
2006, not only because its belief that its own stockpiles of cluster munitions with self-destruct 
mechanism met the 1% limit had been seriously shattered but also to give Norway the 
necessary credibility on the international plane, since it had decided to lead international 
efforts to achieve an international ban o cluster munitions that cause unacceptable 
humanitarian harm.702   
As a result, AAMV/CMC-Austria took up suggestions to proceed in stages and to call 
for a national moratorium on all types of cluster munitions instead of a national ban law right 
away. This helped to ensure a more coherent campaign strategy of AAMV/CMC than that 
advocated previously. In its correspondence from now on, a recurring key message conveyed 
by AAMV/CMC-Austria was that Austria must also live up to the leadership role on the issue 
of cluster munitions shown at the CCW Review Conference on the national level by 
unilaterally declaring a national moratorium on these weapons until the adoption of a new 
international convention. The momentum for these kinds of messages was right, since after 
the CCW Review Conference, Austria was effectively in the same boat as Norway so what 
was achieved on a national level in Norway was definitely also worth pursuing in Austria. 
Much earlier than expected these parallels also came to be reflected in terms of 
concrete action. A press conference held on 7 February 2007 and well-attended by Austrian 
print and electronic media, was a major opportunity for an urgent appeal to the government, 
including the newly-appointed Austrian Minister of Defence, Norbert Darabos (SPÖ). 
AAMV/CMC-Austria as well as Green Party Spokeswoman for Foreign Affairs, MP 
Lunacek, called on the Minister to unilaterally declare a moratorium on all types of cluster 
munitions stockpiled by the Austrian Armed Forces, including those with sub-munitions 
equipped with self-destruct mechanisms. This appeal came right before the Oslo Conference 
on Cluster Munitions as a first of a series of international conferences outside the framework 
of the CCW with the aim of prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to 
                                                 
701 192 projectiles of the type DM 662 were fired, containing a total of 9408 M85 type of sub-munitions. Out of 
this number, 104 duds were left behind, which equates to an average failure rate of 1.11%. See King et al., 
“M85: An analysis of reliability”, supra note 83, at 59. 
702 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway to take the lead in efforts to achieve an international ban on 
cluster munitions”, Press Release of 3 November 2006, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/News/2006/Norway-to-take-the-lead-in-efforts-to-achieve-an-
international-ban-on-cluster-munitions.html?id=424460 (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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civilians which had been scheduled by the Norwegian government for 22 to 23 February 
2007. 
The appeal was broadcast by OE1, the most prominent Austrian radio broadcasting 
news channel, at 6pm prime time in its daily news journal and reported by various Austrian 
newspapers on 8 February 2007.703  
Finally, on 19 February 2007, Minister for Foreign Affairs Ursula Plassnik and 
Minister of Defence Darabos delivered a common statement televised on Austrian national 
television (ORF) that Austria was now ready to adopt a national moratorium on cluster 
munitions.  
Indeed, the timing of that decision was influenced by the beginning international 
diplomatic process and by the leadership role that Austria intended to play at the Oslo 
Conference on Cluster Munitions. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed on 20 February 
in a common Press Release with the Minister of Defence,  
“With this agreement on a comprehensive moratorium on the use of cluster munitions we are sending 
out a clear and unequivocal signal. Austria is thus consistently maintaining its international leading role 
in outlawing this type of weapon.”704 
 
Plassnik also stressed that the moratorium was only the very first step: 
 
“Our long-term goal is and remains a legally binding international treaty on the prohibition of cluster 
munitions. In Oslo we will therefore be joining forces with like-minded partner states to call for the 
elaboration of an international treaty by 2008. Only a legally binding instrument will allow us to effectively 
combat the disastrous humanitarian effects of cluster bombs at international level. These deadly weapons, 
which claim numerous victims worldwide every year, must be outlawed internationally. The conflict in 
southern Lebanon in summer 2006 clearly evidenced the urgent need for international action against cluster 
munitions. The international community is called upon to take concrete measures against the appalling and 
inhumane effects of this type of munitions. Austria is therefore ready to organise a follow-up to the Oslo 
Conference to take place in Vienna in autumn 2007.” 
 
The Minister of Defence on his part made it clear that  
 
“the use of cluster munitions can cause unbearable suffering among civilian populations. I personally was 
deeply shocked by the terrible images from the Lebanon we saw last year. We are thus taking a first 
elementary step to start putting an end to this horror. Although Austria possesses state-of-the-art munitions 
of this type with a very low failure rate for defence purposes only, we will renounce the use of these 
weapons. I do not see this renouncement as having any impact on our national defence, on the protection of 
our soldiers on duty or on our international obligations of solidarity. An international renouncement of this 
kind is also in the interest of our soldiers on duty or on our international obligations of solidarity.” 
                                                 
703 See, e.g., H. Dumbs, “Streumunition: Klein, bunt, tödlich”, Die Presse, 8 February 2007, 
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/108461/index.do?parentid=0&act=0&isanonym=0 (last visited 
22 January 2010); A. Parragh, “Gegen Bomben”, Salzburger Nachrichten, 8 February 2007, 
http://search.salzburg.com/articles/1930590?highlight=Streubomben (last visited 22 January 2010); R. Klär, 
“Initiative gegen Streubomben: Österreich soll Vorreiter sein”, Kurier, 8 February 2007, at 8 (on file with the 
author). 
704 Austria, Ministry of European and International Affairs & Ministry of Defence, “Plassnik/Darabos: Austria 
renounces use of cluster munitions”, Press Release, 20 February 2007, 
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/index.php?id=62390&L=1 (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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 In that spirit, it was announced that Austria would issue a declaration regarding the 
moratorium at the Oslo Conference.705 Thus, the parallel to Norway is again apparent, since 
the moratorium was declared for the main reason of playing a leadership role in outlawing 
these weapons on the international level. The statement of the Minister of Defence 
significantly adds an argument on the limited military necessity of these weapons in national 
defence as well as multinational operations.  
In accordance with the Ministry of European and International Affairs and the 
Ministry of Defence statements, on 21 February 2007, the Council of Ministers of the 
Austrian government took a unanimous decision regarding the national moratorium on the use 
of all types of cluster munitions, including those types constituting an M-85 variant with self-
destruct mechanism also known as the “Hohlladungssprengkörpergranaten”. Significantly, the 
Council of Ministers also decided to uphold the comprehensive moratorium even if a future 
international convention should not be adopted or should fail to achieve such a far-reaching 
solution. Since Austria was neither producing nor transferring cluster munitions, the only 
thing remaining to be done in Austria was to prohibit the continued stockpiling of such 
weapons.  
On 22 February 2007, the first day of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, the 
Austrian representative, in line with the earlier announcement provided a positive impetus by 
informing the other states present of the national moratorium and declaring Austria’s 
readiness to host a diplomatic conference on cluster munitions at the end of 2007. However, 
in Austria’s statement, it was also noted that “this moratorium will in no way interfere with 
Austria’s military commitments in international crisis management operations.”706  
This caveat may be interpreted as reassuring states using cluster munitions with which 
Austria may undertake joint military operations, for instance within the context of operations 
with a UN Charter Chapter VII-authorisation, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) or the 
ESDP, that the continued participation of Austria in such operations would not be endangered 
or hampered with this self-imposed unilateral constraint. The continued collaboration with 
states opposed to prohibiting cluster munitions in joint military activities, the so-called 
“military interoperability” was to remain a debated issue in Austria in the drafting process of 
                                                 
705 Ibid. 
706 Republic of Austria, Statement by Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, On the Austrian Moratorium Concerning 
the Use of Cluster Bombs and Cluster Munitions, Oslo, February 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/ClusterAustria%20Petritsch.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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its subsequent federal legislation on cluster munitions. This concern was also a prelude of 
similar concerns expressed by other participant states in the Oslo process when it came to 
negotiating a new convention on cluster munitions.  
The national moratorium set in motion further parliamentary activity. Still on 22 
February 2007, Green Party MP Lunacek submitted two parliamentary questions707 to 
Defence Minister Darabos in the Austrian National Council: 
 
1. “In the aftermath of the Austrian moratorium, are you envisaging a national federal 
law on a total ban on cluster bombs and cluster munitions (i.e. on the use, stockpiling, 
development and production)? 
2. Are you going to order the destruction of cluster munition stockpiles of the Austrian 
Armed Forces (especially those of the type M-85/155 mm)? If not, what should these 
stockpiles be used for? Are you possibly envisaging the sale of these stockpiles?”708 
 
Before the MP submitted the parliamentary questions, she consulted with 
AAMV/CMC-Austria whose position was that the Austrian government’s declaration of a 
national moratorium could not be the end of the matter. A Federal Act on the total prohibition 
of cluster munitions which would also include the destruction of existing cluster munition 
stockpiles of the Austrian Armed Forces would be a logical next step.  
In his reply dated 11 April 2007 to these parliamentary questions, Defence Minister 
Darabos stated that to him as the Federal Minister of Defence it was of great interest to lobby 
for an international prohibition of such means of combat and that he considered Austria’s 
leadership role important in this regard. Therefore, a sale of existing cluster munition 
stockpiles of the Austrian Armed Forces was out of the question. However, since cluster 
munitions are technically highly complex weapon systems an internal Ministry of Defence 
                                                 
707 Similar to parliamentary resolutions, under Austrian constitutional law, parliamentary questions are a means 
by which MPs may control the exercise of executive power. Art. 52 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law 
(B-VG) speaks to this issue, providing for the right of MPs to interrogate members of the Austrian federal 
government about all subjects pertaining to the exercise of the executive power. This provision of the Austrian 
Federal Constitutional Law provides the basis for a more detailed regulation of this right of interrogation in 
Section 91 of the 1975 Federal Law on the Rules of Procedure of the National Council (Bundesgesetz über die 
Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates), which in relevant part reads as follows: “Parliamentary questions, which 
an MP would like to address to the Federal Government or one of its members during a session, are to be 
submitted to the President of the National Council with at least four copies in writing.  They must be signed 
personally by at least five MPs, including the one asking the question […]. The one to whom the question is 
addressed must answer it orally or in writing within two months after it has been submitted to the President 
[…].” See http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/PA/RG/GONR/gog13_Portal.shtml (last visited 22 January 2010). 
708 Parliamentary Questions by MPs Lunacek & Friends to the Federal Minister of Defence Concerning the 
Process for an International Prohibition and the Adoption of an Austrian Moratorium on Cluster Munitions and 
Cluster Bombs, No. 361/J, XXIII. GP, 22 February 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/J/J_00361/fnameorig_072975.html (last visited 22 January 2010).  
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review process was underway about the future course of action in relation to these 
stockpiles.709 
The demands put forward by AAMV/CMC-Austria and Green Party MP Lunacek 
spurred further parliamentary action. On 24 April 2007, the SPÖ on their part introduced a 
first initiative for an Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Procurement, Sale, Export, Import, Transit, Use and Possession of Cluster Munitions. This 
initiative read as follows: 
 
“Definitions 
 
§ 1. For purposes of this Federal Act: 
1. “Cluster munitions” are munitions containing explosive sub-munitions, deployed by a means of 
delivery and designed to detonate on impact with a statistical distribution in a pre-defined target 
area; 
2. “Cluster bombs” are containers including cluster munitions and releasing them upon activation. 
 
 
Prohibitions 
 
§ 2. The production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of cluster 
munitions and cluster bombs are prohibited. 
 
 
Exceptions 
  
§ 3. Cluster munitions and cluster bombs which are intended exclusively for training of the Armed 
Forces or for demining or clearance purposes shall not be covered by the prohibition pursuant to § 2. 
 
 
Penal Sanctions 
 
§ 4. Anybody who, even if merely negligently, violates § 2 of this Federal Act shall be punished by a 
court of law either with a prison sentence of up to two years or with a fine of up to 360 daily rates 
[Tagessätze], provided the act is not subject to more severe punishment under other Federal Acts. 
 
 
 
Seizure and Forfeiture 
 
§ 5. (1) Cluster munitions and cluster bombs, which are subject to prohibition under § 6, shall be seized 
by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 may be declared 
forfeit by a court of law. At the expense of the owner, it must be ensured that they can no longer be used 
in violation of the prohibition laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the prohibitions laid down in § 2 may be declared forfeit by 
a court of law. 
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation. Items seized 
according to para. 1 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation. 
 
                                                 
709 Written Reply by Mag. Norbert Darabos to Written Parliamentary Questions by Mag. Lunacek, & Friends, 
No. 361/J, 330/AB XXIII. GP, 11 April 2007, 
http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/AB/AB_00330/fnameorig_075817.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
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Transitional Provision 
 
§ 6. The prohibition of the possession of cluster munitions and cluster bombs pursuant to § 2 shall not 
apply to stockpiles of the Armed Forces existing on the date of the entry into force of this Federal Law, 
§ 3 notwithstanding. 
 
 
Execution 
 
§ 7. This Federal Law shall be executed by: 
1. The Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3, 
2. The Federal Minister of Justice with regard to §§ 4 and 5, 
3. The Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 6, 
4. The Federal Minister of the Interior with regard to all other provisions. 
 
 
Entry into Force 
 
§ 8. This Federal Law shall enter into force on 1 May 2007.  
 
 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Special Part (Relevant Extracts) 
 
On § 1: 
 
The selected definition of “cluster munitions” was modelled after a request submitted by the 
government coalition parties in the German Bundestag and adopted by a majority in June 2006 (German 
Bundestag Doc. No. 16/1995 of 28 June 2006). The characteristics of cluster munitions are the lack of 
an autonomous target detection capability and as a rule, the presence of a large number of duds posing a 
threat to civilians. The term cluster munitions does not comprise munitions that are delivered by direct 
fire, flare and smoke ammunitions, sensor fused munitions with a capability of individual target 
detection, non-explosive sub-munitions as well as landmines. Also cluster munition delivery systems, 
notably cluster bombs should be captured by the prohibition. 
 
On § 2: 
 
The prohibition forms the core content of this Bill. […] cluster munitions may have an effect equal to 
that of antipersonnel mines. It was therefore appropriate to model draft § 2 after the prohibitions 
contained in the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines. 
 
On § 3: 
 
The exception to the prohibitions pursuant to § 2 is intended to allow − in the same way as § 3 of the 
Federal Act on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines (Federal Law Gazette I., No. 13/1997)− for 
training purposes of the Armed Forces or for purposes of clearance services, for the retention of some 
cluster munitions that are otherwise prohibited. 
 
[…] On § 6:  
 
In general, the Armed Forces are also addressees of the provisions of § 2 together with the exceptions 
laid down in § 3. Due to the costs involved, currently no provision shall be made for the destruction of 
existing stockpiles […].”710 
 
                                                 
710 Bill submitted by MPs Dr. Einem, Gaal, Ing. Gartlehner, Parnigoni Concerning a Federal Act on the 
Prohibition of Cluster Munitions and Cluster Bombs, No. 192/A XXIII. GP, 24 April 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/A/A_00192/fnameorig_076335.html (last visited 
22 January 2010).  
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While commendable in general, the Bill still revealed some shortcomings.  
Firstly, under § 1, the Bill included both a definition of “cluster munitions” as well as “cluster 
bombs”. With regard to “cluster bombs”, it suggested that “cluster bombs” are containers 
which include “cluster munitions”. However, cluster bombs also fall under “cluster 
munitions” of which they are the air-dropped variant. “Cluster munitions” may also be 
delivered by e.g. means of artillery rockets or howitzers. Therefore, “cluster munitions” are a 
generic term for any kind of artillery- or air-delivered weapon system in this context.  
Also, the definition was modelled after that proposed by the German Bundestag; this 
in itself was not free from difficulties, since for quite some time the German official position 
was to support only a prohibition of cluster munitions with a dud rate higher than 1%.711 In 
this vein, while it is commendable that the Bill did not subscribe to this German restriction it 
engaged in a “copy and paste” exercise of the German Bundestag resolution in the 
Explanatory Memorandum. However, when closely compared to the Explanatory Report on 
the German Bundestag resolution, the latter appeared to be more accurate to the extent that it 
described cluster munition delivery means as including artillery shells, missiles or aircraft. 
From this it follows that cluster munitions equally encompass air-launched cluster bombs, 
which should have also been reflected in this draft. Moreover, neither in outlining the 
problematic characteristics of cluster munitions nor in the proposed exceptions did this draft 
contain any independent analysis or reasoning compared to the German original.  
As regards the way in which the post-conflict problems associated with cluster 
munitions were framed, notably that the problem consisted in “duds posing a threat to 
civilians”, this begs the question of whether there may be any duds not posing any threat to 
civilians.  
In respect of the proposed exceptions, notably direct-fire munitions, smoke and flare 
ammunition, sensor-fused weapons, non-explosive sub-munitions and landmines, it may be 
argued that only smoke and flare ammunitions and non-explosive sub-munitions definitely do 
                                                 
711 See, in this respect, e.g. Statement by H. E. Ambassador Friedrich Gröning, Commissioner of the Federal 
Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Third Review Conference to 
the CCW, Geneva, 7 November 2006, with the German Bundestag Parliamentary Resolution of 28 September 
2006 appended, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/53DB78DB1039B635C125722000470940/$file/04+Ger
many.pdf  (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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not give rise to fundamental humanitarian concerns. Whether this is the case with direct-fire 
munitions and sensor-fused munitions is open to question.712  
Direct-fire munitions is a term for munitions used when the target may be seen with 
the naked eye by those firing and which explode within line of sight; these kinds of munitions 
may be distinguished from indirect-fire munitions where the person operating the weapon 
does not see the target but points the weapon in a certain direction upon instructions by 
others.713 However, while the principle that munitions used in a direct-fire mode tend to be 
more accurate is acknowledged, doubts have been expressed whether certain cluster 
munitions fired from helicopters or main battle tanks are in fact direct-fire weapons 
understood in this sense, as these weapons are intended for targets that are not visible for the 
user like entrenched infantry and targets hidden behind obstacles.714 Even in case cluster 
munitions were to be used as direct-fire munitions, this would contribute nothing to 
addressing the post-conflict legacy problem of unexploded sub-munitions.715  
With regard to sensor-fused munitions, their functioning and potential problematic 
characteristics have already been analysed supra.716 The main drawbacks of the proposed 
exception were that it was a broadly-phased exception that would not take into account the 
existence of different types of sensor-fused munitions, for example in terms of the number of 
sub-munitions, and did not provide any independent answers to the questions already raised.  
 Moreover, the question arose whether the proposed exception for retention of cluster 
munitions for training purposes of the Armed Forces or for clearance under § 3 was 
necessary. This exception was modelled after the same exception contained in the Federal Act 
                                                 
712 On the issue of “landmines”, one could insert an exception on account of the fact that these weapons are 
already prohibited (anti-personnel mines under the 1997 Ottawa Convention) and/or regulated elsewhere (all 
mines but in particular anti-vehicle mines under the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the CCW). However, in the 
International Mine Action Standards which reflect generally accepted standards for clearance operations 
recognised by the UN Mine Action Service and other UN agencies, mines, especially remotely delivered 
landmines, which form part of a Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU), artillery shell or missile payload were included in 
the definition of “sub-munitions”. See International Mine Action Standards 04.10, Glossary of mine action 
terms, definitions and abbreviations, No. 3.255, 2nd ed., 2003, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/IMAS_archive/Amended/Amended3/IMAS_04.10_Edition2_Jan2008rev.p
df (last visited 22 January 2010). See also, UNMAS, UNDP & UNICEF, “Proposed definitions for cluster 
munitions and sub-munitions”, 8 March 2005, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.3. In addition, certain states 
like the United States formally designate certain aerially-delivered mines as cluster bombs, for example, the 
CBU-89/B and the CBU-104 systems which contain a mix of anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines called 
“Gator”. The very denomination of “Cluster Bomb Unit” (CBU) in connection with using these containers also 
for delivery of scatterable anti-vehicle mines is evidence that such mines can be seen as similar to cluster 
munitions. However, any mines were subsequently excluded from the new Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
See Art. 1 (2), Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
713 See Dullum, “Cluster weapons”, supra note 36, at 17. 
714 Ibid., at 17, 24. 
715 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “A Guide to Cluster Munitions”, First Edition, 
supra note 375, at 19. 
716 See supra pp. 27-28, 37-38, 78-80. 
 208
on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines. However, it may be instructive to note that in 
practice Austria in the antipersonnel mine context never availed itself of the possibility to 
retain live mines for these purposes.717 
Finally, the transitional provision under § 6 of this draft could be regarded as 
unsatisfactory at that stage. Austria has neither been a producer nor user of cluster munitions, 
however, it was stockpiling these weapons. Therefore, in the only instance where such a Bill 
would make a significant practical difference in Austria, it carved out a transitional provision 
for stockpiles held by the Austrian Armed Forces upon entry into force and failed to provide 
for the destruction of these stockpiles at a later stage. The Explanatory Memorandum on § 6 
only specified that due to the destruction costs currently no stockpile destruction was 
envisaged without recommending any course of action on how to proceed with these 
stockpiles in the future. 
 In any event, while this first Bill suffered from certain weaknesses it increased 
pressure on the government to proceed with the drafting of a law. 
 Besides the first initiative for a Cluster Munitions Prohibition Bill, the SPÖ submitted 
a further set of the following parliamentary questions to Defence Minister Darabos: 
 
1. What types of cluster munitions and how many are in the possession of the Austrian Armed Forces? 
2.  On which date were these munitions procured? 
3.  What were the costs of procurement (in €)? 
4. What was the proportion of these costs in relation to the overall procurement costs of the Armed Forces 
in the year of procurement? 
5.  What is today’s value of these munitions? 
6.  What military reasons were advanced for this procurement? 
7.  Who drafted this reasoning? 
8. What led the Ministry of Defence − on the occasion of drafting the analysis part of the Austrian   
Security Doctrine − already in 2001 to conclude that within the next twenty years there was no prospect 
of Austria facing any threat from traditional military attack? 
9. Were these findings still not available at the time of cluster munition procurement? 
10. Who finally sanctioned by signature the procurement process before it was completed? 
                                                 
717 This may be seen from transparency reports submitted by Austria as a state party to the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention required under Art. 7. For Austria’s Art. 7 reports received 1999-2004, see 
http://disarmament.un.org/MineBan.nsf (last visited 22 January 2010). For those received 2005-2009, see 
http://www.onug.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/A5378B203CBE9B8CC12573E7006380FA?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 22 January 2010). Indeed, not only Austrian national legislation but also the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention allows in Art. 3 the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of 
and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. However, also this exception in 
the context of anti-personnel mines was subject to debate; on the one hand, there is the argument that live mines 
are needed to conduct a real-life simulation of mine attacks or contamination and to develop military 
countermeasures and demining techniques. This was opposed by those who maintained that even for these 
purposes no live mines would be needed; rather, these purposes could be achieved by using “dumb” or “inert” 
mines. The second problem with the retention of anti-personnel mines for these purposes was that this possibility 
was limited to the “minimum number absolutely necessary.” There have been difficulties as to specify how many 
mines can be retained without undermining the limited purposes of this exception and effectively keeping an 
operational stockpile under the guise of training. On this debate in the 1997 Ottawa Convention context, see 
Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 134-148. 
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11. In case it was not the Minister of Defence: What discretion did the civil servants of the Ministry of 
Defence have in questions of procurement? 
12. How many of those cluster munitions in possession of the Austrian Armed Forces are still needed by 
the Armed Forces or by demining and clearance services [in the Ministry of the Interior] for purposes 
of training − especially of clearance personnel? 
13. What are the costs of safe elimination (destruction) of cluster munition stockpiles held by the Austrian 
Armed Forces that would be in excess of those [needed for training purposes]? 
14. What are the costs of stockpiling these cluster munitions in accordance with usual microeconomic 
calculation methods?718 
 
These parliamentary questions served the important purpose of pressuring the Minister 
of Defence into being completely transparent to the public on the prevailing Austrian situation 
in connection with cluster munitions. In this respect, they also contributed to carrying forward 
the debate on stockpile destruction and thus, remedying a fundamental deficit contained in the 
first Bill. 
 Exactly two months later, Defence Minister Darabos submitted his reply to these 
parliamentary questions.719 He stated that the Austrian Armed Forces are stockpiling 12.672 
so-called “Hohlladungssprengkörpergranaten” 92. Procurement of these stockpiles occurred 
in 1998 and 1999. The overall costs of procurement amounted to around 20,86 Mio. € of 
which 6,88 Mio. were spent in 1998, 9,58 Mio in 1999 and 4,40 Mio. in 2000. In relation to 
the overall budgetary post “Munition and Means of Short-Range Combat” [VA-Post 4591 
“Munition und Nahkampfmittel”] this amounted to proportionate shares of 25,89% for the 
year of 1998, 33,97% for the year of 1999 and 17,85% for the year 2000. Today’s value of 
these munitions revolves around 10,44 Mio. €. As to the question of the military reasoning 
behind procurement, Darabos replied that in the catalogue of military duties of 1992 it was 
specified which tasks may be accomplished by the Artillery [Divisions of the Austrian Armed 
Forces] with the types of munitions introduced into the Austrian Armed Forces. Therein, it 
was also stated that with the munitions then at the disposal of the Austrian military only 
unarmoured targets could be engaged and that the means of combating armoured targets were 
limited. This catalogue of military duties was compiled by the then expert officer of the 
Artillery Division. On the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine and the prospects of 
military threats to Austria, the Minister of Defence replied that in accordance with the military 
                                                 
718 Parliamentary Questions by MPs Dr. Caspar Einem and Comrades to the Minister of Defence Concerning the 
Procurement of Cluster Munitions (Cluster Bombs and Howitzer Grenades) by the Austrian Armed Forces, 26 
April 2007, http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/J/J_00723/fnameorig_076781.html 
(last visited 22 January 2010). 
719 Reply by Minister of Defence Norbert Darabos to the Parliamentary Questions (723/J) submitted by MPs 
Caspar Einem and Comrades to the Minister of Defence Concerning the Procurement of Cluster Munitions 
(Cluster Bombs and Howitzer Grenades) by the Austrian Armed Forces, 26 June 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/AB/AB_00742/fnameorig_081788.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
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intelligence service findings then at their disposal, the Austrian Security and Defence 
Doctrine of 2001 proceeded from the assumption that the prospects of a direct military threat 
through conventional armed forces for Austrian territory have significantly decreased; 
however, such a threat could not be entirely ruled out.  
If one accepts the fundamental rationale of cluster munition procurement by Austria as 
enhancing the Austrian Armed Forces’ capability to engage armoured targets, this statement 
quite clearly illustrates that the likelihood of conventional armed forces equipped with a large 
number of armoured vehicles advancing against Austria is quite minimal indeed. Such a threat 
scenario was paradigmatic of the Cold War era when Western states were afraid that Warsaw 
Pact states could attempt to overrun them with large numbers of personnel and tanks; 
however, contemporary security threats are quite different, as, for instance the European 
Security Strategy emphatically demonstrates. The key threats listed in the European Security 
Strategy do not include conventional inter-state warfare on a massive scale but rather global 
terrorism; acquisition of weapons of mass destruction capabilities by non-state actors; 
regional conflicts; state failure fuelling civil conflicts; as well as organised crime.720 This is in 
line with observations already made that contemporary armed conflicts are predominantly of 
an asymmetrical character. In view of these changed realities, the justification for procuring 
cluster munitions, notably for enhancing military capability against armoured targets, is not 
particularly strong.  
However, the findings of the Austrian Military Intelligence Service 
(Heeresnachrichtendienst) leading to the conclusion that the prospects of a massive military 
invasion of Austria are thin were not available when the catalogue of military duties was 
drafted in 1992 and the cluster munition procurement process initiated in 1996, as the reply to 
the next question indicates. According to Darabos, the signing of the procurement contract 
was within the competence of the head of the purchase department in the Ministry of Defence, 
who could handle such matters independently in the name of the Minister of Defence. On 
question 12, how many of the cluster munition stockpiles were needed for training, the reply 
by the Minister of Defence interestingly reveals that the “Hohlladungssprengkörpergranate 
92” even now was subject to a prohibition of use during training and was only intended for 
use in actual combat. Also, the clearance of unexploded bomblets was currently not part of the 
training curriculum of the Austrian Armed Forces. Finally, Minister Darabos also provided 
figures in relation to the costs likely to be involved for the destruction of the stockpiles and 
                                                 
720 European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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the current costs of stockpiling; the destruction costs would amount to around 1 Mio. €, and 
the stockpiling costs to around 4.000 € per month. 
 The now publicly available information on the Austrian situation regarding cluster 
munitions prompted further efforts in relation to drafting a law. During the summer months, 
the Ministry of European and International Affairs took the lead and circulated a new draft 
which read as follows:  
 
“Draft 
 
Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions 
 
 
Definitions 
 
§ 1. For purposes of this Federal Act,  
 
1. “cluster munitions” are containers including explosive submunitions which are intended to disperse 
these submunitions over an area in order to detonate them before, on, or after impact; however, this 
definition shall not comprise containers including submunitions falling under other already existing 
international law prohibitions or restrictions, flare and smoke ammunitions, pyrotechnical 
chemicals or sensor fused munitions with a capability to engage individual targets. 
2. “procurement” is a transaction by which an Austrian citizen resident in Austria or a legal person, 
partnership or trading company registered in Austria or any other person, partnership or trading 
company that becomes active from within Austria is 
 
a) negotiating a legal transaction that involves the transfer of cluster munitions from a third 
country to another third country, or 
b) arranging such a legal transaction to be accomplished, or 
c) buying or selling cluster munitions if that causes its transfer from a third country to 
another third country, or 
d) arranging a transfer of cluster munitions over which they hold property from a third 
country to another third country. 
 
Prohibitions 
 
§ 2. The development, production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of 
cluster munitions are prohibited. 
 
Exceptions 
 
§ 3. The prohibitions laid down under § 2 shall not be applicable to 
 
1. cluster munitions which are envisaged exclusively for training of the Austrian Armed Forces or of 
demining or clearance services; 
2. the import, possession and stockpiling of cluster munitions for purposes of their immediate 
decommissioning or other destruction; 
3. within the framework of sending personnel in accordance with the Federal Constitutional Act on 
Cooperation and Solidarity in Sending Units and Individuals Abroad [Bundesverfassungsgesetz 
über Kooperation und Solidarität bei der Entsendung von Einheiten und Einzelpersonen in das 
Ausland, in short: KSE-BVG] the participation in the decision on the use of cluster munitions by 
other states or the logistical implementation of such use. 
 
 
Destruction 
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§ 4. Existing stockpiles of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 must be reported to the Federal Ministry of 
Defence within one month after the entry into force of this Federal Law and must be destroyed against 
reimbursement of costs by the Ministry of Defence within three years at the latest. 
 
Penal Sanctions 
 
§ 5. Anybody who, even if merely negligently, violates § 2 of this Federal Law shall be punished by a court of 
law either with a prison sentence of up to two years or with a fine of up to 360 daily rates [Tagessätze], provided 
that the act is not subject to more severe punishment under other federal legislation. 
 
Seizure and Forfeiture 
 
§ 6. (1) Cluster munitions used to commit an act punishable under § 5 shall be seized by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 can be declared forfeit by 
a court of law. At the expense of the owner, it must be ensured that they can no longer be used in violation of the 
prohibitions laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the prohibitions laid down in § 2 can be declared forfeit by a court 
of law.  
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 will pass to the ownership of the Federation [Bund]. 
 
Execution 
 
§ 7. This Federal Act shall be executed by 
 
1. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3 (1) and (2), 
2. the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3 (3) and § 4, 
3. the Federal Minister of Justice with regard to § 5 and § 6, 
4. the Federal Minister of Interior with regard to the remaining provisions. 
 
Entry into Force 
 
§ 8. This Federal Act shall enter into force on 1 December 2007.”721 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum contained the following revised passages in comparison to 
that of the previous Bill:722 
 
“Explanatory Memorandum 
 
II. SPECIAL PART 
 
 
On § 1: 
 
The definition of “cluster munitions” was drafted with a view to discussions held on the international level, inter 
alia, within the framework of the Third Review Conference to the CCW or the Oslo process. 
 
The specific characteristics of cluster munitions are their wide area effect, most often the lack of individual 
target detection and as a rule, the presence of a large number of duds posing a danger to civilians. 
 
In the sense of § 1, “containers” are all delivery systems that include sub-munitions and that may disperse them 
even if the containers themselves constitute munitions (e.g. grenades). Cluster munitions are not only containers 
                                                 
721 Draft, Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions,  24 August 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/ME/ME_00112/fnameorig_085527.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
722 For any subsequent Bills the Explanatory Memoranda shall only be reproduced to the extent that they 
contained changes and/or raised new issues for debate in comparison to previous ones. 
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actually filled with sub-munitions but any containers which are designed to disperse explosive sub-munitions 
that are separated from the container over an area in order to detonate on, before or after impact. 
 
The definition of cluster munitions does not comprise containers including sub-munitions falling under other 
already existing international law prohibitions or restrictions (see, e.g., Protocol II to the CCW in its version 
amended on 3 May 1996, Federal Law Gazette III, No. 17/1999), flare or smoke ammunitions, pyrotechnical 
chemicals and sensor fused munitions with a capability to engage individual targets. The use of these types of 
weapons does not give rise to the same humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions, including the 
wide area effect and the presence of duds dangerous for civilians. Thus, they shall not be addressed by this 
Federal Act. 
 
The definition of “procurement” corresponds to the definition laid down in § 1 (4) of the Federal Act on the 
Import, Export and Transit of War Material, Federal Law Gazette No. 510/1977 in its version currently in force. 
 
 
 
On § 3: 
 
The exception under (3) is indispensable for maintaining Austria’s active participation in military operations 
abroad where the Austrian Armed Forces cooperate with other nations, such as in the framework of the European 
Security and Defence Policy, the Partnership for Peace, the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. This exception prevents personnel sent on such missions from possibly falling under the 
penal provisions of this Federal Act. Notwithstanding this exception, the firing of cluster munitions through a 
member of an Austrian contingent and the use of Austrian cluster munitions within the framework of such 
military operations abroad shall still be punishable. 
 
 
On § 4: 
 
In order to ensure economical destruction of cluster munitions in due course, a maximum period of three years 
for their destruction is hereby determined. 
 
 
On § 5: 
 
Because of the analogy between the prohibitions and the similar necessity of prevention, the penal provision and 
the sentence prescribed was modelled, by analogy, after § 7 (1) of the Federal Act on the Import, Export and 
Transit of War Material (Federal Law Gazette No. 510/1977) as well as § 5 of the Federal Act on the Prohibition 
of Antipersonnel Mines (Federal Law Gazette I No. 13/1997).  
 
 
On § 6: 
 
Seizure and forfeiture are considered to be necessary supplementary measures to the prohibition laid down under 
§ 2 and the provision for penal sanctions under § 5 […].”723 
 
In several respects, this draft constituted a significant improvement over the earlier 
Bill. First and foremost, in the definition contained under § 1, while retaining the 
fundamentally positive approach of the earlier Bill of a general broad prohibition of cluster 
munitions, especially including those with allegedly low failure rates and self-destruct 
mechanisms, no longer does one find the erroneous definition of “cluster bombs” suggested 
                                                 
723 Explanatory Memorandum to Draft, Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, 24 August 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/ME/ME_00112/fnameorig_085528.html (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
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previously. Instead, this new draft definition captured the essential components of cluster 
munitions as a generic category of both ground- and air-delivered types, the container and the 
explosive sub-munitions, and was simpler and more comprehensive than the earlier one, since 
it recognised that sub-munitions may not only be designed to explode on impact but also 
before or after impact. These additions were rightfully added, as some sub-munitions would 
explode in an airburst mode and others at a certain time after impact due to a time-delay 
fuse.724 Apart from the more apposite general definition, it may also be approvingly noted that 
the earlier exception for munitions delivered by direct firing was no longer retained. 
In contrast to the earlier Bill, a landmark improvement can also be seen in the fact that 
this new version did include an explicit provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles 
within a short period of three years. 
 Moreover, the new version also prohibited the “development” of cluster munitions, 
thus extending the scope of the prohibitions and rendering it more expansive than the scope of 
the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines which does not include such a 
prohibition.725 This constituted a welcome addition in recognition of the reality that cluster 
munition production is often only but the result of a lengthy multinational research and 
production process. In this regard, cluster munition production involves the fabrication and 
integration of a large number of components, including metal parts, explosives, fuses and 
packaging materials, and rarely are all components researched into and produced in one 
location only.726 
However, the new draft also retained some weaknesses of the earlier Bill and 
sometimes included new shortcomings. Falling into the former category is the retention of the 
broad exception for sensor-fused munitions. Also the Explanatory Memorandum’s 
justification for this exception remained the same as before, since it again only contains the 
broad reference that all the exempted types of munitions do not give rise to the same 
humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions. Again this claim is not further 
substantiated with concrete evidence that this is necessarily the case under actual combat 
                                                 
724 An example of a cluster munition detonated in the air is the CB470 Cluster Bomb with 40 Alpha anti-
personnel air-burst sub-munitions. See R. McGrath, “Cluster Bombs: The military effectiveness and impact on 
civilians of cluster munitions”, UK Working Group on Landmines, September 2000, Appendix, at 55, 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster_Bombs.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). An example of a 
cluster munition which incorporates a time delay element in detonation after impact on the ground is the CBU-
71/B where each bomb contains 650 sub-munitions.  
While time delay fused sub-munitions are no longer common they were recently considered by some NATO and 
other countries as alternatives to anti-personnel mines. See M. Hiznay, “Survey of Cluster Munitions Produced 
and Stockpiled”, ICRC Expert Meeting Montreux 2007, supra note 41, at 23.  
725 See Federal Act on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, Federal Law Gazette BGBl I, No. 13/1997. 
726 Cf. M. Hiznay, “Operational and technical aspects of cluster munitions”, supra note 231, at 20. 
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conditions. A new ambiguity was added by the inclusion of a broadly-phrased exclusion for 
containers including sub-munitions which already fall under existing international law 
prohibitions or restrictions. While apparently, the purpose of this clause was to exempt 
chemical, biological sub-munitions or landmines, the necessity for such a broad exemption 
stands open to question. 
A further new weakness of this draft was the exception under § 3 (3), which sought to 
exempt the participation in the decision on the use of cluster munitions by other states or the 
logistical implementation of such use within the framework of joint military operations 
conducted under the auspices of international organisations. Participation of Austrian 
personnel in such joint military operations is subject to the provisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Act on Cooperation and Solidarity in Sending Units and Individuals Abroad 
(Bundesverfassungsgesetz über Kooperation and Solidarität bei der Entsendung von Einheiten 
und Einzelpersonen in das Ausland, in short: KSE-BVG).727 As became clear from the 
Explanatory Memorandum on this provision, the motivations for that exception were to 
maintain Austria’s active participation in multinational military operations within the 
frameworks of the ESDP, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), the UN or the OSCE and to 
prevent personnel sent on such missions from possibly falling under the penal provisions of 
this Federal Act. Such penal provision was explicitly enshrined in § 5 of the draft. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a direct reference to it, this explanation implies that in principle 
also the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of somebody else to commit any of the 
acts prohibited by § 2 fell under the scope of the penal provision, i.e. assisting foreign 
personnel in any act prohibited to Austrian soldiers. This is confirmed by § 12 of the Austrian 
Penal Code which makes it clear that not only the direct perpetrator may commit a criminal 
offence but also anybody who induces, encourages or assists another person to commit an 
offence.728  
The KSE-BVG provides essentially for the sending of persons for purposes of taking 
measures of securing peace in order to promote democracy, the rule of law and protection of 
human rights within the frameworks of the above-mentioned international organisations as 
well as military exercises and training to these ends.  
Accordingly, in principle under the proposed national legislation Austrian personnel in 
multinational operations would be prohibited from using cluster munitions and from engaging 
                                                 
727 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über Kooperation and Solidarität bei der Entsendung von Einheiten und 
Einzelpersonen in das Ausland, Federal Law Gazette BGBl I, No. 38/1997. 
728 See § 12, Austrian Penal Code, Federal Law Gazette No. 60/1974, in force since 1 Jan. 1975. 
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in a variety of other activities. With regard to these other activities, they would face possible 
criminal prosecution if they acted in such a way which could be interpreted as “assistance” to 
any nationally prohibited activity to personnel from other states for whom those activities are 
not prohibited. Then the underlying assumption was that Austria would have to refrain from 
participating in such multinational operations altogether whenever there was the possibility of 
cluster munition-related activities by personnel of another state as to avoid these unappealing 
consequences for its own personnel.  
Moreover, the other assumption was that this would undermine the confidence in 
Austria as a reliable partner and active participant in such multinational military operations. 
Especially, such a drastic step would run counter to the concept of “military interoperability” 
which is defined broadly by the latest version of the NATO Glossary of Military Terms and 
Definitions as “the ability of military forces to train, exercise and operate effectively together 
in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”729 The EU 2010 Military Headline Goal 
defines military interoperability as “the ability of our armed forces to work together and to 
interact with civilian tools. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military 
capabilities as a key enabler in achieving EU’s ambitions in Crisis Management 
Operations.”730 The American-British-Australian-Canadian (ABCA) Coalitions Operations 
Handbook published by the ABCA Standardisation Office under the ABCA agreement 
defines interoperability as the “ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and 
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to 
enable them to operate effectively together.”731 For interoperability generally to be achieved, 
the sharing of common doctrine and procedures, each other’s military equipment and bases, 
and to be able to communicate with each other, is necessary; joint planning, training and 
exercises contribute to achieving effective cooperation in these fields.732 To avoid a negative 
impact on such interoperability functions in multinational operations, the exception was 
considered indispensable. 
                                                 
729 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agency, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions”, 
June 2007, Doc. AAP-6, at 2-M-6, http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2007.pdf (last visited 22 
January 2010).  
730 European Union Headline Goal 2010, European Council of 17-18 June 2004, at para. 3, fn. 1, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
731ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook, 1 November 2001, at 253 (Glossary-13), 
http://www.transchool.eustis.army.mil/lic/documents/coalition%20ops%20handbook%20nov%2001.pdf (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
732 NATO, “Backgrounder: Interoperability for joint operations”, July 2006, at 1, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
 217
This presupposed that this dilemma will inevitably arise in multinational operations in 
which Austria participates. However, this is far from being that clear.  
Firstly, one should emphasise that the issue of using cluster munitions in multinational 
operations would only come into play in case of combat operations. With regard to ESDP 
operations, this would only be the case with upper-level ESDP operations involving a 
mandate to engage in peacemaking in accordance with the terms of the EU Treaty. Similarly, 
concerning NATO’s PfP, this would only be relevant for operations within the so-called 
enhanced PfP which includes measures of peace enforcement. In practice, ESDP and NATO 
PfP operations may reach this level if they are given a robust mandate by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures, including the 
use of military force. Combat operations would also be contemplated where UN member 
states are authorised to conduct enforcement or peace enforcement operations under Chapter 
VII. One example where cluster munitions were used by a coalition of the able and willing in 
an enforcement operation authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII was the 
1991 Operation Desert Storm.733  
Finally, it may be observed that while the predecessor of the OSCE, the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was established as a regional arrangement under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which could imply enforcement action undertaken under the 
auspices of the UN Security Council, it also emphasised that CSCE peacekeeping operations 
will not entail enforcement action.734 Attempts to re-examine the debate on a role for wide 
scale armed peacekeeping in the OSCE context did not meet favourably with the majority of 
participating states of the OSCE.735 
 Therefore, it is submitted that armed peacekeeping operations under the auspices of 
the OSCE and the issue of cluster munition use is not a likely prospect. For the other 
frameworks it will be noted that robust combat operations only constitute but a fraction of the 
spectrum of multinational operations where Austrian personnel might be engaged. What 
                                                 
733 UN Security Council Res 678, 29 November 1990, UN Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). For details on the scope of 
use in 1991 Operation Desert Storm, see supra, pp. 27-28. 
734 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki Document 1992, “The Challenges of Change”, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4048_en.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
735 OSCE, Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Decision No. 4 Reviewing the OSCE Role in the Field of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 7 December 2002, Doc. MC (10), Dec. 4, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2002/12/4174_en.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010); OSCE, Eleventh 
Meeting of the Ministerial Council, “Letter from the Chairperson of the Permanent Council to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairperson of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the 
OSCE”, 1 and 2 December 2003, http://osce.org/documents/mcs/2003/12/4175_en.pdf (last visited 22 January 
2010); Chairman-in-Office´s Activity Report for 2003, 20 February 2004, Doc. CIO.GAL/3/04/Rev.3, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2004/01/1936_en.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
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follows is a review of the type of operations with Austrian participation at the relevant time of 
that debate (September 2007) where combat operations could be involved and thus, cluster 
munition use would become an issue. 
Within the context of the ESDP, theoretically, combat operations would be 
contemplated by European Union Force (EUFOR)-Althea since its mandate by SC Res 1575 
of 2004 includes the authorisation under Chapter VII to use the necessary force to implement 
the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement just like the predecessor forces 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR).736 However, the tasks in 
practice were not in any way related to combat missions but included implementation of law 
enforcement activities (criminal searches and investigation) to support local police, support 
for capacity-building of local police and the return of refugees.737 Thus, it can be said to be 
unrealistic to assume that the 112 Austrian Armed Forces personnel then serving with 
EUFOR-Althea would be embroiled in combat. 
With regard to EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, this ESDP operation was also 
furnished with a robust mandate by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil the tasks assigned to it, notably to contribute to protecting 
civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid; and to contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, 
installations and equipment.738 Thus, it is not excluded that the multinational troops could be 
embroiled in combat and there was no doubt as to the insecure environment in which they 
operated;739 however, it is equally clear that the EU military presence was a temporary 
mission of a humanitarian character which was then converted into reinforcements for the 
UN peace enforcement mission Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au 
Tchad (MINURCAT). Given this humanitarian context, it is highly doubtful how the use of 
cluster munitions could in any way contribute to achieving these objectives in view of the 
indiscriminate wide area effect of these weapons especially in and around residential areas 
                                                 
736 See UN Security Council Res 1575, 22 November 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1575; UN Security Council Res 
1031, 15 December 1995, UN Doc. S/RES/1031; UN Security Council Res 1088, 12 December 1996, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1088. 
737 G. Hauser, “Österreich – Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der NATO-Partnerschaft für den Frieden”, 
Österreichische Militär Zeitung, No. 6/2005, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=347 (last 
visited 22 January 2010). 
738 See op. para. 6, UN Security Council Res 1778, 25 September 2007, UN Doc. S/RES/1778 (2007). 
739 A recent UN Secretary-General report attests to the insecure environment with the possibility of renewed 
rebel attacks and the practice of heavily armed bandits who target humanitarian workers and conduct armed 
robberies. See UN Secretary-General, Report to the UN Security Council on the United Nations Mission in the 
Central African Republic and Chad, 14 July 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/359, paras. 6-9. 
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like IDP or refugee camps as well as the post-conflict legacy of duds endangering the lives of 
the very refugees and displaced people they would be intended to protect.  
Moreover, the trends in capability planning in the ESDP context indicate that possible 
reliance on cluster munitions is not a likely future prospect. As regards ESDP military 
capabilities where interoperability issues may arise, the 2003 European Security Strategy 
already significantly states:  
“In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor 
can it be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”740 
 
 Based on this strategic guidance for the ESDP, EU Member States in the Headline 
Goal 2010 committed themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action 
applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations 
covered by Art. 17 (2) TEU and the tasks added by the European Security Strategy.741  
One key element of Headline Goal 2010 is the full operational readiness by 2007 of 
two simultaneously operating rapidly deployable battlegroups (within 10-15 days) across the 
whole spectrum of the Petersburg tasks, numbering 1500 personnel each and sustainable for a 
period of three months, including appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation 
assets. At a Military Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004, Austria 
committed itself to contribute to a battlegroup together with Germany and the Czech 
Republic.742  
Another element of Headline Goal 2010 is the establishment of a European Defence 
Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments 
intended to contribute to developing benchmarks and milestones in order to evaluate progress 
towards the achievement of ESDP military capabilities, inter alia, concerning 
interoperability.743  
The European Defence Agency, whose decision-making body is composed of the EU 
High Representative, the Defence Ministers of 26 participating Member States and the 
Commission,744 published a report entitled “An Initial Long-Term Vision for European 
                                                 
740 European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, supra note 720, at 7. 
741 Headline Goal 2010, supra note 730, at para. 4. 
742 Military Capability Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004, approved by the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council, at 9, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MILITARY%20CAPABILITY%20COMMITMENT%20C
ONFERENCE%2022.11.04.pdf (last visited 22 January 2010). 
743 Headline Goal 2010, supra note 730, at para. 5.  
744 The European Defence Agency was established pursuant to Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 
2004. Also the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union makes reference to the European Defence Agency in Art. 
42 (3). See Art. 42 (3), Treaty of the European Union, Consolidated Version, 9 May 2008, Official Journal 
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Defence Capability and Capacity Shortfalls” in 2006 designed to serve as guidance for 
defence planners in the development of ESDP military capabilities. The report emphasised 
that   
“[i]n the conduct of war, ever greater attention will be paid to proportion and justification in the 
application of force, with an increasing tendency to hold individuals responsible for their actions not 
just at head of state or military commander level but down the command chain. Attention to collateral 
damage will be ever more acute.”745  
 
It goes on to state  
“All parties in modern conflicts realise that the political outcome will be determined not just by the 
achievements of military objectives, but by the manner in which operations are conducted or are 
perceived to be conducted. […] [M]ilitary success achieved in the wrong way can mean political 
failure.”746 
  
These are powerful statements for arguing that there is indeed no room for the use of 
cluster munitions, since military successes achieved through the indiscriminate targeting of 
civilians both during and after conflict will not serve the overall political purposes of ESDP 
crisis management operations.  
Then, the report explicitly spoke to the issue of means of combat. In this context it 
noted  
“the widespread perception that technology is putting into military hands the means to conduct 
operations with ever greater precision and restraint,” 
 
 and that 
 
 “intelligence (or knowledge, or information) will become an ever more important resource for 
successful operations, whilst kinetic energy has to be applied in ever more precise and limited 
quantities.”747 
 
 Most significantly, the report emphasised in this context:  
“Serious thought needs to be given to the future utility of unguided munitions (and of aircraft that 
cannot use smart weapons), as well as cluster bombs, mines and other weapons of indiscriminate 
effects.”748  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
C115/13. Further background information on the European Defence Agency is available at 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122 (last visited 22 January 2010). 
745 European Defence Agency, “An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity 
Needs”, 3 October 2006, at 7, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146 (last visited 22 January 2010). 
The Defence Ministers of the participating Member States endorsed the report as a reasonable foundation for the 
European Defence Agency’s medium-to-long term agendas while noting that general endorsement of the report 
does not mean that all participating Member States have agreed on all the particulars. Still, it constitutes a 
reasonable assessment of challenges arising under ESDP. 
746 Ibid., at 9. 
747 Ibid., at 10. 
748 Ibid., at 10. 
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The need to have precision-guided munitions rather than unguided munitions like 
cluster munitions at the disposal of ESDP operations was also emphasised during a 2006 
ESDP military capabilities evaluation.749  Therefore, the military utility of cluster bombs for 
future ESDP crisis management operations was expressly doubted while precision and 
restraint seem not only possible but also necessary in order to achieve the political aims of EU 
military operations. 
With regard to NATO PfP operations, the greatest number of Austrian personnel by 
far serving in such an operation is and was KFOR with over 500 Austrian soldiers assigned to 
this mission.750 As of 6 December 2007, KFOR consisted of personnel from 24 NATO 
nations and 10 non-NATO nations.751 The basis of KFOR’s mandate is UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 which includes all necessary means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
deter renewed hostilities, maintain and where necessary enforce a ceasefire.752 Thus, KFOR 
constitutes an application of the enhanced NATO PfP which contemplates peace enforcement 
operations and thus, the use of offensive force. However, in practice, even though the security 
environment was unstable before and after the Kosovo-Albanian declaration of independence, 
KFOR tasks were more akin to a police force countering riots and disturbances rather than to 
military forces in a full-fledged armed conflict.753 
Another application of NATO’s enhanced PfP constitutes the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). Originally, a multinational force was designed as a coalition of the 
                                                 
749 See Council of the European Union, Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf (last visited 22 January 
2010). 
750 As of January 2010, Austrian participation in KFOR was at 422 personnel. See Austrian Ministry of Defence, 
“Foreign Deployments of the Austrian Armed Forces”, January 2010, 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/misc/image_popup/popup.php?strAdresse=/english/introle/images/foreign_deployments.
png&intSeite=1024&intHoehe=768&intMaxSeite=1024&intMaxHoehe=734&blnFremd=0 (last visited 22 
January 2010). 
751 See NATO, “KFOR current situation”, http://www.nato.int/issues/kfor/071206-kfor-situation.pdf (last visited 
22 January 2010). As of 12 October 2009, KFOR consisted of 24 NATO member states and 8 states not member. 
See http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf (last visited 6 October 2009). 
752 Op. para. 9 (a), UN Security Council Res 1244, supra note 527. 
753 For instance, KFOR contingency planning before the declaration of independence included multinational 
training in the area of crowd and riot control with the specific aim to control a violent mob by means of adequate 
force. See, for example, Austrian Ministry of Defence, “Austrian Contingent/KFOR: Operation ‛Problemkind’ ”, 
24 November 2007, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/kfor/artikel.php?id=2196 (last visited 22 January 2010). After 
the declaration of independence, disturbances and riots, especially in the North of Kosovo, occurred, for 
example, in March 2008 when armed clashes between Serbs and UNMIK police as well as KFOR troops flared 
up. See International Crisis Group, “Kosovo’s Fragile Transition”, 25 September 2008, at 1, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/196_kosovos_fragile_transition.pdf (last visited 
22 January 2010). At the beginning of 2009 there was unrest in Mitrovica which led to several members of the 
local population being injured and property destroyed. KFOR was tasked to show a security presence by 
patrolling in the area, setting up observation posts and establishing check points. See, for example, Austrian 
Ministry of Defence, “Österreichische KFOR-Soldaten helfen im Norden des Kosovo”, 20 January 2009, 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/kfor/artikel.php?id=2693 (last visited 22 January 2010).  
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able and willing to provide security in Kabul and surrounding areas under Chapter VII as 
envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement concluded between a number of Afghan 
internal ethnic factions.754 In August 2003, NATO assumed command and control over the 
force, whose mandate was expanded to also cover the entire Afghan territory in October 
2003.755 In October 2006, ISAF’s expansion over the entire territory was complete; however, 
until the present day, a separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition remains on 
the ground.756 Since its inception, ISAF was provided with the robust mandate to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its tasks, which thus again contemplates the possibility of peace 
enforcement.757 As of 5 December 2007, ISAF consisted of 37 troop contributing countries, 
including 25 NATO and 12 non-NATO states.758 Austria, however, in 2007 only contributed 
three staff officers, with the possibility of extending this number to ten service members.759 
Over the past months, ISAF has been operating in a very difficult security environment with 
increased insurgent suicide and stand-off attacks by means of rockets and mortars of an 
asymmetric nature, compelling it to engage in combat operations and augment the size of 
ISAF forces; as a result, the number of civilian casualties was rising.760 However, because of 
the concern to reduce civilian casualties in ISAF combat operations, a French General 
heading operational planning for ISAF was quoted as saying that ISAF did not use cluster 
bombs.761 Thus, also in this multinational military operation, cluster munition use is not an 
option despite the fact that the forces involved are engaged in robust combat. Significantly, 
the United States, a declared opponent of a comprehensive prohibition on cluster munitions, 
                                                 
754 See Op. para. 1, UN Security Council Res 1386, 20 December 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1386. 
755 See Op. paras. 1, 3, UN Security Council Res 1510, 13 October 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1510. 
756 For instance, the recent UN Security Council Resolution 1890 calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close 
consultation with, inter alia, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition. See Op. para. 5, UN Security 
Council Res 1890, 8 October 2009, UN Doc. S/RES/1890. On NATO’s role in Afghanistan, see NATO, 
“NATO’s role in Afghanistan: The evolution of ISAF”, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#evolution (last visited 4 January 2010).   
757 Op. para. 3, UN Security Council Res 1386, supra note 754; Op. para. 4, UN Security Council Res 1510, 
supra note 755. 
758 As of 22 December 2009, ISAF consisted of 43 troop contributing states, 28 NATO member states and 15 
states not member. See http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/troop-contributing-nations-3.html (last visited 25 January 
2010). 
759 As of December 2009, that number remained the same. 
760 Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council, “The situation in 
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”, 22 September 2009, UN Docs. A/64/364, 
S/2009/475, at paras. 29-37. 
761 Daily Times, Pakistan, “NATO holding back full force in Afghanistan”, 7 July 2007, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2007\07\07\story_7-7-2007_pg4_12 (last visited 25 January 
2010). A senior Dutch air force commander also said that his biggest worry during high-risk close support 
missions was causing harm to innocent Afghan civilians and confirmed that the Dutch air force was not using 
cluster munitions in Afghanistan. See M. Dodd , “Dutch pound Taliban positions”, The Australian, 11 December 
2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22903147-2703,00.html (last visited 25 January 
2010). 
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also forms part of ISAF. Consequently, even if the Austrian staff officers participated in 
operational planning, interoperability problems in connection with cluster munition use would 
not arise at the time of the debate in late 2007. 
In a similar vein as with ESDP operations, Austria’s specialisations in NATO PfP 
missions until now did not extend to the planning and the execution of combat missions but 
included mainly training, standardisation in areas of leadership, logistical support and civilian 
emergency planning. Austria’s military cooperation overall until now has focused on the 
lower spectrum of the “Petersberg tasks”, notably peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks. As regards training, Austria hosted a larger PfP training exercise in 2001 where staff 
planning and operations concerning the set up and the securing of check points were 
simulated.762 In respect of standardisation in leadership, Austria has hosted a number of 
courses in that area at the International Operations Command (Kommando für Internationale 
Einsätze) in Graz and Götzendorf.763 Concerning logistical support, Austria, on account of a 
national prohibition of cluster munitions, must for instance not assist another State using 
cluster munitions to transport them for a combat mission. Moreover, Austria would have to 
conduct stricter controls of aircraft in transit, which is important in light of the fact that 
between 1997 and 2002 alone, more than 91.000 flights in transit over Austrian territory, 
transporting foreign personnel and equipment, were undertaken as part of PfP missions.764  
Within the framework of the PfP, Austria is also part of the Planning and Review 
Process which provides a basis for evaluating national military capabilities and their ability to 
effectively conduct peace support operations along the entire spectrum of the “Petersberg” 
tasks together with NATO states, i.e. interoperability. Countries participating in this process 
release information every two years on their defence policies and developments of their armed 
forces in relation to present and future PfP operations. On the basis of this information, 
participating Ministers of Defence issue a Ministerial Guidance which constitutes a political 
directive for country-specific Partnership Goals designed to define concrete objectives for 
purposes of enhanced interoperability between the respective PfP state and NATO 
members.765 Another instrument to enhance interoperability is the Operational Capabilities 
                                                 
762 Austrian Ministry of Defence, “Soldaten aus 20 PfP Nationen üben in Österreich”, 8 September 2001, 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/cms/artikel.php?ID=2011 (last visited 25 January 2010). 
763 Hauser, “Österreich – Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der NATO-Partnerschaft für den Frieden”, supra note 
737. 
764 Ibid. 
765 Ibid. 
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Concept offered to PfP participating countries where in particular the readiness of troops 
announced by those states to conduct PfP operations may be tested.766 
In this context, the Country Defence Rapporteur for Austria at NATO’s International 
Staff, Defence Policy and Planning Division expressed satisfaction with current contributions 
to support UN-, EU- and NATO-led operations. Concerning future Partnership Goals he 
emphasised that additional network-enabled and cyber-defence related capabilities will be 
necessary to keep pace with developments of alliance members.767 Thus, NATO currently 
contents itself with the Austrian above-mentioned focus and specialties shown in PfP 
operations to date which did not include combat operations; the additional capabilities 
mentioned have nothing to do with the use of inaccurate and unreliable area weapons like 
cluster munitions. 
Moreover, just like in the ESDP context, also in the NATO capability planning context 
trends away from unguided weapons like cluster munitions may be discerned. Since capability 
goals within the framework of the PfP serve the purpose of improving interoperability with 
NATO members it is useful to have a look at the capability needs of NATO itself. The major 
initiative in this respect was the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment which identified, 
among other things, the following primary areas: enhancing the number of large transport 
aircraft in Europe; increasing air-to-air refuelling capacity and most importantly, increase 
NATO’s stock of non-U.S., air-delivered precision-guided munitions.768 A report to the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly confirmed these needs and specifies further that future 
multinational military operations will be based on the notion of network enabled capabilities 
and extensive use of high-tech. In this context, it was again emphasised that for the 
development of platform-centric capabilities an increase in the number of precision-guided 
munitions such as guided artillery, mortar shells and air-launched standoff missiles is 
necessary.769 This stands in stark contrast to unguided cluster munitions and moreover, points 
at the search for alternatives to the use of cluster munitions from a military point of view in 
multinational contexts. As regards air-lift capabilities and air-to-air refuelling, there is nothing 
to say against building up these capabilities in principle. However, in a specific context, it 
                                                 
766 Ibid. 
767 Austrian Ministry of Defence, “Die Militärvertretung Brüssel und die NATO-Partnerschaft für den Frieden”, 
Truppendienst, No. 6/2007, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/truppendienst/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=655 (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
768 NATO, “NATO after Prague”, http://www.nato.int/docu/after-prague/html_en/after_prague03.html (last 
visited 25 January 2010). 
769 See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Interoperability: The Need For Transatlantic Harmonisation”, 2006 
Annual Session, Doc. 177 STC 06 E, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1004 (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
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would have to be ensured that these capabilities not be used by a state foregoing the use of 
cluster munitions in favour of a state that may take advantage of these capabilities in order to 
then use or transport cluster munitions. 
With regard to UN operations, the largest contingents of Austrian Armed Forces 
personnel serving abroad were with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF, 373 in September 2007).770 However, neither this operation under UN command 
and control nor other multinational operations within the UN framework where Austria 
participates [UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Truce Supervision 
Organisation (UNTSO) or the Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un référendum 
au Sahara occidental (MINURSO)] were established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
thus, do not provide a mandate for combat operations.  
This review attempted to show that the assumption that prohibiting also assistance to 
cluster munition use or related activities by other state’s military personnel in multinational 
operations would not affect Austria’s continued active participation in these missions. Firstly, 
Austria’s contributions to such operations so far were not in any way related to the planning 
for the use and logistical implementation relating to the use of cluster munitions and secondly, 
at the time of the debates on this draft Austria only participated in operations where there was 
no theoretical or practical prospect that the issue of cluster munition use would even arise. 
Still, this will meet with the objection that Austria has declared its readiness to be prepared to 
participate in multinational military operations where the issue may arise in the future. 
However, it has also been shown that even in possible combat-related international operations 
the possibility of envisaging the use of cluster munitions will diminish, as military capability 
planning in both NATO and EU contexts indicates. This possibility will also diminish in the 
light of criticism voiced against the 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force and the decrease of 
military effectiveness, since sub-munition duds halt or delay the advance of friendly forces, as 
was recognised after the 1991 Operation Desert Storm.771 
On an international level, the example most directly relevant to interoperability 
concerns in relation to cluster munitions is that of anti-personnel mines. These weapons are 
comprehensively prohibited by the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines to 
which 156 states are parties to date, including key allies of the United States like Canada, the 
                                                 
770 As of January 2010, the number of Austrian personnel serving in UNDOF was 383. See Austrian Ministry of 
Defence, “Foreign Deployments of the Austrian Armed Forces”, supra note 750. 
771 See supra p. 34 with references. 
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United Kingdom, Australia, France or Germany.772 Among those states not party to the 
convention is most notably the United States. The Ottawa Convention does not only prohibit 
the use, development, production, stockpiling, retention and transfer of anti-personnel mines 
but under its Article 1 (1) (c) states parties are also prohibited from assisting, encouraging or 
inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party under the 
convention. The broad wording of “in any way” and “anyone” which suggests that the 
potential accomplice may include another state or a group of states makes it clear that these 
prohibitions are generally applicable to joint military operations with states not party to the 
convention, including under the auspices of international organisations. 
That the issue of reconciling the prohibition of assistance under Art. 1 (1) (c) with 
maintaining an active cooperation with states not party to the Ottawa Convention in joint or 
multinational military operations was considered is evidenced both by unilateral interpretative 
declarations by certain states upon ratification or accession as well as by subsequent 
declarations of their official positions on the meaning of prohibited assistance.  For example, 
Canada upon ratification of the Ottawa Convention issued an interpretative declaration which 
reads as follows:  
“[…] in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United Nations 
or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Canadian 
Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in 
combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity 
prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be assistance, encouragement or 
inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in article 1, paragraph 1 (c).”773 
 
This clarifies that “assistance” is not to be interpreted so broadly as to preclude any 
joint military operations with states not party to the convention. Thus, general participation in 
multinational military operations with states not party to the treaty would not suffice for the 
issue of prohibited assistance to arise.  
Specific conduct by the state party must facilitate acts by the state not party which 
would be prohibited to the state party itself to be captured by the prohibition of assistance. 
This requirement of specificity in order to constitute prohibited assistance can also be derived 
from Art. 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility which regulates state responsibility for aid 
                                                 
772 A list of states parties to the Ottawa Convention is available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&chapter=26&lang=en (last 
visited 25 January 2010). 
773 Statement of Understanding made by Canada, quoted in Chief of Defence Staff, Joint Doctrine Manual, “Law 
of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels”, Annex A to Chapter V, “Restrictions on the Use of 
Weapons”, at 5A-1, Annex A, “Main International Treaties on the Law of Armed Conflict Relating to Canada”, 
at A-8, 13 August 2001, http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/Training-formation/LOAC-DDCA_2004-
eng.pdf  (last visited 25 January 2010). Similar declarations were also made by Australia, the Czech Republic, 
and the United Kingdom. See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 101. 
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or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act of another state. For such 
responsibility of the assisting state, Art. 16 requires that the assisting state be aware of the 
circumstances making the conduct of the assisted state internationally wrongful, that the 
assistance must be provided with a view to facilitating the commission of the specific act and 
that the act would have been wrongful if committed by the assisting state itself.774 The 
condition of knowledge of the circumstances making the conduct wrongful as well as the 
clear link required between the assistance and the subsequent conduct by the assisted state 
expressed by the element “with a view to facilitate the commission of the act” illustrate that 
for such specificity to be present, a certain state of mind (knowledge) by the assisting state’s 
personnel and a certain causal proximity between the conduct of the assisting and the assisted 
state is required.775 
 Subsequently, a number of states parties to the Ottawa Convention made their official 
positions known as to which specific activities in connection with joint military operations 
would be captured by prohibited assistance, in other words, where the prohibition of 
assistance would prevail over the interest of military cooperation with states not party. Such 
specific prohibited activities include the participation in the planning and implementation of 
activities related to anti-personnel mine use in joint operations,776 the agreement to rules of 
engagement permitting the use or orders to use anti-personnel mines,777 the drawing of direct 
military benefit from anti-personnel mine use by a state not party to the convention,778 or the 
transit through, stockpiling of, or the authorisation of anti-personnel mines on national 
                                                 
774 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, 149 (2002). 
775 It is acknowledged that Art. 16 only applies to situations where both states involved, the assisting and the 
assisted state, are bound by the international obligation breached by the assisted state. To that extent, Art. 1 (1) 
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776 43 states have declared this to be their position, including Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
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Human Rights Watch, “Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet, A Prohibition On Assistance in a Future Treaty Banning 
Cluster Munitions: The Mine Ban Treaty Experience”, February 2008, 
http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/content/view/full/22877 (last visited 25 January 2010). 
777 This position has been advanced by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See 
ibid. 
778 Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are proponents of this view. See ibid. 
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territory.779 However, the latter prohibitions were interpreted more narrowly by certain states 
parties by stating that certain U.S. anti-personnel mine stockpiles on their territories are not 
under their jurisdiction or control and thus, not covered by the prohibitions.780 
This does pose challenges to interoperability between states parties and not parties to 
the Ottawa Convention. For example, where personnel is embedded in U.S. headquarters and 
performs coalition staff functions the prohibition to participate in the planning of anti-
personnel mine use affects military cooperation.781 The fuelling or refuelling by personnel of 
a state party of United States aircraft without ascertaining whether the aircraft are fitted with 
anti-personnel mines, which would fall under prohibited implementation of activities related 
to anti-personnel use, also hampers the effectiveness of common operations.782 Nor can a 
request from personnel of a state party for fire support (close air support) be addressed to that 
of a state not party without ascertaining that the latter will not use anti-personnel mines.783 
 However, while the balance between the prohibition of assistance in Art. 1 (1) (c) and 
interoperability could have been struck differently, the fact that no explicit treaty language on 
qualifying the prohibition of assistance in favour of interoperability with states not party 
found its way into the Ottawa Convention as adopted can be attributed to a conscious decision 
of the drafters. As the travaux préparatoires to the Ottawa Convention reveal, during 
negotiations the leader of the Ottawa process, Canada, chaired an informal meeting of NATO 
countries where the issue of interoperability was discussed. However, while Canada 
entertained the idea to include specific language on interoperability in the Ottawa Convention, 
states interested in this matter finally settled for the aforementioned solutions to clarify their 
positions through interpretative declarations, largely also due to the fact that the United States 
did not press too hard on this issue. Consequently, the prohibition of assistance remained 
                                                 
779 Ibid. According to Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
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unchanged and also no additional text to incorporate interoperability concerns was 
included.784 Similar scenarios may be conceivable concerning cluster munitions.785 
This review of scenarios caught by the prohibition of assistance shows that had the 
proposed exception been adopted, Austria would have expressly allowed activities in 
multinational military operations in relation to cluster munitions that have been viewed by 
some states as prohibited assistance in the context of antipersonnel mines. The underlying 
assumption may then be that cluster munition use was seen differently from antipersonnel 
mine use in such operations but no reasons for this different treatment were advanced.786 The 
Ottawa Convention experience showed that interoperability problems could be managed by 
unilateral declarations which attempted to clarify the scope of prohibited assistance and 
emphasised that the mere general participation in military cooperation or operations with 
states not party bearing no relation to activities in connection with antipersonnel mines is 
permitted. 
However, this may be open to the objection that multiple unilateral interpretative 
declarations carry the risk of inconsistent interpretations of the prohibition of assistance. 
While this is a valid concern, beyond the specific context, it should also be emphasised that 
interoperability concerns also regularly arise in multinational military operations where one 
troop contributing state has more stringent national or international legal obligations than 
others. For example, during the 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force in Kosovo major 
challenges emerged due to the fact that out of the participating states, while a majority were 
parties to API, the United States, France and Turkey were not. In this respect, it is generally 
known that the United States adopts a broad interpretation of the definition of “military 
target” under Art. 52 (2) API in that it considers it permissible to attack economic targets that 
sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability instead of those objects which effectively 
                                                 
784 Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 100. As we shall see, this was one of the 
significant differences between the negotiations of the Ottawa Convention and the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions analysed below.  
785 For an illustration of various conceivable scenarios, see Australia, Discussion Paper Cluster Munitions and 
Inter-Operability: The Oslo Process Discussion Text and Implications for International Operations,  Wellington 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Discussion-paper-Au-et-al.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010). 
786 Precisely the difference between the two weapons was advanced as an argument for including an express 
provision on interoperability in a cluster munitions treaty while such an express provision was not included in 
the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines. For instance, it was maintained that it was much more 
likely that cluster munitions would be used in conventional battles that are fast-moving or operations that are 
non-conventional or insurgent in nature than anti-personnel mines.  See ibid. 
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contribute to military action.787 As a result, in the initial stages of the bombing campaign, 
significant disagreements arose between the United States and other allied nations as to what 
targets could be permissibly attacked, especially when all the uncontroversial military targets 
had been exhausted and the United States proposed to broaden the list of permissible targets 
to include economic targets such as power stations and the public transportation system.788 In 
order to accommodate these differing legal interpretations, decisions relating to targeting were 
subject to legal review by each contributing NATO member state.789 This also resulted in the 
cancellation of particular bombing sorties.790 Similarly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003, legal differences in assessing legitimate targets resulted in the use of “red cards” where 
coalition partners indicated their disapproval of their involvement in particular operations due 
to their more restrictive interpretations of legitimate targets.791 
Thus, interoperability concerns are not insurmountable although they may entail 
increased operational planning. In this respect, each troop contributing nation is likely to 
present to the coalition different Rules of Engagement (RoE), i.e. directives issued by 
competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which 
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.792 As a 
result, national political authorities should give specific guidance to the personnel sent on 
multinational operations on their state’s obligations with regard to cluster munitions when 
operating alongside other states with no or less stringent obligations in the RoE.793 Military 
lawyers have an important role to play in identifying such differences and providing legal 
advice.794 The joint force commander and planning staff must take legal limitations into 
account and construct the operational plan as to ensure that personnel of a state with more 
                                                 
787 United States Naval War College, Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations, Newport, 1997, at § 8.1.1., http://www.diils.org/file/8/view (last visited 25 January 2010).  
788 However, later NATO’s target lists were in fact broadened as to also include such targets. This has been 
alleged as the main factor why the campaign lost its effectiveness, since this facilitated targeting errors as in the 
case of hitting a trail of Albanian refugees and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. See Kelly, “Military 
Interoperability”, supra note 781, at 163. 
789 Ibid. Also see J. E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for 
Transatlantic Cooperation, 26-29 (2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1391.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010). 
790 Peters, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force, supra note 789, at 28.  
791 Kelly, “Military Interoperability”, supra note 781, at 165. 
792 NATO, “Glossary of Terms and Definitions”, Doc. AAP-6 (2009), at 2-R-10, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2009.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
793 K. Watkin, “Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, 
Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing”, 15 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 281, 
289 (2005). 
794 G. Walsh, “Interoperability of United States and Canadian Armed Forces”, 15 Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law 315, 317 (2005). 
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stringent legal obligations may honour these obligations.795 Also, states with less stringent 
obligations like the United States have sometimes modified their doctrine for multinational 
operations to accommodate differences of their allies.796 
Therefore, the exception under § 3 (3) of this draft legislation was not indispensable 
for the maintenance of Austrian active participation in multinational operations. Finally, the 
addition in the Explanatory Memorandum that “notwithstanding, the firing of cluster 
munitions by a member of an Austrian contingent and the use of Austrian cluster munitions 
within the framework of such military operations abroad shall still be punishable” still 
exacerbated confusion. As was rightly emphasised, on the one hand, Austrian soldiers would 
have been permitted to participate in the logistical implementation of use of cluster munitions 
by another troop contributing nation but on the other, were prohibited from taking the last step 
in such logistical implementation themselves, notably the firing, dropping or launching of 
cluster munitions.797  As we shall see, the debate on interoperability was soon laid to rest in 
the Austrian context. However, this debate is a useful indication of the still more controversial 
discussions and negotiations of this issue in the international context. 
Subsequently, the following new Bill was presented by the governmental parties on 10 
October 2007: 
 
“Government Bill 
 
Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions 
 
Definitions 
 
§ 1.  For purposes of this Federal Act,  
 
1. “cluster munitions” are containers including explosive sub-munitions which are intended to 
disperse these sub-munitions over an area in order to detonate them before, on, or after impact; 
however, this definition shall not comprise flare and smoke ammunitions, pyrotechnical chemicals, 
sensor fused munitions with a capability to engage individual targets or munitions used to set off 
avalanches. 
2.    “procurement” is a transaction by which an Austrian citizen resident in Austria or a legal person,         
partnership or trading company registered in Austria or any other person, partnership or trading 
company that becomes active from within Austria is 
 
a) negotiating a legal transaction that involves the transfer of cluster munitions from a 
third country to another third country, or 
b) arranging such a legal transaction to be accomplished, or 
                                                 
795 Ibid., at 328. 
796 Kelly, “Military Interoperability”, supra note 781, at 168. 
797 Amnesty International Austria & International Fellowship of Reconciliation – Austrian Branch, “Comments 
on a Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions”, No. 11/SN-112/ME XXIII, 17 September 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/ME/ME_00112_11/fnameorig_086540.html (last visited 25 January 
2010) . 
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c) buying or selling cluster munitions if that causes its transfer from a third country to 
another third country, or 
d) arranging a transfer of cluster munitions over which they hold property from a third 
country to another third country. 
 
 
Prohibitions 
 
§ 2. The development, production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of 
cluster munitions are prohibited. 
 
Exceptions 
 
§ 3. The prohibitions laid down under § 2 shall not be applicable to 
 
1. cluster munitions which are envisaged exclusively for training of the Austrian Armed Forces or 
of demining or clearance services; 
2. the import, possession and stockpiling of cluster munitions for purposes of their immediate 
decommissioning or other destruction. 
 
 
 
Destruction 
 
§ 4. Existing stockpiles of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 must be reported to the Federal Ministry of 
Defence within one month after the entry into force of this Federal Act and must be destroyed against 
reimbursement of costs by the Ministry of Defence within a maximum period of three years after the entry into 
force of this Federal Act. 
 
 
Penal Sanctions 
 
§ 5. Anybody who, even if merely negligently, violates § 2 of this Federal Law shall be punished by a court of 
law either with a prison sentence of up to two years or with a fine of up to 360 daily rates [Tagessätze], provided 
that the act is not subject to more severe punishment under another federal law. 
 
Seizure and Forfeiture 
 
§ 6. (1) Cluster munitions used to commit an act punishable under § 5 shall be seized by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 can be declared forfeit by 
a court of law. At the expense of the owner, it must be ensured that they can no longer be used in violation of the 
prohibitions laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the prohibitions laid down in § 2 can be declared forfeit by a court 
of law.  
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation [Bund]. Items seized 
according to para. 1 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation and are to be reported to the Federal Ministry 
of Defence for destruction pursuant to § 4. 
 
 
 
Execution 
 
§ 7. This Federal Act shall be executed by 
 
1. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3, 
2. the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 4, 
3. the Federal Minister of Justice with regard to § 5 and § 6 paras. 1 to 3, 
4. the Federal Minister of Justice and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 6 para. 4, 
5. the Federal Minister of the Interior with regard to the remaining provisions. 
 
Entry into Force 
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§ 8. This Federal Act shall enter into force on 1 December 2007.”798 
 
 
 
 
“Explanatory Memorandum 
 
II. Special Part 
 
 
On § 1: 
 
The definition of cluster munitions does not comprise flare or smoke ammunitions, pyrotechnical chemicals, 
sensor fused munitions with a capability to engage individual targets and munitions used to set off avalanches. 
The use of these types of munitions does not give rise to the same humanitarian concerns associated with cluster 
munitions, including the wide area effect and the presence of duds dangerous for civilians. Thus, they shall not 
be covered by this Federal Act. 
 
 
On § 2: 
 
The prohibition forms the core content of this draft law. As already observed in the General Part of the 
Explanatory Memorandum, cluster munitions may have an effect equal to that of antipersonnel mines. It was 
therefore appropriate to model draft § 2 after the prohibition contained in the Federal Law on the Prohibition of 
Antipersonnel Mines. The provision as currently drafted is however wider in scope insofar as also the 
development of cluster munitions is prohibited. 
 
 
On § 3: 
 
The term “decommissioning” means the dismantling of the munitions into harmless single components. 
 
 
On § 4: 
 
The duties of reporting and destruction shall not extend to cluster munitions exempted from the prohibitions 
pursuant to § 3. 
 
The existing cluster munition stockpiles of the Austrian Armed Forces shall be destroyed by the Federal Ministry 
of Defence at their own expense; the Federal Ministry of Defence is to be reimbursed for any destruction costs of 
stockpiles, if any, which have to be transferred to the Ministry by domestic arms manufacturers. ”799 
 
At the outset, it is to be observed that this was the draft that was to serve as a basis for 
further parliamentary deliberations.  
                                                 
798 Government Bill, Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, No. 232 of the Supplements to the 
Stenographic Protocols of the Austrian National Council XXIII. GP, 10 October 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/I/I_00232/fnameorig_087959.html (last visited 
25 January 2010). 
799 Government Bill, Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, No. 232 of the Supplements to the 
Stenographic Protocols of the Austrian National Council, Explanatory Materials, XXIII. GP, 10 October 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/I/I_00232/fname_087961.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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In comparison to the draft initially submitted by the Ministry of European and 
International Affairs, this government-backed initiative on a Federal Law on the Prohibition 
of Cluster Munitions contained several improvements.  
Most fundamentally, the exception contained under § 3 (3) under the earlier Bill for 
Austrian personnel sent to multinational prohibitions abroad under the KSE-BVG no longer 
formed part of the exceptions under § 3. As we shall see, on the international level the issue of 
interoperability was not to be solved so smoothly during the negotiations of the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions in Dublin. Moreover, the exception from the definition for cluster 
munitions “with sub-munitions falling under other already existing international law 
prohibitions or restrictions” could no longer be found in the Bill 
However, as for the definition, one weakness became apparent with the circulation by 
the CMC experts of their draft definition of what should be prohibited as cluster munitions in 
a future Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to that proposed definition, a cluster 
munition was “a weapon comprising multiple explosive sub-munitions which are dispensed 
from a container.”800 Compared with the Austrian draft law, the focus of the proposed CMC 
definition was more on the explosive sub-munitions rather than on the container from which 
they are dispensed. This approach had the merit of taking into account that it is the explosive 
sub-munitions finally inflicting civilian harm, not the container.  
Another weakness was that the draft retained a broad exemption for “sensor fused 
munitions with a capability to engage individual targets” from the prohibition without 
providing any further detailed justification why it was necessary and if yes, why it was valid 
for “sensor fused weapons” as a broad category.  
This broad exception set in motion a fruitful exchange between CMC-Austria and their 
civil society colleagues. As a result of these exchanges, CMC-Austria expressed its political 
concerns shared by the other CMC members with regard to an exception on all sensor-fused 
munitions across the board to the Austrian government. Such exception could set a negative 
precedent for other states participating in the Oslo process, since it could actually pre-empt a 
possible stronger wording on sensor-fused munitions in a future cluster munition ban treaty. 
 These concerns were not unfounded, since the Australian government, a participant in 
the Oslo process, on 3 October 2007 announced that it had spent 14 Mio. Australian dollars 
on the acquisition of a new round of the German “SMArt 155” and thus had set a negative 
                                                 
800 Cluster Munition Coalition, “Definition for the Future Cluster Munition Convention”, October 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/News/October2007News/Oct16CMCdefinition.html (last 
visited 25 January 2010). Moreover, an “explosive submunition” was defined as “a munition designed to be 
dispensed in multiple quantities from a container and to detonate prior to, on, or after impact.” 
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precedent.801 This move by the Australian Ministry of Defence was fiercely criticised in a 
press release by Austcare, an Australian CMC member organisation stating that at a time 
while the precise definition of cluster munitions was being discussed in the Oslo process the 
Australian government should not have acquired the SMArt 155.802  
Furthermore, in the notes on the draft definition proposed by the CMC it was 
emphasised that “with this definition there is no exception for, inter alia, sensor-fused 
munitions although it recognises that some states believe certain weapons do not cause 
unacceptable harm [the wording used in the Final Declaration of the Oslo Conference on 
Cluster Munitions] to civilians. However, too little is known about these weapons and their 
effects to warrant a blanket exception in the convention at this time. The CMC believes that 
the burden of proof is on governments to demonstrate otherwise.”803  
CMC-Austria soon learned that due to the busy parliamentary schedule debate on the 
draft in the Foreign Affairs Committee would only take place on 27 November. This meant 
that the legislation could only be enacted at the beginning of December 2007. Importantly, 
this would coincide with the Third Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in the Oslo 
Process from 5-7 December 2007 hosted by Austria in Vienna. Since the intention was to 
announce the enactment of legislation on the prohibition on cluster munitions at the Vienna 
Conference on Cluster Munitions to give a positive impetus to the conference, there was a 
chance that the Austrian government would be responsive to arguments that an ambitious 
outcome on the sensor fused weapon issue could be undermined at that stage. 
Before the decisive debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee, CMC-Austria drafted a 
letter addressed to all MPs of the Committee and held a press conference in which CMC-
Austria advocated the clear position that a comprehensive definition of cluster munitions 
should also include sensor-fused munitions and that the exception then provided for in the Bill 
be struck out. This position was substantiated with the argument that due to the uncertainties 
currently involved with sensor-fused munitions the case had not been made for excluding 
these weapons from a comprehensive national prohibition. CMC-Austria also emphasised the 
strengths of the current draft at length, especially the absence of any exception from the 
definition of cluster munitions for sub-munitions with self-destruct mechanisms or a specific 
failure rate and the short deadline of three years for the destruction of existing stockpiles. In 
                                                 
801 Australia, Department of Defence, “Defence Purchases New Anti-Tank Artillery Round”, Defence Media 
Release CPA 346/07, 3 October 2007, http://www.defence.gov.au/media/2007/34607.doc (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
802 Austcare, “Austcare Calls for Australian Leadership to Ban Clusters”, Media Release, 8 October 2007, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/austcare/11918050001.htm (last visited 25 January 2010).  
803 Cluster Munition Coalition, “Cluster Munition Draft Definition”, supra note 800. 
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its appeal for support of the proposed legislation, CMC-Austria underlined the significance of 
the legislation to be passed early by stating that it could establish Austria in a lasting manner 
as a standard-setting example internationally. A positive vote on the Bill was not about 
individual, political party, government or NGO interests but about a common signal of 
humanity in the lead-up to the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions from 5 to 7 
December. 
On 27 November, the government Bill on a Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster 
Munitions was debated and voted upon by the MPs of the Foreign Affairs Committee. During 
debate, ÖVP, SPÖ and Green Party MPs introduced the following amendment request: 
 
“On (1) concerning § 1 (1): 
The exception for certain sensor-fused munitions originally provided for shall be dispensed with to 
expand the humanitarian scope of this Law. [italics by the author] 
 
On (2): 
The offence of procurement shall also be applicable to Austrian citizens with no residence in Austria. 
 
On (3) concerning § 8: 
The government initiative provides for 1 Dec. 2007 as the date of entry into force. Due to the 
parliamentary schedule [debate in the plenary could not take place before 6 Dec. 2007] this would entail 
a retroactive entry into force which would not be permissible in view of the penal provisions contained 
in the Act. As a consequence of this amendment this Act may enter into force as promptly as 
possible.”804 
 
Two separate final votes were conducted. One was on the Federal Act without the 
amendments requested. This vote was unanimous. The other one was a separate vote on the 
amended version of the Federal Act taking into account the amendment request. On this, there 
was an absolute majority through the positive votes of SPÖ, ÖVP and Green Party MPs with 
the minority of FPÖ and BZÖ MPs voting against. FPÖ and BZÖ MPs voted against the 
amendment precisely because they could not support an elimination of the sensor-fused 
exception. In their view, the retention of these high-technology state-of-the-art munitions was 
indispensable for developing future military capabilities of the Austrian Armed Forces. 
Thus, the final result of the vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Council read as follows: 
“Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions 
 
The National Council has decided: 
 
                                                 
804 Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Federal Council on the government Bill: Federal Act 
on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions (No. 232 of Supplements), No. 350 of the Supplements to the 
Stenographic Protocols of the National Council XXIII.GP, 27 November 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/I/I_00350/fnameorig_093084.html  (last visited 
25 January 2010). 
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Definitions 
 
§ 1. For purposes of this Federal Act,  
 
1. “cluster munitions” are containers including explosive submunitions which are intended to disperse 
these submunitions over an area in order to detonate them before, on, or after impact; however, this 
definition shall not comprise flare and smoke ammunitions, pyrotechnical chemicals or munitions 
used to set off avalanches. 
2.    “procurement” is a transaction by which an Austrian citizen or a legal person, partnership or trading 
company registered in Austria or any other person, partnership or trading company that becomes 
active from within Austria is 
 
a) negotiating a legal transaction that involves the transfer of cluster munitions from a third 
country to another third country, or 
b) arranging such a legal transaction to be accomplished, or 
c) buying or selling cluster munitions if that causes its transfer from a third country to 
another third country, or 
d) arranging a transfer of cluster munitions over which they hold property from a third 
country to another third country. 
 
Prohibitions 
 
§ 2. The development, production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of 
cluster munitions are prohibited. 
 
Exceptions 
 
§ 3. The prohibitions laid down under § 2 shall not be applicable to 
 
1. cluster munitions which are envisaged exclusively for training of the Austrian Armed Forces or 
of demining or clearance services; 
2. the import, possession and stockpiling of cluster munitions for purposes of their immediate 
decommissioning or other destruction. 
 
 
Destruction 
 
§ 4. Existing supplies of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 must be reported to the Federal Ministry of 
Defence within one month after the entry into force of this Federal Act and must be destroyed against 
reimbursement of costs by the Ministry of Defence within a maximum period of three years after the entry into 
force of this Federal Act. 
 
Penal Sanctions 
 
§ 5. Anybody who, even if merely negligently, violates § 2 of this Federal Law shall be punished by a court of 
law either with a prison sentence of up to two years or with a fine of up to 360 daily rates [Tagessätze], provided 
that the act is not subject to more severe punishment under other federal laws. 
 
Seizure and Forfeiture 
 
§ 6. (1) Cluster munitions used to commit an act punishable under § 5 shall be seized by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 can be declared forfeit by 
a court of law. At the expense of the owner, it must be ensured that they can no longer be used in violation of the 
prohibitions laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the prohibitions laid down in § 2 can be declared forfeit by a court 
of law.  
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation [Bund]. Items 
confiscated according to para. 1 shall pass to the ownership of the Federation and are to be reported to the 
Federal Ministry of Defence for destruction pursuant to § 4. 
 
Execution 
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§ 7. This Federal Act shall be executed by 
 
2. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3, 
3. the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 4, 
4. the Federal Minister of Justice with regard to § 5 and § 6 paras. 1 to 3, 
5. the Federal Minister of Justice and the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 6 para. 4, 
6. the Federal Minister of the Interior with regard to the remaining provisions. 
 
 
 
 
Entry into Force 
 
§ 8. This Federal Act shall enter into force upon expiry of the day of publication in the Austrian Federal 
Gazette.”805 
 
Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously adopted the following decisions for 
the parliamentary record: 
 
“The Foreign Affairs Committee assumes  
• that the definition of the territorial and personal scope in § 1 comprises all relevant facts with a 
sufficient link to Austria in the sense of the territoriality principle under penal law including duty free 
bonded warehouses [German: Zollfreilager]; 
• that the exception for training of the Austrian Armed Forces under § 3 (1) does not aim at or include 
training in the use of prohibited munitions; 
• that the Federal Government will submit a report to the National Council especially on the destruction 
of existing stockpiles pursuant to § 4, on criminal law proceedings pursuant to §§ 5 and 6, and on 
progress on efforts to achieve an international law prohibition on cluster munitions by the end of three 
years after the entry into force of this Federal Act. 
 
As a result of its deliberations, the Foreign Affairs Committee thus requests that the National Council [in 
plenary session] give its assent to the enclosed Bill according to the constitution.” 806 
 
 
Thus, a Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions without any exception 
giving rise to humanitarian concerns, especially a definition of cluster munitions without any 
exception for sensor-fused munitions as an entire category, had almost become a reality. In 
comparing the Bill with that submitted to the plenary of the National Council, it also 
contained a broader scope of the active personality principle with procurement since it also 
applied to Austrian citizens with no residence in Austria. The amendment to § 8 on entry into 
force was also reasonable in light of the fundamental general principle of criminal law of the 
                                                 
805 Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, No. 350 of Supplements XXIII. GP, Committee Report 
National Council, Text of Legislation, 27 November 2007, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/PG/DE/XXIII/I/I_00350/fnameorig_093085.html (last visited 
25 January 2010). 
806 See Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, supra note 804. 
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prohibition of retroactivity.807 The decision on interpreting the territorial and personal scope 
in § 1 as covering all relevant facts with a sufficient link to Austria not only ensures that a 
dangerous loophole with duty free bonded warehouses will not arise but also places the 
provision squarely within the accepted notion of a “genuine link” as jurisdictional principle of 
international law.808 Further, the determination that the retention of a certain number of 
cluster munitions by the Austrian Armed Forces shall not include the training in the use of 
such munitions was an important clarification; this shed light on the fundamental rationale of 
this exception, notably that Austrian Armed Forces and clearance specialists in the Ministry 
of the Interior in principle have the possibility to be trained to live up to clearance tasks they 
might be confronted with when participating in future peacekeeping missions.809 
Finally, the reporting duties of the Austrian government to the National Council on 
stockpile destruction and criminal proceedings ensure adequate parliamentary control over the 
execution of this Act. 
 This Bill accepted by the Foreign Affairs Committee enabled the Minister of European 
and International Affairs to give the positive impetus to the Vienna Conference on Cluster 
Munitions the government so greatly desired. In her welcome address to the Vienna 
Conference on Cluster Munitions on 5 December 2007, Minister Plassnik stated:  
 
“[…] I am proud to inform you that the Austrian Parliament will adopt tomorrow a national law that bans the 
possession, use, production, development and transfer of cluster munitions. Once this law is in force, all types of 
cluster munitions will be illegal, including so-called “intelligent” sensor-fused munitions. We hope that this law 
will become a trend setter and we stand ready to assist other States in their own legislative efforts.”810 
 
On 6 December the Bill assented to by the Foreign Affairs Committee was voted upon 
in the plenary of the National Council. The Bill was subjected to the same differentiated vote 
as in the Foreign Affairs Committee, with § 1 on the definition of cluster munitions being 
voted on separately and adopted by SPÖ/ÖVP/Green Party majority, with the BZÖ and the 
                                                 
807 Compare, e.g., § 1 of the Austrian Penal Code which reads as follows: “A sentence or a preventive measure 
may only be imposed in respect of such criminal act for which an explicit sentence is provided and which was 
already punishable at the time of its commission.” 
808 For the notion of “genuine link” see supra note 456 (containing an explanatory comment on the Nottebohm 
case.  
809 As mentioned supra, in the anti-personnel mine context, Austria has never retained any mines for training or 
development of countermeasures, i.e. measures to defend against cluster munition attacks, despite the legal 
possibility to do so both in the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the 1997 Federal Act on the Prohibition of Anti-
Personnel Mines. In the meantime, at the Berlin Conference on Stockpile Destruction Austria stated on 25 June 
2009 that neither would it retain any cluster munitions for training or research purposes. 
810 Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, Statement by Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Minister for European and 
International Affairs, 5 December 2007, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/index.php?id=62146&L=0 (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
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FPÖ voting against, and the rest of the Bill agreed upon unanimously. The final hurdle with 
regard to securing parliamentary support occurred with the debates on the Bill in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the plenary of the Federal Council, the second Austrian parliamentary 
chamber representing the interests of the provinces, on 18 and 20 December, respectively.811 
On 18 December, the Foreign Affairs Committee, once again with the votes of the SPÖ, ÖVP 
and the Green Party, submitted the request to the plenary to raise no objection to the Bill as 
enacted by the National Council and on 20 December, the plenary of the Federal Council 
followed suit. 
The Federal Act was published in the Federal Law Gazette on 7 January 2008 and 
thus, entered into force as the new Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions on 8 
January 2008.812 Austria then had the most stringent national prohibition of cluster munitions 
in place in the world. The Federal Act was only the second of its kind after Belgium adopted 
legislation banning cluster munitions in 2006. However, the Belgian legislation included an 
exemption from the prohibition of cluster munitions for certain kinds of sensor-fused 
weapons.813 The omission of any exclusion for all or certain types of sensor-fused weapons 
from the definition of cluster munitions could be viewed at the time as reflecting a 
precautionary approach both in terms of substance as well as in terms of political process. As 
for substance, it may be argued that no field-based evidence according to which sensor-fused 
munitions did not possess the characteristics giving rise to the same humanitarian concerns as 
those sub-munition based weapon systems acknowledged as cluster munitions could be 
provided. Thus, erring on the side of caution seemed to be a rational strategy already from a 
                                                 
811 Involvement of the Federal Council [Bundesrat] in the adoption of federal legislation is regulated by Art. 42 
of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG) which reads as follows: (2) Save as otherwise provided by 
constitutional law, an enactment can be authenticated and published only if the Federal Council has not raised a 
reasoned objection to this enactment. (3) This objection must be conveyed to the National Council in writing by 
the Chairman of the Federal Council within eight weeks of the enactment’s arrival; the Federal Chancellor shall 
be informed thereof. (4) If the National Council in the presence of at least half of its members once more carries 
its original resolution, this shall be authenticated and published. If the Federal Council resolves not to raise any 
objection or if no reasoned objection is raised within the deadline laid down in para. 3 above, the enactment shall 
be authenticated and published. For an English translation see supra note 681. 
812 Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, Federal Law Gazette BGBl I, No. 12/2008, entry into 
force 8 January 2008, http://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2008_I_12/BGBLA_2008_I_12.pdf  
(last visited 25 January 2010). 
813 See Moniteur Belge, Loi réglant des activités économiques et individuelles avec des armes, 8 June 2006, pp. 
29839-29868, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/api2.pl?lg=fr&pd=2006-06-09&numac=2006009449 (last 
visited 25 January 2010). Art. 2 (4) on the definition of sub-munitions reads in the French original: “les sous-
munitions”: “toute munition qui, pour remplir sa function, se sépare d´une munition mère. Cela recouvre toutes 
les munitions ou charges explosives conçues pour exploser à un moment donné après avoir éte lancées ou 
éjectées d´une munition à dispersion mère, à l´exception: […] – des dispositifs qui contiennent plusieurs 
munitions uniquement destines à percer et détruire des engines blindés, qui ne sont utilisables qu´à cette fin sans 
possibilité de saturer indistinctement des zones de combat, notamment par le contrôle obligatoire de leur 
trajectoire et de leur destination, et qui, le cas échéant, ne peuvent exploser du fait du contact, de la presence ou 
de la proximité d´une personne”. 
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substantive point of view. With regard to political process, considerations as to not hamper 
efforts at a comprehensive definition on the international level weighed heavily on the mind 
of the majority of the MPs and the government and most likely had a great influence on 
finally adopting the legislation without any exclusion for sensor fused weapons.  
Related to such considerations was the need to maintain a close and constructive 
cooperation with the CMC which would have arguably been jeopardised had Austria decided 
to retain a broad exclusion for sensor fused munitions in its national legislation. We shall see 
that this approach was to be modified subsequently as a result of the definition of prohibited 
cluster munitions adopted in the new Convention on Cluster Munitions, which again 
demonstrates how closely intertwined the national and international political levels were in 
efforts to specifically prohibit cluster munitions. 
All other possible types of cluster munitions were equally prohibited. In particular, 
there were no exceptions for sub-munitions with self-destruct, self-deactivation or self-
neutralising mechanisms, sub-munitions based on a specific failure (reliability) rate, so-called 
“direct fire” sub-munitions or cluster munitions containing ten or fewer sub-munitions. 
However, the definition as finally adopted was still not entirely satisfactory, since – regardless 
of whether or not this result was intended – the emphasis on what was prohibited was still 
more on the container than on the individual explosive sub-munitions that actually inflict 
civilian suffering.  
This general shortcoming notwithstanding, a wide variety of activities in connection 
with the weapons thus defined were prohibited, notably the development, production, 
acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession. In this respect, the 
inclusion of a prohibition of development of cluster munitions broadened the scope of the 
prohibitions in comparison to the 1997 Federal Act on Antipersonnel Mines. The prohibitions 
also extended to the transit of cluster munitions through Austria, ensuring that the Austrian 
territory can no longer be used in any way for the proliferation of these weapons. Since 
“possession” of cluster munitions was banned, also the stockpiling of cluster munitions can be 
considered to be covered by the ban. Still, this could have been made more explicit in the law, 
as “stockpiling” should have been enumerated as a separate prohibition under § 2.   
This would have also been justified for systematic reasons, since § 3 (2) provides for 
an exception to the prohibition that literally extends to “stockpiling” besides “possession”.814  
                                                 
814 However, on this point, the Federal Act on Cluster Munitions follows the inconsistency of the Federal Act on 
the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines which among the general prohibitions also only includes “possession” 
under § 2 but “possession” and “stockpiling” under § 3 (2) that equally provides for an exception from these 
 
 242
Another issue worthy of comment is that no specific prohibition on “assistance” was 
inserted among the prohibitions under § 2. Generally, this seemed to be legitimate, since it is 
already clear by virtue of § 12 of the Austrian Penal Code that assistance, encouragement and 
inducement to any specifically criminalised conduct is prohibited.  
However, it would have been desirable to include a specific prohibition on assistance 
especially with regard to any financing by Austrian natural or legal persons of foreign cluster 
munition producers. In this regard, it remains debatable if such actions would fall under the 
specific criminal prohibitions of the Federal Act in connection with § 12 of the Austrian Penal 
Code. This is because a prohibited “assistance” pursuant to this provision requires that the 
principal perpetrator has engaged in criminally punishable conduct to which the conduct by 
the accomplice made a causal contribution. The prohibited “assistance” is thus at least to a 
limited extent accessory, i.e. dependent, on the realisation of the actus reus (objective 
element) of a punishable attempt by the principal perpetrator.815 Since the principal 
perpetrator, i.e. the producer company, will likely be registered abroad and production will 
also take place abroad the question arises whether Austria would have criminal jurisdiction 
over the principal perpetrator at all.  
As for the Federal Act, the only specific statement as to its jurisdictional scope may be 
made with respect to the clarification adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee that the 
definition of the territorial and personal scope in § 1 comprises all relevant facts with a 
sufficient link to Austria in the sense of the territoriality principle. However, this clarification 
was only adopted for the specific crime of “procurement” of cluster munitions which requires 
specific acts in relation to a transfer of cluster munitions. It is submitted that the financing of 
cluster munition producers will not be specific enough as to fall under this specific 
prohibition. Therefore, the general provisions on the ambit of Austrian criminal jurisdiction in 
cases where there is a foreign link must be resorted to under §§ 64, 65 of the Austrian Penal 
Code. Besides the specific crimes enumerated, under § 64 (1) (8) of the Austrian Penal Code 
an assistance to a criminally punishable conduct only falls under Austrian criminal 
jurisdiction if the principal perpetrator committed the crime in Austria. Thus, this regulates 
the reverse case, i.e. where a foreigner engages in conduct abroad constituting assistance to a 
crime committed in Austria.  
                                                                                                                                                        
prohibitions for purposes of decommissioning or destruction. Compare Federal Act on the Prohibition of Anti-
Personnel Mines, supra note 725. 
815 E. E. Fabrizy, Strafgesetzbuch: Kurzkommentar, 70, 73-74 (9th ed., 2006). 
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Further, § 64 (1) (6) of the Austrian Penal Code provides for Austrian criminal 
jurisdiction in respect of crimes to whose prosecution Austria is obliged, even if they were 
committed abroad and irrespective of the criminal law of the locus delicti. This is nothing else 
but the Austrian reference to international treaties to which Austria is a party and which bind 
states parties to provide for universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of crimes laid down in 
such a treaty. However, since the subsequently adopted Convention on Cluster Munitions did 
not foresee universal jurisdiction for prosecution of criminal acts in relation to cluster 
munitions, this provision also does not provide an adequate jurisdictional basis for Austrian 
prosecution of the principal crime of production of cluster munitions by foreigners abroad.816 
On the other hand, if financing of foreign companies producing cluster munitions 
abroad fell outside the reach of Austrian criminal jurisdiction, it may be asked why it was 
considered necessary in the first place to enshrine the exception under § 3 (3) in the earlier 
draft Bill which would have exempted the participation in the decision on the use of cluster 
munitions by other states or the logistical implementation of such use for multinational 
military operations. After all, the Explanatory Memorandum on this draft provision stated that 
this exception was designed to prevent Austrian personnel in multinational military operations 
from falling under the penal provisions of this Act. Both participation in the decision on the 
use and logistical implementation of such use are typical acts of assistance and the principal 
perpetrators, the users, will be foreign nationals operating abroad. This demonstrates that this 
exception and the rationale for it only make sense if it were acknowledged that an assistance 
to anyone anywhere was capable of falling under the penal provisions of the Federal Act.  
In any event, since criminal law requires a particular amount of clarity due to the 
general criminal law principle of nullum crimen sine lege already for that reason it would 
have been desirable to clarify in this legislation that assistance to any of these activities 
specifically included financing of foreign companies producing cluster munitions even if 
these foreign companies operate abroad. Moreover, the Belgian legislation prohibiting cluster 
                                                 
816 Both the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions do not provide for 
compulsory universal jurisdiction. This may be deduced from the respective Arts. 9 of both treaties which  oblige 
states parties to take all appropriate measures, including penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any prohibited 
activity by persons  or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. For the Ottawa Convention, the drafting 
debates reveal in this regard that attempts to include a regime of universal jurisdiction were ultimately rejected. 
See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 255-259. For the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions it is instructive to note Norway’s statement on the general scope of application of the Convention 
made at the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions that it “is also important to underline that draft article 9 
deals with sanctions under national law, and we are not here creating a new category of international crimes or 
universal jurisdiction […].” See Norway, “Statement on general scope and obligations in relation to 
interoperability”, 18 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/Norway-general-obligations-statement.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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munitions subsequently inserted an explicit prohibition of financing either Belgian or foreign 
companies which engage in the production, use, repair, exposition for sale, the sale, the 
distribution, the import, export, stockpiling or transport of inter alia cluster munitions.817 
Further positive aspects of the Federal Law included the additional interpretative 
statement made in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council that the exception 
contained in § 3 (1) for training purposes of the armed forces shall not mean training in the 
use of cluster munitions. In the final version, there was also no exception on interoperability 
for Austrian personnel sent on multinational military missions. Thus, especially no activities 
which may assist other coalition service members in the use, transport, stockpiling etc. of 
cluster munitions may be undertaken by Austrian service members. The deadline for 
destroying the existing stockpiles of the Austrian Armed Forces is only three years.  
Finally, an adequate follow-up to governmental implementation was entrenched with a 
duty of the government to report on stockpile destruction, criminal proceedings in relation to 
the legislation and the Oslo process after the expiry of the deadline of three years.  
Altogether, the adoption of the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions 
accomplished its main purpose to entrench Austria as a trend-setter on the prohibition of 
cluster munitions in the Oslo process. The discussions in its run-up can also be seen as a 
prelude to the international negotiations on the new Convention on Cluster Munitions several 
months later, since many issues that arose in the national context were also subject to intense 
                                                 
817 Art. 8 of the Belgian legislation reads in its original version: “Nul ne peut fabriquer, réparer, exposer en 
vente, vendre, céder ou transporter des armes prohibées, en tenir en dépôt, en détenir ou en être porteur.  […]Est 
également interdit le financement d'une entreprise de droit belge ou de droit étranger dont l'activité consiste en la 
fabrication, l'utilisation, la réparation, l'exposition en vente, la vente, la distribution, l'importation ou 
l'exportation, l'entreposage ou le transport de mines antipersonnel et/ou de sous-munitions au sens de la présente 
loi en vue de leur propagation. 
A cette fin, le Roi publiera, au plus tard le premier jour du treizième mois suivant le mois de la publication de la 
loi, une liste publique 
i) des entreprises dont il a été démontré qu'elles exercent l'une des activités visées à l'alinéa précédent ; 
ii) des entreprises actionnaires à plus de 50 % d'une entreprise au point i) ; 
iii) des organismes de placement collectif détenteurs d'instruments financiers d'une entreprise aux points i) et ii). 
Il fixera également les modalités de publication de cette liste. 
Par financement d'une entreprise figurant dans cette liste, on entend toutes les formes de soutien financier, à 
savoir les crédits et les garanties bancaires, ainsi que l'acquisition pour compte propre d'instruments financiers 
émis par cette entreprise. 
Lorsqu'un financement a déjà été accordé à une entreprise figurant dans la liste, ce financement doit être 
complètement interrompu pour autant que cela soit contractuellement possible. 
Cette interdiction ne s'applique pas aux organismes de placement dont la politique d'investissement, 
conformément à leurs statuts ou à leurs règlements de gestion, a pour objet de suivre la composition d'un indice 
d'actions ou d'obligations déterminé. 
L'interdiction de financement ne s'applique pas non plus aux projets bien déterminés d'une entreprise figurant 
dans cette liste, pour autant que le financement ne vise aucune des activités mentionnées dans cet article. 
L'entreprise est tenue de confirmer ceci dans une déclaration écrite.” See Belgium, Loi interdisant le financement 
de la fabrication, de l´utilisation ou de la detention de mines antipersonnel et de sous-munitions, 26 April 2007, 
http://reflex.raadvst-consetat.be/reflex/pdf/Mbbs/2007/04/26/104281.pdf  (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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debate and negotiations on the international level. The analysis of the evolution of the 
Austrian position also reveals that even small and middle-sized states needed to be convinced 
to adopt a primarily humanitarian stance in respect of cluster munitions. For such an evolution 
to take place, credible and reliable evidence on the part of civil society, in this case 
AAMV/CMC-Austria, was necessary to shape government positions. In the next chapter, the 
history of the Oslo process where such dynamics could be observed on a larger scale shall be 
reviewed before proceeding to an analysis of the new Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
 
5.2.  The Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions 
5.2.1. The Third Review Conference of the CCW and Norway’s Announcement 
to Lead a New Diplomatic Process 
 
“It would certainly be desirable to introduce a broad prohibition or restriction of use of fragmentation weapons, 
which typically are employed against a very large area, with the substantial risk for indiscriminate effects that 
such use entails. The formulation of such a broad rule raises great difficulties. A specific ban on use is less 
difficult to devise in regard to one type of fragmentation weapons, namely, those which are constructed in the 
form of a cluster of bomblets and which are primarly [sic!] suited for use against personnel. These anti-
personnel fragmentation weapons tend to have both indiscriminate effects and to cause unnecessary suffering. At 
detonation a vast number of small fragments or pellets are dispersed, evenly covering a large area with a high 
degree of hit probability for any person in the area. The effects of such a detonation on unprotected persons – 
military or civilian – in the comparatively large target area is almost certain to be severe with multiple injuries 
caused by many tiny fragments. Multiple injuries considerably raise the level of pain and suffering. They often 
call for prolonged and difficult medical treatment and the cumulative effect of the many injuries increases the 
mortality risk. It is queried whether the military value of these weapons is so great as to justify the suffering they 
cause. […] The following draft rule is submitted for examination: “Cluster warheads with bomblets which act 
through the ejection of a great number of small calibred fragments or pellets are prohibited for use.”818 
 
This proposal was not submitted recently but already in 1974 on the initiative of 
Sweden when the first in a series of diplomatic conferences leading to the adoption of the two 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1980 CCW were convened. 
The proposal remained on the table at yet another meeting of governmental experts in Lugano 
in 1976. 
The triggering event for this initiative was undoubtedly the excessive use of cluster 
munitions by the United States on the battlefields in South-East Asia. It has already been 
mentioned above that this effort at prohibiting at least certain cluster munitions ultimately did 
not succeed.819 One reason for the failure of this initiative was certainly that NATO states, 
especially the United States and the United Kingdom, came prepared with military experts 
who emphasised the military utility (as opposed to military necessity) and downplayed the 
                                                 
818 Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland & Yugoslavia, Working Paper, Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 21 
February 1974, UN Doc. CDDH/DT/2, at 8-9. 
819 See supra, p. 31. 
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humanitarian concerns of cluster munitions. If anything, these humanitarian concerns could be 
accommodated by incorporating technological improvements in new cluster munition types. 
A specific example already given above was that of the UK military expert who praised the 
military effectiveness of the then newly-developed BL755 cluster munition and made 
technical remarks as to how the dispersal pattern would be reduced and the fusing 
improved.820 Another example was the statement by another expert who said that the danger 
that civilians faced when a military target was situated in their vicinity due to the wide area 
effect of cluster munitions could be avoided as even light shelters would offer protection to 
any civilians near the target.821  
Moreover, no agreement could be found on whether the aspect of fragmentation in 
cluster munitions with the potential to inflict multiple wounds would result in more or less 
suffering than other conventional weapons. 822 These statements could prevail, since the ban 
advocate camp was not sufficiently equipped to counter them on the basis of its own 
evidence. In particular, there was a lack of reliable field evidence portraying the human 
suffering caused by cluster munitions. A factor that certainly contributed to this lack of field 
evidence was that states that were most affected by previous cluster munitions, Laos and 
Cambodia were not present at the conference, and the South Vietnamese Provisional 
Revolutionary government had been excluded from the conference in Lucerne in 1974 as a 
result of U.S. pressure.823 But also civil society was underrepresented.824  
In the later Oslo process leading to the adoption of an international treaty prohibiting 
cluster munitions, just like in the Ottawa process to ban anti-personnel mines, civil society 
played a key role through their carefully documented field evidence to make the humanitarian 
case. Thus, civil society, which organised in an international network, was instrumental for 
challenging ban opponents, raising public awareness through effective media work and 
contributing to stigmatisation of the weapon at large.  
In contrast, in the 1970s, this stigmatisation was only achieved for napalm bombs 
which arguably distracted all the attention from the civilian harm that was inflicted through 
cluster munitions.825 Fundamentally, since no affected states and not more NGOs were 
                                                 
820 See supra pp. 32-33. 
821 ICRC, Report on the 1974 Lucerne Conference, supra note 53, at 54, para. 174. 
822 Ibid., at 60-61, paras. 213-216. 
823 Prokosch, Technology of Killing, supra note 34, at 149. 
824 Only two NGOs were listed in the ICRC report on the 1974 Lucerne conference, the Special NGO Committee 
on Disarmament and the Friends World Committee. See ICRC, Report on the 1974 Lucerne Conference, supra 
note 53, Annex I, 95. 
825 Prokosch, Technology of Killing, supra note 34, at 170. 
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present at the meetings in the 1970s, also experts were not faced with cluster munition victims 
who would serve as a vivid testimony of the human suffering caused by these weapons.  
All these factors were missing and thus, the humanitarian case could not be made 
compellingly enough to move an international process for a prohibition of cluster munitions 
forward.826 The fact that the second major humanitarian problem, the post-conflict legacy of 
de facto landmines, did not receive great attention was an additional testimony of this. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the moment was perhaps not right to gather the 
necessary political momentum; when the first of these meetings was convened in 1974, the 
anti-Vietnam protest movement was already past its climax.827 Thus, no specific prohibitions 
or regulations on cluster munitions were adopted in the CCW which sought to prohibit or 
restrict weapons causing unnecessary suffering and/or indiscriminate effects. Even if specific 
provisions on cluster munitions along the lines of the Swedish proposal had been adopted this 
would not have been comprehensive enough, as the Swedish proposal would only have 
prohibited antipersonnel cluster munitions, leaving dangerous loopholes for anti-matériel, 
DPICM or CEM.828  
While the CCW included from the beginning Protocol II on landmines, these norms 
soon proved to be ineffective to contain the massive use of landmines. The humanitarian 
disaster caused by anti-personnel mines triggered the already mentioned innovative 
diplomatic process, the Ottawa process, characterised by a close cooperation between a core 
group of small- to medium- sized states, the ICRC, UN agencies, and the global civil society 
network ICBL. However, despite the similarities in effects between antipersonnel mines and 
unexploded cluster sub-munitions the latter were not covered by the definition of prohibited 
antipersonnel mines in the Ottawa convention. This can also be attributed to the fact that the 
ICBL made a conscious decision not to include cluster munitions into the antipersonnel mines 
campaign.829 Had a definition of antipersonnel mines been incorporated based on the effects 
rather than the design of the weapon, many cluster munitions would already have been 
prohibited. 
                                                 
826 While there was public protest against cluster munition use by the US in South-East Asia as part of the 
broader anti-Vietnam War protest movement, this movement failed to attract widespread sympathy from the 
media. See ibid., at 182. 
827 E. Prokosch, “Why History Should Not Repeat Itself: Lessons From the 1970s Effort to Ban Cluster Bombs”, 
Lunch Time Presentation at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 May 2008 (personal 
notes of this author). 
828 Wiebe, “Footprints of Death”, supra note 60, at 157. 
829 See supra p. 100, note 368. Also see the so called Bad Honnef Guidelines adopted by a number of ICBL 
members which argue for an effects-based rather than a design-based definition of anti-personnel mines. See 
Mine Action Programmes from a Development-Oriented Point of View (“The Bad Honnef Framework”), 1997, 
http://www.landmine.de/fix/BH_English.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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Thus, cluster munitions can be regarded as “unfinished business” of the 1970s and the 
1990s. Importantly, the Ottawa process on antipersonnel mines proved that new humanitarian 
disarmament norms could be established without the participation of some powerful states. 
Also, in contrast to the 1970s the new process could arguably also gain international political 
momentum because the participants in this process could point to the failure to address the 
scourge of antipersonnel mines in another forum, notably the CCW.  
The Ottawa Treaty experience and cluster munition use by the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands in Operation Allied Force in 1999 gave renewed 
attention to the issue of cluster munitions besides those NGOs which since the Ottawa process 
have advocated an effects-based approach towards addressing the humanitarian problems of 
landmines and landmine-like weapons on the international level.830 As a result, one NGO, 
Human Rights Watch, called for a global moratorium on use, production and transfer of 
cluster munitions until the humanitarian concerns were adequately addressed on the 
international level. Other NGOs, Landmine Action, Handicap International, Mines Action 
Canada and AAMV/CMC-Austria, joined in Human Rights Watch’s call to develop a specific 
protocol on cluster munitions within the CCW in view of the Second Review Conference of 
the CCW in 2001.831  
However, as detailed supra,832 this call did not receive a favourable response by all 
States parties to the CCW. In particular, this demand was opposed by major users or 
producers or stockpilers of the weapon like the United States, China, Russia, India and 
Pakistan. Again, any decision within the framework of the CCW requires consent even if no 
negotiations are involved.  
Over the next years, work on the humanitarian concerns relating to cluster munitions 
was embedded into the broader category of ERW which culminated in the adoption of 
Protocol V to the CCW on ERW in November 2003. But even before that, just after the 2003 
Iraq invasion by U.S. and UK troops, the Irish government in collaboration with Pax Christi 
Ireland hosted a conference on ERW where it was decided by NGOs to form a new global 
network to address the humanitarian concerns on cluster munitions. As has already been 
mentioned, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) was formally launched in the Hague in 
November 2003 with the central campaign calls for no production, use and transfer of cluster 
                                                 
830 One advocate of this position in accordance with the Bad Honnef Guidelines has been the German NGO 
Landmine.de since 1995. 
831 Cf. Goose, “Cluster Munitions in the Crosshairs” in Williams, Goose & Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 221. 
832 See supra p. 116. 
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munitions until their humanitarian problems were resolved; increased resources for assistance 
to communities and individuals affected by unexploded cluster munitions and all other 
explosive remnants of war; and a special user responsibility for clearance, warnings, risk 
education, provision of information and victim assistance.833 Interestingly, discussion of the 
legal issues relating to the use of cluster munitions revealed that the civil society organisations 
present did not consider that there was a legal basis for a ban on cluster munitions, since the 
weapon itself was not inherently indiscriminate. On the other hand, it was emphasised that 
existing IHL was inadequate to deal with the humanitarian problems emanating from cluster 
munitions.834  
Thus, civil society did not yet call for a specific disarmament treaty on cluster 
munitions based on the inadequacy of IHL and on the fact that general rules of IHL were 
never properly implemented in connection with past cluster munition use. While a first 
proposal on a negotiating mandate for an internationally binding legal instrument on cluster 
munitions was already made in 2003, opposition to any such mandate by China, Russia, the 
United States and others caused the CCW to only discuss technical improvements on sub-
munitions and whether existing IHL was sufficient to address issues relating to sub-munitions 
throughout 2004 and 2005. An important contribution in this regard was a survey conducted 
among CCW states parties on IHL and ERW where a number of states made their views 
known.835 During 2006 in view of the upcoming Third Review Conference to the CCW, the 
CMC emphasised that the time was ripe for a CCW negotiating mandate on cluster munitions, 
otherwise concrete action should be considered outside the forum of the CCW.836  
While informal discussions already began to prepare for the eventuality of failure of 
the Third Review Conference to the CCW in November 2006, especially Israel’s massive use 
of cluster munitions in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 was a triggering moment for still more 
determined action by both certain states and NGOs. Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, 
New Zealand and Sweden introduced a proposal for a mandate to negotiate a new legally-
binding international instrument specifically on cluster munitions within the CCW to be 
decided at the Third Review Conference.837 The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
                                                 
833 See supra pp. 191-192. 
834 Pax Christi Netherlands, CMC Launch Conference Report, supra note 676, at 26. 
835 See supra pp. 72-73. 
836 Goose, “Cluster Munitions in the Crosshairs” in Williams, Goose & Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 224. 
837 Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a 
Legally-Binding Instrument that Addresses the Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster Munitions, UN Doc. 
CCW/CONF.III/WP.1, 6 October 2006 (reissued on 25 October 2006). 
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response to a parliamentary question regarding cluster munition use in the armed conflict in 
Lebanon and Israel at the end of October 2006 stated that: 
“In the Government’s view, the human suffering caused by the use of cluster munitions is 
unacceptable. This is why Norway will take the lead – together with other like-minded countries and 
international humanitarian actors – to put in place an international prohibition against cluster 
munitions.”838  
 
This was interpreted as the first public indication that Norway would be prepared to 
take the initiative for an international diplomatic process outside the framework of the 
CCW.839 Another statement made by the Norwegian Foreign Minister just ahead of the Third 
Review Conference underlined the accuracy of this interpretation. He emphasised that 
Norway was prepared to take a leading role to speed up efforts to achieve an international ban 
on cluster munitions after noting that UN agencies, Norwegian and international humanitarian 
organisations as well as other interested countries expected Norway to play this leadership 
role. The Foreign Minister declared that Norway was ready to cooperate with like-minded 
countries and other partners such as the UN, the Red Cross movement and other humanitarian 
actors to start a negotiating process.840 This emphasis on the urgency to arrive at an 
international prohibition on cluster munitions and on a process between like-minded states, 
the UN, the Red Cross and other humanitarian actors was an indication that Norway was 
already actively considering failure of the CCW to decide on a negotiating mandate for a new 
international treaty on cluster munitions as a likely prospect.  
For the NGO community cluster munition use during the conflict between Hezbollah 
and Israel provided yet another opportunity to gather field-based evidence of the humanitarian 
consequences of cluster munitions and perhaps even more importantly, mobilise the media to 
stigmatise the weapon in advance of the Third Review Conference.841 
This Third Review Conference took off with a statement by the then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan on 7 November 2006. The highest UN official emphasised the 
                                                 
838 Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reply to Olav Akselsen’s (Labour Party) question 
regarding the war in Libanon [sic!] and the use of cluster munitions, 24 October 2006, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about_mfa/minister-of-foreign-affairs-jonas-gahr-s/Speeches-and-
articles/2006/Reply-to-Olav-Akselsens-question-regarding-the-war-in-Libanon-and-cluster-
munitions.html?id=420888# (last visited 25 January 2010). 
839 Goose, “Cluster Munitions in the Crosshairs” in Williams, Goose & Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 225. 
840 Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway to take the lead in efforts to achieve an international ban on 
cluster munitions”, 3 November 2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/News/2006/Norway-to-take-
the-lead-in-efforts-to-achieve-an-international-ban-on-cluster-munitions.html?id=424460&epslanguage=en-GB 
(last visited 7 April 2010). 
841 For example, Landmine Action produced a comprehensive report on the humanitarian consequences of 
cluster munition use in Lebanon still in 2006. See Landmine Action, “Foreseeable harm”, supra note 100. A 
variety of research reports subsequently published was also based on field evidence gathered in Lebanon. See in 
this context, King et al, “M85”, supra note 83; Human Rights Watch, “Flooding South Lebanon”, supra note 91. 
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importance of the issue of cluster munitions for the UN and challenged states parties of the 
CCW to devise effective norms to immediately address the atrocious, inhumane effects of 
cluster munitions both at the time of their use and after conflict ends. He also called on states 
parties to freeze both the use of cluster munitions against military assets located in or near 
populated areas and the transfer of those cluster munitions known to be inaccurate and 
unreliable, and to dispose of them.842 Thus, one may observe that the UN Secretary-General 
did not only emphasise the need for an IHL prohibition of at least certain cluster munitions 
but for disarmament which would equally address transfers and stockpiles in relation to these 
weapons. 
The following general exchange of views on 7 and 8 November 2006 brought to the 
fore three different positions on how to proceed with regard to cluster munitions. A first group 
comprised those states that advocated a specific regulation of cluster munitions within the 
CCW since existing IHL was not considered to be adequate to deal with all humanitarian 
problems posed by the use of these weapons.843 Other states regarded a continuation of the 
already existing discussion mandate for the GGE on the wider category of ERW as 
appropriate rather than the negotiation of a new treaty on cluster munitions,844 while certain 
                                                 
842 UN Secretary-General, Message to the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, 7 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/81D9D5CBD4AC8BC3C1257220002F981A/$file/UNS
G+message+re+CCW+Third+RevCon+(final).doc (last visited 25 January 2010). 
843 States falling in this camp included: New Zealand, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1160269FCFC6B8B6C12572200046EF66/$file/03+New
+Zealand.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Mexico, Statement by Macedo, supra note 160; Switzerland, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5E137C29CDB2E9FFC12572200068F66A/$file/CCW+
CONF.III+SWITZERLAND.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Holy See, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/086F7DE2F8308590C12572200047778B/$file/12+Holy
+See.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Argentina, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/61FDC0BDE2351B98C12572200047B482/$file/18+Arg
entina.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Austria, Statements by Markus Reiterer und Wolfgang Petritsch, supra 
note 698; Germany, Statement by Gröning, supra note 711; Lebanon, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C494387857A94F12C125722F003AE726/$file/01+Leba
non.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
844 Australia, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4C0D505ED460775FC12572200046C59C/$file/02+Aus
tralia.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); South Korea, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/580A0402780751AEC125722000472081/$file/06+Repu
blic+of+Korea.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); India, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/75643031BA5F13A0C125722000478386/$file/13+India
.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Brazil, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/897239567B984258C12572200047BFC0/$file/19+Brazi
l.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Japan, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/91F35F3BF48F0C25C12572200047D0DB/$file/20+Jap
an.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Ukraine, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1A60988F7979C47BC12572200047DF6D/$file/21+Ukr
aine.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Italy, 
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states were not convinced that cluster munitions warranted any further specific activity, 
neither specifically binding regulations nor the discussion of legally non-binding technical 
preventive measures.845 Norway’s position during the conference was rather specific, as it did 
emphasise the humanitarian urgency to conclude an international legally binding instrument 
on cluster munitions but did not expressly state that such an instrument should be concluded 
within the CCW.846 
The ICRC also endorsed the call for a specific international legal instrument on cluster 
munitions and stressed the humanitarian urgency of solving the problems posed by the use of 
these weapons, thus adding its credibility as a well-respected impartial humanitarian 
organisation to this demand.847 According to the ICRC, the specific characteristics of cluster 
munitions, the unfortunate history of their use and their severe and long-lasting costs to 
civilians justified strong action, including at a national level to immediately end the use and 
eliminate stocks of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions, and pending their destruction, 
not to transfer them to other countries, as well as to prohibit the targeting of cluster munitions 
against military objective located in a populated area.848 Thus, just like the UN Secretary-
General the ICRC did not content itself with calling for a specific IHL regulation or 
prohibition on the use of these weapons but also for a disarmament treaty also addressing 
transfers and stockpile destruction on humanitarian grounds. 
The UN Mine Action Team as representative of the operational focal point for 
clearance of mines and ERW, including unexploded sub-munitions, reiterated the message 
from the UN Secretary-General to devise effective norms to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
the adverse humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and to declare unilateral moratoria on 
the use of these weapons in or near populated areas as well as to freeze the transfer and 
destroy stockpiles of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/CA39DEB409584374C125722000693A2D/$file/CCW+
CONF.III+ITALY.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
845 United States of America, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/AC4F9F4B10B117B4C125722000478F7F/$file/14+US
A.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Russian Federation, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E701176903915C1EC1257220004740D0/$file/08+Russi
an+Federation.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Pakistan, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/9CC66AF776BBEB7EC125722000475B52/$file/10+Pa
kistan.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
846 Norway, General Statement to the Third Review Conference of the CCW, 7 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A9580B6FCCBDE401C12572200068E78F/$file/CCW+
CONF.III+NORWAY.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
847 International Committee of the Red Cross,   Statement to the Third Review Conference of the CCW, supra 
note 161. 
848 Ibid. 
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Significantly, the UN Mine Action Team also called for technical requirements for 
new weapons systems to reduce risks to civilian population, thus advocating a precautionary 
or preventive rather than remedial approach towards technological developments that might 
occur in this area.849 As a matter of fact, such an approach is not well-established under IHL, 
since there are very few examples where new weapons have been subject to an international 
prohibition or restriction.850 Again, this reflects the particular humanitarian concerns 
associated with the use of cluster munitions which would necessitate such a precautionary 
approach. 
Civil society represented first and foremost by the CMC came well prepared and in 
significant numbers to this conference. Already on the weekend before the conference started 
the CMC held a briefing session for participating members to ensure that everyone involved 
had adequate knowledge about the humanitarian problems associated with the weapon and the 
international challenge of the Review Conference ahead as well as to ensure a coordinated 
approach in conveying key messages to governments.  
Probably the most important key message that the CMC delivered in its statements to 
states parties of the CCW was the urgency of tackling the humanitarian problem of cluster 
munitions which justified a decision on a mandate for negotiating a legally binding 
international instrument rather than continuing mere discussions on the way forward.851 This 
urgency was also expressed in a public awareness-raising activity when CMC members 
gathered in front of the diplomat entrance of the UN in Geneva dressed in T-shirts with “Stop 
Cluster Munitions, Start a New Treaty” printed on them and handed out flyers with the same 
                                                 
849 UN Mine Action Team, Statement to the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW Convention, 
7 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/35F4F97BD01410D9C125722000483811/$file/30+UN
MAS.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
850 In fact, it has been maintained that only the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration prohibiting the use of explosive 
projectiles under the weight of 400 g against individual soldiers and the 1995 CCW Protocol IV on Blinding 
Laser Weapons can be cited as examples of a strict precautionary approach towards weapons not (widely) used 
on the battlefield. See, for example, L. Doswald-Beck, “New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons”, 312 
International Review of the Red Cross 272-299, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn4y?opendocument (last visited 25 January 2010); B. M. 
Carnahan & M. Robertson, “The Protocol on “Blinding Laser Weapons”: A New Direction for International 
Humanitarian Law”, 90 AJIL 484, 484, 490 (1996). To this list, one could possibly add the 1899 prohibition of 
dum-dum bullets, the prohibition of launching balloons filled with explosives and the 1925 and 1972 
prohibitions of biological weapons. 
851 This key message becomes evident, for example, from the statement on behalf of the CMC as a whole and the 
statement by Human Rights Watch. See Cluster Munition Coalition, Statement to the Third Review Conference 
on Certain Conventional Weapons, 8 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C7CB9BF595CBC7FC1257289003C94F4/$file/06110
8+CMC.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Human Rights Watch, Statement during the General Exchange of 
Views, Third Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, 8 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0D573BA9A191A2B6C1257220006921DC/$file/CCW
+CONF.III+HRW.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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slogan which summarised the humanitarian harm documented by the use of these weapons. 
What added credibility to the demands of civil society was the presence of cluster munition 
victims who confronted government delegates with a first hand account of their plight.852 
NGO members of the CMC also made use of the opportunity of lunch time events to present 
new research reports on the recent use of cluster munitions in Lebanon and the preliminary 
findings of a report on the global humanitarian impact of these weapons. These reports 
contributed to the purpose of making the humanitarian case by adding to the record of 
humanitarian evidence for a new treaty on cluster munitions.853 
From this overview, it can be concluded that the opposition forming against cluster 
munitions yielded the first tangible results. First and foremost, cluster munitions figured 
prominently in discussions during the Third Review Conference. This was largely due to the 
pressure by civil society in getting states to acknowledge the humanitarian problems posed by 
the use of these weapons, by like-minded states which were ready to take action, but also by 
the UN and the ICRC which were active in the field and could contribute their credibility to 
the discussions. At the same time, not even those in favour of a specific international treaty on 
cluster munitions advocated a comprehensive prohibition of these weapons just yet. However, 
that was not the issue then since the objective was to simply agree on the fact that concrete 
action in the form of a negotiating mandate on a new international treaty within the CCW was 
necessary. In this regard, until the end of the Review Conference, the proposal for such a 
negotiating mandate initially introduced by Austria and Sweden and co-sponsored by four 
other states,854 was formally supported by 26 states.855  
Consistent with what it had announced previously, Norway shared the view of Austria 
and others that the humanitarian disaster caused by cluster munitions needed to be dealt with 
urgently and that negotiations on an international treaty on cluster munitions should begin as 
promptly as possible; but Norway wanted to take the opportunity to underline that in her view 
negotiations should take place where they could effectively be conducted and where there was 
                                                 
852 Statement by Firoz Ali Alizada, Handicap International Afghanistan (on file with the author); Statement by 
Habbouba Aoun, Landmine Resources Centre for Lebanon, on behalf of the Cluster Munition Coalition, 8 
November 2006 (on file with the author). 
853 On 7 November 2006, Landmine Action presented the most important findings of its report on the 
humanitarian consequences of cluster munition use in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. See Landmine Action, 
Landmine Action, “Foreseeable harm”, supra note 100. On 8 November, Handicap International presented 
“Fatal Footprint” whose most significant finding of the preliminary report on the humanitarian impact of cluster 
munitions in 23 affected states and areas not internationally recognised was that 98% of the victims of these 
weapons were civilians. See Handicap International, “Fatal Footprint”, supra note 360. 
854 Holy See, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand. 
855 In addition to the states already mentioned, negotiations were supported by Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Peru, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland. 
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a realistic possibility of such a treaty. Here, Norway already made it clear that it was not 
convinced that the forum of the CCW could provide an adequate basis to produce such an 
international treaty.856  
This statement indicated that Norway was already actively considering that the CCW 
would not be able to agree on a negotiating mandate for a new international convention on 
cluster munitions. That Norway’s assessment was realistic may already be explained by the 
above-mentioned practice in the CCW to take any kind of decision only once consensus is 
achieved. As already mentioned, China, Pakistan, India, Russia, South Korea and the United 
States, some of which are major users, producers and stockpilers of the weapon, remained 
opposed to the ambitious humanitarian initiative to negotiate new legally binding international 
rules on cluster munitions. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the Review Conference 
decision agreed to by participating states parties of the CCW fell far short of the demands of 
Norway and other states who had been in favour of starting negotiations on a new 
international treaty on cluster munitions without any further delay. That decision read as 
follows:  
“To convene, as a matter of urgency, an intersessional meeting of governmental experts:  
To consider further the application and implementation of existing international humanitarian law to 
specific munitions that may cause explosive remnants of war, with particular focus on cluster 
munitions, including the factors affecting their reliability and their technical and design characteristics, 
with a view to minimizing the humanitarian impact of the use of these munitions. 
This meeting of governmental experts will, inter alia, consider the results of the meeting of experts on 
cluster munitions to be held by the ICRC. The meeting of governmental experts will report to the next 
meeting of the High Contracting Parties. 
The Meetings of Military and Technical Experts of the GGE shall continue their technical work and 
provide further advice, as required.”857 
 
In the light of this outcome, Norway converted its previous allusions into reality that it 
would go outside of the framework of the CCW to achieve a convention on cluster munitions 
in an alternative diplomatic process. In a Press Release issued by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Minister Jonas Gahr Støre invited countries that had shown an interest and a 
will to take urgent action to address the cluster munition problem, together with other partners 
such as the relevant UN organisations, the Red Cross movement and other humanitarian 
organisations, to an international conference in Oslo to start a process towards an international 
                                                 
856 Norway, Statement to the Special Plenary Meeting on Protocol V, 13 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (statement only available in audio format). 
857 Third Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Final Document, Part II: Final 
Declaration, Decision 1, at 6, UN Doc CCW/CONF.III/11, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/84E7CBDD66F28699C125729E00605345/$file/CCW+
CONF.III+11+PART+II+E.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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ban on cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences.858 24 other 
states expressed their disappointment at the failure of the Review Conference to agree on the 
urgency to negotiate an international treaty on cluster munitions by submitting a common 
Final Declaration on Cluster Munitions in which they called for an agreement that should, 
inter alia, (a) prohibit the use of cluster munitions within concentrations of civilians; (b) 
prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of cluster munitions that 
pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate; 
(c) assure the destruction of stockpiles of cluster munitions that pose serious humanitarian 
hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate, and in this context 
establish forms of cooperation and assistance.859 Therefore, what was proposed at the end of 
the Third Review Conference was a more elaborate proposal for a humanitarian disarmament 
treaty that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and transfer along with 
the use of at least certain cluster munitions. 
On the other hand, it may be noted that neither Norway nor any other state in favour of 
a specific international treaty on cluster munitions expressly proposed a total ban on cluster 
munitions. Rather, Norway used the rather enigmatic wording of “cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians.” This wording may mean different things to different 
constituencies. As will become clear, one of the core intentions of Norway was to lead a 
process that emphasised the elimination of a humanitarian problem rather than let military or 
technical concerns prevail. A prohibition of cluster munitions should therefore be based on a 
careful analysis of the humanitarian concerns that types of existing munitions with more than 
one sub-munition cause. At the same time, this wording implies that there may be cluster 
munitions that cause acceptable harm to civilians which may be a justification for exclusions 
or exceptions from a definition of prohibited cluster munitions. As will be seen, defining the 
dividing line between what is acceptable as opposed to unacceptable in humanitarian terms in 
relation to what is a cluster munition in technical terms proved to be the key challenge in the 
diplomatic process that was now on the table.  
Interestingly, the wording of acceptable/unacceptable also differs from the wording 
used by the customary international law rules of API, especially of Art. 51 (5) (b) on 
                                                 
858 Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway takes the initiative for a ban on cluster munitions”, Press 
Release No. 149/06, 17 November 2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/News/2006/Norway-takes-
the-initiative-for-a-ban-on-cluster-munitions.html?id=436868# (last visited 25 January 2010). 
859 Declaration on Cluster Munitions by Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E4AC282AA43501A6C125723000605378/$file/Sweden
+(CM).pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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proportionality which, as mentioned above, calls for an evaluation of whether civilian harm is 
excessive in relation to a direct and concrete military advantage pursued. In this context, it is 
also interesting to recall what was also already mentioned above, notably that the famous IHL 
scholar Kalshoven explained this balancing act underlying Art. 51 (5) (b) of API precisely in 
terms of a dividing line separating acceptable collateral civilian damage from such attacks 
which entailed unacceptable civilian losses. If that is the case, then Norway could have just 
adopted the formula of Art. 51 (5) (b) of API to signal to others that an appropriate balancing 
between humanitarian and military considerations must be found.  
However, in the view of this author, Norway used the wording of “unacceptable harm” 
for good reasons. This is already justified by the view that existing IHL was obviously not 
capable of providing adequate protection for civilians from the use of these weapons in 
practice. The wording also marks a shift in focus from the way discussions had been 
conducted in the framework of the CCW for several years until then which arguably were 
based on existing IHL but which accorded priority to national security and military concerns 
over humanitarian considerations, i.e. human security based on protection of individual 
civilians. 
Be that as it may, besides this essentially humanitarian rationale the wording of 
“unacceptable harm” also served the purpose of reassuring those that were not prepared to go 
as far as a comprehensive prohibition of cluster munitions at that stage and thus, of mobilising 
a first critical mass of support for the new alternative process.860  
As was to be expected, the announcement by Norway did not meet with the support of 
all states present. The United States was most outspoken in stating its disappointment by 
Norway’s announcement to go outside the CCW framework for dealing with cluster 
munitions. It made it clear that states should not work outside the CCW to achieve meaningful 
results on cluster munitions, since the CCW took into account both humanitarian and military 
interests and truly brought together users and producers of weapons and humanitarian 
advocates.861 Others, like India and the Republic of Korea, welcomed the decision of the 
                                                 
860 In this light, for example, the cautious wording of Austria of declaring in two of its statements that its support 
for a new international treaty on cluster munitions did not imply a proposal for a total ban may be understood. 
See Austria, Statements by Markus Reiterer and Wolfgang Petritsch, supra note 698. 
861 United States, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format). 
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Review Conference to continue discussions on cluster munitions within the CCW rather than 
start negotiations on a new treaty on cluster munitions.862  
The ICRC and the CMC both welcomed Norway’s announcement, with the ICRC 
offering to host an expert meeting in 2007 to contribute to a convergence of views on how to 
reduce the human costs of cluster munitions.863  
Australia and the United Kingdom could be regarded as holding an intermediate 
position, since both recognised cluster munitions as a humanitarian problem and stated that 
they would have been in favour of negotiations. However, for those states what counted was a 
solution to the cluster munition problem in practical terms and this is why they still welcomed 
the agreement on a discussion mandate.864  
Also Germany entertained an intermediate position in the sense that it subscribed to 
the final declaration by 25 states calling for a new international treaty on cluster munitions but 
added that it was only prepared to conclude such a treaty within the framework of the 
CCW.865 
With the announcement of Norway on the table to start an alternative diplomatic 
process, it remained to be seen whether a sufficient critical mass of states would support it. 
 
5.2.2.  The First Litmus Test For a New Diplomatic Process on Cluster 
Munitions: The Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions 
  
At that stage, there was no reassurance whatsoever that the announcement of an 
alternative diplomatic process with the aim of banning cluster munitions that cause 
                                                 
862 India, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format); Republic of Korea, Statement at the Final Plenary 
Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format). 
863 ICRC, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format); Cluster Munition Coalition, Statement at the Final 
Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format). 
864 Australia, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0C1A931310AC367AC12572300061B464/$file/Australi
a.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); United Kingdom, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 
2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format). 
865 Germany, Statement at the Final Plenary Meeting, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/1DB747088014E6D7C12571C0003A0818?OpenDocume
nt (last visited 25 January 2010) (only in audio format). 
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unacceptable harm to civilians would translate into effective action at the international level. 
By “effective” one may understand a process which includes those states specially affected by 
the issue of cluster munitions, i.e. past users, producers, stockpilers but also those states 
contaminated by sub-munition duds. In an ideal world, the most effective action would be to 
include major users and producers like Russia or the United States along with the states most 
affected by sub-munition contamination including Laos, Afghanistan or Lebanon in a process 
leading to legally binding rules on these weapons. However, not getting any of the relevant 
states on board of an alternative diplomatic process would entail the danger that this 
alternative process could not acquire even a minimum of relevance for the problem on the 
ground.  
As to the possible objection that for a meaningful diplomatic process major military 
powers must be on board, the idea for an alternative process was precisely born out of the 
deadlock in the CCW where the fulfilment of such an objective proved impossible. In that 
respect, it is clear that at the beginning of a new diplomatic process not all the relevant players 
are yet on board. Moreover, it is a historical fact that the CCW counts few states parties from 
the developing world. That the CCW itself was aware of the problem of its lack of legitimacy 
and representation among developing states may be derived from the fact that at the Third 
Review Conference one of the agenda items was a sponsorship programme to enable more 
active participation in CCW meetings by delegations from the developing world. In particular, 
the argument can be made that the CCW does not adequately reflect the interests of states 
contaminated with sub-munition duds.866 
  Still, tested against the relevance criteria of users, producers, stockpilers and affected 
states, the group of 25 states in favour of the final declaration were certainly not sufficient in 
themselves to create enough political pressure for the new process to become effective. While 
it was true that out of this group of 25, 16 states were stockpilers of the weapon,867 only 7 of 
them were producers or former producers,868 one (former) user,869 and three states affected870 
by sub-munition contamination.871  
                                                 
866 For instance, of the states worst affected by sub-munition contamination, only Laos is a state party to the 
CCW, while Afghanistan and Vietnam are mere signatories, and Lebanon and Iraq neither states parties nor 
signatories. 
867 Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Norway, 
Peru, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. 
868 Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Germany, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland. 
869 Serbia. 
870 Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. 
871 An updated statistic published by the CMC in June 2009 shows that altogether 31 states are known to be 
affected by cluster munitions, 15 have used them, 34 have produced them or are still producing them, and 85 
have stockpiled them. See Cluster Munition Coalition, “How Big Is the Problem?”, 
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Especially in the categories of user and affected states significant work lay ahead for 
an effective alternative process to be started. A first conference in this new diplomatic process 
was scheduled by Norway for 22-23 February 2007 in Oslo. In terms of strategy, Norway set 
out to identify a core group of states. This core group was not only formed out of a shared 
concern about the humanitarian urgency of concluding an international treaty banning cluster 
munitions; Norway also selected certain states on the basis of their willingness to invest 
heavily in a new process by providing leadership and resources necessary to carry out an 
initiative outside of traditional forums and without UN staff to take care of administrative 
matters.872 Initially, the core group included Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and 
Sweden. Austria was one of the most outspoken states at the Third Review Conference and 
had delivered several statements on behalf of other states interested in negotiating a new 
international treaty on cluster munitions. Moreover, as shown above, Austria had also already 
acknowledged the humanitarian concerns on cluster munitions by adopting a parliamentary 
resolution on a national level. Like Austria, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden, Ireland had 
been in the initial group of six states in the CCW calling for a negotiating mandate on cluster 
munitions and had put forward a further proposal to include long-term civilian harm in the 
interpretation of the proportionality assessment to be conducted by attackers. However, only 
Austria, Norway and Sweden were stockpilers of the weapon, and in Sweden cluster 
munitions were produced. 
The goal of this first conference was to rally a critical mass of states behind the idea of 
negotiating a new international treaty on banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable 
harm to civilians. For this new process to be relevant, more than the 25 states supporting the 
final declaration would have to participate, especially some developed producer and user 
states and some developing affected states. The Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions passed 
this first test of relevance with honours; a total of 49 states participated, which far surpassed 
expectations by the Norwegian government. Out of these 49 states 30 were stockpilers, 19 
producers, six users and six affected states. For example, important European producers and 
stockpilers like France, Germany and the United Kingdom attended the Oslo Conference, 
with the United Kingdom also being the third-biggest user of cluster munitions. It was also 
noteworthy that two of the worst affected states, Afghanistan and Lebanon, were present. 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/how-big-is-the-problem-120609.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010). 
872 Goose, “Cluster Munitions in the Crosshairs” in Williams, Goose & Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines, 
supra note 403, at 225-226. 
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In his opening statement to the Conference, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
stressed that the time had come to agree on a new international instrument to ban cluster 
munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences and a framework to ensure care 
and rehabilitation to victims and affected communities.  
On the approach to be taken to achieve that end, he left no doubt about the 
humanitarian character of such a process which should be inclusive and mobilise states, 
humanitarian actors, civil society and the United Nations. While the Minister stated that this 
approach may mean to ban only the use of certain types of cluster munitions, he also 
dispensed with the idea that technical improvements in weapons technology may be sufficient 
to address the complex humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions. Moreover, he 
confirmed the essential humanitarian core task ahead in closing by outlining the objective as 
reaching agreement on a plan for developing and implementing a new instrument of 
international humanitarian law that addresses all the unacceptable consequences of cluster 
munitions by 2008.873  
Responding to the call for a humanitarian approach, Austria contributed to the 
momentum of this conference by informing the other participating states of its national 
moratorium.874 However, the real litmus test for the Oslo Conference was whether those states 
that had reservations on some issues could be won over politically for supporting this process. 
The tool by which that political commitment should be expressed was a Final Declaration, a 
draft of which had already been prepared by Norway and other members of the core group. 
Support for such a Final Declaration was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, the Oslo 
Conference already brought certain controversies to the fore which were to persist throughout 
the whole process.  
For example, several states expressed a preference for continuing work on cluster 
munitions predominantly in the CCW, with the Oslo process exerting political pressure on 
achieving concrete results in the former forum which included major users, producers and 
stockpilers.875 Another issue concerned whether technical improvements such as restrictions 
                                                 
873 Norway, Opening Statement by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
22 February 2007, http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/ud/Om-departementet/Utenriksminister-Jonas-Gahr-
Store/Taler-og-artiklar/2007/oslo-conference-on-cluster-munitions-222.html?id=454595 (last visited 25 January 
2010). 
874 Austria, Statement on the Austrian Moratorium, supra note 706. Also Bosnia and Herzegovina announced its 
intention to declare a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions until an international prohibition of these 
weapons is established. See Bosnia & Herzegovina, Statement to the Oslo Conference, 22 February 2007, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/ClusterBosnia.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
875 See Germany, Statement by Mr. Heinrich Haupt, Division of Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, Oslo 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22-23 February 2007, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/ClusterGermany%20Haupt.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
 
 262
on use of cluster munitions with failure rates of over 1% were sufficient to achieve the goal of 
prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Argentina, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and Germany expressed support for an approach designed to lower the 
failure rates of and equip sub-munitions with self-destruct mechanisms rather than a more 
comprehensive prohibition of cluster munitions.876 Sweden advocated this position mainly 
because of a national change of government before the Oslo Conference. This was also why 
Sweden finally retreated from the core group, with Peru taking Sweden’s place. 
Such statements were contested not only by other states but especially by the CMC 
and another expert who gave presentations on the problems associated with such technical 
fixes. Their main message was that figures of failure rates of 1% were determined under ideal 
test conditions which differed considerably from actual combat conditions.877  
This also reflected the humanitarian focus of this new process where considerable 
room was given to voices from the field and cluster munition victims rather than only to 
diplomats, military experts or producers. Especially the constant presence and active 
participation of cluster munition victims was a vivid reminder to participating states that at the 
core of this new diplomatic process were humanitarian goals. The CMC also hosted a Civil 
Society Forum on the day before the official conference started and held a series of 
workshops during the official conference on technical and legal aspects relating to cluster 
munitions, investments on cluster munitions, on advocacy and media strategies and country-
specific humanitarian situations in the cluster munition affected states of Afghanistan, 
Lebanon and Serbia. This underlined the educative role that civil society was to play 
throughout this process and the practice of convening a Civil Society Forum ahead of a 
conference was also followed in subsequent Oslo process meetings. 
Despite certain fears on the part of Norway, other states, the CMC and other 
humanitarian organisations that certain states would not be able to subscribe to the Final 
                                                                                                                                                        
The statement by Germany was echoed by France, another important European producer and user state. Other 
states, like Italy, Argentina and the Netherlands also indicated their support for the CCW and their view that 
international action against cluster munitions should be taken in the framework of the CCW. In a similar vein, 
Egypt, Latvia, Switzerland, Sweden and Canada expressed their fears that the emerging Oslo process may 
compete negatively with the CCW framework. See K. Harrison, “Report from the Oslo Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, 23-25 February 2007”, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/OSLO_Report.pdf (last visited 25 January 
2010).  
876 Sweden, Intervention on Scope of a future instrument, Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23 February 
2007, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/ClusterSweden.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
877 For example, see G. Østern, Policy Adviser on Cluster Munitions, Norwegian People’s Aid “Basing Policy 
Responses on Field Realities”, Presentation to the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2007, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/ClusterNorwePAid.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010).  
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Declaration of the Oslo Conference, 46 out of 49 states present supported the Oslo 
Declaration which read as follows: 
 
 
“Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
22 – 23 February 2007 
Declaration 
A group of States, United Nations Organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster 
Munitions Coalition and other humanitarian organisations met in Oslo on 22 – 23 February 2007 to discuss how 
to effectively address the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions.  
Recognising the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and the need for immediate action, 
states commit themselves to:  
1. Conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that will:  
(i) prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster  
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and  
(ii) establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care 
and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities, clearance of contaminated areas, risk 
education and destruction of stockpiles of prohibited cluster munitions.  
2. Consider taking steps at the national level to address these problems.  
3. Continue to address the humanitarian challenges posed by cluster munitions within the framework of 
international humanitarian law and in all relevant fora.  
4. Meet again to continue their work, including in Lima in May/June and Vienna in November/December 
2007, and in Dublin in early 2008, and welcome the announcement of Belgium to organise a regional 
meeting. ”878 
 
 
Thus, the Oslo Declaration importantly enjoyed the support of European producer, 
user and stockpiler states like France, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as two of 
the most heavily affected states, Afghanistan and Lebanon.879 Significantly, in its para. 1, the 
Declaration did not only envisage a new disarmament treaty on what would later be defined as 
cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians within a clear deadline, notably 
only one year later by 2008 but it made the humanitarian focus of such a new treaty clear by 
committing states to establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures 
adequate care for provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities, 
clearance of contaminated areas, risk education and destruction of stockpiles of prohibited 
                                                 
878 Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, Final Declaration, 23 February 2007, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Oslo%20Declaration%20(final)%2023%20February%202007.pd
f (last visited 25 January 2010). 
879 However, it failed to evince support from Japan, Poland and Romania. Japan stated that a decision on the 
course of action with regard to cluster munitions could not be taken until all humanitarian, technological, 
security and legal aspects were discussed with the participation of more countries. It attached importance to the 
upcoming ICRC expert meeting in April and the CCW GGE meeting in June 2007. Poland also emphasised the 
importance of the CCW which should not be put aside and considered that the results of the Oslo conference 
would give new momentum to work within the CCW. See Harrison, “Report from the Oslo Conference”, supra 
note 875. 
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cluster munitions. With regard to the reference to cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable 
harm to civilians”, some states emphasised the need to clarify this wording in a future 
definition of cluster munitions.880 
The reference to “national steps” in para. 2 may be understood as responding to 
demands by the UN and CMC member NGOs to take unilateral national measures, such as the 
declaration of moratoria or the enactment of national legislation until the humanitarian 
problems were addressed on an international level. 
Para. 3, and in particular the wording of “to continue to address the humanitarian 
challenges posed by cluster munitions … in all relevant fora” was an important compromise 
between those states that still had expressed a preference for addressing cluster munitions in 
the CCW and those which regarded the CCW as ineffective. On the one hand, some states in 
accepting the Declaration explicitly interpreted this reference as meaning the CCW, on the 
other, those regarding the CCW as not any more appropriate to deal with cluster munitions 
considered it a success that the CCW was not expressly mentioned. 
Finally, the Oslo Declaration laid down a roadmap towards concluding an 
international legally binding instrument on cluster munitions by 2008, with follow up 
conferences in Lima in May 2007, in Vienna in December 2007 and in Dublin in 2008. On the 
whole, the goal of this first conference in this new “Oslo process” can be considered to be 
fulfilled, notably to politically commit a first critical mass of countries prepared to adopt a 
new treaty prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians by a 
concrete deadline, namely 2008.  
Yet, despite the fact that there was some level of political commitment, including by 
important European producer, user and stockpiler states it still remained to be seen whether all 
these states expressed their commitment because they were of the view that the new “Oslo 
process” was the only process viable to provide an effective humanitarian response to the 
cluster munition problem or whether some of them would use the momentum and pressure of 
the “Oslo process” for continuing work in the CCW.  
For instance, the argument was still used by some signatories to the Oslo declaration 
that any effective initiative against cluster munitions should include the major users and 
producers. This could hardly be considered an unwavering commitment to concluding a treaty 
prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, since it will be 
                                                 
880 Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland. On the other hand, Mexico stated that in its understanding there 
was no such thing as a cluster munition that causes acceptable harm to civilians. Therefore, the process should 
aim at prohibiting cluster munitions because they cause unacceptable harm to civilians. See Harrison, “Report 
from the Oslo Conference”, supra note 875. 
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recalled that this process emerged as a response to the failure of the CCW process due to the 
opposition of these major users and/or producers to come up with a concrete deadline for a 
new legally binding instrument on cluster munitions. Still, for the core group countries it was 
necessary to engage with these arguments which were made precisely by producer and user 
states whose participation was vital for the credibility and effectiveness of a future 
international treaty on cluster munitions. And, after all hope dies last and at that stage while it 
was unlikely that sufficient momentum could be generated in order to negotiate new 
international law on cluster munitions within the CCW it could also not be entirely ruled out. 
This is why already at the Oslo Conference the formula of “two complementary processes that 
should be mutually reinforcing” was born.881 
In view of these complications, it may be concluded that the Oslo Conference was 
nothing more than a strong start. However, firstly significant opposition remained and 
secondly, concerns were justified that certain states signing up to the Oslo process still needed 
to be convinced that there was only a realistic prospect for a new treaty outside the forum of 
the CCW.  
This became obvious at the expert meeting hosted by the ICRC in Montreux from 18-
20 April 2007. Already announced at the Third Review Conference in November 2006, this 
expert meeting brought together humanitarian, military, technical and legal experts from a 
variety of backgrounds, including governmental, intergovernmental, non-governmental, to 
discuss key issues in the international debate on cluster munitions like the humanitarian 
impact and the military role of cluster munitions, the feasibility/desirability of technical 
solutions to eliminate the humanitarian problems, the adequacy/inadequacy of existing IHL or 
ways to approach a definition of cluster munitions on the international level.  
On the one hand, US army officials emphasised the ongoing military utility, the 
feasibility of technical solutions to reduce humanitarian concerns and the adequacy of IHL 
while a Chinese governmental expert concurred with his US colleagues on the issue of 
adequacy of existing IHL but disagreed as to the feasibility and/or desirability of technical 
solutions to tackle the humanitarian problem. This indicated that the prospects of any new 
international treaty on cluster munitions within the CCW were indeed slim, since the US and 
                                                 
881 In this regard, for example, the Co-Chair from New Zealand emphasised that the Oslo Conference was not a 
question of participation in the CCW or outside of it but rather an expression of likemindedness and that the two 
processes needed to draw strength from each other and be mutually reinforcing. See ibid. 
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China remained opposed to new rules and even on other measures there was apparently no 
consensus among those major military powers.882  
On the other hand, Germany, an important European producer state and signatory to 
the Oslo Declaration, introduced a proposal for the upcoming GGE meeting of the CCW 
which was due to take place in June, thus reaffirming its preference for results to be achieved 
within that framework. The proposal sought to divide the universe of cluster munitions into 
three parts: Firstly, the use, transfer, stockpiling, development and production of any 
unreliable and/or inaccurate cluster munitions should be prohibited immediately. Secondly, 
the same activities in relation to accurate and/or reliable cluster munitions should be 
prohibited after a certain transition period (10 years were suggested), while so called 
“alternative munitions”, also referred to as “sensor-fused area munitions” (SEFAM) should 
substitute the military capabilities of cluster munitions after the transition period.883 
 According to this German draft, “unreliable” cluster munitions were those which 
contain sub-munitions of a dangerous dud rate of one percent or more measured in testing, 
“inaccurate” those which are effective also outside a pre-defined target area, i.e. the deviation 
from the centre of a pattern to the aim point.884  
While this was an attempt to find some middle ground between those inspired mainly 
by the humanitarian problem associated with cluster munitions and those opposed to any new 
rules on cluster munitions, as was noted by one participant it was unrealistic to think that this 
proposal would succeed in the CCW. It would be “too little for many and too much for 
some”.885 In terms of substance, those most strongly behind the Oslo process criticised the use 
of terms such as “dangerous duds” and the reliance on testing regimes that differed from 
actual combat conditions as well as the fact that through a transition period some type of 
cluster munitions with documented humanitarian harm would continue to be used.886 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
882 ICRC Expert Meeting Montreux 2007, supra note 41. 
883 Germany, Draft CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions, 1 May 2007, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP.1. 
884 Ibid. 
885 ICRC Expert Meeting Montreux 2007, supra note 41, at 78-79. 
886 For more detailed criticism, see Cluster Munition Coalition, “German proposal is not a basis for new cluster 
munition treaty”, 27 April 2007 (on file with the author). The notion of “dangerous duds” was also opposed by a 
number of experts at the expert meeting in Montreux. 
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5.2.3.  The Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23-25 May 2007 
 
Thus, significant challenges remained for the next Oslo process conference in Lima 
from 23-25 May 2007. Before that conference, a first discussion text on a future cluster 
munition treaty was prepared and circulated by the core group. 887 
The intention was to enable streamlined discussions on the basis of a concrete text. 
The general structure of this discussion text strongly resembled that of the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on Antipersonnel Mines with Article 1 on the general prohibitions and scope of 
application, Article 2 on the definition of prohibited weapons, as well as provisions on storage 
and stockpile destruction (Article 3), clearance (Article 4), international cooperation and 
assistance (Article 5) , transparency measures and compliance (Articles 7 and 8), national 
implementation measures (Article 9), and provisions on dispute settlement (Article 10), future 
meetings of states parties (Article 11), review conferences (Article 12), and the final 
provisions on signature, ratification and entry into force (Articles 15-17).  
Thus, the basic philosophy was the same as with the Ottawa Convention on 
Antipersonnel Mines, notably not only a traditional disarmament instrument with prohibitions 
on use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions was envisaged but also one 
that contained humanitarian obligations such as clearance of contaminated areas.  
In fact, this humanitarian focus which underpinned the Oslo process from the start was 
even more evident in the Lima discussion text than in the Ottawa Convention, since the Lima 
discussion text contained a stand-alone provision on victim assistance (Article 6) while in the 
Ottawa Convention victim assistance was only included as part of the provision on 
international cooperation and assistance (Article 6 (3), as described above). Significantly, 
Article 6 on victim assistance specifically referred to “human rights” as the fundamental 
rationale for providing medical care, rehabilitation and “facilitating social and economic 
reintegration” of cluster munition victims. Thus, it can be seen that the drafters of the 
discussion text attempted to build on lessons learnt from the Ottawa Convention as well as the 
adoption of the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities inasmuch as it was 
reaffirmed that the plight of cluster munition victims was a matter of human rights rather than 
a mere medical or welfare issue.  
                                                 
887 For the entire Lima Discussion Text, see Annex, infra pp. 377-384. 
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This human rights focus besides a disarmament focus set the work on a specific 
instrument on cluster munitions apart from other disarmament treaties like the Convention on 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  
Moreover, unlike other disarmament treaties which rely on intrusive regimes of 
inspections and on independent expert bodies on verifying compliance (such as the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), compliance was to be based here 
more on a cooperative rather than intrusive approach. Accordingly, the basic principle on 
compliance enshrined in the Lima discussion text was that states parties to the future treaty 
would agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the 
future convention (Article 8 (1)). The only specific compliance mechanism foreseen in the 
Lima discussion text was the possibility to submit requests for clarification to another state 
party through the UN Secretary-General which in the case no response would be received 
could be brought up at the subsequent meeting of states parties. This compliance tool was 
modelled after the 1997 Ottawa Convention and also here, some lessons learnt were duly 
taken into account, since a further possibility of ensuring compliance in the form of field 
visits decided on a meeting of states parties against the will of a non-compliant state was 
neither included in the Lima discussion text nor any time thereafter in the Oslo process. As 
this possibility had never been resorted to in the implementation of the Ottawa Convention, it 
was not considered in the discussions and negotiations on a Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
.  On this general structure of a human rights inspired disarmament treaty there was no 
discussion, as none of the states participating in the Oslo process ever stated that the new 
instrument should not include specific obligations to provide assistance to victims or to clear 
contaminated areas. This was already ensured once again by the active participation of cluster 
munition victims in the discussions, a prominent feature throughout the Oslo process. For 
example, a Serbian victim reported on his former profession as a clearance expert in the 
Serbian army at the time when NATO member states had used cluster munitions in and near 
populated civilian areas in Niš, Kraljevo, Ponikve and Sjenica; one day in November 2000 a 
sub-munition dud exploded and the clearance expert lost both arms and both legs. He 
emphasised that a new treaty could prevent civilian suffering in the future and that it can help 
people who have been disabled by cluster munitions in the past. Mr. Kapetanović hoped that 
state delegates would keep focusing on the needs of people and communities affected by 
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cluster munitions and he believed that the efforts would be rewarded with success, i.e. a 
strong ban.888 
But how strong such a ban should be and in which forum it should be achieved were, 
much like in Oslo, the most controversial issues of the conference. Some important user, 
producer and stockpiler states, including France, Germany, Japan, Italy, or Australia 
expressed strong support for the CCW process. The argument was once again that the CCW 
included all the major users and producers of cluster munitions and a treaty concluded in this 
framework would be the most effective on the ground.889 It may be restated here that it 
seemed to be idealistic rather than realistic to assume that even less ambitious international 
law on cluster munitions had any realistic chance to succeed in the CCW within a timeframe 
that duly reflected the humanitarian urgency of the problem. Again, this may be concluded in 
light of the fact that the Third Review Conference in November 2006 could not achieve 
anything concrete after approximately five years of discussions. Also, only one month before 
in Montreux, divergent views among two of the major producer states, the United States and 
China, had again become apparent, which made any decision based on consensus within the 
CCW unlikely. Still, for example for France and Germany, it was important to attempt 
everything possible to decide on a negotiation mandate for a new Protocol VI on cluster 
munitions in the CCW. 
Moreover, the argument about major producers and stockpilers does not adequately 
reflect the comprehensive nature of the proposed treaty, since it must be emphasised that this 
argument places overemphasis on the disarmament component but neglects the 
humanitarian/human rights component. Thus, such a treaty will be relevant even in the 
absence of participation of some major military powers especially when it comes to 
international assistance and funding of mine action/ERW programmes. Among the largest 
donors of such programmes which include clearance, risk education or victim assistance, were 
European states committed to the Oslo process like Norway, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
France or Austria.890 Further, heavily affected states like Laos and Lebanon were also 
                                                 
888 CMC, Statement to the Lima Conference, delivered by Branislav Kapetanović, 23 May 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/LIMA/statements/23MayCMC.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
889 For example, see France, General Statement, Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23 May 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/LIMA/statements/23France.html (last visited 25 January 
2010). 
890 See the figures quoted for 2007 in Landmine Monitor 2008, “Support for Mine Action”, 
http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/support_for_mine_action.html (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
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strongly committed to the Oslo process. For these states, their motivation was clear, since 
victims in these states would greatly benefit from a new treaty with a strong human rights 
component that would deal with the pre-existing problem caused by sub-munition 
contamination.  
Another concern expressed by certain states, including Italy, the Netherlands, 
Australia and Switzerland, was that a treaty adopted in the Oslo process would undermine the 
already existing Protocol V of the CCW.  
At the outset, it should be noted that the treaty envisaged in the Oslo process and 
Protocol V are different in scope. The Lima discussion text contained prohibitions regarding a 
specific weapon, cluster munitions, addressing their effects during and after conflict, while 
Protocol V applies to any unexploded and abandoned ordnance at the post-conflict stage only. 
Thus, the cluster munitions discussion text and Protocol V only partially overlap to the extent 
that the post-conflict effects of cluster munitions are at issue. For other types of unexploded or 
abandoned ordnance, Protocol V only remains relevant.  
Further, Protocol V does not have any retroactive effect and thus, does not apply to 
cluster munition remnants already existing before the entry into force of this treaty, i.e. 
November 2006. In contrast, the proposed text for a future convention specific to cluster 
munitions was not only preventive but also reactive in that it dealt with sub-munition 
contamination that would predate the entry into force of the future treaty. Thus, the issue of 
overlap or duplication would only arise with regard to cluster munition remnants created after 
the entry into force of Protocol V in November 2006.  
In that respect, if a state became party to the future treaty as envisaged in the Lima 
draft and at the same time, was party to Protocol V then there would be parallel obligations in 
particular as to clearance of cluster munition remnants in areas under that state’s jurisdiction 
and control. But that still would not in principle mean that through the operation of a new 
specific convention on cluster munitions Protocol V would be undermined. It would in 
principle only mean that fulfilment of the obligation under the future cluster munition 
convention also entails fulfilment of clearance obligations under Protocol V. However, in 
view of the preventive character of the proposed cluster munition treaty, if widely adhered to, 
this future treaty would have the effect that no new cluster munition remnants would be 
created and accordingly, no clearance and related obligations like recording of information on 
new ERW, on risk education or fencing under Protocol V in the cluster munition context 
would arise. 
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Still, in the event new cluster munition remnants were to be created (e.g. violation by 
state party of the future cluster munition convention or cluster munition use by a state not 
party to the future treaty) regarding the Lima draft, the argument could be made that this text 
did not adequately take into account the existence of Protocol V. Thus, there could be a risk 
that in these rare instances future states parties may divert their priorities and especially scarce 
resources to clearance and victim assistance activities concerning cluster munition remnants 
only. In that case, it may be concluded that indeed regarding ERW other than cluster munition 
remnants the fulfilment of obligations under Protocol V may be delayed or weakened. 
However, as will be seen infra, the lack of coherence between the future Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and Protocol V was subsequently remedied.891  
As was to be expected, the most contentious discussions in Lima were held on the 
definitions on what constitutes cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 
The major divide was between those holding the view that technical benchmarks like 
accuracy, reliability, self-destruct or self-neutralisation mechanisms were not sufficient to 
remedy the humanitarian problems associated with cluster munition use and thus advocated a 
comprehensive prohibition of cluster munitions,892 and those that did and thus, only 
advocated for a partial ban or regulation.893 In fact, the discussion represented the 
continuation of discussions in Oslo, with the CMC vehemently opposing with recent field 
evidence, especially from Lebanon, views as to the viability and desirability of approaches to 
the definition based on self-destruct mechanisms or failure rates. As an alternative to the Lima 
discussion text, Germany again lobbied for its proposal it was going to submit to the CCW 
GGE in June 2007. 
Significantly, the Lima discussion text in its proposed Art. 2 on the definition of 
cluster munitions did not provide for exceptions to prohibited cluster munitions based on self- 
destruct mechanisms or failure rates. In this regard, the draft may be seen to be biased in 
favour of the position of especially core group members and affected states which did not 
support a partial ban.  
                                                 
891 See the analysis of the Vienna Discussion Text, infra p. 286. 
892 Ireland, Intervention on Definitions, Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 24 May 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/LIMA/statements/24MayIreland.html (last visited 25 
January 2010). Norway, Lebanon, Chad, Senegal, Indonesia, Ecuador, Bosnia and the CMC also opposed 
exceptions from prohibitions based on self destruct or neutralisation mechanisms or failure rates. K. Harrison, 
“Report on the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions 23-25 May 2007”, at 27-29, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/LIMA%20REPORT.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
893 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom were not in favour of a comprehensive prohibition but dividing the cluster munition universe into 
illegal and legal weapons. See Harrison, “Report on the Lima Conference”, supra note 892, at 27. 
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That did not mean, however, that the draft foresaw the prohibition of anything that 
could be technically considered a cluster munition. This is evidenced by an exception to the 
prohibition for those munitions that are designed to, manually or automatically, aim, detect 
and engage point targets, or are meant for smoke or flaring, or where their use is regulated or 
prohibited by other treaties. While the exception or exclusion for flare or smoke ammunition 
was uncontested, the other two posed more problems, at least for the CMC.  
The exception for munitions designed to aim, detect and engage point targets was 
drafted with a view to sensor-fused weapons. The CMC had circulated certain key principles 
that it considered essential for any future treaty on cluster munitions. On the question of 
sensor-fused weapons, it stated that the CMC believed that the burden of proof must be on 
governments to demonstrate that such weapons do not cause unacceptable harm to civilians, 
that they do not have an indiscriminate wide area effect and that they do not leave behind 
large numbers of duds.894 
 In specific comments to the Lima discussion text, the CMC criticised that the current 
definition could be understood as capturing primarily the container or delivery system from 
which the explosive sub-munitions are dispensed.895 Thus, the definition in the Lima 
discussion text suffered from the same flaw as the Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of 
Cluster Munitions when it originally entered into force in January 2008, since what is the part 
ultimately causing civilian harm are the sub-munitions, not the container.  
In addition, on the sensor-fused exception the lack of definition for “point target” gave 
rise to concerns as to what level of precision was required in order to detect and engage such 
targets.896 
The exception for weapons whose use is regulated or prohibited under other treaties 
also posed problems in the eyes of the CMC. Rightfully, the CMC argued that this exception 
was vague, as it was not clear what weapons should be exempted, potentially landmines, 
incendiary, nuclear, biological, chemical weapons? Drawing the line to NBC and incendiary 
weapons should not be difficult if it is specified that what was to be addressed by a future 
                                                 
894 Cluster Munition Coalition, Treaty Principles, 19 June 2007, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP.7. This is an 
indication on attempts to reverse the burden of proof with regard to cluster munitions. While traditionally under 
IHL the case has to be made that a weapon should be prohibited on humanitarian grounds, here the argument is 
that weapons should be presumed to fall under a possible prohibition unless the case is made that it does not 
cause the same humanitarian concern and therefore should be exempted from a ban. 
895 Cluster Munition Coalition, “Observations by the Cluster Munition Coalition on the Chair’s discussion text 
for the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions 23-25 May 2007”, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/LIMA/statements/CMCchairtext.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
896 See ibid. 
 273
treaty on cluster munitions was conventional explosives. However, subsequent regulations or 
prohibitions on cluster munitions, for instance within the CCW, could be weaker and thus, 
such an exception could be used to undermine a cluster munition treaty concluded in the Oslo 
process.897 
These comments made clear that the Lima discussion text was in fact a good starting 
point in an attempt to show the way towards a negotiated and balanced outcome, since 
apparently it was still not ambitious enough for the CMC while it was too ambitious for 
certain states. On a positive note, the “Oslo process” gained additional momentum and 
enjoyed increased participation especially from African and Latin American countries. Thus, 
the geographical representation of participants became more diverse, and in contrast to the 
CCW, the Oslo process rapidly gained acceptance among less developed countries. 
Significantly, Cambodia and Laos, two of the most heavily affected states, participated in an 
Oslo process conference for the first time, as well as Albania, a European affected state. 
Moreover, Hungary during the conference announced a national moratorium concerning its 
cluster munitions and Peru declared its idea to create the first cluster munitions free zone in 
Latin America.898 On the other hand, it must be observed that among the new countries 
joining the process there was only one former user, Nigeria. Nevertheless, the Lima 
Conference achieved what is required for any diplomatic process to succeed, notably to 
evince support from developing countries. The increase in participation from 49 states 
participating in Oslo to 67 in Lima also meant that opponents could not simply ignore the 
“Oslo process” any more. 
Some important European states, especially Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom, were still not prepared to accept that there were no realistic prospects that concrete 
action on cluster munitions would be taken within the framework of the CCW. In addition, the 
major opponents to the “Oslo process”, in particular the United States and Russia, were 
becoming aware that control over the international agenda on cluster munitions was escaping 
them. 
These observations can be made in respect of the next meeting of the GGE of the 
CCW which convened from 19-22 June 2007. On the one hand, Germany submitted its Draft 
Protocol on Cluster Munitions already introduced at the ICRC expert meeting and at the Lima 
Conference, as well as a CCW Negotiating Mandate on Cluster Munitions, on behalf of the 
European Union which provided for a schedule of no less than three meetings to negotiate a 
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legally binding instrument that would address the humanitarian concerns of cluster munitions 
in all their aspects by the end of 2008.899 Also France strongly advocated the conclusion of a 
Protocol VI to the CCW that it did not regard as being in competition with the Oslo process 
but rather felt that the two processes would “mutually reinforce” one another. The paper on 
cluster munitions it submitted was, with slight modifications, identical to a non-paper already 
submitted to the Lima Conference and contained as key features a ban on the use, 
development, production, stockpiling and transfer of certain types of cluster munitions; the 
need not to restrict participation in coalition or alliance military operations and to preserve 
states’ defence interests; a definition of prohibited cluster munitions taking into account 
technical characteristics such as age and number of sub-munitions; an obligation to destroy 
stockpiles of prohibited cluster munitions while providing for a transition period during which 
prohibited cluster munitions could still be used, and best practice measures to improve the 
reliability and accuracy of authorised cluster munitions.900  
The United Kingdom’s position overlapped with that of France inasmuch as it also did 
not support a prohibition on all types of cluster munitions. Rather, it supported a prohibition 
only on cluster munitions other than direct-fire munitions which released more than a 
specified number of sub-munitions that in turn contained explosives but no guidance system 
or fail-safe mechanisms. Moreover, like France, the United Kingdom specifically argued that 
a transition period during which the prohibition of use would not come into effect was 
necessary; this would be consistent with the aim of changing the military capabilities without 
incurring a capability gap.901 These approaches contained many issues that remained 
controversial in the Oslo process, notably definitions based on guidance systems, numbers of 
sub-munitions, exceptions for using munitions in a direct fire mode or fail safe mechanisms; 
the need to respect the maintenance of international military coalitions and alliances as well as 
transition periods. 
On the other hand, there were signs that the major users and producers hitherto hostile 
to the Oslo process were starting to react to it to regain control over the international agenda 
on cluster munitions. This was most evident from the statements by U.S. diplomats. 
Interestingly, the most significant of these statements was not made to the CCW itself but in a 
press conference the day before the GGE meeting. There, the United States announced that it 
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was now willing to consider negotiations on a treaty to regulate rather than ban cluster 
munitions. However, any treaty had to be concluded within the CCW to enjoy U.S. support.902  
During the meeting itself, the United States argued that the impacts of cluster 
munitions were episodic and limited in scope, scale and duration as compared to other ERW; 
that there was no country in the world where cluster munitions constituted the principal ERW 
threat; and that existing resource mobilisation, coordination and clearance were sufficient to 
deal with the post-conflict problems associated with cluster munition use.903  
It may well be that in absolute terms the problems caused by cluster munitions may 
still be regarded as limited since there have been, for instance, far fewer instances to date in 
which cluster munitions have been used compared to antipersonnel mines. However, this 
statement ignores that humanitarian initiatives must sometimes also be of a preventive 
character. In this regard, it was argued that if the huge stockpiles currently in the arsenals of 
states were to get used in the future the problem on the ground would be even more severe 
than the landmine crisis that prompted the Ottawa process in the 1990s. One may observe a 
proliferation argument for the sake of the ultimate goal, the better protection of civilians from 
these weapons, in line with the fundamental thesis of this study, i.e. disarmament serving first 
and foremost a humanitarian goal. 
The fact remains that in the relatively limited circumstances in which cluster 
munitions have been used these weapons always caused a humanitarian problem. The U.S. 
statement also ignores that even within the CCW international norms have been adopted with 
a view to prevent future humanitarian problems; the perfect example in this regard is Protocol 
IV to the CCW on blinding laser weapons where weapons have been prohibited without them 
ever having been used.904 
Russia, for its part, considered that the humanitarian problems associated with cluster 
munition use could be remedied by properly implementing IHL and that it was still premature 
to even impose legally binding restrictions on the technical characteristics of cluster 
munitions.905 It also maintained that the various types of modern cluster munitions were 
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reliable and safe to use, and ensure highly effective strikes against a very wide array of 
targets.906 Other states, including Brazil, China and the Republic of Korea, also opposed 
negotiations on a new treaty on cluster munitions within the CCW.907  
In fact, it was no great concession with much practical impact by the United States to 
suddenly declare its readiness to commence negotiations on a new treaty on cluster munitions 
within the CCW. The practice of the CCW that decisions would only be taken by consensus 
made such decision unlikely due to the opposition of the above-mentioned CCW states 
parties.  
Moreover, while the GGE to the CCW could not take a decision it could propose a 
way ahead to the meeting of the states parties which was due to take place in November 2007. 
The recommendation adopted by the GGE to the CCW was that the 2007 Meeting of the High 
Contracting Parties should decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster 
munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument; striking the 
right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the 
decision.908  
Rather than making a straight recommendation to decide on negotiations the 
recommendation adopted reflected the fact that there was still no agreement on whether a new 
treaty on cluster munitions should be concluded. In view of the opposition of the above-
mentioned states it also seemed unlikely that this would fundamentally change about five 
months later at the meeting of states parties. According to this author, the GGE meeting made 
clear that the major producers and users still tended to emphasise military aspects while 
downplaying humanitarian considerations. But hope dies last, and certainly the 2007 
November meeting of states parties would mark a making or breaking point on whether the 
CCW could address the humanitarian urgency of dealing with the problems associated with 
cluster munition use. 
Those representing humanitarian interests retained a rather low key presence at the 
GGE meeting. In particular the CMC did not make any statements on behalf of the coalition 
as a whole but only circulated principles that any treaty on cluster munitions in its view 
should contain as a working paper.909 On the other hand, the ICRC summarised its legal 
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concerns on the use of cluster munitions under general IHL, i.e. the rules already discussed 
extensively by this author in Chapter 3, the rule of distinction, the rule prohibiting 
indiscriminate attacks, the rule of proportionality, and the rule on feasible precautions. This 
legal analysis caused it to strongly argue for the development of new and specific regulations 
in view of the specific characteristics of cluster munitions as well as their history of causing 
severe humanitarian problems.910   
Between this GGE meeting to the CCW and the meeting of states parties, especially 
states committed to the Oslo process, in collaboration with the CMC, the ICRC and UN 
agencies like UNDP, put a lot of effort into further entrenching the humanitarian focus of the 
Oslo process on the international agenda. In this respect, three meetings with a humanitarian 
focus were held between the GGE to the CCW and the November meeting of states parties to 
the CCW: From 4-5 September 2007 the Latin American Regional Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, the Belgrade Conference of States Affected by Cluster Munitions from 3-4 
October 2007, and the European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions on 30 October 
2007. 
The Latin American Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions was held in San José, 
Costa Rica, with eighteen Latin American states participating.911 The objectives were winning 
over as many governments as possible for a proposal by core group member state Peru and 
Costa Rica on a Latin American Cluster Munition Free Zone,912 and to strengthen support by 
Latin America as a region for the strongest possible treaty in humanitarian terms concluded in 
the shortest possible time. 
 Significant progress towards achieving these aims could be made, since except for 
Cuba all Latin American states attended the conference and all states present but Brazil 
expressed support for the Oslo process. While Brazil was a substantial producer, exporter and 
stockpiler of cluster munitions, the other two Latin American producers of cluster munitions, 
Argentina and Chile, both declared that they no longer produced these weapons nor had they 
an intention to do so in the future.913 In addition, Argentina announced that it had completed 
destruction of its cluster munition stockpiles. Participants emphasised the need to conclude a 
comprehensive cluster munition treaty with obligations for stockpile destruction, clearance of 
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contaminated areas and victim assistance. In the view of Latin American governments, so-
called technical solutions like self-destruct mechanisms did not present an adequate solution 
to addressing the humanitarian concerns posed by the use of cluster munitions.914 
The Belgrade Conference on Cluster Munitions represented an especially pertinent 
opportunity to demonstrate that humanitarian considerations were at the forefront of concerns 
in the Oslo process. This was due to the fact that this conference assembled almost 
exclusively states affected by past cluster munition use, including Afghanistan, Albania, 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Croatia, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Monenegro, Sierra 
Leone, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda and Vietnam. Especially Serbia qualified as a host, 
since this country had been specially affected by the issue of cluster munitions in a variety of 
ways: It was a state contaminated by cluster munitions used during the 1999 “Operation 
Allied Force” by NATO member states United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
But it was also a state which has formerly used, produced and was still stockpiling these 
weapons.  
As had become tradition with Oslo process conferences, the CMC hosted an 
international forum on cluster munitions. At the Belgrade Civil Society Forum in particular, 
victims from Serbia, Tajikistan, Laos and Lebanon conveyed their first-hand experience of 
what it means to live in contaminated areas and their demand to include strong obligations on 
victim assistance in a future treaty. For instance, a Serbian victim of the 1999 cluster bombing 
of Niš, put forward some demands of cluster munition victims which should be understood 
not only as those directly injured by cluster munitions but also their families and affected 
communities; importantly, victim assistance in a future treaty should feature as a separate 
article and reflect the dual responsibility of the affected state itself as well as international 
actors providing assistance. Victim assistance should mean guaranteeing the implementation 
of data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support, social inclusion, economic inclusion, legal support and disability laws 
and policies, linking assistance strategies to public health, development, poverty reduction 
and disability initiatives in affected communities.915 Compulsory reporting should be required 
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of both affected and donor states to measure progress towards the implementation of victim 
assistance goals.916  
Affected States agreed that victim assistance was to comprise these elements and that 
it should be provided with a view to help ensuring the full realisation of the human rights and 
promotion of the inherent dignity of victims, including the victims, their families and 
communities. In their endeavours, affected countries should be assisted by other states in a 
position to do so.917 
Among the other aspects discussed by states in Belgrade were clearance of unexploded 
ordnance from cluster munitions, international cooperation and assistance and the prevention 
of further proliferation of cluster munitions.  
Regarding clearance, affected states recognised their obligation to clear all cluster 
munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction and control. For clearance, general surveys 
to identify contaminated areas and GPS data on the location of cluster munition remnants 
were essential. Affected States should also ensure as soon as possible that all cluster 
munitions in such areas are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other 
means and that risk education is provided to reduce civilian harm arising from sub-munition 
duds.  
In terms of international cooperation and assistance, affected States emphasised that 
they should have a right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of clearance equipment, 
scientific and technical information. Assistance should be provided by states in a position to 
do so for victim assistance, clearance, risk education and stockpile destruction through the 
United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the 
Red Cross movement, NGOs or on a bilateral basis. 
To achieve the goal of prevention of further proliferation, affected states advocated for 
a clear prohibition to transfer and stockpile cluster munitions. In this regard, the safe and 
secure destruction of stockpiles should be undertaken as soon as possible and pending the 
entry into force of a new international treaty on cluster munitions the importance of national 
moratoria on the use, production and transfer of these weapons was emphasised.918 
Declarations on contemplated national measures were made by Albania, announcing that it 
would neither produce nor trade in cluster munitions, by Uganda and Montenegro which 
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declared their intention to destroy their stockpiles, as well as Serbia which was considering a 
national moratorium.919  
Another highlight of this conference was the declaration of the UN common position 
on cluster munitions agreed by the heads of all UN agencies at an inter-agency coordination 
meeting in September 2007. The UN demanded that for addressing the humanitarian, human 
rights and developmental effects of cluster munitions, a legally binding instrument of 
international humanitarian law that prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling 
and transfer of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians; that requires the 
destruction of stockpiles and that provides for clearance, risk education and other risk 
mitigation activities, as well as actions for victim assistance, for cooperation, and for 
compliance and transparency measures was necessary. Until such treaty was adopted the UN 
called on states to take domestic measures to freeze the use and transfer of all cluster 
munitions. A very practical expression of UN support for the Oslo process was the 
organisation of sponsorship programmes by UNDP needed for participants from developing 
countries in Oslo process conferences.920  
This may serve to dispel misconceptions that the initiators of the Oslo process have 
taken this issue out of the UN. Rather, the Belgrade Conference again underlined that the 
issue of cluster munitions had been taken out of the traditional diplomatic forum to address 
specific regulations or prohibitions based on IHL, the CCW. The alternative forum had been 
created because the CCW forum placed the perceived military needs of users and producers 
above humanitarian considerations and because this forum required consensus to take any 
decision.  
However, it did not follow that a process driven above all by humanitarian concerns, 
i.e. victim perspectives, was without backing of the UN. The Belgrade Conference also made 
clear that part of this humanitarian focus was preventive. As the Norwegian Ambassador in 
his opening statement to the conference put it:  
“Many of you can confirm the horrible consequences of the use of cluster munitions, and would agree 
that it is vital to prevent the proliferation of the billions of submunitions currently stockpiled. An 
instrument that prevents transfer of cluster munitions will be an instrument that prevents a humanitarian 
disaster of a larger magnitude than the landmines represented 10 years ago.”921 
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Half of the European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions was devoted o the 
issue of stockpile destruction and thus, to one of the areas of the future treaty which should 
function in a preventive manner. Several presentations highlighted technical and financial 
challenges posed by stockpile destruction. Among the aspects commonly agreed by 
participants were that adequate attention should be paid to a framework for cooperation and 
assistance to account for both the lack of technical or financial capacities that certain 
stockpiler countries may have and that transparency and the exchange of technical 
information could be properly considered. On the other hand, discussions highlighted 
differences especially on the timeframe during which future states parties to a cluster 
munition treaty would be obliged to destroy their stockpiles and on whether the retention of a 
certain number of a stockpile should be permitted for keeping destruction or clearance 
capabilities.922  
Like the Belgrade Conference, the European Regional Conference also extensively 
discussed the humanitarian challenge to provide victim assistance in a future international 
treaty on cluster munitions. Once again, a conference in the Oslo process emphasised a core 
feature for which this process was different from other attempts to deal with cluster 
munitions, notably to integrate a victim perspective as its fundamental rationale. As the 
Norwegian Ambassador emphasised, the plight of victims provided a reality check to 
diplomatic efforts to conclude a cluster munition treaty. With this in mind, diplomats would 
not be so easily trapped into drifting into the technical details based on theoretical tests and 
far removed from the reality of the suffering of victims which usually dominate multilateral 
arms negotiations.923 On the question of a provision in a future cluster munition treaty, it was 
emphasised that the obligation to provide victim assistance should be on the same footing as 
the other elements of the future convention, including clearance and stockpile destruction, and 
also subject to state reporting obligations. Furthermore, a broad definition of victim as 
encompassing the direct victims but also their families and affected communities, was 
advocated as well as a human-rights based approach inspired by the recent CRPD. This 
general human rights approach is reflected in the demand that the obligation to provide victim 
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assistance is primarily incumbent upon the territorial state in line with the traditional 
territorial focus of HRL. On the other hand, this obligation should be complemented by an 
obligation of other states parties in a position to do so to support these assistance efforts. This 
is in line with the obligation to have recourse not only to national but also to international 
resources to progressively realise especially economic and social human rights. 924 
Altogether, the three smaller conferences in San José, Belgrade and Brussels could be 
considered successful in driving the victim-orientated and human-rights inspired international 
agenda of the Oslo process. The pressure mounted for the CCW meeting of states parties in 
November to itself deal with the issue of cluster munitions in a concrete and urgent manner. 
This pressure also mounted as a result of an urgent appeal made by the ICRC in October 
2007.  
In that appeal, the ICRC emphasised the important aspect of prevention of 
proliferation of large amounts of stockpiles of cluster munitions. From the expert meeting in 
April 2007, the ICRC had come up with its own conclusions, notably that to date, the armed 
forces of the main users of cluster munitions had not presented concrete evidence that the 
specific military results to be achieved by the use of these weapons would outweigh their well 
documented humanitarian concerns and that technological fixes like improving the reliability 
of fuses or adding self-destruct mechanisms could be the sole solution to addressing the 
humanitarian problems. Based on these conclusions the ICRC called for the urgent adoption 
of a new treaty which would prohibit the use, development, production, stockpiling and 
transfer of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions, require the elimination of current 
stockpiles and provide for victim assistance, clearance and activities to minimise the impact 
of these weapons on civilians. Until such treaty was adopted, states should immediately end 
the use of cluster munitions on a national level, not transfer them to anyone and destroy 
existing stockpiles. The ICRC also made clear remarks on what the process to negotiate a new 
treaty should as well as what it should not look like; in the view of the ICRC the process 
should have a clear commitment to a new treaty completely prohibiting those weapons 
causing the humanitarian problem and a time frame for negotiations. At the same time, the 
ICRC cautioned against avoiding a repetition of disappointing efforts on anti-vehicle mines 
where after more than five years no new internationally binding rules within the CCW could 
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be agreed on. It also expressed its concern about decision making processes that not only 
seek, but in practice require, consensus before any decision could be taken.925 
With the guardian of IHL expressing quite clearly that it expected the states party 
meeting to the CCW meeting to come up with a clear time frame for negotiating a treaty 
prohibiting cluster munitions it became clear that this meeting marked a turning point for the 
relationship between the Oslo and the CCW processes. It will be recalled that Oslo process 
participants like Germany but also others sought to use what they saw as a reinvigorated 
CCW process to produce the most effective result on cluster munitions on the ground through 
the inclusion of major producers, users and stockpilers of the weapon. In this regard, Germany 
indeed stated that it considered “the adoption of the proposed clear and substantive 
negotiating mandate to be a decisive litmus test” for the CCW.926  
The mandate referred to was nothing less than a mandate submitted by the EU “to 
establish a Group of Governmental Experts with a schedule of no less than three meetings to 
negotiate a legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns of cluster 
munitions by the end of 2008.”927 Significantly, what the EU had in mind was prohibition of 
use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to 
civilians.  
It was remarkable that at least all states agreed that the use of cluster munitions posed 
a humanitarian problem, even those states that had ignored or downplayed these concerns at 
the Third Review Conference one year earlier. This would provide some support for the 
argument of certain states participating in the Oslo process that this process would reinforce 
the CCW framework.  
However, it became clear from the first day that negotiations even on a limited 
prohibition of cluster munitions would not be achievable. For instance, Russia still made it 
clear that it was opposed to any negotiations at this point.928 Other states like the United 
States, Pakistan or Brazil still emphasised the military utility of cluster munitions that needed 
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to be taken into account.929 Some states also emphasised that the CCW was the most 
appropriate forum as it included the major producers, users and stockpilers of cluster 
munitions and struck the appropriate balance between military and humanitarian 
considerations.930  
These arguments were nothing new and doubts remain as to their strength: As to the 
first part, inclusion of all major military powers, while this is true as a general proposition, 
once again the fact that any decision, even those to initiate negotiations have to be taken by 
consensus means that the CCW will most often not live up to the potential to achieve 
meaningful results on the ground. If only one of these military powers does not give its stamp 
of approval then no results at all can be achieved. As for the second part, the balance between 
military and humanitarian concerns, it is to be doubted whether the CCW often achieves to 
balance the two, since many of those states that have a humanitarian interest in the issue of 
cluster munitions, affected and less developed states, are not states parties to the CCW. 
Furthermore, as both the ICRC and the CMC in its opening statement emphasised, concrete 
evidence of the military utility or necessity was scarce compared to the thorough 
documentation of humanitarian harm caused by the use of these weapons. 
These persistent differences also explain the somewhat peculiar decision taken by the 
meeting of states parties on 13 November 2007 after little public debate and many informal 
consultations. It read in its most relevant part:  
“The Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided that the GGE [Group of Governmental 
Experts] will negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, 
while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.”931  
 
The wording of “negotiate a proposal” is tortuous, as it does not state that the objective 
of negotiations would be international legally binding rules, let alone that a prohibition of 
                                                 
929 United States of America, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 7 November 
2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/US-statement-nov7.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010); Pakistan, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 7 
November 2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Pakistan-statement-
nov7.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); Brazil, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the 
CCW, 7 November 2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Brazil-
statement-nov7.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
930 Republic of Korea, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 7 November 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Korea-statement-nov7.pdf (last visited 
25 January 2010); Japan, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 7 November 
2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Japan-statement-nov7.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010); China, Opening Statement to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 7 
November 2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/China-statement-
nov7.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010); United States, Opening Statement, supra note 929. 
931 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Report, UN Doc. CCW/MSP/2007/5, 3 December 
2007. 
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cluster munitions would be pursued. Moreover, the mandate also failed to establish a time 
frame in which tangible results were to be achieved.  
The reactions to the outcome clearly reflected the fact that the CCW had missed this 
turning point for coming up with a concrete decision which reflected the humanitarian 
urgency of the problems associated with cluster munitions. A number of states, including 
Austria, Mexico, New Zealand and Switzerland, did not hide their disappointment about the 
fact that they would have expected the CCW to decide on a negotiating mandate for a new 
treaty prohibiting cluster munitions by 2008.932  
The EU as a whole could not be content with this outcome either, since this meant that 
the EU’s proposal for a negotiating mandate on a prohibition of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians by 2008 was rejected. On the other hand, Russia stated that it 
still harboured doubts as to any negotiations and that it was neither prepared to support 
proposals weakening its possibilities for defence nor that proposals should be in the form of 
technical fixes or have any economic and financial consequences. If technical proposals 
should be necessary, they should be in the form of recommendations and must be 
accompanied by a transition period.933 Therefore, while states participating in the CCW 
meeting of high contracting parties agreed on the humanitarian problem associated with the 
use of cluster munitions, the decision demonstrated that the rift between states on how to 
address the problem would not be overcome fast or easily. The CCW could be said to have 
failed the “litmus test” as Germany had put it. 
As a consequence, especially the CMC emphasised that efforts should now be invested 
in the Oslo process while it was hopeless to still count on the CCW to address humanitarian 
concerns associated with cluster munition use in a meaningful manner, i.e. through a ban. In 
this regard, the CMC urged states to engage in substantive work on a new treaty in the next 
                                                 
932 Austria, Concluding Statement to the Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 13 November 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Austria_Nov13.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010); Mexico, Intervención de la Delegación de Mexico en la Reunión Anual de Los Estados Partes de 
la Convención sobre Prohibiciones o Restricciones del Empleo de Ciertas Armas Convencionales que Puedan 
Considerarse Excesivamente Nocivas o de Efectos Indiscriminados (CCAC) Sobre el Tema Relativo a Las 
Municiones en Racimo, 13 November 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Mexico_Nov13.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010); New Zealand, Concluding Statement to the Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, 13 November 
2007, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/NZ-statement-nov13.pdf (last 
visited 25 January 2010); Switzerland, Déclaration de M. L´Ambassadeur Jürg Streuli, Reunion des Hautes 
Parties Contractantes, Convention sur l´interdiction où  la limitation de l´emploi de certaines armes classiques, 
13 November 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Switzerland_Nov13.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010). 
933 K. Harrison, “Report on the Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Geneva, 7-13 November 2007”,  
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/CCW_8MEET/MSPReport2007.html (last visited 25 January 2010). 
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Oslo process conference in Vienna due to be held from 5-7 December 2007.934 Certain of the 
states participating in the Oslo process also explicitly reaffirmed their support for the Oslo 
process alongside their readiness to continue work on cluster munitions within the CCW.935 In 
fact, this 2007 meeting of the states parties was a turning point; it signalled that only the Oslo 
process had the potential to deliver a new treaty on cluster munitions in a time frame that 
reflected the humanitarian urgency of the issue despite the often quoted “complementarity” 
between the two processes. Accordingly, all eyes were on Vienna to see how much support 
the alternative rather than complementary Oslo process could garner and how far states would 
be able to agree on substantive elements for a future treaty there. 
 
 
5.2.4. The Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 5-7 December 2007 
 
Like before the last major Oslo process conference in Lima, also in the lead-up to the 
Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, a new discussion text for a future Convention on 
Cluster Munitions was forwarded by the core-group members. In comparison to the Lima 
discussion text, the Vienna discussion text936 contained the following modifications: Firstly, 
the proposed definition of cluster munitions in Article 2 was worded in much simpler a 
fashion. “Cluster munition” was defined as “a munition that is designed to disperse or release 
explosive sub-munitions, and includes those explosive sub-munitions.” The Vienna 
discussion text also contained a separate definition of “explosive sub-munitions” as 
“munitions that in order to perform their task separate from a parent munition and are 
designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or immediately after 
impact.” As opposed to the Lima draft, the Vienna draft omitted any specific references to 
what would be excluded from the definition, including on sensor-fused weapons, smoke or 
flare ammunition, or weapons regulated or prohibited by other treaties. Most strikingly, the 
draft did not use the wording of “cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” 
                                                 
934 Cluster Munition Coalition, “No hope for cluster bomb ban in Geneva but momentum grows for Vienna 
treaty talks”, Press Release, 13 November 2007 (on file with the author). 
935 Austria, Concluding Statement, supra note 932; New Zealand, Concluding Statement, supra note 932; 
Ireland, Concluding Statement to CCW MSP, 13 November 2007, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/CCW_8MSP_Nov2007/Ireland-nov13.pdf (last visited 25 
January 2010). New Zealand was most outspoken on the issue of the relationship between the Oslo process and 
the CCW, stating that the difficulty the CCW was having in dealing meaningfully with the cluster munitions 
issue meant that much of its effort in 2008 would be directed towards fulfilling the specific, measurable and 
time-bound commitment undertaken in Oslo in February. 
936 See Annexes, infra pp. 384-390. 
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any more. The draft also ensured that both the container and the explosive sub-munitions 
would be adequately covered by the prohibitions. 
With regard to the obligations to destroy stockpiles of cluster munitions under the 
proposed Art. 3, the drafters only provided for one possibility for extending the initial 
deadline of six years for a period of up to ten years rather than providing for repeated 
extension requests as in the Lima discussion text. 
As for the obligations to clear and destroy cluster munition remnants under the 
proposed Art. 4, the deadline for clearance was reduced from ten to five years, which was 
very ambitious given the extent of contamination with cluster munition remnants in countries 
such as Laos. The drafters also took more care than in the Lima text to model the individual 
steps that future states parties were obliged to take more closely after CCW Protocol V on 
ERW, in particular after Art. 3 of Protocol V. In this regard, mandatory measures according to 
the proposed Art. 4 of the Vienna draft included to survey and assess the threat posed by 
cluster munition remnants (taken almost verbatim from Art. 3 (3) (a) of Protocol V); to assess 
and prioritise needs and practicability in terms of marking, protection of civilians and 
clearance and destruction and take steps to mobilise resources to carry out these activities 
(modelled after Arts. 3 (3) (b) and (d) of Protocol V).  
Entirely new provisions proposed by the Vienna discussion text were Arts. 4 (4) and 6 
(4) which enshrined an obligation of former user states to provide assistance to an affected 
state. The proposed provisions, if adopted, would have been revolutionary. They would have 
had retroactive effect as opposed to Art. 3 (2) Protocol V to the CCW which included a 
special user responsibility but this responsibility would not cover past uses of cluster 
munitions. The proposed Arts. 4 (4) and 6 (4) would have also addressed inadequacies in the 
general regime of HRL applicable post-conflict and the reality that cluster munitions have 
been used to a large extent in IAC in the past. In the aftermath of such conflicts, as shown 
supra, it is the territorial state that has the general obligation to protect, most importantly, the 
right to life of its own population from cluster munition remnants.937 However, if the 
territorial state was not the user of cluster munitions in the first place it will not have adequate 
knowledge on where remnants are located on its territory. Thus, it seems legitimate to insert 
special obligations incumbent on a past user, especially to provide recorded information on 
the location of cluster munition remnants, to build upon the existing non-retroactive 
formulation of such obligations in Protocol V to the CCW and to complement existing HRL. 
                                                 
937 See supra pp. 145-154. 
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The victim assistance obligations and thus, also another important HRL component of 
the future treaty, was also strengthened compared to the Lima discussion text, as the wording 
“shall … adequately provide” no longer left any doubt that the obligation to provide 
assistance to victims was to be considered hard law as opposed to the somewhat 
programmatic wording “shall endeavour” that the Lima text still employed. In addition, the 
Vienna discussion text made provision for data collection, included a reporting obligation on 
measures of victim assistance in the future Art. 7 on transparency measures, and made 
reference to the rights of cluster munition victims and the CRPD in some proposed 
preambular paragraphs.  
On the other hand, in the proposed Art. 1 the Vienna discussion text, while 
maintaining the major thrust of the Lima discussion text with prohibitions on the use, 
development, production, stockpile, transfer as well as on assistance with any of the 
prohibited acts, the scope of the prohibition of assistance was modified. Before, a prohibition 
to assist, encourage or induce anyone, in any way, to engage in any activity prohibited to a 
state party was envisaged by the proposed Art. 1 (c); now, the scope of the prohibition was 
reduced to a prohibition of assistance, encouragement or inducement of anyone to engage in 
any activity and the reference to “in any way” was omitted.  
The structure of the proposed Art. 1 derives from the one found in the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. As already shown supra, certain future states parties 
during the travaux préparatoires to the Ottawa Convention raised the concern of the 
prohibition of assistance interfering unduly with military interoperability with states not party 
to the convention. The solution adopted in the antipersonnel mine context was that states 
concerned issued interpretative declarations which clarified that the mere participation in joint 
military operations with states not party to the convention would not infringe the prohibition 
of assistance. Indeed, the way the prohibition of assistance was worded [“in any way”] in the 
Ottawa Convention made the prohibition extremely broad on the face of it. However, as has 
been argued supra, the elements of “specifically” and “knowingly” should be read into the 
meaning of prohibited assistance.938 
Arguably, the deletion of the three words “in any way” may provide comfort for those 
that may have concerns that joint military operations with states not party to the future cluster 
munition treaty would be effectively precluded through a broad prohibition of assistance. 
                                                 
938 See supra pp. 225-227. 
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However, as we shall see, this alone was not sufficient to accommodate those states that 
voiced this military concern of interoperability. 
Aside from this marginal military concession, overall, the Vienna discussion text 
focused on further strengthening the humanitarian aspects of the future treaty rather than 
making more concessions on security and military aspects. In particular, the views of certain 
states arguing for exceptions from the definition of prohibited cluster munitions, for inserting 
an explicit provision preserving military interoperability or for the possibility to retain a 
certain number of cluster munitions for developing clearance and disposal capabilities in 
Lima were not incorporated in the Vienna discussion text itself. Instead, the core group 
members took note of conflicting positions on these issues in an Explanatory Annex to the 
main text.939 
The importance of the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions could not be 
underestimated, as general agreement on the human rights elements of the future treaty could 
be achieved. In this regard, again the presence of victims as the human faces of suffering from 
the effects of cluster munitions ensured that states never lost sight of the central humanitarian 
rationale of the Oslo process. Virtually all states, for instance, sought to even strengthen the 
proposed provision on victim assistance, and there was almost unanimous agreement that the 
definition of “victim” to be enshrined in the future treaty should be broad and should include 
the families and whole affected communities besides the direct victims. Moreover, there was 
broad agreement on the human rights-based approach to victim assistance, which also 
embodied the notion of providing victim assistance on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus, the 
primary obligations would be imposed on the territorial state. It was felt, however, that these 
primary obligations must be complemented by efforts by the international community to 
enable capacities in the territorial state. Repeatedly, the obligation to report annually on 
measures taken to provide victim assistance was also endorsed by participants.940  
As for the substantive elements of victim assistance, these largely corresponded to the 
specific elements already agreed on by states parties to the Ottawa Convention, except for the 
establishment, implementation and enforcement of national laws and policies. States also 
generally recognised the need to provide a framework for international cooperation and 
assistance to affected states. In this context, quite a few states expressed their support for 
                                                 
939 See Annexes infra p. 390. 
940 For a summary of the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, see K. Harrison, “Report from the Vienna 
Conference on Cluster Munitions 5-7 December”, at 20-22, 28, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/ViennaReport.pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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special obligations for users to assist with the clearance of cluster munition remnants caused 
by their past use while the view was also put forward that one needed to be careful about 
enshrining special obligations that retroactively addressed actions occurring 30, 40 years 
ago.941  
As regards the positive future obligations of clearance, developed states especially 
stressed that in this matter, a deadline should be incorporated that would allow affected states 
to meet this deadline; the five year deadline envisaged in the Vienna discussion text was 
considered too brief by many states including by Laos, the most severely affected state.942  
The Vienna Conference not only served as an opportunity to consolidate agreement on 
the human rights oriented aspects of the future treaty but also to review the state of affairs 
regarding the more contentious disarmament components. As was to be expected, the 
definition of prohibited cluster munitions continued to be the most vexing issue. The general 
positions were largely unchanged in comparison to the Lima conference but participants were 
more specific about what they wanted to see in a future cluster munition treaty.  
At this conference, the issue of whether cluster munitions with self-destruct 
mechanisms would not cause unacceptable harm to civilians was in the centre of debate. This 
debate was carried on to a more concrete level with the presentation of the report “M85: An 
analysis of reliability” published by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the 
NGO Norwegian People’s Aid and a UK clearance expert.943  
The report critically examined the proposition that the equipment of explosive sub-
munitions with self-destruct fuses coupled with a maximum failure rate percentage of 1 or 2% 
could effectively prevent post-conflict civilian harm associated with the use of these weapons. 
These claims were especially analysed in the aftermath of concrete combat conditions in 
respect of the submunition type M85. This particular type was widely acknowledged to 
represent the “benchmark” among explosive sub-munitions with self-destruct mechanisms, 
and this was the only type with such secondary fuse to be actually used in combat by the UK 
in Iraq in 2003 and by Israel in Lebanon in 2006.944  
The report drew upon field research into unexploded M85 sub-munitions found in 
Lebanon. Significantly, it was emphasised that conditions for deployment of cluster munitions 
in Lebanon were rather favourable, since the models used were relatively new, they were 
deployed onto predominantly hard and lightly vegetated ground, in good climatic conditions 
                                                 
941 Ibid., at 23. 
942 Ibid., at 16. 
943 King et al., “M85: An analysis of reliability”, supra note 83. 
944 Ibid., at 8-9. 
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and Israeli gun crews were in home territory and thus, had to cope with comparatively low 
levels of stress. 
 Still, the actual failure rate of these M85 determined on the ground on the basis of 
strike site samples was nowhere near the 1 or 2 % failure rate claimed by manufacturers or 
users but rather around 10%. Accordingly, in more adverse combat conditions, such as when 
old, poorly maintained stockpiles are used by undisciplined soldiers in more stressful 
conditions and fired onto soft, heavily vegetated ground, the actual failure rates may still be 
higher.  
Moreover, as the M85 is among the most highly sophisticated sub-munitions with that 
kind of mechanical self-destruct fuse, the authors stated that it was unlikely that any similar 
explosive sub-munitions would achieve significantly better results under combat conditions. 
 Further, even if such a minimum percentage could be achieved the sheer numbers of 
sub-munitions used would still account for a large number of duds.945 The authors also drew 
attention to the fact that current testing regimes were inadequate to realistically simulate real 
combat performance of the self-destruct mechanisms, as not only systemic failures were 
among the causes why self-destruct mechanisms malfunctioned but also human error and 
environmental factors. Such factors are difficult to take into account in testing regimes.946  
Despite this field-based evidence, certain states continued to hold the position that 
cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms or with a failure rate of less than 1% should 
be exempted from the prohibitions.947 Other states regarded it as necessary to define cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians along reliability and accuracy criteria.948 
Further, some states proposed to exempt certain weapons with low numbers of sub-munitions, 
for instance, ten.949 Another solution proposed was to exclude sensor-fused weapons from a 
prohibition because such sub-munition based systems would have an individual targeting 
                                                 
945 Ibid., at 21-22, 31. 
946 Ibid., at 39. 
947 Finland and Japan favoured a general exemption for cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms. 
Denmark, France and Germany advocated for an immediate prohibition of cluster munitions without self-
destruct mechanisms and a failure rate of more than 1 % while those falling outside of this category should be 
phased out after a transition period of 10 years. Statements to the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 6 
December 2007 (personal notes by this author). 
948 Among these states were Canada, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. See ibid. 
949 Ibid. The Czech Republic, Italy and the United Kingdom proposed exemptions for cluster munitions with 
lower numbers of sub-munitions. 
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capability.950 Finally, certain states also argued in favour of exempting cluster munitions 
being used in a direct fire mode.951 
However, those who supported exceptions for certain weapons from a prohibition 
largely did not make any more concrete IHL arguments as to the military necessity that 
outweighed humanitarian concerns in those particular cases. The only more concrete military 
argument made was that in high-intensity armed conflicts when opponents or multiple mobile 
targets must be destroyed rapidly cluster munitions could be an appropriate means as well as 
certain types of cluster munitions in a force protection role, i.e. to ensure that adversaries 
cannot use their weapons and stay in their foxholes against a friendly force.952  
Other statements contained a mere reference to national defence without providing any 
more concrete reasoning. Still, one may particularly doubt as to whether a short-term military 
advantage would be able to outweigh the long-term humanitarian harm through duds that 
would be left on a state’s territory, were it to use these weapons in a last resort of self-
defence. Quite a few times, the argument for a prohibition with exceptions was maintained by 
mentioning the necessity of crafting a treaty that could be ratified by major users and 
producers absent from the Oslo process.953 This argument would, however, not likely serve 
the fundamental humanitarian objective of the process, since a treaty, if any, acceptable to the 
United States or Russia would involve such broad exception from a prohibition that protection 
of civilians from the consistent dangers associated with all cluster munitions used to date 
would not be guaranteed. 
Closely connected to the question of the definition was also the proposal by a few 
states to grant states parties a transition period of ten years during which certain more 
advanced types of cluster munitions could still be used while after that period they would 
have to be replaced by alternatives.954 However, making provision for a transition period 
during which a weapon that has been identified to cause unacceptable harm to civilians could 
                                                 
950 Ibid. Australia stated that sensor-fused weapons should be excluded from the definition of cluster munitions. 
951 Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom expressed support for an exception of this kind. See 
Statements to the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 6 December 2007 (personal notes of this author). On 
objections to an exclusion from the definition of cluster munitions based on a direct fire delivery mode, see 
supra pp. 206-207. 
952 Statement by the United Kingdom, Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 6 December 2007 (personal 
notes by this author). 
953 For instance, Algeria, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Japan , Morocco and the United Kingdom insisted on the 
participation of major users and producers of cluster munitions. See Harrison, “Report from the Vienna 
Conference”, supra note 940, at 14-15. 
954 In particular, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom considered a transition period to be 
necessary. See ibid., at 13. 
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still be used would run counter to the humanitarian urgency of the problem to be addressed in 
the future treaty. 
At the other end of the spectrum were quite a few states that wanted to see a 
prohibition of cluster munitions without such exceptions.955 While there was thus no 
agreement as to the scope of the prohibition, certain exclusions from the definition became 
clear such as smoke, flare and chaff ammunitions or antipersonnel mines. 
Another military concern that came more prominently to the fore in Vienna was that of 
interoperability. The problems regarding that issue have already extensively been reviewed in 
the Austrian national context.956 Interoperability today may be regarded as a national security 
concern, since many states, especially NATO member states, inextricably link their national 
security with the capabilities of the alliance. Suffice it to state here that those states raising 
issues of maintaining their capability to conduct joint military operations with future states not 
party to a cluster munition treaty indicated that this problem could not be resolved in the same 
manner as in the Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines.  
Accordingly, it was proposed that clear provision in the treaty text itself be made 
rather than addressing this concern by unilateral interpretative declarations.957 This signalled 
to other states participating in the Oslo process that states with interoperability concerns 
would not be content unless specific treaty language besides the prohibition of assistance 
would be included to allow for continued participation in joint military operations and 
cooperation.958  
Finally, in terms of stockpile destruction, besides different views on whether the 
deadline of six years was adequate, some states also favoured an exception for retaining a 
                                                 
955 Among these states were Austria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, Luxembourg, Mali, Nigeria, Norway, 
Mexico, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tajikistan. See ibid., at 10. 
956 See supra pp. 214-231. 
957 The issue of interoperability was raised by Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. While Australia maintained that resolving 
interoperability problems was a “red line issue” for them, the Czech Republic stated that the future treaty must 
contain clear provisions to allow for interoperability with states not party, or NATO member states would not be 
able to participate. See Harrison, “Report from the Vienna Conference”, supra note 940, at 13-14. 
958 Although arguments were made similar to the arguments that were already presented by this author in the 
discussion of the drafting history of Austrian national legislation prohibiting cluster munitions. For instance, 
Norway rightfully drew attention to the fact that issues arising under interoperability have existed in all 
multinational operations where different states are bound by different legal obligations and mentioned that it was 
a NATO member itself. However, it should not be automatically assumed that the future convention would 
create an obstacle for joint military operations. Austria also questioned the need to include a specific exemption 
for interoperability, as the use of cluster munitions will increasingly become a non-issue in international 
operations. Moreover, also states with a total ban on cluster munitions like Austria could continue their 
engagements in UN peacekeeping operations. See Harrison, “Report from the Vienna Conference”, supra note 
940, at 14. 
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limited number of live samples of cluster munitions for clearance training and the 
development of cluster munition countermeasures, i.e. measures to defend against cluster 
munition attacks.959 However, others pointed towards the fact that for these purposes live 
ammunition was normally not used and that in the context of the Ottawa Convention a similar 
exception had raised issues of abuse.960 
Besides an in-depth discussion and identification of areas of convergence and 
divergence, the Vienna Conference was most notable in assembling the highest number of 
states (138) of the entire Oslo process. The greatest increase in participants came again from 
developing countries, especially from Africa. But also the Asia and Pacific, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, as well as the Middle East and North Africa regions were represented in larger 
numbers than in previous Oslo process conferences. This left no doubt about the global 
dimension that the Oslo process had acquired. Almost all affected states with significant 
contamination of their territory were present, including for the first time Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Tajikistan which also endorsed the Oslo Declaration, and Vietnam.961  
While the biggest users, producers and stockpilers, including Russia, the United 
States, Israel, Brazil, India, Pakistan or South Korea remained outside this process, the 
presence of such a large number of states certainly increased the momentum for widespread 
international condemnation of these weapons, which would raise the political costs for these 
states to use these weapons in the future.  
The great increase in the participation of developing countries, especially from Africa, 
also meant that these states were sympathetic to the prevention rationale underlying the Oslo 
process, notably to prevent huge stockpiles from being used in the future. Since many of these 
countries had experienced armed conflicts first hand and Africa was the biggest dumping 
ground for weapons produced in the West, it came as no surprise that Ghana announced on 
behalf of the African Union that it intended to build a common AU position on a complete 
ban on cluster munitions.962 Uganda, for its part, declared its intention to co-host an African 
regional cluster munitions conference in March 2008.963  
Consequently, the pressure also mounted on Australia, Canada and certain European 
states to provide more detailed arguments for the exceptions they were seeking or 
compromise. With the end of the Vienna Conference, the attention already turned to 
                                                 
959 Ibid., at 13. An exception to the obligations on stockpile destruction along these lines was especially 
supported by Australia, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland.   
960Ibid.  Compare statements by Norway and the CMC. 
961 Ibid., at 28-29. 
962 Ibid., at 5. 
963 Ibid. 
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Wellington where the next Oslo process conference would take place. While the Vienna 
Conference was already crucial for identifying broad convergence on the human rights related 
aspects and the gulfs on the disarmament aspects still to be bridged, the Wellington 
Conference would still be more decisive, as the ultimate aim of this conference would be to 
rally as many states as possible behind a Final Declaration. That Final Declaration would 
establish the substantive basis, the Draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, on which formal 
negotiations would take place in Dublin in May 2008. 
 
5.2.5. The Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions: Bumps on the Road 
Towards the Wellington Declaration 
 
As with previous Oslo process conferences, the core-group again presented a revised 
discussion text, naming it “Draft Cluster Munitions Convention”.964 Technically, however, it 
remained to be seen if this draft would be accepted by as large a number of states as possible 
in light of the clear areas of divergence identified on several issues in Vienna. 
 Despite the fact that certain states had expressed their discomfort with Art. 1 as 
proposed in Vienna, since it did not foresee a transition period or accommodated concerns on 
interoperability, the text before delegations in Wellington did not contain revisions taking 
these issues into account.965 Moreover, the new text in its proposed Art. 2 also did not make 
provision for exceptions from the definition of cluster munitions for certain types of weapons 
on the basis of accuracy or reliability criteria like fail safe mechanisms, sensor fusing 
technology, a certain failure or a lower number of sub-munitions. The only exclusions from 
the definition of cluster munitions found in the Wellington text were those considered 
uncontroversial, notably for munitions to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics, chaff and 
those merely producing electrical or electronic effects, since these weapons do not contain 
explosives that lie at the root of the humanitarian problem to be addressed. 
 Therefore, opposition from those that supported specific exceptions for these areas 
could be expected. This time, the opposition took on a more coordinated manner (a group of 
around 15 states calling themselves “like-mindeds”)966 and in the form of concrete textual 
proposals.  
                                                 
964 For its text, see Annexes infra, pp. 391-399. 
965 The only change included was to exclude mines from the scope of the Convention under the newly proposed 
Art. 1 (2). 
966 These states included Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  The term “like-minded” 
was used by France in its closing statement at the Wellington Conference, speaking on behalf of all these 
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With regard to Art. 1 (c) and the concerns by certain states a prohibition of assistance 
to anyone, including states not party, to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party 
raised with military interoperability, Australia presented a discussion paper where these 
concerns were articulated in depth.967 The paper was useful in providing illustrative scenarios 
in which the proposed prohibition of assistance would interfere with interoperability in 
multinational operations as well as an interpretation of the prohibition of assistance and clarity 
on the options to solve these concerns.  
The scenarios outlined (air support, refuelling services, multinational staff functions or 
an air traffic controller from a state party that passes coordinates for a target to aircraft from a 
state not party using or likely to use cluster munitions) largely correspond to those already 
described by this author when discussing the interoperability exception contained in an early 
Bill of the Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions.968 Thus, one can 
agree that challenges to interoperability are posed by the prohibition of assistance in such 
situations, especially with regard to the prohibition to assist in the use or transfer of cluster 
munitions. 
One can also agree to the Australian analysis that assistance, encouragement, 
inducement in this context would presumably require mental and causation elements to be 
satisfied, i.e. acts which have and are intended to have a substantial effect in facilitating a 
specific act prohibited under the future convention.969 Nothing else transpires from this 
author’s analysis supra based on the almost identical prohibition of assistance in the Ottawa 
Convention and Art. 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.970 Thus, assistance should be 
understood as making a specific and direct contribution to an act prohibited to a state party 
with direct or indirect intent (i.e. at least knowledge that this contribution/assistance will 
probably be used for a prohibited act). This understanding of assistance would make it clear 
that the simple participation in combined operations with states not party that may use cluster 
munitions would not be prohibited; that this would not, as such, preclude national forces to be 
engaged in headquarters, missions or other planning activities while embedded with personnel 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries except for Spain. See Statement by France on behalf of like-minded countries, Closing Plenary of the 
Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/France-et-al-
closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
967 Australia, “Discussion Paper Cluster Munitions and Inter-operability, supra note 785. The paper was 
explicitly supported by Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
968 See supra pp. 227-228. 
969 Australia, “Discussion Paper Cluster Munitions and Interoperability”, supra note 785, at 2. 
970 See supra pp. 226-229. 
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of states not party; that this would not preclude, as such, calling in close air support from 
personnel of states not party or prevent, as such, national forces from providing logistical 
support to forces of states not party; or that this would prevent, as such, states not party from 
having military bases on the territory of a state party or using a state party’s ports.971  
Rather, the participation in specific operations involving cluster munitions used or 
transferred by a state not party would be prohibited. The participation in the planning of 
individual sorties involving cluster munitions would be prohibited. The request for air support 
or the provision of logistics with at least indirect intent would be prohibited. Finally, there is 
nothing wrong with states not party using ports of a state party as long as the state party 
would not regard it as probable that the state not party is stockpiling cluster munitions on its 
territory or transporting cluster munitions through its port. 
However, disagreement still persisted on how to address these challenges. As has also 
already been described above, the solution that ultimately prevailed to take into account 
similar concerns in respect of anti-personnel mines in the context of the Ottawa Convention 
was to issue declarations on the meaning of prohibited assistance and on what was 
prohibited/permitted in multinational operations. In addition, generally differences in 
obligations among coalition partners may be resolved by different RoEs or specific national 
instructions.972  
The Australian paper and other concerned states’ statements made it clear that these 
solutions would not work for those states in the Oslo process concerned about 
interoperability.  In particular, it was argued that cluster munitions posed a different problem 
from anti-personnel mines, since it was  
 
“reasonable to expect that cluster munitions are much more likely than APM [anti-personnel mines] to 
be used by States in future operations. Cluster munitions form a critical component in the arsenals of 
such States. By contrast, APMs are less likely to be used in modern coalition warfare, having reduced 
military utility where conventional battles are fast-moving or operations are non-conventional or 
insurgent in nature.”973 
 
 However, one may object to the assumption that cluster munitions are more likely to 
be used than anti-personnel mines. While it is true that certain states not likely to become state 
party to a Convention on Cluster Munitions have huge stockpiles of cluster munitions, 
including Russia and the United States, this by itself does not mean that these stockpiles will 
                                                 
971 These questions were raised by Canada. See Canada, Statement on General Obligations and Scope of 
Application, 18 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/Canadian-Statement-on-General-Obligations-Scope.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
972 See supra, p. 230. 
973 Australia, “Discussion Paper Cluster munitions and Interoperability”, supra note 785, at 2. 
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also get used in the future. Firstly, were cluster munitions to be effectively stigmatised the 
price even for these countries to use these weapons would be too high. Secondly, this 
assumption is strongly based on the military necessity to use cluster munitions in 
multinational operations. However, even in fast-moving enforcement operations of a 
conventional kind contemplated in the Australian paper the fact that all cluster munitions used 
to date left behind duds sheds considerable doubt as to the military effectiveness since the 
advance of friendly forces will be delayed or halted. Finally, the reference to non-
conventional or insurgent warfare is misplaced, as insurgents usually mingle with the civilian 
population and do not advance in great numbers, a scenario for which cluster munitions are 
simply not adequate weapons. Therefore, if one does not adhere to the assumptions made in 
the Australian paper (and reasonable arguments can be made in the view of this author not to 
adhere to them) then the basis for arguing that different solutions must be found for cluster 
munitions than for anti-personnel mines is also undermined.  
Moreover, the paper did not explain why the case of different obligations relating to 
cluster munitions should be unique or different from other contexts where coalition partners 
would also have differing obligations, for instance with regard to targeting.974  
On the other hand, the Australian paper again is sound in its analysis of the aim of Art. 
1 (c) to promote universalisation by imposing obligations which are designed to affect the 
behaviour of states not party. It is also significant that the paper emphasised that while 
addressing interoperability concerns, states should be advocates for an effective convention 
and seek to promote its universalisation. Further, addressing these concerns should not mean 
to condone continued use of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.975 
However, most textual suggestions regarding interoperability put forward in 
Wellington did not follow the kind of balance implied in the Australian paper.976 For instance, 
the United Kingdom proposed to delete the prohibition of assistance altogether. Given that 
cluster munition use in the last two decades has occurred as a result of joint military 
                                                 
974 Norway in its statement on the proposed Art. 1 gave other examples, such as states parties and not party to the 
ICC Statute, the Chemical Weapons Convention or different interpretations of international human rights 
obligations, all of which create interoperability problems. See Norway, Statement on interoperability, Wellington 
Conference, supra note 816. 
975 Australia, “Discussion Paper Cluster munitions and Interoperability”, supra note 785, at 1. 
976 For an analysis of these interoperability proposals, see Human Rights Watch, “Interoperability and the 
Prohibition on Assistance”, Memorandum to Delegates of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, May 2008, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/HRW_HLS_Interoperability_0508.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010). 
 299
operations in international armed conflicts in territories far from the territories of the users, 
the practical effect of the other prohibitions of Art. 1 would be significantly reduced.977  
In a similar vein, a Japanese proposal would have changed Art. 1 (c) from providing 
for a prohibition of assistance to any prohibited act to a mere prohibition of assistance to 
develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions, thus permitting most significantly, 
the assistance in the use of cluster munitions by a state not party in joint military 
operations.978 
  France proposed to incorporate a separate provision according to which nothing in the 
future convention shall be interpreted as in any way preventing military interoperability 
between states parties and non-states parties to the treaty. The major flaw of this proposal lay 
in its broad scope, since the wording of “nothing in this convention” subjects the entire treaty 
to the concern of military interoperability, elevating it to a dominant interpretative maxim and 
completely undermining the humanitarian object and purpose of a future convention.979 
 Germany, while leaving Art. 1 (c) intact, suggested to incorporate an additional 
sentence to this provision which stated that this provision does not preclude the mere 
participation in the planning or the execution of operations, exercises or other military 
activities by the armed forces or by an individual national of a state party to this convention, 
conducted in combination with the armed forces of states not parties to this convention which 
engage in activity prohibited under this convention. In fact, this addition is closely modelled 
after the unilateral interpretative declarations submitted by, for instance, Canada, upon 
ratification of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines.  
While the proposal can be considered more refined than the others, one may still 
question why it would not be more useful to clarify first hand the scope of the terms 
“assistance”, “encouragement” or “inducement” before deciding whether more language is 
needed to address interoperability concerns. Thus, this means nothing else but clarifying in a 
negative manner that for an act to be considered prohibited assistance, a specific and 
intentional contribution to an act prohibited to a state party must be made.  
Moreover, the German proposal was more specific than these unilateral declarations in 
adding that the mere participation in the planning or the execution of operations, exercises or 
other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of states not party 
would not be precluded. In particular, with regard to “participation in the execution of 
                                                 
977 Ibid., at 14. 
978 Ibid., at 15-16. 
979 Ibid., at 16-17. 
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operations” it has been suggested that this could be interpreted as permitting operational 
cooperation such as the provision of resources or intelligence and information related to 
targets it desires to strike with cluster munitions, thus circumventing its obligations under the 
treaty.980  
In fact, the wording of this proposed provision suffers from the same flaw as the 
exception proposed in the early Bill for the Austrian Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster 
Munitions which had the effect of allowing the participation in the logistical facilitation of 
cluster munition use by personnel from a state not party to the future treaty but just 
prohibiting the armed forces of a state party from taking the last step in such logistical 
execution themselves, notably the firing, dropping or launching of cluster munitions. 
 If one appreciates that states concerned about interoperability would not accept 
anything less than concrete language in the future operational text of the convention, then an 
interesting informal proposal was also put forward by Canada in Wellington. That proposal 
read:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Convention, a State, on becoming a party  
to this Convention, may declare that, for a period of [xx] years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for the State concerned, it does not accept the application of Article 1 (c) with respect to its 
participation in combined operations and activities with non-party states. A declaration under this article 
may be withdrawn at any time. During this period in which the declaration under this article remains in 
force, the State concerned shall take steps to encourage the government of any non-party state 
participating in such combined operations and activities to ratify this Convention.”981 
 
 In explaining its proposal, Canada made it clear that this would be a separate 
provision and that it was modelled after Art. 124 of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) which permits states parties to make a declaration with the effect of 
opting out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes for up to seven years.982 This proposal 
differs from all the others in that it implicitly recognises that the interoperability issue 
effectively only concerns a limited number of states participating in the Oslo process, in 
particular US allies. Secondly, a declaration to opt out of Art. 1 (c) for joint military 
operations would only be valid for a limited rather than unlimited time period. Finally, the 
                                                 
980 Ibid., at 17. 
981 Canada, Statement on General Obligations and Scope of Application: Interoperability Informal, Wellington 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, 21 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Canada-
statement.interoperability.informal.21feb08.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
982 Art. 124 of the Rome Statute reads: “Notwithstanding Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a 
party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the 
State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to 
in Article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration 
under this Article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at the Review 
Conference convened in accordance with Article 123, paragraph 1.” See Art. 124, ICC Statute, supra note 482. 
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proposal required an active effort on the part of the state availing itself of the possibility to opt 
out of Art. 1 (c) to encourage states not party to ratify the convention. In this sense, only the 
Canadian informal proposal took issue with the demand of the Australian paper that advocates 
for interoperability should also be advocates for promoting the universalisation of the 
convention and should not condone the continued use of these weapons. 
However, this should not endorse or conceal the flaws from which this proposal 
suffered. Firstly, the effect of such a declaration would be to permit assistance with any of the 
acts prohibited to a state party under the convention. Thus, the assistance to all prohibited 
activities, including the development, production, acquisition, transfer, use and stockpiling 
would be permitted in the interest of participation in joint military operations and military 
activities with states not party. Moreover, since Art. 124 of the Rome Statute was cited as 
inspiration for this informal proposal, it is interesting to note that the travaux préparatoires of 
the Rome Statute indicate that this provision was only inserted in the final stages of 
negotiations in order to secure the acceptance of certain states, including especially France as 
one permanent member of the Security Council.983 Accordingly, this opt-out clause was only 
incorporated as a measure of last resort, implying that all other options for obtaining an 
acceptable compromise between negotiating states had been futile. Such a final stage, 
however, could not have been reached with regard to the interoperability issue, since 
negotiations had not even started. 
The other major area of contention with regard to the proposed Art. 1 was whether the 
prohibitions should apply immediately upon entry into force of the convention or whether a 
transition period should allow states parties to use otherwise prohibited weapons until the 
military capabilities that existing cluster munition stockpiles hold would be replaced with 
alternatives.  
The textual proposals were again different in scope. The United Kingdom, for 
example, generally proposed a new Art. 1 (c): While striking out the original prohibition of 
assistance, this should be replaced with a formula according to which the entirety of the 
prohibitions contained in Arts. 1 (a) and (b) should not come into force until an unspecified 
number of years after entry into force.984 This would thus mean to create the same transitional 
                                                 
983 A. Zimmermann, “Article 124 Transitional Provision” in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, at 1281, 1281-1282 (1st edn., 
1999). 
984 United Kingdom, “Proposal on Art. 1”, Compendium of Proposals, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/WCCM-Compendium-v2.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010). 
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regime for all future states parties even if, for instance, certain developing countries would not 
require such a regime.  
Other proposals were more restricted. In this respect, Japan’s proposal specified that a 
transition period was a possibility of which states parties could make use by virtue of a 
declaration upon expressing their consent to be bound; the unspecified transitional period 
should apply to the use only when strictly necessary.985 The proposal did not elaborate on the 
notion of “strictly necessary” any further. It is to be noted that the use of any cluster munition, 
even the most inaccurate and unreliable ones, would have been permitted following Japan’s 
proposal. 
Germany and Switzerland circulated quite similar proposals on transition periods. 986  
In contrast to the Japanese proposal, the transition period would only allow the use of cluster 
munitions with self-destruct, self-neutralisation or self-deactivation mechanisms and the 
prohibition of transfer would continue to apply for any cluster munition. While the Swiss 
proposal still narrowed down the purposes for which cluster munitions with fail safe 
mechanisms could be used, notably for training, as last resort or for self-defence, the German 
proposal subjected declarations for a transition period to the obligations of states parties to 
provide transparency reports to the UN Secretary-General. Other states also supported the 
idea of transition periods, including Denmark, France, Italy, Slovakia, Spain and the Czech 
Republic.987 However, still other states rejected the notion of a transition period by arguing 
that it was inconsistent to prohibit weapons that cause unacceptable civilian harm but at the 
same time allow continued use of the weapon and thus, continued suffering of civilians from 
that weapon.988 
                                                 
985 Japan, “Comments on the Draft Cluster Munition Convention”, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Japan-article-one-comments.pdf 
(last visited 26 January 2010). 
986 Germany, “Proposal for Amendment to the Draft Cluster Munitions Convention: Transition Period”, 20 
February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Germany-
discussion-paper-transition-period.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Switzerland, “Proposal for a new Art. on a 
Transition Period”, Compendium of Proposals, supra note 984. 
987 K. Harrison, “Report from the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008”, at 11, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/PDF/DisarmamentPDF/ClusterMunitions/REPORT_Wellington.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
988 See Compendium of Proposals, supra note 984. Express opponents of a transition period included Ecuador, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Laos, Mauretania, Norway, Sierra Leone and the CMC. See Ecuador, General Statement, 
Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 18 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Ecuador-Statement-general.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010); Lao PDR, Déclaration Sur l´Article premier du projet de Convention sur les Armes à 
Sous-Munitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 18 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Laos-statement.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2010); Norway, Statement on interoperability, Wellington Conference, supra note 816; Ghana, 
Statement on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 20 February 2008,  
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Ghana-definitions.pdf (last visited  
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As was to be expected, there continued to be major divergences on the question of the 
scope of the definition of prohibited weapons, in particular between those favouring a 
complete prohibition of all sub-munition based weapons989 and those who suggested 
exemptions to varying degrees. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom enumerated certain reliability and 
accuracy characteristics, either individually or in some combination, as benchmarks for those 
cluster munitions that do not cause unacceptable harm to civilians.990  
Among these characteristics were sensor-fusing (multiple or single) which had the 
capability to discriminate point targets or deliver effects within a defined area; fail-safe 
systems (mechanical and/or electronic self-destruct, self-neutralisation, self-deactivation 
mechanisms); restrictions on the numbers of sub-munitions per cluster munition; delivery by 
direct fire; failure rates; and accuracy (in terms of delivery of the cluster munition to the target 
area). The exemptions proposed ranged from very broad to narrower exemptions. The 
broadest exemptions were proposed by the United Kingdom which considered any of the 
following criteria sufficient, notably numbers of sub-munitions, self-destruct, self-
neutralisation or self-deactivation mechanisms, direct fire weapons and munitions which 
incorporate systems designed to deliver effects within a pre-defined area or on point targets. 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 January 2010); Sierra Leone, General Statement, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 18 February 
2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Sierra-Leone-country-
statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). See also Harrison, “Report from the Wellington Conference”, supra 
note 987, at 11. 
989 Including diverse states like Austria, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Laos, Mexico, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zambia.  
See Cambodia, Statement on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Cambodia-statement-
intervention_on_CM_definition.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Democratic Republic of Congo, Déclaration 
sur Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Congo-Definitions.pdf (last visited 
26 January 2010); Ecuador, General Statement, supra note 988; Ghana, Statement on Definitions, supra note 
988; Guatemala, Statement on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Guatemala-definitions.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010); Lao PDR, Déclaration sur Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
19 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Laos-
definitions.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Mexico, Intervención sobre el Articulo 2 relativo a las 
Definiciónes, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008,  
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Mexico-Definitions.pdf (last visited 
26 January 2010); Mozambique, Statement on Definitions,  Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 
February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/MOZAMBICAN-
statement-definitions.pdf  (last visited 26 January 2010); Senegal, Déclaration sur l´Article 2, Wellington 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Senegal-statement.pdf (last visited 
26 January 2010); Sierra Lone, General Statement, supra note 988; Zambia, Statement on Definitions, 19 
February 2009, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Zambia-
definitions.pdf  (last visited 26 January 2010). 
990 All these proposals were compiled in the Compendium of Proposals, supra note 984. 
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Japan closely followed suit with proposing the same stand alone criteria, except for direct fire 
munitions. 
Other states proposed narrower exemptions. For France, numbers of sub-munitions 
and direct-fire munitions constituted a stand alone criterion on which to base an exemption. 
As for accuracy, i.e. effectiveness only within a pre-defined target area, and reliability, i.e. 
dud rate of not more than one percent or equipped with fail safe mechanism, as opposed to the 
United Kingdom and Japan these were recognised as benchmarks only in a cumulative 
fashion. However, France coupled these exemptions with the possibility to review the whole 
definition upon five years after the entry into force of the convention.  
Switzerland and Germany took a very similar approach; essentially, in their view 
sensor-fused weapons equipped with additional fail safe mechanisms should be completely 
exempted while accurate and reliable cluster munitions, i.e. those which contain sub-
munitions of a dud rate of not more than one percent and equipped with fail safe mechanisms 
should be only temporarily exempted subject to a transition period.991  
In a similar vein, Sweden proposed exempting sensor-fused munitions with fail-safe 
mechanisms. However, it specified that the latter must be electrical rather than mechanical 
self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. This specification was made with the 
understanding that battery-driven electrical fuses much more likely become inoperable than 
fuses depending on mechanical impact to discharge only. This exemption was coupled by the 
Swedish support for a transition period without, however specifying what weapons should be 
further exempted during that period. 
Still other states, notably Australia and Norway, also expressed support for excluding 
sensor fused weapons equipped with fail safe mechanisms from the definition of cluster 
munitions.992 
While interoperability, transition periods and possible exceptions from the definition 
of cluster munitions were the major areas of disagreement which could not be bridged at the 
Wellington Conference, other areas continued to remain contentious as well. Among these 
                                                 
991 In addition, Switzerland, too, considered direct-fire munitions a stand-alone criterion for an exemption. 
Germany’s proposed exemption was slightly narrower than Switzerland’s, since completely exempted sensor 
fused weapons must be equipped with both self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms while in the Swiss 
proposal any self-destruct, self-deactivation or self-neutralisation mechanism besides sensor fusing would be 
sufficient. The Swiss proposal was expressly endorsed by Italy. See Compendium of Proposals, supra note 984. 
992 Australia, Intervention on Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Australia-Definitions.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010); Norway, Intervention on Article 2, Definitions, Wellington Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, 19 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/Norwary-Statement%20_Definitions.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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issues were the retention of a certain number of cluster munitions for training detection, 
clearance, destruction techniques or the development of cluster munition countermeasures 
under Art. 3; the deletion of the current version of a special retroactive user responsibility to 
assist affected states with clearance under Art. 4; the respective deadlines for the obligations 
to destroy stockpiles and clear contaminated areas; the ambit of the definition of cluster 
munition victims and the scope of the obligations to provide victim assistance; as well as the 
number of ratifications required for the future convention to enter into force.993 
Despite considerable divergences over certain issues and an increasingly antagonistic 
atmosphere, the core group members finally decided to submit the Wellington discussion text 
unchanged as the basic proposal for negotiations in Dublin. The many textual proposals were 
appended to the unchanged discussion text as the Compendium of Proposals,994 which was 
referred to as “other relevant proposals” in the Wellington Declaration to which Oslo process 
participants had to agree in order to be eligible for participating in the negotiations in Dublin. 
The Wellington Declaration reiterated that an enduring solution to the grave humanitarian 
consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions must be pursued and that this solution 
must include the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument prohibiting cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. States subscribing to the Wellington 
Declaration decided to forward the draft Cluster Munitions Convention as the basic proposal 
for consideration at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference, together with other relevant proposals 
including those contained in the compendium attached to this Declaration and those which 
may be put forward there.995  
In this regard, it was not merely a semantic difference to refer to the unchanged 
discussion text as “basic proposal” and to the Compendium of Proposals as “other relevant 
proposal”. It meant that for getting the proposals contained in the Compendium of Proposals 
accepted, consensus or a two-thirds majority would be needed, which was not realistic given 
that the overwhelming majority of states supported the Wellington discussion text as it stood. 
 This was not uncontroversial, since in the lead-up to negotiations often heavily 
bracketed texts are submitted as a basis for negotiations. Thus, it would have been possible to 
include the proposed exemptions in a bracketed text, and acceptance of preserving the 
Wellington discussion text as the Draft Cluster Munitions Convention by those states calling 
for exceptions and referring to themselves as “like-minded” was not certain until the last 
                                                 
993 See Harrison, “Report from the Wellington Conference”, supra note 987, at 21-29; Compendium of 
Proposals, supra note 984. 
994 Compendium of Proposals, supra note 984. 
995 For the text of the Wellington Declaration, see Annexes, infra p. 400. 
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moment. However, also these states finally gave in and endorsed the Wellington Declaration 
which showed their willingness to enter into negotiations in Dublin. Still, to varying degrees, 
these states expressed their disappointment about what they perceived to be a lack of 
transparency, equilibrium and inclusiveness, since their textual proposals were not reflected. 
Moreover, these states emphasised that in their understanding both the Draft Convention text 
as well as the compendium of proposals would form the basis for negotiations.996  
This, however, was not the case in light of the Wellington Declaration and the Draft 
Rules of Procedure circulated for the Dublin Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions which reiterated the distinction between the draft 
convention as basic proposal and other proposals that would be treated as amendments.997  
Accordingly, uncertainty remained as to whether the “like-minded states” would 
attempt to obstruct the process of the adoption of the Draft Rules of Procedure to exert more 
influence on what would form part of the draft convention.  
Ironically, the CCW especially in its second meeting of governmental experts in April 
2008 provided an opportunity for Oslo process participants to overcome those differences and 
                                                 
996 Statement by France on behalf of like-minded countries, supra note 966; United Kingdom, Closing Statement 
to the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/UK-closing-
statment.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Germany, Closing Statement to the Wellington Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/closing-statements/Germany-closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Australia, Closing 
Statement to the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/Australia-
closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Canada, Closing Statement to the Wellington Conference 
on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/closing-statements/Canada-closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Czech Republic, 
Closing Statement to the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/Czech-Republic-
closing-statement.pdf  (last visited 26 January 2010); Italy, Closing Statement to the Wellington Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/closing-statements/Italy-closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); Netherlands, Closing 
Statement to the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-statements/Netherlands-
closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). Lithuania likewise endorsed the Wellington Declaration 
with the understanding that the Draft Convention and the compendium of proposals would enjoy equal footing. 
See Lithuania, Closing Statement to the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/closing-
statements/Lithuania_closing-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
997 Art. 30 of the Draft Rules of Procedure which were subsequently adopted by participating states in the Dublin 
negotiations read: “The draft Cluster Munitions Convention, dated 21 January 2008, shall constitute the basic 
proposal for consideration by the Conference.” In contrast, Art. 31 read: “Other proposals shall normally be 
submitted in writing to the Executive Secretary, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. As a general rule, 
no proposal shall be considered at any meeting of the Conference unless copies of it have been circulated to all 
delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. The President may, however, permit the consideration 
of amendments, even though these amendments have not been circulated or have only been circulated on the 
same day. See Draft Rules of Procedure, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Cluster Munitions 
Convention, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/2. 
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refocus efforts to emphasise commonalities in the face of a stalled CCW process, as the 
United States was in the process of reviewing its own position and especially the Russian or 
Chinese positions had not become more favourable towards a new CCW Protocol.998 With the 
CCW process dragging its feet towards coming up with any concrete decision to tackle the 
humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munition use, it was vividly demonstrated also 
to the so-called “like-minded States” that the Oslo process would be the only forum to provide 
concrete action for the foreseeable future. Thus, as negotiations in Dublin were getting closer, 
the “like-minded” states were prepared to engage constructively with other Oslo process 
participants rather than being perceived as blocking progress mainly on procedural matters. 
In the lead-up to the Dublin negotiations, also African states met at an African 
Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions in Livingstone, Zambia. The outcome of this 
conference was the endorsement by 39 African states of the Livingstone Declaration. This 
Final Declaration entrenched the common African position in negotiations that all cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm must be subject to negotiations and that the 
prohibitions on production, stockpiling, transfer and use should be total and immediate from 
the convention’s entry into force. The African states also supported victim assistance as an 
essential component of the future treaty and stressed the preventive aspect of this negotiating 
effort so as to avoid a similar disaster as with the landmine crisis in the 1990s.999 
The Latin American and Caribbean countries, on their part, met for a Regional 
Conference on Cluster Munitions in Mexico. There, more than twenty states from the region, 
except for Brazil, one of three cluster munition producers in Latin America, and Cuba, agreed 
on a common position on a future convention; according to this common position, no 
weapons that would cause the same humanitarian effects as cluster munitions should be 
excluded from the prohibition; no transition period for further use should be enshrined; nor a 
loophole for addressing interoperability concerns should be left. 
Consequently, there was a sense of common purpose and good faith that characterised 
state ambitions on the eve of formal negotiations in Dublin while of course areas of 
divergence remained.  
 
 
                                                 
998 J. Borrie, “How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won: Oslo Treaty Negotiations Conclude in Dublin”, 88 
Disarmament Diplomacy, Summer 2008, http://www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd88/88jb.htm (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
999 Livingstone Declaration on Cluster Munitions, 1 April 2008, 
http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/LIVINGSTONEDECL.PDF?link_id=19&s
link_id=5859&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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6. The Adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 
Dublin: An Analysis of the Negotiations and Important 
Substantive Provisions 
 
“On the proposition of the Imperial Cabinet of Russia, an International Military Commission having 
assembled at St.Petersburg in order to examine the expediency of forbidding the use of certain 
projectiles in time of war between civilized nations, and that Commission having by common agreement 
fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity 
[…].”1000   
 
The humanitarian urgency and the good faith spirit of all delegations to negotiate a 
treaty could be felt at the conference venue of the Croke Park Stadium from day one, 19 May 
2008. After formal opening statements by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs, a video 
message by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki moon, by UNDP, the ICRC and the CMC which 
brought an unprecedented number of cluster munition victims to an Oslo process Conference, 
the Irish President took the floor and explained the manner in which to conduct 
negotiations.1001 As is standard in multilateral treaty negotiations, the President emphasised 
that every effort would be made to reach general agreement, i.e. consensus, on the text but at 
the same time he made it clear that a new Convention on Cluster Munitions would be adopted 
on 30 May 2008, which included the possibility of voting by two-thirds majority. Consistent 
with the very limited time available for negotiations, the President discouraged general 
statements and the introduction of text in square brackets. Instead, the Irish Ambassador 
proposed to proceed quickly to negotiations Article by Article in the Committee of the Whole, 
while general statements should be made in a separate meeting. Different text options should 
be explored in informal discussions. Where there was general agreement on a provision it 
would be forwarded to the Plenary as a Presidency text. Failing such agreement, Friends of 
the Chair would be appointed to hold informal consultations the format of which was subject 
to their own discretion. The outcome of such consultations should then be shared with the 
Committee of the Whole which should then find general agreement on a given provision. 
 As was to be expected, there was still no agreement in particular on the definition of 
prohibited weapons, the questions of interoperability, transition periods, deadlines for 
stockpile destruction, the possibility of retention of cluster munitions for training purposes, 
the question of a special user responsibility in assisting with clearance and the scope of the 
                                                 
1000 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 8. 
1001 For all relevant documentation on the Diplomatic Conference, see 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/documents.asp (last visited 26 January 2010). To the extent that certain 
statements made during the informal sessions are not available on this website, they are based on the personal 
notes of this author from the Conference. 
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victim assistance obligations. Therefore, Friends of the Chair were appointed with 
Switzerland being appointed Friend of the Chair for interoperability, New Zealand for the 
definition, Norway for stockpile destruction, Ireland for definitions other than cluster 
munitions and cluster munition victims as well as special user responsibility or Austria for 
victim assistance. The analysis shall be broken down into issue-specific sections. It shall start 
with the most contentious issues, interoperability (Art. 1) and the definition of cluster 
munitions (Art. 2). This shall be followed by the remaining most important issues in their 
(proposed) order in the Convention, i.e. transition periods (mainly proposed under Art. 1), 
stockpile destruction (Art. 3), clearance (Art. 4) and victim assistance (Art. 5). 
  
6.1.  Interoperability 
 
At the outset of open informal discussions on interoperability, the Swiss Friend of the 
Chair posed several questions, notably: What are the different scenarios where these concerns 
arise? Why does the present draft treaty cause problems? Why are unilateral declarations like 
in the case of anti-personnel mines not sufficient? What different language was proposed and 
where should it be placed in the convention?  It should also be added that the textual 
proposals that states had submitted on the subject in Wellington were already on the table as 
formal amendment proposals for negotiations.1002 
As for different scenarios, the United Kingdom and Australia referred to the Australian 
paper submitted in Wellington.1003 Japan stated that not only the military but also civilian 
contractors needed to carry out activities for states not party to a future convention, including 
the need to transport cluster munitions. Germany mentioned the approval of joint operational 
plans with states not party. France listed as specific scenarios air to air refuelling, air to air 
support and any form of cooperation with states not party.1004 Finally, the Philippines came up 
with joint military exercises, UN Chapter VII peace support operations, logistical support, 
visiting forces and transit of cluster munitions as relevant examples. 
                                                 
1002 Proposal by Japan for the amendment of Article 1, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention 
on Cluster Munitions, Doc. CCM/10, 19 May 2008; Proposal by Germany, supported by Denmark, France, Italy, 
Spain, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom for the amendment of Article 1, Doc. CCM/13, 19 May 
2008; Proposal by the United Kingdom for the amendment of Article 1, Doc. CCM/14, 19 May 2008; Proposal 
by France for the amendment of Article 1, Doc. CCM/16, 19 May 2008. 
1003 See Australia, Discussion Paper Cluster Munitions and Interoperability, supra note 785. 
1004 The first two scenarios were also mentioned by the United Kingdom while Denmark also referred to the 
issue of close air support. 
 310
One major reason identified why the draft treaty created problems in terms of 
interoperability was that through the scope of draft Art. 1 (c) together with Art. 9 there was a 
risk of both state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for state party personnel 
involved in joined military operations with personnel from states not party.1005 It is true that 
implementation of the prohibitions contained in draft Art. 1 together with Art. 9 would in 
most states entail the adoption of criminal legislation. However, as the experience with 
precisely the same provisions in the Ottawa Convention shows, the wording of “appropriate” 
in Art. 9 gives states parties considerable discretion as to how to implement the prohibitions. 
 Thus, for example, states have enshrined specific exemptions from criminal 
legislation for foreigners, i.e. mainly military personnel, whose own country has not ratified 
the convention, or for their own military personnel when they serve abroad alongside 
personnel from states not party and they did not suspect nor had grounds of suspecting that 
conduct related to the use of anti-personnel mines would occur.1006  
Again, this demonstrates that states concerned have taken unilateral measures to 
address interoperability concerns without the need to create a specific international treaty 
provision applicable to all states parties, also to those that would be less concerned with 
interoperability. However, on the question why unilateral declarations or national legislative 
measures would not be sufficient, Australia, New Zealand and Canada pointed out that a wide 
range of interpretative declarations would give rise to different interpretations and that such 
declarations could even create a problem for the state submitting them, since they may be 
construed as disguised reservations prohibited under the future treaty.  
While “interpretative declarations” intend to clarify the meaning or scope of certain 
treaty provisions where there are several possible interpretations, a “reservation” explicitly 
has the effect of excluding or modifying the legal effect of the treaty in its application to the 
state declaring it.1007 The difference is indeed crucial, since “interpretative declarations” 
despite being so termed may in fact constitute “disguised reservations”,1008 which would be 
expressly prohibited by draft Art. 19 of the future Cluster Munition Convention. On the other 
hand, if no objection is made to a genuine “interpretative declaration” by other states such 
                                                 
1005 This was explicitly referred to by France, New Zealand and Sweden. 
1006 See Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 259-260. 
1007 See Art. 2 (1) (d), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 402. 
1008 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 104 (2000). 
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declaration may be taken into account as relevant context for the purposes of treaty 
interpretation.1009 
It is submitted that these arguments related to legal certainty sound reasonable in 
principle. However, there are alternatives to incorporating a broad exemption on 
interoperability, notably to more narrowly and carefully define the meaning of “assistance” at 
the outset and then see whether any additional language is needed to accommodate 
interoperability concerns. Notwithstanding, a clear trend among those states concerned about 
interoperability emerged to have specific treaty language on interoperability, not in Art. 1 
itself but in a separate provision.1010  
The strong outside influence that the United States played in relation to the 
interoperability issue is already evident from the fact that quite a few states, among them the 
closest allies of the United States, were also among the most active supporters of an 
interoperability provision in the future Convention. This strong influence was openly admitted 
by the U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At a briefing in 
Washington on 21 May 2008, he said that a Norwegian delegation had been in the United 
States and that the United States met with all NATO embassies in Washington to discuss the 
issue of how the future Cluster Munition Convention would impact on military cooperation 
between the United States and Oslo process allies.  
In addition, the United States also contacted major contributors to peacekeeping and 
stabilisation operations on this issue. On possible missions where the problem could arise, the 
Assistant Secretary of State said that for example,  
“any U.S. military ship would be technically not able to get involved in a peacekeeping operation, in 
providing disaster relief or humanitarian assistance as we’re doing right now in the aftermath of the 
earthquake in China and the typhoon in Burma, and not to mention everything we did in Southeast Asia 
after the tsunami in December of 2004.”1011 
 
With respect, it is hard to see how humanitarian assistance missions of the kind 
enumerated here may be jeopardised if certain allied partners of the United States decided not 
to use or transfer cluster munitions.1012 When issue was taken with these remarks during the 
                                                 
1009 Ibid., at 103. The other argument again invoked by Australia was the assumption that cluster munitions will 
far more likely be used in the future, often with a short lead-up time.  
1010 For instance, Germany, France, New Zealand, Italy and Japan, expressly declared their support for such a 
solution. 
1011 U.S. Department of State, “Ambassador Mull Briefs on U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy”, 21 May 2008, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/May/20080522163101eaifas0.8921015.html (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
1012 The Assistant Secretary of State’s remarks have been commented on thus, “If their tactical purpose was to 
influence or undermine the Dublin negotiations, their hyperbole made it hard for anyone to take him seriously.” 
See Borrie, “How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won”, supra note 998. 
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briefing, the answers by the Assistant-Secretary of State remained elusive, pointing out that it 
is a reasonable expectation in humanitarian relief exercises that military units involved would 
have some form of these munitions as part of their inventory to defend themselves.1013 
In light of this considerable pressure it becomes clear why there was finally no way 
around a solution which addressed this concern in the Convention text itself. This is also the 
underlying reason why this issue was treated differently in the present context than in the 
1997 Ottawa Convention; as a matter of fact, the United States was involved in negotiations 
for the Ottawa Convention and only in the final stages could not agree to the treaty as 
adopted. In contrast, with regard to cluster munitions the United States remained outside of 
the Oslo process from the very beginning and this level of greater opposition to the process 
made it also pressure Oslo process participants harder to have its own interests not 
undermined. 
In Dublin, Argentina, Austria, Indonesia, Jamaica, the Philippines and the ICRC all 
stated that interoperability was dealt with successfully under the Ottawa Convention, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and that the use of 
cluster munitions in joint military operations would diminish.  
However, as a result of closed informal consultations on the issue, the Swiss Friend of 
the Chair circulated a first informal proposal on a separate Article on interoperability on 21 
May 2008. The informal proposal reflected the desire among the interoperability hardliners to 
have a separate provision on the issue while leaving Art. 1 intact. This separate proposed 
Article was entitled “Relations between States Parties and States not parties to this 
Convention” and consisted of four paragraphs. On a positive note, the first two paragraphs 
demonstrated the good faith also of those for whom interoperability was a red line issue like 
Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, as 
they made it clear that each state party must encourage states not party to express its consent 
to be bound by the Convention (para. 1) and that each state party shall notify the governments 
of all states not party to the treaty of its obligations under the Convention, shall promote the 
norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage states not party to this 
Convention from using cluster munitions (para. 2). Accordingly, the fulfilment of such 
positive obligations may act as a guarantee that the permission to engage in certain military 
conduct in joint military operations or cooperation will not undermine the object and purpose 
of the convention to put an end to civilian suffering through the use of these weapons. Such 
                                                 
1013 U.S. Department of State, “Ambassador Mull Briefs on U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy”, supra note 1011. 
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obligations which would ensure the often quoted balance between humanitarian and military 
considerations by also enshrining an express humanitarian component in a provision 
addressing a security and military concern had been absent from most of the proposals 
presented before the Dublin negotiations. On this part of the provision there was soon 
consensus and even the critics of an interoperability provision had positive remarks on the 
first two paragraphs.1014  
However, the proposed paras. 3 and 4 remained hotly debated as these two paragraphs 
sought to clarify the boundaries between permissive and prohibited conduct in military 
operations and cooperation with states not party. In their first version, these paragraphs read: 
 
“3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this convention and for the purposes of the maintenance 
of international peace and security in accordance with international law, a State Party may, 
a. host States not party to this Convention which engage in activities described in Article 1. 
b. participate in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military and related 
logistic activities by that State Party, its armed forces or individual nationals, conducted in 
combination with armed forces of States not parties to this Convention which engage in 
activities described in Article 1. 
 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall, however, authorise a State Party to itself use cluster 
munitions as defined in Article 2 of this Convention.” 
 
Criticism against the wording of this proposal was not unjustified. Para. 3 made a broad 
reference to the entire Art. 1, thus to all its paragraphs, not just Art. 1 (c) on the prohibition of 
assistance. The very vague and general wording of “for the purposes of the maintenance of 
international peace and security” may imply that the use of cluster munitions is generally 
suitable for achieving these purposes. Why the entire Art. 1 was referenced in the chapeau 
becomes then apparent with subpara. (a) which would have allowed a state party to “host” a 
state not party which engages in activities prohibited to a state party. The background for the 
insertion of this provision was that a number of states had foreign military bases, especially 
U.S. military bases, on their soil where cluster munitions are stockpiled. Hence the intention 
of these states to see to it that the protection of these foreign military bases would not be 
considered prohibited assistance to stockpiling of cluster munitions. 
 While it is already problematic to incorporate any exception for foreign stockpiling 
from a prohibition of assistance at all,1015 the way this was initially worded was sweeping, as 
                                                 
1014 Including Austria, Chile, Tanzania, the ICRC and the CMC. 
1015 Experience with the implementation of the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines shows that a total of 
32 states parties prohibit foreign stockpiling on, or authorising of foreign antipersonnel mines on national 
territory. Only a minority of states parties, including Germany, Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom, declared 
that U.S. anti-personnel mine stocks on their territory in U.S. military bases are not under their national 
jurisdiction or control and are thus not subject to the national implementation measures of that state party. See 
Human Rights Watch, “A Prohibition on Assistance in a Future Treaty Banning Cluster Munitions: The Mine 
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this ensures that a state not party could be hosted on a state party’s territory for any prohibited 
conduct, including the use, development, production, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of 
cluster munitions. 
 In a similar vein, subpara. (b) was excessively broad as to significantly even allow 
participation in the execution of the use of cluster munitions by a state not party short of 
actual physical use which would remain prohibited under para. 4. Thus, it was legitimately 
asked by the ICRC what kind of assistance would then still remain prohibited, as the 
sweeping formulations contained in the proposed para. 3 would render Art. 1 (c) meaningless. 
The comments and criticisms received prompted the Swiss Friend of the Chair to present a 
revised version of the proposal on 23 May, at the end of the first week of negotiations. That 
proposal read:  
 
 
 
Proposal by the Friend of the President on Interoperability For the Committee of the 
Whole, 23 May 2008 
 
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve 
or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting adherence of all States to this Convention. 
 
 2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, 
referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the 
norms it establishes and shall make in all circumstances its best efforts to discourage States not party to 
this Convention from using cluster munitions as defined in Article 2 of this Convention. 
 
3. Notwithstanding the obligations of States Parties under Article 1 of this Convention, a State 
Party, in accordance with international law, may, 
a. host States not party to this Convention which engage in activities described in Article 
1; 
b. take part in planning, operations, exercises or other military and related logistic 
activities conducted by that State Party, its armed forces or individual nationals, in combination 
with armed forces of States not parties to this Convention which engage in activities described 
in Article 1; 
so long as a potential use in a specific operation by a State not party to this Convention is out of the 
effective control of the State party. 
 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall, however, authorise a State Party to develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, itself use, or expressly request the use of cluster munitions as defined in 
Article 2 of this Convention. 
 
Thus, the first two paragraphs of the proposed provision remained almost unchanged 
in comparison to the proposal of 21 May. Para. 2 was strengthened in that states parties shall 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ban Treaty Experience”, supra note 776. Accordingly, the inclusion of an exception into a Convention on 
Cluster Munitions for foreign stockpiling means a weakening of the prohibition of assistance with regard to 
foreign stockpiling, since this would elevate a minority position under the Ottawa Convention to the general 
position under the CCM. 
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make “in all circumstances” its best efforts to discourage states not party from using cluster 
munitions. Arguably, this would have clarified that not only when a specific joint military 
operation with states not party would be undertaken these efforts must be made but also in 
more general strategic and political discussions with states not party. The wording of “in all 
circumstances” also reaffirms the approach followed in Art. 1 and arguably further develops 
the general IHL obligation to respect and ensure IHL “in all circumstances”. 
However, in respect of the more controversial paras. 3 and 4, the major thrust of para. 
3, with slight variations, could still be regarded as subject to the same legitimate criticism. 
The proposed chapeau to para. 3 still referred to Art. 1 as a whole. Moreover, para. 3 (a) still 
retained the formula that states not party which engage in activities prohibited to a state party 
may be hosted by the state party and para. 3 (b) also remained virtually unchanged. A new 
qualification was added at the end of para. 3; this addition in fact only really made sense 
together with para. 3 (b), as this was designed for covering the scenario where time is of the 
essence and the choice of munitions is beyond the control of state party personnel operating 
alongside personnel from a state not party which might then use cluster munitions.  
On the other hand, the intention behind also adding this clause to para. 3 (a) was 
arguably to cover the scenario where a state party had stockpiles of cluster munitions from a 
state not party on its territory and through international agreements (e.g. Status of Forces 
Agreements) would not be able to legally induce the state not party to get rid of these 
stockpiles. However, the reference to “so long as a potential use in a specific operation by a 
state not party” did not fit with this different context. 
As for para. 4, at least it was clarified that not only the use of cluster munitions by a 
state party itself but also the development, production and acquisition of cluster munitions 
would remain prohibited as well as to expressly request the use of these weapons. 
However, still no agreement could be found at the end of the first week of negotiations 
or at the beginning of the second week in the plenary. As a result, a new proposal was 
circulated on 26 May 2008 in the afternoon which contained a revised version of paras. 3 and 
4 of the interoperability provision. Para. 3 did not attempt to make explicit the permitted 
scenarios in joint military operations and cooperation any more but stated that: 
 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international 
law, States Parties, or their military personnel or others under their jurisdiction, may engage in military 
cooperation with non-States Parties engaged in activities prohibited under this Convention.” 
 
However, para. 4 was expanded as to now cover an explicit prohibition for a state 
party to “itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions.” While a broad wording of “host” was 
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avoided and finally the intention of this exemption became clear, this might still permit a state 
party to stockpile foreign cluster munitions on its territory indefinitely as well as assist in the 
loading of cluster munitions from those foreign stockpiles.  
The issue of foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions was brought into play especially 
because of existing U.S. military bases located in some of the Oslo participant states’ 
territory. Thus, large U.S. military bases are, for instance, located in Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom (both mainland and in the British Indian Ocean Territories) or Japan.1016  
Already during the implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention ambiguities of 
interpretation of the obligation to destroy stockpiles ensued because of the location of U.S. 
antipersonnel stockpiles in U.S. military bases on state party territory. In this regard, the 
German government has made it clear that stockpiles and transfers of U.S. antipersonnel 
mines would be permitted, since weapons of foreign armed forces within Germany are not 
covered by German law and control. In particular, according to the 1959 NATO Status of 
Forces Supplementary Agreement, the property of a foreign force shall be immune from 
search, seizure or censorship by German authorities except where immunity is waived by the 
foreign state.1017 This means that the German authorities have no jurisdiction or control over 
weapons of whatever type stockpiled by the United States in these bases unless the United 
States waives the immunity relating to enforcement jurisdiction. The seizure of weapon 
stockpiles by the German authorities would entail such an exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction and could thus not occur without U.S. consent.  
                                                 
1016 For instance, in Germany, the largest U.S. military bases are Ramstein near Kaiserslautern and Spangdahlem 
near Trier. Italy has large U.S. military bases in Aviano, Veneto region and with the Naval Air Station Sigonella 
in Sicily. The United Kingdom hosts large U.S. airforce bases in Lakenheath, located 70 miles northeast of 
London and 25 miles from Cambridge, and Mildenhall near Suffolk. In the British Indian Ocean Territories, 
Diego Garcia has been repeatedly in the news because of the U.S. secret detention centre there. Torture has been 
allegedly committed, and certain countries, such as the United Kingdom, have been suspected of assisting the 
United States in secret flights operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to transport terrorist suspects to 
this island. See, e.g., K. Sullivan, “U.S. Fueled ‛Rendition’ Flights on British Soil”, Washington Post, 22 
February 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/21/AR2008022100822.html 
(last visited 26 January 2010); R. Norton-Taylor, “Records show Diego Garcia link to alleged torture flights”, 
The Guardian, 4 January 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jan/04/usa.world (last visited 26 January 
2010); D. Priest & B. Gellman, “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations”, Washington Post, 26 
December 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html 
(last visited 26 January 2010).  In Japan, the U.S. is hosted in large bases in Kadena near Okinawa, Misawa in 
the north of the main island, as well as in Yokosuka, 65 km south of Tokyo and 30 km from Yokohama. For a 
list of U.S. military bases on foreign soil according to their size, see Center for Defense Information, “U.S. 
Military Bases in Foreign Nations According to the Department of Defense.s Property Replacement Value 
(PRV)”, current as of 30 September 2006, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/ReedBsrPRV.pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
1017 Art. 40, Agreement to Supplement the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding 
the Status of their Forces with respect to Foreign Forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 August 
1959, 486 UNTS 6986. 
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In a similar vein, regarding the United Kingdom, for instance with regard to Diego 
Garcia, a bilateral agreement exists in which it is also specified that removable property 
brought into the island by or on behalf of the U.S. government shall be exempt from 
inspection, search and seizure.1018  
Moreover, with regard to Japan, the Status of Forces Agreement between the United 
States and Japan provides that within the U.S. military facilities and areas the United States 
may take all the measures necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and 
control. Accordingly, the same as in the case of Germany would apply in case of cluster 
munition stockpiles in these installations, as the territorial states cannot legally compel the 
United States in such cases to remove their cluster munition stockpiles. If one interprets the 
proposed Art. 1 (b) in combination with the obligation to destroy its stockpiles (irrespective of 
whether it applies to cluster munitions under its “jurisdiction or control” or to those under its 
“jurisdiction and control”), then one could argue that the prohibition is not violated at all and 
thus, also no issue of prohibited assistance would arise.1019 
 The case of Italy is different, as the U.S. commander of a military base will notify the 
Italian commander of all significant U.S. activities, with specific reference to, inter alia, the 
movements of materiel or weapons, and the Italian commander will advise the U.S. 
commander if he believes U.S. activities are not respecting applicable Italian law. Moreover, 
permanent increases of the operational component shall be authorised by the Italian 
authorities and temporary increases of military and civilian personnel will be approved by the 
Italian commander. Also, the Italian commander has free access to all the facilities.1020 Given 
these competencies, Italy may exercise control over weapons stockpiled in these facilities, and 
if Italy does not advise a U.S. base commander that stockpiling of U.S. cluster munitions, if 
any, or settle this issue with the U.S. government, it would risk being in violation of the 
prohibition to stockpile cluster munitions.  
Accordingly, in order not to place Italy and other states in the position of having to 
negotiate with the United States for the removal of cluster munitions stockpiled in U.S. 
military bases, this reference to “itself” stockpile or transfer was included. 
                                                 
1018 Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Concerning a United States Naval Support Facility on Diego 
Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, 25 February 1976, 603 UNTS 273. This treaty also provides that such 
property may be freely removed by the United States, thus placing transfer of U.S. cluster munitions to a third 
state beyond the control of the United Kingdom. 
1019 This interpretation was supported by Maslen in his commentary to the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, 
at 104, 156-158. 
1020 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy and the 
Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning Use of Installations/Infrastructure by U.S. 
Forces in Italy, 2 February 1995. 
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Despite these concerns, however, the major gist of the new provision remained 
unchanged until it was agreed on 28 May 2008 that the draft convention would not be 
subjected to any more changes. On the contrary, by virtue of the next draft proposal by the 
Friend of the President of 27 May, in para. 2 reference to “in all circumstances” with regard to 
the obligation to make its best efforts to discourage use by a state not party was dropped 
again. However, para. 3 contained a slight improvement in that it allowed state parties to 
engage in military activities with states not party to the Convention which “might engage in 
activities prohibited under this Convention.” The specification of “might engage” instead of 
“engaged in” removed the direct link to activities prohibited to a state party and made the 
intention of the provision to not preclude the mere participation in joint military operations in 
matters unrelated to cluster munition specific activities more apparent. 
While already the substance of this provision was among the most controversial 
Articles, a critical comment must also be made about the manner in which the negotiations on 
interoperability unfolded. Despite the assurances by the closest U.S. allies that interoperability 
was not an issue reduced to NATO cooperation and operations alone and by the Swiss Friend 
of the President that also states more critical of interoperability were involved in the evolution 
of these proposals, the decisive consultations were held in a small room with no microphone 
or translations into French or Spanish. This meant that especially Latin American and French 
speaking African countries were at a disadvantage in following the negotiations and 
contributing to them and that European NATO and other allies of the United States, including 
Australia, Canada, Japan or New Zealand, could dominate the outcome.1021 
As a consequence, the following provision was finally adopted as part of the 
negotiation package: 
 
Article 21 
Relations with States not parties to this Convention 
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not parties to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve 
or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting adherence of all States to this Convention. 
 
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not parties to this Convention, 
referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the 
norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention 
from using cluster munitions as defined in Article 2 of this Convention. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with 
international law, States Parties, or their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military 
                                                 
1021 Criticism along these lines was also voiced by K. Harrison, “Update from the Dublin Diplomatic Conference 
on Cluster Munitions: Tuesday, 27 May 2008”, 
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermunitions/Dublin%202008/Tuesday27.html (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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cooperation and operations with States not parties to this Convention that might engage in activities 
prohibited to a State party. 
 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party: 
 
(a) To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions; 
(b) To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions; 
(c) To itself use cluster munitions; or 
(d) To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions is 
within its exclusive control.1022 
 
 
 
6.2.  The Definition of Prohibited Cluster Munitions 
 
From the beginning, the New Zealand Friend of the President held negotiations in an 
open informal manner.1023 In the centre of debates was whether or not an exclusion from the 
definition of cluster munitions should be incorporated in an Art. 2 (c). The Friend of the 
President structured the discussions first around the proposed lists of reliability and accuracy 
characteristics that those supporting exceptions or exclusions had proposed, including sensor- 
fusing, fail-safe systems, numbers of sub-munitions per cluster munition and delivery by 
direct fire. 
During the first round, Germany emphasised that it was aiming at a complete 
prohibition of cluster munitions but that there existed alternative munitions that should be 
distinguished. The line should be drawn with cumulative characteristics, laying down a limit 
to the number of explosive submunitions (less than 10), sensor-fusing which should only 
function within a pre-defined area and electronic self-destruct and –deactivation mechanisms. 
At this point, however, it should not be forgotten that Germany also advocated for a transition 
period as part of its three-step approach where cluster munitions with a dud rate below one 
percent and effective only within a pre-defined area should be progressively phased out.  
Be that as it may, the German proposal certainly had the most significant initial impact 
on the negotiations, as states quickly positioned themselves in various camps. Firstly, there 
were those states that showed some support for the German proposal, including Australia, 
Canada, Norway and Portugal. Secondly, there were those states not supporting any further 
exclusion from the definition under Art. 2 (c) at all, including Austria and many less 
developed Asian, African and Latin American and Caribbean states. Finally, there were those 
                                                 
1022 Art. 21, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
1023 Since of these informal sessions no official Conference documentation is available, the statements reported 
here are based on personal Conference notes of this author. 
 320
states which supported more far-reaching exclusions; in particular, this included the United 
Kingdom but also Finland, Slovakia and Spain.  
The negotiations were ably assisted by an independent expert who greatly contributed 
to a common understanding of some of the very technical concepts discussed.1024 For 
instance, this expert explained the difference between sensor-fused munitions and traditional 
cluster munitions with the ability of sensor-fused weapons to discriminately hit targets and 
being thus the opposite of a free-falling munition. Moreover, he saw a difference between 
traditional cluster munitions and sensor fused munitions in that traditional cluster munitions 
explode on the ground in a wide area, making use of fragmentation while sensor-fused 
munitions explode in the air and do not display a pattern of fragmentation, which avoids a 
wide area effect. The negotiations thus soon moved away from concepts as vague as 
“accuracy” and “reliability”. Instead with regard to “accuracy” it was specified that this 
involves the entire process from locating to engaging a target with the aim of exploding the 
munition where it is supposed to explode. In this regard, also concepts proposed by Germany 
such as “point target” and “pre-defined area” were elaborated on. With regard to the concept 
of “point target” questions were raised as to what size a target could have in order to still 
qualify as “point target”. 
Interestingly, these concepts were already discussed by the ICRC in its 1973 expert 
report on weapons. In that report, “point targets” were described as “by definition, well 
defined and usually small in size”. On the other hand, “area targets” were defined as “large in 
size” and as presenting “no specific aiming point to an attacker.” As examples of “area 
targets” enemy troops deployed over a wide area, or targets comprising many buildings or 
fixed installations were mentioned.1025 This apparently neat distinction works well in cases 
where civilian and military targets are well separated but not where there are small single 
military targets within civilian concentrations.  
The independent expert usefully distinguished two areas, notably one where the enemy 
is located and the other where the weapon will display its effect. The challenge then lies in 
how well the second area superimposes the first one and that presents a particular problem 
where the first area is quite small while the area of effectiveness where the sub-munitions 
actually hit is much larger. 
                                                 
1024 Colin King who had already written a first groundbreaking study on explosive sub-munitions conmmissioned 
by the ICRC in 2000. He was also one of the authors of the report on the M-85 sub-munition with mechanical 
self-destruct mechanism quoted in supra note 83. 
1025 ICRC, 1973 Weapons Report, supra note 187, at 24, paras. 54-55. 
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The problem of the entire negotiations on whether a difference between sensor fused 
weapons with the additional cumulative requirements (limited numbers of sub-munitions and 
self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms) and cluster munitions should be warranted 
was aptly commented on by the ICRC which stated that it was a largely philosophical 
discussion to try to prove the unprovable. Indeed, the Oslo process is characterised by the 
fundamental aim of prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. In 
this spirit, especially the CMC was the driving force behind an approach that would require 
proof that any weapon category excluded from the definition of prohibited weapons would not 
give rise to the same humanitarian concerns as cluster munitions. 
 Thus, there is a presumption that cluster munitions should be prohibited and that this 
presumption must be rebutted in individual cases for excluding a weapon from the 
prohibition. This approach, however, has already moved beyond the approach of traditional 
IHL according to which proof of humanitarian harm must be furnished in all circumstances to 
justify a general prohibition of a weapon. Therefore, there is the reverse presumption of 
legality of a weapon which must be rebutted to justify a prohibition.  
The question then arises how humanitarian harm is measured? The Oslo process gave 
the answer to this question by relying on the actual effects of cluster munitions with the 
proposed additional cumulative requirements on civilians on the ground. But how is one to 
judge the actual effects of such technologically advanced munitions on civilians if these 
weapons have almost never been used? As the ICRC emphasised the only way to get certainty 
on the actual humanitarian effects of sensor fused weapons would require large scale use of 
such weapons. However, this would not be a desirable prospect given that the Oslo process 
was also inspired by the consideration of preventing the same humanitarian problems arising 
from cluster munitions in the future. 
There are at the outset different alternatives how to solve this dilemma. Firstly, 
different alternatives may be informed by a precautionary approach which is guided by the 
fundamental rationale to protect civilians from serious harm before definitive proof through 
large scale use of this weapon is provided.1026 One of these alternatives could be not to have 
any exclusion for such technologically advanced munitions. This is essentially what the states 
argued which did not support any exclusion under a future Art. 2 (c). A more nuanced 
approach would be to incorporate such an exclusion but at the same time explicitly enshrine 
                                                 
1026 For an interesting argument on how to make use of the precautionary principle which derives from 
international environmental law to depleted uranium weapons, see L. Wexler, “Limiting the Precautionary 
Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty”, 39 University of California Davis Law 
Review 459 (2006). 
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the obligation to review the definition (and this exclusion) at subsequent Review Conferences; 
this approach was proposed by the ICRC.1027 On the other hand, one could envisage to make 
provision for an exclusion under Art. 2 (c) without any complementary provisions, as 
favoured by those possessing the capabilities to develop these advanced munitions. 
The first approach (no Art. 2 [c] at all) accords precedence to humanitarian concerns 
over military considerations and applies lessons learnt from the past by taking a rigorous 
precautionary approach. As to the military considerations, advanced sensor fused munitions 
with additional highly developed fail safe mechanisms are considered by military experts to 
be an alternative to inaccurate and unreliable DPICM for long range artillery capabilities 
because it would more accurately and forcefully strike armoured targets like main battle tanks 
and self propelled howitzers at distances beyond 15 km.1028  
However, according to the first approach no faith should be put in technology to 
remedy the already experienced problems with cluster munitions. There is in principle some 
justification for this stance, since in the past also assurances were made that with 
technological fixes the humanitarian problems resulting from cluster munition use could be 
prevented; yet, on the battlefields these claims were proven wrong. On the other hand, sensor 
fused weapons have only been used once in a combat situation, by the United States in Iraq. 
One could thus say that the case cannot be made one way or another yet as regards 
humanitarian concerns, but that there is a concrete military rationale to fight armoured targets 
at long range with these weapons in the future instead of traditional cluster munitions. 
Accordingly, without a record of humanitarian harm, by still prohibiting also the most 
advanced sensor fused weapons, one may inadvertently deprive the militaries of a needed 
capability. In this regard, taking such a principled precautionary approach, while laudable 
from a humanitarian perspective, may invite more challenges from those outside of the Oslo 
process that the Oslo process does not strike the right balance between humanitarian and 
military considerations. Especially, this adds fuel to the arguments by major military powers 
represented in the CCW that this forum is better equipped to strike the right balance between 
these two competing rationales even if the CCW is far from balanced and actually has a heavy 
national security and military bias. Finally, as already observed supra, precedents are rare 
                                                 
1027 A French amendment proposal submitted already in Wellington and part of the compendium also suggested a  
review obligation although the definition proposed by France was much more restrictive. See Proposal by France 
for the amendment of Article 2, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
Doc. CCM/20, 19 May 2008. 
1028 Dullum, “Cluster weapons”, supra note 36, at 50. 
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under IHL to prohibit weapons without (widespread) use on the battlefield to support an 
approach that errs on the side of humanitarian caution.1029 
Conversely, the third approach takes sides in favour of preserving the long-range 
attack capability against armoured target in the face of humanitarian uncertainty. The 
historical lessons from the 1970s where newly developed cluster munitions were hailed as 
sufficient to remedy past concerns would be ignored were such an approach to be followed 
slavishly. 
Finally, the second approach which was suggested by the ICRC was to complement 
any exclusion by the explicit and specific possibility of reviewing any types of weapons at a 
subsequent conference. While a general provision on review conferences already featured in 
the Draft Convention under Art. 12, this would be a specific course of action binding on the 
states parties to revisit the issue of the definition.  
This approach differs from the first one in that it is based more on a traditional 
understanding of IHL and disarmament by balancing humanitarian with security and military 
considerations. In this respect, it is cautious not to inadvertently undermine any future military 
capability without the humanitarian urgency underlying the Oslo process for prohibiting 
cluster munitions. On the other hand, future humanitarian concerns arising from these high 
technology sub-munition based systems are given specific recognition by enshrining a 
concrete obligation to review the definition should the same humanitarian problems as with 
cluster munitions materialise. Therefore, this approach is more sophisticated than the third 
one in that some level of humanitarian safeguards would be built into the exclusion. While 
based on the fundamental IHL and disarmament rationale of balancing humanitarian with 
military concerns, the way in which humanitarian concerns should be examined would mark a 
novelty under IHL and disarmament, as legal weapons have never been subjected to such an 
additional layer of international review before. 
Thus, in principle, this second alternative seems to be more attractive than the other 
two, since it is more balanced. However, also this alternative has its drawbacks. Firstly, the 
basis for the review is still not clear. In this regard, one may raise the question how the review 
process should be more reliable than the assurances made by users and producers in the past 
regarding unproven technological fixes. Especially, how should one gain an understanding of 
the actual effects of these weapons in a combat situation other than through their use in future 
armed conflicts? One would need to align the testing regimes to the reality of combat, which 
                                                 
1029 See supra p. 253, note 850. 
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has until now been proved to be impossible. Moreover, excluding a weapon from a 
prohibition now but building in a review clause regarding the definition does give the 
impression of postponing a clear decision at the current stage. This could contribute to 
considerable legal uncertainty and may actually hinder universalisation of the convention in 
the future, since states not party would not have a clear guidance as to how they should adapt 
their procurement policies in order to join the treaty. 
Be that as it may, the positive bottom line of the discussions was that technical criteria 
should be scrutinised against the objectionable effects that cluster munitions cause to 
civilians, the fundamental purpose of the entire Oslo process. After the Friend of the President 
had drawn up a list of several alternatives with cumulative criteria and there had been some 
support for the German proposal, Norway submitted a decisive proposal on 21 May 2008. The 
proposal contained the following definition of a cluster munition as a 
 
“munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive sub-munitions each weighing less than 20 
kilograms, and includes those explosive sub-munitions. It does not mean the following: 
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) a munition with sub-munitions each weighing more than five kilograms, designed to seek, detect 
and engage point targets, and equipped with electronic self destruct and self deactivation 
mechanisms.”1030 
 
In an explanation, Norway argued that weight as one of the cumulative criteria, in 
addition to other criteria of point target capability and fail-safe mechanisms, would effectively 
capture almost all cluster munitions used to date. According to Norway, the advantages of a 
weight limit were that this would reduce the total numbers of sub-munitions that could 
physically fit into a container/dispenser. This would substantially reduce the problem of 
unexploded sub-munitions. At the same time, this approach would safeguard against future 
miniaturisation (and resulting increase in numbers). Larger sub-munitions would also be 
easier to detect, less sensitive to handle and easier to clear, which would go some way 
towards reducing the risk for civilian accidents due to inadvertent contact with sub-munition 
duds.  
The Norwegian paper also emphasised that this proposal would allow for weapons that 
may be technically considered cluster munitions but did not share the same humanitarian 
effects such as larger and heavier anti-runway and anti-structural bomblets. As for the upper 
limit of 20 kg above which sub-munitions would not be considered part of a cluster munition 
                                                 
1030 Norway, “How to address the humanitarian effects of unacceptable cluster munitions: Explanatory note on 
the Norwegian informal proposal based on weight criterion to Art 2 on definitions”, 21 May 2008 (on file with 
the author). 
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such an exclusion was justified, since the intention was not to ban by default nuclear 
warheads and special purpose conventional bombs for which there were other treaties and 
which should be possible to use to preserve military capabilities on the battlefield, 
respectively. Between 5 and 20 kg per individual sub-munition a munition would have to have 
the additional characteristics to be excluded from the definition of cluster munitions while 
with less than 5 kg per sub-munition a weapon would be prohibited if the definition of a 
cluster munition was otherwise fulfilled. Finally, the Norwegians stressed that the criterion of 
weight constituted an added safeguard, as this criterion was easy to verify and in practice 
almost impossible to circumvent.1031 
While the three major camps on the issue of a proposed exclusion under Art. 2 (c) 
remained unchanged,1032 the Friend of the President, for his part, produced his own discussion 
paper to move negotiations forward. In that discussion paper, the New Zealand Ambassador 
took up the criterion of weight proposed by the Norwegians, i.e. that sub-munitions weighing 
20 kilograms or more would be excluded from the convention, while a possible Art. 2 (c) read 
as follows: 
“(c) a munition that has the following characteristics that limit its area effect and reduce the risk of 
unexploded ordnance contamination from its use: [italics by this author] 
 
 a. each munition contains fewer than 10 sub-munitions; 
 b. each sub-munition weighs more than five kilograms; 
c. each sub-munition is designed to locate and engage a point target within a pre-defined 
area; 
d. each sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-destruct mechanism; 
e. each sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivation mechanism.”1033 
 
Accordingly, this paper combined elements essentially of the German and Norwegian 
proposals. However, chapeau language was crucially added which made it clear not only that 
the technical criteria had to be fulfilled cumulatively but also that the yardstick against which 
this exclusion must be measured is the wide area effect and the risk of unexploded ordnance, 
the two humanitarian problems associated with the use of cluster munitions. Thus, while the 
motivation was to not deprive states of a military capability an attempt was made to balance 
this aim against the humanitarian concern to protect civilians from unacceptable harm in the 
future. 
                                                 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Some of those states opposed to any further exclusion under a future Art. 2 (c) had formalised their position 
by an official proposal in the meantime. See Proposal by Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Palau and Uruguay for the amendment of Article 2, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 21 May 2008, Doc. CCM/71. 
1033 Chair’s Discussion Paper, 21 May 2008 (on file with the author). 
 326
Still, certain doubts as to the weight criterion were expressed by a number of 
delegations, in particular whether this would a future proof element preventing the same 
humanitarian harm as in the past.1034 Others made the argument that adopting such an 
approach would mean to return to traditional unitary heavy munitions which may induce 
military commanders to let their subordinates use even higher numbers entailing the risk of 
more civilian casualties.1035  
This latter reasoning, however, was eloquently refuted by the ICRC which emphasised 
that the use of each weapon involved a targeting decision under IHL. While such a decision 
would only be made once for a cluster munition if it were true that massive numbers of 
unitary munitions would be used instead of cluster munitions, then also many targeting 
decisions would have to be taken, each of which would have to comply with IHL. Thus, to 
automatically assume that the use of higher numbers of unitary munitions would entail more 
civilian casualties would raise serious questions under IHL.1036 
Other concerns that surfaced during discussions were that numbers and weight could 
be perceived by some to be motivated by commercial interests and that less developed states 
would be at a disadvantage meeting these technological standards.1037  
The first concern can be addressed to some extent by the humanitarian chapeau 
language which makes it clear that the technological criteria in and of itself are not sufficient 
to justify future use, production and transfer of sub-munition based weapons. In this regard, 
while the language proposed by the Friend of the President already reflected an effects-based 
(i.e. a munition that limits the area effect and reduces the risk of unexploded ordnance) rather 
than design-based approach (a munition that is designed to limit the area effect and reduce the 
UXO risk), there were interventions even proposing to strengthen this language, for instance, 
not only to limit but to avoid or at least minimise these effects.1038  
With regard to the second concern it is noted that this concern is informed by a 
classical disarmament perspective, since disarmament arguably seeks in the best case to 
                                                 
1034 Delegations sceptical about the inclusion of weight as one of the criteria to define cluster munitions that do 
not cause unacceptable harm to civilians included Canada, Costa Rica, Mauretania, the Netherlands and South 
Africa. 
1035 The argument made by Finland and Spain was not new and had been repeatedly made by those opposed to 
specific cluster munition prohibition or regulation in the past. 
1036 International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement, Informal Debate on Definitions, Art. 2, 21 May 2008 
(personal notes of this author). 
1037 These concerns were voiced, for instance, by Zambia, Ghana, Indonesia and Switzerland. See Zambia, 
Statement, Informal Debate on Definitions, 21 May 2008; Ghana, ibid.; Indonesia, Statement, Informal Debate 
on Definitions, 22 May 2008; Switzerland, ibid. (personal notes of this author). 
1038 Germany and the United Kingdom suggested strengthening the provision in this manner. See Germany, 
Statement, Informal Debate on Definitions, 21 May 2008; United Kingdom, Informal Debate on Definitions, 22 
May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
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eliminate weapons across all countries with different levels of development and in the worst 
case level out existing differences in terms of weapons technology available between potential 
adversaries. This is in tension with an IHL approach which inherently recognises that there 
may be different levels of weapon technology, apparent for instance, in the “obligation to take 
all feasible precautions”, since what is feasible depends on the technological capabilities of 
the weapon user.1039  
In this respect, however, the basic philosophy of the future convention is humanitarian 
and not a balance of military power. To that extent disarmament embraces the humanitarian 
aspect of IHL which gives meaning to the term “humanitarian disarmament”. After all, a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions should compensate for the inadequacies of IHL relating to 
the use of cluster munitions. IHL does recognise that military force is needed in armed 
conflicts but as Norway put it, whenever force is needed, excessive civilian harm should be 
avoided and this entails that modern accurate weapons will replace inaccurate and unreliable 
ones rather than military capabilities will be eliminated altogether.1040  
The next Friend of the President’s Paper contained an improved version of the 
humanitarian language in the chapeau as it spoke of a “munition that has all of the following 
characteristics which minimise its area effect and the risk of unexploded ordnance 
contamination from its use.”1041 Thus, the cumulative and effects-based approach to this 
exclusion was made more explicit by this revised draft. However, weight as one of the criteria 
did not feature in this draft, as some reservations had still been expressed about the 
appropriateness of this criterion to remedy the humanitarian concerns relating to cluster 
munition use. Instead, the draft retained the criterion of reducing the number of sub-munitions 
in a container to fewer than ten and the other conditions of point target strike capability and 
electronic self-destruct and deactivation mechanisms.  
Still, there is merit in including both conditions, not only numbers but also weight; 
numbers only are open to abuse, since one may just deploy more delivery systems with fewer 
sub-munitions and in this way cause similar humanitarian harm. That might be the case even 
if the weapons are sensor fused as greater numbers would entail a greater risk of volatile small 
sub-munitions.  
                                                 
1039  Supra pp. 74-75. See also M. Schmitt, “Precision attack and international humanitarian law”, 859 
International Review of the Red Cross 445, 460 (2005). 
1040 Interestingly, Norway did not employ the wording of “unacceptable harm” but that of “excessive civilian 
harm”, the traditional IHL formula.  
1041 Friend of the Chair’s Paper on Definition of a “Cluster Munition”, Dublin Diplomatic Conference for the 
Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 22 May 2008 (on file with the author). 
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Significantly, some of those previously not supporting any Art. 2 (c) exclusion in the 
Convention started to show more flexibility in that they stated that any such exclusion should 
be complemented by an annual reporting obligation under the proposed Art. 7 and by a 
possibility to revisit the definition at a later stage.1042 Thus, these states leaned more towards 
the position advocated by the ICRC earlier. Moreover, some of the delegations initially 
critical about the desirability to include weight as a criterion reconsidered their original 
reservations and expressed support for a cumulative approach with weight of the individual 
explosive sub-munitions.1043 This approximation of positions served as a basis for a series of 
bilateral consultations, as a result of which the Irish President could present his assessment of 
where consensus on an exclusion lay. A significant boost to building consensus was the 
radical shift of the position of the third-biggest user of cluster munitions of all times, the 
United Kingdom. On 28 May 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown delivered the following 
statement: 
“After 10 days of intense talks in Dublin, we are now very close to agreement on a new international 
Convention prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians. In order to secure as strong a Convention as possible in the last hours of 
negotiation we have issued instructions that we should support a ban on all cluster bombs, including 
those currently in service by the UK. This Convention will be a major breakthrough, and builds on the 
UK’s leadership on landmines and the Arms Trade Treaty. We will now work to encourage the widest 
possible international support for the new Convention.”1044 
Thus, the United Kingdom was finally prepared to scrap its entire arsenal of cluster 
munitions, including those with M85 sub-munitions as well as the multipurpose rockets fired 
from helicopters containing so-called M73 sub-munitions; especially in respect of the latter 
type of sub-munitions the United Kingdom strove for an exception from the prohibitions to 
protect what it regarded as a more accurate munition to be employed in a “direct-fire” 
mode.1045 
This encouraging development made it easier for the Irish President to present a 
proposal on the definition which remained the version finally adopted. It reads as follows: 
“(c) a munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded 
submunitions, has all of the following characteristics: 
                                                 
1042 Austria, Malta and Lebanon adopted this approach towards the proposed Art. 2 (c). See Statements 
summarised in Summary Record of the Committee of the Whole, Dublin Conference, 26 May 2008, supra note 
184. 
1043 For instance, France, Malta, Mexico, Senegal, Sweden as well as the ICRC now indicated that they 
supported favourable consideration of weight as one of the exclusion criteria. See ibid. 
1044 Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “Breakthrough on cluster bombs draws closer”, Statement of 28 May 2008, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page15608 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1045 Borrie, “How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won”, supra note 998. 
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 (i) each munition contains fewer than 10 explosive sub-munitions; 
 (ii) each sub-munition weighs more than four kilograms; 
(iii) each sub-munition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; 
(iv) each sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-destruct mechanism; 
(v). each sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivation feature.”1046 
 
Firstly, the humanitarian chapeau language had been strengthened, as the yardstick on 
which this exclusion is based is no longer “minimise” area effect and the risk of “unexploded 
ordnance contamination” but on “avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by 
unexploded submunitions”. Thus, there is no tolerance of these effects whatsoever. Moreover, 
the fact that not only unexploded ordnance contamination but the risk posed by unexploded 
submunitions must be avoided also strengthens this language, as smaller numbers of 
individual unexploded sub-munitions rather than massive numbers resulting in 
“contamination” already pose a risk for civilians.  
While the intention of the chapeau is clear, i.e. to adopt a humanitarian effects-based 
approach to this exclusion, in the view of this author this objective could have still been better 
reflected in the Convention as adopted. The main drawback is the subjective element that is 
included by the wording of “in order to avoid” the objectionable effects of cluster munitions. 
This means that the subjective intention rather than the objective result/effect of avoiding 
indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded sub-munitions is decisive. It is 
true that the final exclusion better accomplishes the goal of enshrining these effects as 
independent yardstick against which the enumerated technical criteria must be tested, since 
the preceding versions imply a factual statement that these technical specifications generally 
accomplish the humanitarian aims.  
However, the humanitarian effects as the ultimate yardstick could have been expressed 
in a more objective manner and as a stand-alone criterion. Moreover, the technical 
characteristics could have been enumerated in a non-exhaustive fashion. In this vein, the 
chapeau of the exclusion could have read as follows:  
“A munition that avoids indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded 
sub-munitions, and that has, at a minimum, all of the following characteristics: […]”. 
 Be that as it may, the exclusion as finally adopted is very narrow and much narrower 
than, for instance, the very broad exemptions demanded by certain states at the outset of the 
Dublin negotiations. There is only a limited number of weapon systems that currently fulfil 
the technical criteria stipulated by Art. 2 (2) (c) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. This 
                                                 
1046 Draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, Presidency Paper, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 28 May 2008, Doc. CCM/PT/14. 
 330
would include the German SMArt 155,1047 the French/Swedish BONUS,1048 or the U.S. 
SADARM which is one of the two types of SFW ever used in combat.1049 On the other hand, 
the other U.S. type SFW used in combat, the CBU-97/CBU-105 containing 40 BLU-108 sub-
munitions, each weighing 3,4 kg, clearly falls outside the permitted exclusion under Art. 2 (2) 
(c), as would, based on the available information of this author, for instance, the Russian 
RBK-500 SPBE-D sensor fused weapon, since it includes 15 sub-munitions per container. 
Therefore, at first sight, it does not come as a surprise that the negotiated result in 
Dublin was reproached on the basis that the 
“major military powers that did participate, mostly Europeans, saw to it that their newest cluster 
munitions were not banned at the May meeting. But under the planned criteria for prohibition, every 
cluster bomb in the current U.S. arsenal would become illegal, including weapons carefully designed to 
pose little danger to civilians.”1050 
 
Two points must be made in response. The first is that this comment overemphasises 
the technical criteria provided for in Art. 2 (2) (c). However, it ignores the humanitarian 
object and purpose of the CCM to put an end for all time to the unacceptable harm to civilians 
and the humanitarian yardstick imposed by the chapeau of Art. 2 (2) (c) against which 
weapons possessing these criteria must ultimately be assessed. Thus, even if certain weapons 
fulfil the technical characteristics under Art. 2 (2) (c) of the CCM were they to claim civilian 
victims by striking targets indiscriminately or leaving unexploded sub-munitions they would 
still be prohibited under the CCM. In that sense, for those weapons fulfilling the technical 
criteria there is merely a legal presumption that they do not cause unacceptable harm to 
civilians. However, such presumptions are rebuttable in case of concrete humanitarian 
problems on the battlefield. 
                                                 
1047 The German SMArt 155 has two or four explosive sub-munitions; each sub-munition weighs more than 4 kg; 
each sub-munition contains one active and one passive millimetre wave and one infrared sensor to detect and 
engage single targets. If no target is sensed, the sub-munition will electronically self-destruct in the air. Should 
this device still fail, the battery on which the functioning of the fuse depends will run dead. The search area is 
between 15,000 and 35,000 m2. See Aktionsbündnis Landmine.De, “Sensor Fuzed Alternative Cluster 
Munitions, supra note 261, at 14; Dullum, “Cluster weapons”, supra note 36, at 56. 
1048 The French/Swedish BONUS 155 mm artillery shells incorporate two explosive sub-munitions; each 
explosive sub-munition weighs 6,5 kg; each sub-munition is equipped with three multiband infrared sensors and 
a laser radar to detect and engage single targets and the two electronic self-destruct and deactivation devices. The 
search area for one shell is 64,000 m2 and one sub-munition may pierce armour of more than 100mm at ranges 
around 30km. See Nexter, “Artillery Ammunition: Bonus”, supra note 89. 
1049 The SADARM contains two explosive sub-munitions per container and each sub-munition weighs 11,77 kg. 
Each  submunition is equipped with a millimeter wave sensor and an infrared sensor array. Using the two sensors 
and detection logic, the submunition is designed to detect countermeasured targets in a variety of climates in an 
area of around 70,000m2. If the sensor detects a target, the submunition fires an explosively formed penetrator 
(EFP) at the target. If no target is detected the submunition is designed to electronically self-destruct and self-
deactivate. As has already been mentioned, of the SFW mentioned here, the SADARM is the only one that was 
actually used in combat. See supra note 85.  
1050 L. B. Thompson, “Thompson Files: Fuzed Weapons are good”, 1 August 2008, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Thompson_Files_Fuzed_weapons_are_good_999.html (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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Secondly, as one civil society expert at the Dublin Conference emphasised, unlike 
with the systems that would fall outside the definition of prohibited cluster munitions, the 
BLU-108 sub-munitions have actually been used in combat in 2003. Unexploded sub-
munitions were actually found around the area of Mosul. On the basis of photographic 
evidence, the expert concluded that it was clear from a humanitarian clearance team’s 
overview on the battlefield performance of this weapon that the percentage of unexploded 
sub-munitions from this weapon was higher than the often quoted 1 % and that this weapon 
does not leave a clean battlefield contrary to claims of producers.1051 Accordingly, some 
humanitarian case with concrete battlefield evidence that the BLU-108 shares objectionable 
humanitarian harmful effects with other cluster munitions could be made while the same case 
cannot be made for other weapon systems like the SMArt and the BONUS as of now. Seen 
from that perspective, it does not seem unreasonable to set the limit between weapons 
prohibited by the CCM and those excluded from its scope precisely around the technical data 
pertaining to the BLU-108. 
Therefore, where there is still lack of evidence of humanitarian harm the military 
capability to defeat armoured targets at long range was considered so important as to warrant 
an exclusion from prohibited cluster munitions. This is informed by a traditional IHL 
approach that requires a balance between military and humanitarian considerations. Still, one 
may object to that numerical and weight limits on the basis that they appear rather arbitrary.  
In fact there is a historical precedent for at least weight as a criterion to distinguish 
between permissible and prohibited weapons, notably the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 
prohibiting the use of explosive projectiles of a weight below 400 grammes.  
History shows that this prohibition was introduced to preclude the development of rifle 
bullets exploding upon impact with the human body which were considerably lighter than 
existing artillery shells. However, the weight limit was more or less arbitrary in that the newly 
developed bullets were far below 400 g and the artillery shells much heavier.1052 The 
arbitrariness of the weight limit was revealed in the light of a later blurring of the dividing 
lines between infantry and artillery; for instance, lighter artillery grenades and exploding anti-
materiel bullets have been developed since. At present the view is held that only the exclusive 
anti-personnel use of bullets or only if such projectiles are designed to explode upon impact 
with the human body have survived as prohibition under customary international law.1053 
                                                 
1051 McGrath, “Sensor-Fuzed Submunitions and Clean Battlefields”, supra note 87. 
1052 Kalshoven, “Arms”, supra note 23, at 207-208. 
1053 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 169, at 272-274. 
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This experience tells us to approach weight limits with caution, since they reflect the 
best of knowledge where to draw the line between prohibited and permissible weapon use in 
armed conflict at a given moment only. Thus, the limits set may prove to be legitimate only 
on a temporary basis. In the famous words of the St. Petersburg Declaration, “having by 
common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to 
the requirements of humanity.”1054 On the other hand, the parties to the Declaration  
“reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be 
drawn up in view of future improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order 
to maintain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the 
laws of humanity.”1055  
 
  What has remained of the St. Petersburg Declaration is the rationale behind the limit 
originally set, notably to preclude the use of explosive projectiles, i.e. infantry munitions that 
are designed to explode upon impact with the human body only, as the use of such weapons 
goes beyond that militarily necessary to put an individual soldier out of action. 
In a similar vein, one may posit with regard to the CCM that in the future, massive 
numbers of light and unguided sub-munitions with insensitive fuses in a container should 
never be used again as to preclude an indiscriminate area effect and the risks of unexploded 
sub-munitions. The humanitarian rationale behind the specific technical criteria, especially 
where they appear arbitrary, should thus always remain first and foremost on our minds to 
draw the line where the technical limits ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.   
The above-mentioned military considerations, i.e. to preserve the capability to defeat 
armoured targets at long range, should also undermine the military argument that the effect of 
prohibiting cluster munitions would entail to revert to the use in greater numbers of heavier 
unitary munitions, irrespective of the IHL argument advanced by the ICRC.1056 
 
6.3.  Transition Periods  
 
As with the other major points of contention, also with regard to transition periods the 
various textual proposals submitted by Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland 
were included in the Conference documents as amendment proposals, with Slovakia tabling 
an additional proposal for a transition period of twelve years.1057 
                                                 
1054 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 8. 
1055 Ibid. 
1056 This argument was particularly emphasised by Australia. See the Australian statement summarised in 
Summary Record of the Committee of the Whole, Dublin Conference, 26 May 2008, supra note 184. 
1057 Japan, Proposal for the amendment of Article 1, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/10; United Kingdom, Proposal for the amendment of Article 1, 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/14; 
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In contrast to the other two major issues, interoperability and the definition of cluster 
munitions, the views on the opposite sides proved to be more irreconcilable. Already in the 
round of general statements it became clear that especially Latin American and African states 
adopted a very firm stance against transition periods during which prohibited weapons could 
still be used, speaking about the need of an “immediate” prohibition,1058 or of a treaty 
“without delays”,1059 the latter also being part of the slogan “no exceptions, no delays, no 
loopholes” which reflected certain “red lines” for the CMC in the negotiations.1060 The 
proponents of transition periods refrained from making express statements of support in this 
respect, with Estonia being the only exception, demanding a transition period that should be 
“as short as possible and as long as necessary.”1061 Until the end of the first week, there were 
only two allusions to transition periods in connection with negotiations on the definition.1062 
At the end of the first week, on 23 May 2008, the day had come to put the cards on the 
table regarding the issue of transition periods in the Committee of the Whole. Altogether, 69 
states took the floor, with an overwhelming majority of 62 against transition periods and 8 in 
favour. Those in favour were mainly European user, producer and stockpiler states only, 
including Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom, with Japan being the only non-European state declaring its support for transition 
periods.1063  
                                                                                                                                                        
Germany, Proposal for the amendment of Article 18, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention 
on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/46; Switzerland, Proposal for additional text, Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/50; Slovakia, 
Proposal for additional text: New Article (18 bis), Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/66. 
1058 Like Costa Rica or Benin. See Costa Rica, General Statement, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008 (personal notes of this author); Benin, General Statement, 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/documents/general-statements/benin.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1059 Like Guinea. See Guinea, General Statement, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1060 Niger and Panama literally repeated this slogan during their opening statements. See Niger, General 
Statement, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008 
(personal notes of this author); Panama, General Statement, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1061 Estonia, General Statement, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
19 May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1062 France stated that there was essentially the category of weapon with unclear status; in this connection, it 
mentioned the possibility of an “interim period”. See France, Informal Statement on Definitions, Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 20 May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
Also the United Kingdom spoke of “phasing out” cluster munitions with mechanical self-destruct mechanisms 
over time. See United Kingdom, Informal Statement on Definitions, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of 
a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 22 May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1063 The statements are summarised in Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, Summary Record of the Eighth Session of the Committee of the Whole, 23 May 2008, Doc. 
CCM/CW/´SR/8, http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/CoW8May23am_001.pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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Probably the strongest argument against transition periods made by the opponents was 
that by allowing continued use of some cluster munitions during a transition period one would 
keep the door open for more civilian victims in the future, which would completely 
undermine the object and purpose of ending civilian suffering from the use of these weapons. 
Linked with this fundamental flaw is the observation that the very notion of a transition period 
implicitly assumes that certain weapons are unacceptable from a humanitarian point of view 
because otherwise one would exclude certain weapons from the prohibitions in perpetuity. 
Moreover, it was emphasised that this would introduce two different levels of states parties, 
i.e. those for whom the prohibitions would be effective immediately and those availing 
themselves of the possibility to phase out part of their arsenals.1064 In this regard, also the 
difference between this convention as humanitarian and a traditional arms control convention 
was mentioned.1065 Finally, if a state estimates that it would have to wait until the military 
capability be replaced that would be missing in case of compliance with the convention, it 
could simply wait to sign and ratify the treaty.1066 
Accordingly, those in favour of transition periods were very much on the defensive. It 
did not come as a surprise that a few of them, clearly uncomfortable of being so outnumbered, 
suggested to postpone negotiations until agreement on the definition of cluster munitions 
would have been reached and to appoint a Friend of the President on this issue.1067 However, 
this idea was also firmly opposed by a number of delegations.1068 In the end, the Irish 
President asked Germany to conduct further consultations and report back to the conference 
on the results of these consultations.1069 As a result, it appeared unlikely that transition 
periods would remain any bargaining chip for the second week of negotiations in view of the 
unequivocal opposition from an overwhelming majority of delegations. 
The report by Germany on its consultations had to acknowledge that also at the 
beginning of the second week there still remained a basic difference between states on 
whether to include a transition period in the convention at all. The advocates were eager to 
                                                 
1064 Austria, Statement on Additional Proposals (Art. 18 bis): Transition Periods, ibid. 
1065 Benin, Statement on Additional Proposals (Art. 18 bis): Transition Periods, Committee of the Whole, 23 
May 2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1066 Malta, Statement on Additional Proposals (Art. 18 bis): Transition Periods, Committee of the Whole, 23 May 
2008 (personal notes of this author). 
1067 Denmark, Japan, Slovakia and Switzerland suggested to postpone negotiations until the scope of the 
definition of prohibited cluster munitions became clear. Moreover, the United Kingdom and Slovakia supported 
the idea of appointing a Friend of the President on transition periods. See Summary Record of the Eighth Session 
of the Committee of the Whole, supra note 1063. 
1068 Ibid. States opposed to the idea of appointing a Friend of the President on transition periods included Costa 
Rica, Malta, Nicaragua, Niger and Venezuela.  
1069 Ibid. 
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assure others that nobody wanted to create any loopholes and that Arts. 1 and 2 of the treaty 
should not be undermined. The circumstances in which cluster munitions use should still be 
allowed would be limited, such as territorial defence, and the cluster munitions to be phased 
out would have to be defined according to specific characteristics, such as numbers of 
submunitions, accuracy, reliability and age. Finally, in case there would be a need to enshrine 
a transition period, there would also be a need for subjecting those cluster munitions subject 
to the transition period to the reporting obligations required by the future Art. 7.1070 
Therefore, it came as no surprise that the issue of transition periods did not command 
any consensus in the last informal consultations that were held after Germany’s report. Unlike 
with any other issue, there was clear, outspoken and overwhelming principled opposition 
against including a provision allowing for continued use of weapons that were otherwise 
considered unacceptable. As a result, the Convention on Cluster Munitions as finally adopted 
does not contain any transition period. 
 
 
6.4. Stockpile Destruction 
With regard to the obligation to destroy cluster munition stockpiles, essentially three 
issues were contentious at the beginning of the negotiations, namely what the basic deadline 
for destroying existing stockpiles should be; whether to allow for an extension of this initial 
deadline; and whether there was a need to enshrine an exception to this obligation for the 
development of and training in cluster munition detection, clearance or destruction 
techniques, or for the development of military countermeasures, such as armour protection for 
armed forces facing cluster munition attacks. The initial basis for discussions were 
amendment proposals submitted by the United Kingdom and Peru on extending the basic 
deadline from six to ten years,1071 and proposals by Australia, the United Kingdom and other 
states to enshrine an exemption for retaining munitions for testing and training for purposes of 
detection, clearance, destruction or the development of military countermeasures.1072 
                                                 
1070 Germany, Statement to the Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the Committee of the Whole, 
Dublin Conference, 26 May 2008, supra note 184. 
1071 United Kingdom, Proposal for the amendment of Article 3, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, CCM/29; Peru, Proposal for the amendment of Article 3, 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, CCM/30. 
1072 United Kingdom, Proposal for the amendment of Article 3, supra note 1068; Australia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Proposal for the 
amendment of Article 3, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 
2008, CCM/28. 
 336
While it is clear that stockpile destruction is an expensive and complex process, the 
pressure should also be on states to destroy existing stockpiles as early as possible. In this 
regard, if one recognises, for instance, that ongoing storage costs of existing stockpiles are 
rather high then this would be all the more an incentive to enshrine as short a deadline for 
destruction as possible. On the other hand, given the technical and financial challenges 
involved, defining the basic deadline too short may lead to too many extension requests.1073 
Thus, the challenge before negotiators was to reflect, by the deadline for stockpile destruction 
and extensions, if any, the right balance between the technical and financial challenges and 
the humanitarian urgency to prevent future use and proliferation, especially to other states not 
party or non-state actors. 
The calls for an exception for retaining a certain number of cluster munitions have 
been justified as necessary for the adequate and live training of personnel in detection of 
cluster munitions and in explosive ordnance disposal. Such retention is considered necessary 
for personnel to engage in humanitarian clearance operations but also to develop military 
countermeasures designed to minimise effects of cluster munition attacks or contamination on 
armed forces.1074  
Opponents of such a retention exemption have pointed out that the high metal content 
of most existing sub-munitions eliminates the need for retaining live samples for detection 
purposes; it is unclear how states will be able to reliably and safely create unexploded sub-
munitions for training purposes; standard operating procedures of experienced clearance 
organisations do not use live munitions; stockpile destruction techniques could be developed 
with already existing stockpiles and after destruction there would be no further need for 
retention for this purpose; there are alternative methods to develop military 
countermeasures.1075  
Moreover, opponents repeatedly cited the Ottawa Convention experience in this 
regard; in its Art. 3, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Mines enshrines an 
exception to the prohibitions of retention and transfer for mine detection, clearance and 
destruction techniques for no more than “the minimum number absolutely necessary” to fulfil 
                                                 
1073 See, in this sense, already Norway, Statement on Storage and Stockpile Destruction, Wellington Conference 
on Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/Norway-stockpile-destruction-statement.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1074 See, in this regard, Australia, Intervention on Storage and Stockpile Destruction, Wellington Conference on 
Cluster Munitions, 18-22 February 2008, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-
documents/Australia-Statement-Stockpiles_and_Storage_vers_1.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1075 For a useful summary of these arguments, see Cluster Munition Coalition, “Big risk, little gain: Calls for an 
exemption to retain munitions for training, development, and counter-measures”, Policy Paper No. 10, May 
2008, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions (on file with this author). 
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these purposes. However, that minimum number was never defined and as a result, there was 
one state party that expressed its desire to keep almost 70,000 anti-personnel mines for 
research and training.1076  While this was the most extreme example, it showed the potential 
for abuse for what would in fact be the retention of an operational stockpile despite 
reassurances to the contrary. In this context, it should be noted that the majority of states 
parties that retain mines, a total of 38 retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines, another 23 states 
parties retain fewer than 1,000 mines and only ten more than 5,000 mines each.1077 
Despite these concerns, there was great support from delegations for inserting a longer 
initial destruction deadline than the initially proposed six years; for making provision for 
extension requests; and for inserting the proposed exemption for research and training.  
As a result, a first paper by the Norwegian Friend of the President of 22 May provided 
for a deadline of eight years; the possibility to request an extension of the deadline for a 
period of up to four years and thereafter, for additional extension periods, in exceptional 
circumstances, of up to four years; as well as an exemption for the development and training 
in cluster munitions and sub-munitions detection, clearance, destruction or the development of 
cluster munition counter-measures.1078 As opposed to the draft Convention the extension 
periods to be granted were shortened from ten years to four years. On the positive side, the 
information required for an extension request was extended to cover the quantity and type of 
cluster munitions and sub-munitions held at entry into force and any additional cluster 
munitions discovered after entry into force; the quantity and type of cluster munitions and 
sub-munitions destroyed during the initial period; and the quantity and type of cluster 
munitions and sub-munitions remaining to be destroyed during the extension period and the 
annual destruction rate expected to be achieved. Moreover, it was specified in this paper that 
the decision on whether to grant an extension request could also involve upholding the request 
for a shorter time period than requested and a detailed procedure on how to handle such 
requests was laid down.1079 Finally, the possibility to retain or transfer live cluster munitions 
                                                 
1076 On the example of that state party, Turkmenistan, as well as other controversial cases, see Maslen, 
Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 143-148, 163-164. 
1077 See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Mines Retained for 
Research and Training”, October 2008, 
http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/ban.html (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1078 Friend of the President’s Paper on Article 3-Storage and stockpile destruction, 22 May 2008 (on file with the 
author). 
1079 The proposed Art. 3 (5) of the Friend’s Paper read: “The meeting of the States Parties or the Review 
Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request 
and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an 
extension period. Based on their assessment, States Parties may also grant an extension request for a lesser 
amount of time than originally requested. Extension requests shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior 
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or sub-munitions was complemented by a reporting obligation, thus at least ensuring 
transparency in this regard.1080 
However, as was criticised by the ICRC, the text provided for the possibility of an 
unlimited number of extension periods. Indeed, if such an unlimited possibility for extensions 
of the deadline had been included this would not have sat well with the fundamental objective 
to urgently prevent the further proliferation of cluster munitions. Moreover, the ICRC stated 
that the experience of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Mines had shown that States 
frequently requested unjustified extensions. For this reason, the ICRC suggested to strengthen 
the wording from requiring states to merely provide “a detailed explanation of the reasons for 
the proposed extension” to requiring them to provide “a detailed explanation of the 
exceptional circumstances” leading to the proposed extension.1081  
In view of these and other comments that criticised the detail of the procedure for 
handling extension requests, a revised version of draft Art. 3 was presented by the Friend of 
the President on 25 May which was converted, almost literally, into a Presidency Text on 27 
May 2008.1082  
Thus, this revised version required a detailed explanation of the exceptional 
circumstances rather than just reasons for an extension request and the detailed procedure in 
handling extension requests was shortened. The basic deadline was changed from the initial 
six to eight years with the possibility of an unspecified number of extensions of up to four 
years. However, as provided for in the last sentence of the proposed Art. 3, the requested 
extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to 
complete its stockpile destruction obligations. This addition arguably is designed to counter 
abuse of the possibility of extending the deadline. With regard to the reports to be submitted 
by those states retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or sub-munitions for 
permitted purposes, it was striking that the text forwarded to the plenary dropped reference to 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference that would consider them. To assist States Parties in the 
assessment of any requests for extensions to a deadline, a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference shall 
assign the President of the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference immediately preceding the meeting 
that would consider them, the responsibility to conduct an assessment of extension requests received for 
consideration by the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference. That President may select interested 
States Parties and available experts to assist him in that task.” 
1080 The Paper obliged states parties to submit a detailed report on the planned use of retained or transferred 
weapons and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or sub-munitions are transferred to 
another state party, the report must also include a reference to the receiving party. Moreover, the report shall be 
submitted annually to the UN Secretary-General in accordance with the procedure for submitting the report on 
other matters in accordance with Art. 7. See Friend of the President’s Paper, supra note 1078. 
1081 International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement on draft Art. 3, Summary Record of the Eighth Session 
of the Committee of the Whole, supra note 1063. 
1082 Presidency Text transmitted to the Plenary on Article 3: Storage and stockpile destruction, Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 27 May 2008, Doc. CCM/PT/13/Corr. 
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the regular transparency reporting system under Art. 7, thus creating a separate reporting 
obligation under Art. 3 (8). 
The Presidency Text specified that the obligations to separate, mark and destroy 
cluster munition stockpiles applied to all cluster munitions under a state party’s “jurisdiction 
or control”. Accordingly, the same formula as in the Ottawa Convention was used for the 
scope of the stockpile. Had this wording been retained, the issue of foreign stockpiling would 
again have arisen, since the individual circumstances of U.S. allies differ as to whether they 
exercise jurisdiction or control over such stockpiles. For instance, under this formula, as 
argued above, Italy would be under the obligation to itself destroy U.S. cluster munitions that 
may be stored in U.S. military bases.1083 
In order not to create a new difficulty for these U.S. allies which had been closed in 
Art. 21 (4) (b) of the Convention, negotiating states modified the scope of the stockpile 
destruction obligations from cluster munitions “under the jurisdiction or control” to “under 
the jurisdiction and control”. 1084 This makes it clear that both jurisdiction as the capacity to 
exercise legal authority, i.e. the state’s right to regulate conduct through legislation 
(jurisdiction to regulate), through its courts to regulate legal differences between individuals 
(jurisdiction to adjudicate) or regulate conduct by taking executive action (jurisdiction to 
enforce), as well as factual control over these stockpiles would have to be present for the 
obligations of stockpile destruction to be triggered. 
Another issue would have arisen had the wording of “jurisdiction or control” been 
retained, since there may be situations where a state has undeniably jurisdiction but not 
control over part of its territory. This is the case where a non-state armed group has de facto 
control over that portion of the territory. In the Ottawa Convention, the scope of the obligation 
to destroy stockpiles was reduced in light of the fundamental principle of treaty interpretation 
that treaties must be interpreted in good faith. Accordingly, a good faith interpretation would 
mean that in such cases the stockpile destruction obligation would only be triggered once the 
state party regains control over these parts of its territory or where it captures anti-personnel 
mines from non-state armed groups.1085 This interpretative effort is avoided by laying down 
the formula of “jurisdiction and control.” 
                                                 
1083 See supra, pp. 316-317. 
1084 That the issue of foreign stockpiling was the decisive motivation behind modifying the wording of Art. 3 in 
this way has also been confirmed by at least one legal adviser to one of the negotiating states. See T. Di Ruzza, 
Legal adviser of the Holy See in the Oslo Process, “The Convention on Cluster Munitions: Towards a Balance 
between Humanitarian and Military Considerations?”, 47 (3-4) Military Law and the Law of War Review 405, 
426 (2008). 
1085 Maslen, Commentary on the Ottawa Convention, supra note 368, at 159-160. 
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Thus, the final outcome of the negotiations with regard to Art. 3 looks as follows: 
 
“Article 3 
Storage and stockpile destruction 
 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its 
jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of 
destruction.  
 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with 
applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.  
 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State 
Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party 
may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions 
shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under 
paragraph 2 of this Article.  
 
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:  
(a) The duration of the proposed extension;  
(b) A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical 
 means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster  
munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional 
circumstances justifying it;  
(c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;  
(d) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions 
discovered after such entry into force, 
(e) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period 
referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and 
(f) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed 
during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved. 
 
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to 
in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and 
voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension 
than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension 
shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at 
which it is to be considered. 
  
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited 
number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition 
and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster 
munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not 
exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.  
 
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another 
State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is 
permitted. 
  
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes 
described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of 
these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions 
or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include 
reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party 
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retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.”1086 
 
 
6.5.  Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munition Remnants and 
Risk Reduction Education: The Question of Special User State 
Responsibility 
 
Based on the analysis carried out on the inadequacies of existing IHL and HRL, 
special retroactive obligations on a past user would contribute to remedying several deficits: 
Firstly, it would address the inadequacy of implementation of IHL precautionary obligations 
which arguably would already require a party whose cluster munition use resulted in 
unexploded sub-munitions to at least assist in the clearance of these duds. Secondly, it would 
remedy the shortcoming of Protocol V which enshrines such special responsibility but that 
only applies to ERW created upon the entry into force of the protocol in 2006, not to already 
existing ERW. Thirdly, it would complement the weakness of HRL that its applicability is 
still very much focused on the territorial state. This is evident in the fact that the territorial 
state is not obliged to successfully mark and clear sub-munition contaminated areas where the 
location of duds is unknown in order to comply, for instance, with its obligation to protect the 
right to life of people under its jurisdiction and/or control. 
 These would already be compelling legal arguments in the view of this author for 
including special obligations on a past user state party to assist an affected state with the 
clearance of unexploded sub-munitions caused by such past use. In conformity with such 
reasoning, at the beginning of the negotiations, the Draft Cluster Munition Convention 
contained the following draft Article 4 (4): 
 
“This paragraph [relating to clearance and destruction obligations of cluster munition remnants under a 
state’s jurisdiction or control] shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or 
abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it and have become cluster 
munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of 
entry into force of this Convention for the latter. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention 
for both States Parties, the former State Party shall provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or 
human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third 
party, including through the UN system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, 
clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants. Such assistance shall include information 
on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and 
areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.”1087 
 
 
                                                 
1086 Art. 3, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
1087 Art. 4 (4), Draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/3. 
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Nevertheless, some states were opposed to laying down such special user 
responsibility.1088 The argument repeatedly made was the need to avoid any inconsistencies 
between the future CCM on the one and Protocol V to the CCW and the Ottawa Convention 
on the other hand.1089 Moreover, the risk that States might be deterred from joining the 
Convention should be borne in mind when considering any retroactive obligations.1090 
With regard to the first argument it may first be observed that there could only be a 
question of consistency if there are reasonable grounds for not regulating cluster munitions 
differently from ERW and anti-personnel mines. However, there is no basis for that argument 
in relation to anti-personnel mines, since a different regulation of cluster munitions from anti-
personnel mines is warranted due to the additional problem of the wide area effect of cluster 
munitions during armed conflict which anti-personnel mines do not display. Moreover, while 
it is true that the Ottawa Convention finally did not require former user states to assist with 
the clearance of mined areas, during the negotiations of that treaty certain states did propose 
to include such a special responsibility. It is also worth observing in this respect that this issue 
is not even regulated in any consistent manner for the category of anti-personnel mines, since 
Amended Protocol II to the CCW does contain such special user state responsibility.1091 
 Also the argument that providing for such special responsibility would be inconsistent 
in relation to Protocol V fails to convince. Firstly, in the view of this author there is no such 
inconsistency, as Art. 7 (2) requires each state party to Protocol V “in a position to do so” to 
provide assistance in dealing with existing ERW, taking into account also the humanitarian 
objectives of Protocol V. In this respect, the special user state responsibility would simply 
imply a recognition that past users are in a specific “position to do so” to assist an affected 
state with clearance, since such a user state most importantly possesses knowledge of the 
presumed locations of unexploded sub-munitions. Thus, this would strengthen the existing 
obligations under Protocol V, not undermine them. 
                                                 
1088 France and Germany, Proposal for the amendment of Article 4, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/32; United Kingdom, Proposal for the amendment 
of Article 4, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. 
CCM/33; Italy, Proposal for the amendment of Article 4, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/34. In addition, on 20 May 2008, Australia, Canada, 
Japan and Finland supported deleting reference to a special user state responsibility. See Summary Record of 
Second Session of the Committee of the Whole, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, 20 May 2008, Doc. CCM/CW/SR/2. 
1089 Australia, Canada, France and Germany raised this issue during negotiations in the Committee of the Whole 
on 20 May 2008. See Summary Record of Second Session of the Committee of the Whole, supra note 1088. 
1090 This concern was raised by Finland during negotiations in the Committee of the Whole on 20 May 2008. See 
ibid. 
1091 See Arts. 3 (2), 10 (3), Amended Protocol II to the CCW, supra note 246. 
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 Secondly, even if the two regimes were inconsistent, there would be some justification 
for regulating them differently, as the presumptions on which the two treaties are based are 
different. While Protocol V presumes that in the future new ERW may be created by states 
parties, the CCM would act to prevent the creation of new cluster munition remnants by those 
states. In line with this preventive goal, under the CCM there could only be an issue in dealing 
with the existing cluster munition remnants problem, for which a special user state 
responsibility would be a desirable vehicle. 1092 
Moreover, it is expressly permitted to enshrine retroactivity in international 
conventions which is supported by Art. 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Under the express terms of the provision: 
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not 
bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before 
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”1093 
 It follows from Art. 28 that states parties are free to enshrine retroactivity in the 
treaty.1094 Secondly, the intention of this treaty is also to come to terms with the existing 
problem of sub-munition contamination. A special user responsibility would be absolutely 
crucial to accomplish the objective to “put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties 
caused by the use of cluster munitions.” Finally, if any situation has not ceased to exist, it also 
follows from Art. 28 that a treaty may regulate such situation that existed before and 
continues up to the present. Thus, there are in principle no legal difficulties standing in the 
way of a special user responsibility.  
However, the second concern, notably that states, i.e. especially past user states, might 
be discouraged from joining the CCM were such responsibility included is not so easily 
                                                 
1092 In this sense, also the remarks by the ICRC may be understood which observed that Protocol V to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons refers to the explosive remnants of munitions that may still be 
used by states. In contrast, Art. 4 of the CCM would refer to remnants of cluster munitions that would be 
prohibited for use. Accordingly, the ICRC demanded that the wording of the draft Convention should reflect this 
distinction. See ICRC, Statement on Art. 4 to the Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of Second Session 
of the Committee of the Whole, 20 May 2008, supra note 1088. 
1093 Art. 28, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 402. 
1094 Thus, the contrary position argued by Italy during the Wellington Conference is legally untenable. There, 
Italy stated that “In addition to the political/historical arguments there are juridical reasons which make the 
introduction of the concept of retroactivity unadvisable. The international law principle of the “Non-
Retroactivity of Treaties” enshrined in article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties encapsulates 
well this concept: A departure from this norm would create major difficulties and could become an obstacle to 
reach a consensus in the Oslo process.” See Italy, Retroactivity and International Arms Control Treaties: 
Retroactive aspects of article 4.4, Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/clustermunitionswellington/conference-documents/Italy-statement-Clearance.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010). 
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dismissed, since states may be expected to be sensitive to accusations that they have used a 
weapon now judged illegal sometimes long ago in the past.  
Only two states expressly spoke in favour of retaining the special user state 
responsibility contained in the draft Convention.1095 Despite the staunch opposition by user 
and stockpiler states of the weapon, in a first informal paper circulated on 22 May 2008, the 
provision related to a special user responsibility in draft Art. 4 (4) was retained, albeit in a 
weakened form, since the obligation to provide assistance was qualified by the words “to the 
extent feasible” and the specification that such assistance shall include certain information 
designed to assist in locating cluster munition remnants by the words “where available.” 
At the end of the first week of negotiations, still no consensus on Art. 4 (4) had been 
found and informal consultations continued up until 28 May 2008 when it was decided not to 
reopen the text of the draft Convention as it then stood. While it was not possible to achieve 
consensus on draft Art. 4 (4) in the (already weakened) version of 22 May 2008, the 
Presidency finally presented the following compromise that was then accepted by all 
delegations: 
“This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one 
State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster 
munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the 
time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter. 
(a) In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State 
Party is strongly encouraged to provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human 
resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third 
party, including through the UN system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, 
clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants. 
(b) Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster 
munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition 
remnants are known to be located.”1096 
Therefore, the regulation of a special user responsibility was significantly weakened in 
the text as finally adopted. Due to political exigencies, one cannot speak of a hard obligation 
any more. Rather, the wording of “strongly encouraged” reflects a soft obligation of a moral 
character. It will depend on whether any former user state will act based on this provision as a 
                                                 
1095 Lebanon and Venezuela. See Summary Record of Second Session of the Committee of the Whole, 20 May 
2008, supra note 1088. 
1096 Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. By 28 May 2008, the compromise package presented by 
the President only featured in Art. 4 (4) (a) that a former user state “is encouraged” to provide assistance to 
another state affected by the past use of cluster munitions by the former state. However, the President could push 
through a last minute technical correction to include the word “strongly“.  
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future state party to determine the practical impact of what remained of an innovative concept 
in this area of international law.  
As for the rest of Art. 4, the basic deadline for fulfilling the clearance obligations was 
extended from five to ten years to account for concerns by the most heavily affected states 
such as Laos, which repeatedly stated that they may not be able to comply with a more 
ambitious five-year deadline. If a state party is still unable to clear contaminated areas within 
ten years, it may apply for an extension for up to five years. Just like in the case of the Ottawa 
Convention, such a request must be accompanied by detailed information; in this respect, the 
CCM is even more detailed than the Ottawa Convention, expressly requiring a state party that 
requests an extension to set out the total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time 
of entry into force of the convention for that state party and any additional areas containing 
cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force; the total area already cleared 
since entry into force; and the total area remaining to be cleared during the extension.1097 The 
obligation to clear and destroy cluster munition remnants is specified by a detailed catalogue 
of operational measures in Art. 4 (2) of the CCM which builds upon the precise treaties with 
which consistency was demanded by a variety of delegations, the Ottawa Convention and 
Protocol V on ERW to the CCW.1098 
                                                 
1097 The other information requirements closely follow Art. 5 (4) of the Ottawa Convention, supra note 224. 
1098 States parties shall (a) Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making 
every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control; (b) Assess and 
prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise 
resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing 
structures, experiences and methodologies; (c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or 
other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily 
recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs 
and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to 
environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within 
the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe; (d) Clear and destroy all cluster 
munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and  (e)  Conduct risk reduction education to 
ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by 
such remnants. The language of “survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants” is 
modelled after Art. 3 (3) (a) of Protocol V to the CCW. “Making every effort to identify all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control” is taken from Art. 5 (2) of the Ottawa Convention. Art. 4 (2) 
(b) of the CCM consolidates Arts. 3 (3) (b), 3 (3) (d) and 5 of Protocol V, with the important additions  of 
“develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, 
experiences and methodologies.” This last addition ensures that there is no duplication of structures and that 
there is no false prioritisation of cluster munition remnants over other ERW where other ERW represent a more 
immediate threat. See, in this sense, K. Harrison & R. Moyes, “CCW Protocol V and the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions: Note on Coherence”, Landmine Action, 26 June 2008, 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/CCM%20CCW%20PV%20Coherence%20paper.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
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6.6.  Victim Assistance 
As has been seen supra, there has already been ample precedent in terms of victim 
assistance, including in the context of the Ottawa Convention.1099 The lessons learnt there and 
in connection with the adoption of the Disability Rights Convention could be used during 
negotiations in Dublin. 
From the beginning of the Oslo process there was overwhelming support for including 
a separate provision on victim assistance with strong obligations. This was no different during 
the Dublin negotiations although individual countries had problems with the broad scope of 
the definition of “victim”,1100 and were anxious to ensure that no special categories of cluster 
munition victims that would be favoured over other war victims would be created.1101  
 However, these problems could be sorted out early on in the negotiations by including 
those persons directly impacted and the affected families and communities among “cluster 
munition victims” as defined by the convention. With regard to the second difficulty, in 
addition to already existing references to non-discrimination in the proposed Preamble, the 
need to avoid discriminating against different victims was to be included in the operative 
provision on victim assistance. 
But the overwhelming majority of states sought to strengthen rather than weaken the 
obligation to provide victim assistance. As a result, a first non-paper by the Austrian Friend of 
the President already  specified in its proposed Art 5 (1) that states parties with respect to 
cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control shall not only adequately 
provide assistance in accordance with applicable HRL but also IHL.1102 This reference 
importantly recognises that IHL in general is moving closer towards HRL by imposing 
                                                                                                                                                        
Art. 4 (2) (c), first sentence is modelled after Art. 5 (2) of the Ottawa Convention, whereas Art. 4 (2) (c) second 
sentence takes up relevant language from the Technical Annex, Part 2 of Protocol V on Warnings, Risk 
Education, Marking, Fencing and Monitoring. Art. 4 (2) (d) adapts the wording of Art. 3 (3) (c) of Protocol V for 
the purposes of clearing cluster munition remnants. Only Art. 4 (2) (e) on risk reduction education does not find 
an equivalent but the gist of this provision is certainly inspired by Technical Annex Part 2 of Protocol V together 
with the International Mine Action Standards, which shall be taken into account just like in Art. 3 (4) of Protocol 
V. 
1099 See supra pp. 165-191. 
1100 The United Kingdom proposed to reduce the scope of the obligation to provide victim assistance to victims 
injured on a state party’s own territory only. See United Kingdom, Proposal for the amendment of Article 5, 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/36. 
1101 On this basis, Switzerland wanted to see any special reference to “cluster munition victims” omitted. See 
Switzerland, Proposal for the amendment of Article 5, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention 
on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/35. 
1102 Non Paper by Friend of the President on Victim Assistance, 22 May 2008, 11am (on file with the author). 
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obligations on states with the aim of remedying the plight of past victims rather than only 
preventing future victims. However, a similar reasoning as to the obligation to provide victim 
assistance under the Ottawa Convention is appropriate here, as this obligation may not be 
understood by the negotiating parties as fulfilling the secondary obligation to make reparation 
after a previous internationally wrongful act but an original primary obligation imposed 
primarily on the territorial state. Evidence for that interpretation can be derived from the fact 
that a proposal to enshrine a special user responsibility in assisting the territorial state with 
providing victim assistance did not make its way into the CCM.1103 
Moreover, this first paper contained a non-exhaustive rather than exhaustive 
enumeration of the victim assistance components. Thus, states would be required to 
adequately provide assistance, including (but not limited to) medical care and rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social and economic inclusion. 
Significantly, with consistent advocacy by CMC experts which was most supported by 
Latin American states, the proposed new version of Art. 5 (2) also specified a catalogue of 
measures which states parties must take in order to adequately provide victim assistance, 
notably develop, implement and enforce relevant national laws and policies; assess the needs 
of victims; take steps to mobilise national and international resources; develop a national plan 
and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating it 
within existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and 
mechanisms; closely consult with and actively involve victims and their representative 
organisations; and designate a focal point within the government for implementing victim 
assistance. In taking these measures, states shall not discriminate among cluster munitions 
victims, or between cluster munition victims and other victims and shall take into 
consideration relevant guidelines and good practices in the areas pertaining to victim 
assistance. The detailed nature of the required actions is in line with the newest generation of 
human rights treaty law; while earlier norm-setting efforts, such as the two Covenants, 
contented themselves with formulating very general obligations, leaving it to the treaty 
monitoring bodies to flesh out more concrete action-orientated obligations, the newest 
                                                 
1103 The Philippines proposed insertion of a new paragraph into Art. 5 which read as follows: “When a State 
Party, before entry into force of the Convention for it, has used or abandoned cluster munitions in areas under the 
jurisdiction or control of another State Party, the former State Party shall have the responsibility to help the latter 
State Party in addressing the requirements of victim assistance as delineated in Article 5 (1).” See Philippines, 
Proposal for the amendment of Article 5, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/58. 
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generation of human rights conventions such as the CRPD enshrine action-orientated 
obligations already in the convention itself. 
The definition of “cluster munition victims” was expanded to also cover those who 
have been killed by the use of cluster munitions, in fact recognising that those who are most 
directly impacted by cluster munitions and their affected families and communities would not 
be left out of victim assistance efforts.1104 
This first paper was still strengthened by adding to the definition of “cluster munition 
victims” that it applied to “all persons” who have been killed or suffered in other ways. Thus, 
it was understood that the definition of “cluster munition victims” extends to all persons 
harmed by cluster munitions in the affected areas, including migrants, refugees and other non-
nationals.1105 Secondly, the fundamental obligation to provide victim assistance was explicitly 
subjected to age and gender-sensitive considerations consistent with specific concerns about 
women and children flowing from the CRPD with separate provisions on these groups but 
also UNSC Resolutions on women and children.1106 Moreover, the specific catalogue of 
implementing measures under Art. 5 (2) was better structured and further strengthened.1107 
This revised paper by the Friend of the President was forwarded to the plenary as 
Presidency Text on 23 May 2008,1108 and was adopted as the final version with small 
grammatical modifications only which reads as follows: 
                                                 
1104 This expansion of the scope of the definition goes back to another proposal by the Philippines concerning the 
definition of “cluster munition victims” under Art. 2. See Philippines, Proposal for the amendment of Article 2, 
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, Doc. CCM/57. 
1105 See Non Paper by Friend of the President on Victim Assistance, 22 May 2008, pm (on file with the author). 
This understanding is again based the proposal submitted by the Philippines on Art. 2. See, Philippines, Proposal 
for the amendment of Article 2, supra note 1102.  
1106 UNSC Res 1325 on women, peace and security and Res 1612 on children and armed conflict. Reference to 
these UNSC resolutions was also made in the Preamble to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See Preamble, 
para. 14, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
1107 For instance, states parties shall “develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies” 
instead of “as necessary, develop, implement and enforce relevant national laws and policies”. To the obligation 
to “develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to 
incorporating it within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and 
mechanisms” the wording “while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors” was added. 
This is designed to reaffirm the independence of humanitarian NGOs which often fulfil important tasks in the 
area of victim assistance. Moreover, states shall not discriminate “among cluster munition victims, or between 
cluster munition victims and other victims” but also shall not discriminate “against cluster munition victims”, i.e. 
put cluster munition victims at a disadvantage over other victims, not only the other way round. Finally, the 
wording of “shall take into consideration” relevant guidelines and good practices in the victim assistance areas 
was changed to read shall “strive to incorporate”. 
1108 Presidency Text transmitted to the Plenary on Victim Assistance, Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of 
a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 23 May 2008, Doc. CCM/PT/12. 
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“Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
2. “Cluster munition victims” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or 
psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the 
realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons 
directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities; 
Article 5 
Victim assistance 
 
1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in 
accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and 
gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide 
for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data 
with respect to cluster munition victims.  
 
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:  
(a) Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;  
(b) Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;  
(c) Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these 
 activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, 
 development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the 
 specific role and contribution of relevant actors;  
(d) Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;  
(e) Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster 
 munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other 
 causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, 
 psychological or socio-economic needs;  
(f) Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their 
 representative organisations;  
(g) Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating 
 to the implementation of this Article; and  
(h) Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas 
 of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and 
 economic inclusion.”1109 
 
The definition of “victim” is the first one of its kind in a binding HRL or disarmament 
treaty and builds upon preceding soft law instruments,1110 and most importantly, the agreed 
                                                 
1109 Arts. 2 (1), 5, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
1110 In this regard, the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
defines “victims” as “persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or 
omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws 
proscribing criminal abuse of power.” See UN General Assembly, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, Res 40/34, Annex, 29 November 1985, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34. Also see 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law which defines 
“victims” as “persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or 
omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist 
victims in distress or to prevent victimization.” See UN General Assembly, Basic Principles, supra note 591. 
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scope of that notion of the 2004 First Review Conference to the Ottawa Convention in the 
context of anti-personnel landmine victims as encompassing not only the direct victim and its 
family but also entire affected communities. 
The complementarity between victim assistance as implemented under the Ottawa 
Convention, the ICESCR and the CRPD does not only exist with regard to the substantive 
areas of victim assistance. Art. 5 of the CCM also showed strong parallels and 
complementarity with the CRPD in terms of implementation of these substantive obligations. 
Thus, the obligation to assess the needs of cluster munition victims may be seen as a logical 
next step after the obligation to collect reliable data under Art. 5 (1). In a similar vein, under 
Art. 31 of the CRPD information collected in compliance with the obligation  to collect 
statistics and research date shall be used to help assess the implementation of States Parties’ 
obligations and to identify and address barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising 
their rights.  
The obligation under the CCM to develop, implement and enforce relevant national 
laws and policies finds its equivalent in Art. 4 (1) (a) of the CRPD where states shall adopt all 
appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
recognised in the CRPD. 
The obligation under Art. 5 (2) (c) of the CCM to develop a national plan and budget 
may be regarded as one of the measures reflected in the general obligations of both Art. 2 (1) 
of the ICESCR and Art. 4 (2) of the CRPD to “take measures to the maximum of available 
resources.” As the General Comment No. 5 on Persons with Disabilities published by the 
CESCR emphasised, the need to make appropriate budgetary provisions must be considered 
as one of the means of implementation of the general obligations under the ICESCR.1111 The 
demand that such national plan and budget shall be incorporated within the existing national 
disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms under Art. 5 (2) (c) of 
the CCM may be served by Art. 33 (1) of the CRPD which requires states parties to give due 
consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within 
government to facilitate related action in different sectors and at different levels.1112 
Similar to the obligation to develop a national plan and budget, also the obligation to 
take steps to mobilise national and international resources may be based on the general 
obligations under the ICESCR and the CRPD to take measures to the maximum of available 
                                                 
1111 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on Persons with Disabilities, supra 
note 625, at para. 13. 
1112 In this sense, see also Survivor Corps, “Victim Assistance and Human Rights”, supra note 669, at 12. 
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resources. In this regard, it is worth repeating that the CESCR noted in its General Comment 
No. 2 on the general obligations under the ICESCR that  
 
“the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to 
refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance.”1113  
 
Thus, already by virtue of Art. 5 (2) (d) of the CCM a link is provided to Art. 6 on 
international cooperation and assistance. 
The principle of non-discrimination provided for under Art. 5 (2) (e) of the CCM can 
be considered one of the general cornerstones of HRL; this provision thus emphatically 
reflects the HRL character of the provision. Non-discrimination in this context ensures that an 
artificial categorisation between cluster munition victims and other war victims is avoided. 
Indeed, for a victim it will in practice make little difference what the cause of the harm 
suffered is, cluster munitions or other weapons or causes. Moreover, a notion of non-
discrimination where difference in treatment among victims of armed conflict is based merely 
on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs, as mandated by Art. 5 (2) 
(e) of the CCM, is also inherent in one of the fundamental principles by which the Red Cross 
movement, one of the main providers of victim assistance, is guided, notably on 
impartiality.1114 
Under Art. 5 (2) (f) of the CCM the essential principle of participatory inclusion of 
victims in all decision-making is enshrined. That states parties shall closely “consult with and 
actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations” is taken 
almost verbatim from Art. 4 (3) of the CRPD which commits states parties to “closely consult 
with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, 
through their representative organisations.” 
Also the institution of a focal point features in both Conventions, in Art. 5 (2) (g) of 
the CCM and Art. 33 (1) of the CRPD, respectively. 
                                                 
1113 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties’ 
obligations, supra note 541. 
1114 See, in this context, Statutes of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, as amended in 1995 and 2006, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/statutes-movement-220506/$File/Statutes-EN-A5.pdf (last 
visited 26 January 2010). 
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Finally, the reference to “guidelines and good practices” that states must strive to 
incorporate, should help to build on already existing recommendations and practices by 
governments, IGOs as well as NGOs active in providing victim assistance.1115 
As a result, the provisions related to victim assistance in the CCM build upon the 
significant strides made in this area in the context of the Ottawa Convention, the CRPD and 
Protocol V. Firstly, it explicitly frames the issue of cluster munition victims as a HRL issue 
by expressing the determination of states parties to ensure the full realisation of the rights of 
all cluster munition victims, recognising their inherent dignity, and by referring to the CRPD 
in the Preamble.1116  
Secondly, in its Art. 5 (1) the connection with HRL is made clear by the reference of 
“in accordance with applicable human rights law”. Moreover, the reference to “international 
humanitarian law” points to the growing convergence between IHL and HRL also in this area, 
a key aspect for this author underlying the whole cluster munition issue.  
Thirdly, the scope of the obligation as extending to cluster munition victims in areas 
under a state party’s jurisdiction or control clarifies that the obligation to provide victim 
assistance is mainly incumbent upon the affected territorial state, which is also in keeping 
with a traditional HRL concept based on triggering primarily obligations only for those states 
under whose jurisdiction or control victims are. The broad definition of “cluster munition 
victims” may also be explained by a HRL approach to, in particular, the post-conflict threat of 
cluster munition remnants, since contamination of populated and agricultural areas and 
potable water resources results, for instance, in impairments of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, including food, water and housing of the entire population of the affected 
area. 
Finally, under the general ICESCR obligations the fulfilment of state party obligations 
is conditioned by the criterion of availability of resources but where there is a lack of national 
                                                 
1115 Relevant guidelines would include those that were drafted in the context of victim assistance under the 
Ottawa Convention. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining study on the role of mine 
action in victim assistance provides a good overview over such guidelines, including the ICBL Guidelines for the 
Care and Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors, the Bern Manifesto elaborated by the Swiss government, the 
ICRC, UNICEF and the WHO, the Guidelines for Socio-Economic Integration of Landmine Survivors 
developed by the World Rehabilitation Fund under the auspices of UNDP or the Bad Honnef Guidelines adopted 
by ICBL experts. See Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “The Role of Mine Action in 
Victim Assistance”, supra note 586, at 11-16.  
1116 Preamble, paras. 6, 9, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
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resources a state must strive for fulfilling its HRL obligations by resorting to international 
cooperation and assistance. On the reverse side of the coin are the other states parties which 
arguably have international obligations to provide assistance to the state that is unable to fulfil 
its obligations under the ICESCR itself. Under the CCM, this translates into the primary 
obligation to provide victim assistance imposed on the affected territorial state but a 
complementary obligation “on each state party in a position to do so” to provide assistance for 
victim assistance efforts as foreseen under Art. 6 (7) of the CCM.1117 This division of 
responsibilities in respect of victim assistance, represents a culmination of the understandings 
reached in relation to victim assistance under the Ottawa Convention while the text of that 
treaty only imposed an obligation on states parties in a position to do so to provide victim 
assistance.  
Accordingly, the obligation to take steps collectively to achieve progressive realisation 
of economic, social and cultural rights under the ICESCR finds its equivalent in the CCM 
under the heading of “International cooperation and assistance” in Art. 6. This is not only 
valid for the obligation to provide victim assistance but also for the fulfilment of the other 
positive obligations under the CCM, i.e. the obligations to destroy stockpiles, to mark, clear 
and destroy cluster munition remnants, as well as to provide risk reduction education to 
civilians.  
As has been argued supra, the obligations to mark, clear and destroy cluster munition 
remnants and to provide risk reduction education may be considered specific derivatives of 
positive obligations under HRL to safeguard the lives and the adequate standard of living of 
the general population under a state’s jurisdiction or control.1118 If one takes the obligations 
under HRL to prevent general threats for the lives and arguably, also the livelihoods of the 
general population under a state’s jurisdiction or control seriously, then a classical 
                                                 
1117 One of the leading negotiators and experts on victim assistance, Markus Reiterer, has emphasised that due to 
capacity shortcomings to comply with international obligations, developing states are reluctant to take on new 
international commitments without mirroring commitments on behalf of developed states for international 
cooperation and assistance. In this context, he specifically mentioned Art. 6 of the CCM.  See M. Reiterer, 
“Some Thoughts on Compliance with International Obligations” in I. Buffard/J. Crawford/A. Pellet/S. Wittich, 
International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner, 943, 
945 (2008).  
1118 See supra pp. 145-156. 
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disarmament obligation to destroy stockpiles to prevent such a threat from even materialising 
may also be based on HRL.1119 
In any event, the argument can be made that the fewer cases of deaths and injuries 
arising from cluster munition use in the future, the more resources will be available to states 
to tackle other economic and social development challenges. Understood in this sense, the 
obligations under Arts. 6 (4), (5) and (7) of the CCM constitute specific offshoots of the 
collective obligations of states parties under the ICESCR to assist individual states parties 
with national resource constraints in meeting their obligations under this treaty. Moreover, the 
already mentioned CESCR demand that states have an obligation to cooperate in providing 
humanitarian assistance to affected states in times of emergency is directly taken up by Art. 6 
(6) of the CCM which requires each state party in a position to do so to urgently provide 
emergency assistance to a state party which has become affected by cluster munition remnants 
after the entry into force of the convention. Finally, Art. 6 (8) of the CCM obliges each state 
party in a position to do so to provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social 
recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected states parties. 
 In other words, Art. 6 of the CCM on the specific issue of cluster munitions is in 
keeping with the classic demand already spelt out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of “a social and international order in which the fundamental rights and freedoms can 
be fully realized.”1120 It also shows a spirit of solidarity between developed and less 
developed states with the latter unfortunately being also the most affected by cluster munition 
use. 
 
7. Conclusions   
“Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the 
time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned.”1121 
                                                 
1119 This would also be in line with a structural approach to HRL which may be read into Art. 28 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights referred to at supra pp. 21-22. 
1120 Art. 28, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32. See, in this sense, also Di Ruzza, 
“Convention on Cluster Munitions”, supra note 1084, at 436, 437-439. 
1121 Preamble, para. 2, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
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This thesis has made the case that for better protection of civilians, in particular, from 
the effects of cluster munitions there was no way around the adoption of a humanitarian 
disarmament treaty like the CCM.  
Firstly, the interpretation of the general rules of IHL with regard to cluster munition 
use has resulted in the prevalence of military/security concerns over humanitarian 
considerations. This conclusion was substantiated by exposing the classical design-based 
rather than the effects-based interpretation of the prohibition of indiscriminate means of 
combat. Since only this prohibition would be truly preventive in the sense that certain 
weapons would be prohibited irrespective of the specific context of use, this interpretation 
ensures that consistent past battlefield experience with unintended civilian casualties is not 
adequately taken into account. The evaluation of the legality of cluster munition use thus rests 
on the prohibition of indiscriminate methods of combat, the way a weapon is used in 
particular circumstances. Such a case-by-case assessment of the legality of cluster munition 
use under the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks has, however, not prevented the use of 
these weapons in circumstances where civilian targets were intermingled with military ones. 
Moreover, for a long time it was not clear whether the proportionality assessment, in 
balancing the concrete and direct military advantage against expected civilian harm, required 
the consideration of long-term civilian harm. In respect of cluster munition use, taking this 
aspect into account is particularly relevant due to the long-term civilian harm these weapons 
regularly cause. 
Secondly, where the general rules of IHL have potential for preventing civilian harm 
they have not been properly implemented. This was true for the obligation to take all feasible 
precautions in attack. Implementation of this obligation would have required attackers in past 
conflicts to consider the accuracy of cluster munitions, the size of the dispersal pattern, the 
likely amount of unexploded sub-munitions, the presence of civilian in the proximity of 
military objectives and the use of alternative weapons. However, the consistent evidence of 
civilian harm leads one to conclude that these factors were not appropriately taken into 
account. 
Thirdly, Protocol V on ERW to the CCW only speaks to the post-conflict dimension of 
the problem that cluster munition use may cause but does not remedy the problems in relation 
to these weapons at the time of use. Furthermore, Protocol V only applies to ERW created 
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after the entry into force of this treaty and is thus inadequate for dealing with the challenge of 
pre-existing unexploded sub-munitions.  
Generally, HRL provides an additional layer of protection for civilians especially 
relevant in relation to dealing with such pre-existing sub-munition dud contamination. 
Obligations of marking, warnings and risk education, as well as clearance were identified as 
specific emanations of a territorial state’s positive HRL obligations towards its population to 
protect their lives and ensure their health with all its underlying determinants. However, the 
limits of its jurisdiction and the still existing uncertainty about its capacity to also bind non-
state actors are inadequacies under HRL for the better protection of civilians from the effects 
of cluster munitions. Notwithstanding, HRL is a pertinent conceptual framework to reframe 
the issue of cluster munitions in humanitarian terms. Most importantly, drawing on the 
precedents of the implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the 2006 CRPD, HRL 
supports a paradigm shift from disarmament motivated by strategic national security 
considerations to disarmament motivated by human security, i.e. humanitarian concerns for 
victims.  
For a variety of reasons, this necessary paradigm change was not possible in the CCW. 
First and foremost the practice of requiring rather than only seeking consensus means that 
powerful opponents to specific rules on cluster munitions like China, Russia or the United 
States may block any initiative that is perceived too ambitious for them. This makes it already 
difficult to conclude any new specific international weapons treaty. Even if consensus can be 
attained, it is unlikely that in respect of weapons that are actually used by some or all of these 
states stringent rules will result. Protocol V on ERW to the CCW is an example because its 
humanitarian potential is weakened by language qualifying state obligations like “as far as 
practicable, subject to legitimate security interests”, “feasible” or “in a position to do so”. In 
addition, the framework of the CCW has a record of giving greater weight to military and 
security experts than to humanitarian experts. This reduces the impact that the voice of 
victims, intergovernmental and non-governmental experts can have on outcomes. Finally, 
participation in the CCW and its protocols is not representative of all the world’s regions. 
Especially African, Asian but also Latin American states generally sympathetic to 
disarmament initiatives are underrepresented in this forum. This makes it easier for European 
and North American developed states with strategic security considerations uppermost in their 
minds to dominate in CCW deliberations. Therefore, it did not come as a surprise that no 
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consensus emerged until 2008 within that framework whether to negotiate a legally binding 
instrument on cluster munitions at all, let alone on the scope of a potential Protocol VI. 
In contrast, the Oslo process can be understood as a reaction to the standstill within the 
framework of the CCW. Norway took the ambitious and to some extent risky initiative to 
conclude a legally binding instrument that would prohibit cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians outside the CCW. This concrete goal of a prohibition was 
shared by other small-sized states, including Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Peru, 
the core group which drove this alternative diplomatic process. Thus, none of the major 
military powers, i.e. China, India, Russia or the United States, would obstruct progress 
towards this ambitious aim in the first place.  
Also contributions from the humanitarian community had an extraordinary influence 
on the outcome of the Oslo process, the CCM. Victims of cluster munitions who actively 
participated in Oslo process conferences vividly reminded state representatives of the 
predominant and ultimate humanitarian character of this endeavour. Civil society, loosely 
organised in the CMC, not only played its traditional role of attracting media attention 
through activism but also assumed the educative role of experts. This expertise was so highly 
valued by like-minded governmental representatives that CMC experts were given an 
extraordinary amount of slots for interventions and presentations at Oslo process conferences. 
The mutual appreciation between humanitarian-minded small-sized states and the CMC was 
so high that a close collaboration resulted, much closer than the collaboration with other states 
less enthusiastic about the initiative on the road to the Dublin negotiations. This alliance 
which cut across the traditional divide between states and NGOs was necessary to increase the 
chances of the CCM as a meaningful instrument which would enjoy the support also 
especially by certain European user, producer and stockpiler states.  
The extraordinary role played by the CMC in the Oslo process was explicitly 
recognised in the Preamble to the CCM along with that of the United Nations and the ICRC. 
The operational agencies of the United Nations like the United Nations Mine Action Service 
or UNDP not only increased the field evidence-based credibility of the diplomatic process but 
the financial support provided by UNDP was vital in enabling the participation of especially 
African and Asian developing states.  
The support of the process by the ICRC was also crucial in adding the credibility of 
the universally respected guardian of IHL. In particular, the ICRC’s hosting of an expert 
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meeting on cluster munitions, which brought together supporters and opponents of the Oslo 
process, provided an opportunity where both camps could make their case. Further, the public 
appeal by the ICRC of October 2007 to urgently adopt a new disarmament treaty on cluster 
munitions helped to put the opponents of ambitious specific rules on cluster munitions, both 
inside and outside the Oslo process, on the defensive. Its statement that it was not convinced 
that military considerations could outweigh the well documented humanitarian concerns about 
cluster munition use or that technological solutions alone would suffice was certainly crucial 
in this context. With the guardian of IHL being that outspoken, it was difficult for opponents 
to (continue to) argue that the Oslo process was merely a “feel good” exercise mainly for 
those not stockpiling, producing or using cluster munitions. 
Hence, all these factors made it possible to conclude an ambitious humanitarian 
disarmament convention, the CCM which will enter into force on 1 August 2010. The 
following reflections are an attempt to assess the potential of the CCM to influence IHL and 
HRL as well as accomplish the ultimate objective of a better protection of civilians from the 
harmful effects of cluster munitions. 
The first point to be made about a possible influence on IHL interpretation is that the 
customary international law prohibition of indiscriminate weapons is placed in a more 
realistic context for conventional weapons. That would mean to evaluate the legality of a 
weapon in light of the nature and regular tactics prevailing in contemporary armed conflict 
and in light of a past record of humanitarian harm and not only base such a judgement on the 
design and effects of a weapon as intended in theory by users and producers. After the 
successful conclusion and entry into force of the CCM for the first 30 states parties, one may 
ask how legitimate an IHL interpretation of the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons still is 
to state that this prohibition is not violated where it is theoretically possible to use a weapon 
far away from civilian targets without inquiring to what extent this theoretical condition is 
present on a contemporary battlefield. 
 Paradoxically, precisely the most controversial exclusion from the definition of 
prohibited cluster munitions does most explicitly away with an IHL understanding which is 
blind to the actual effects under real combat conditions, notably Art. 2 (2) (c) of the CCM 
which connects the technical exclusion criteria with the overarching aim “to avoid 
indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions.” As has been 
seen supra, such an effects-based approach was on the table in the 1970s before API, APII 
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and the CCW were adopted.1122 Thus, this constitutes the revival of an approach that has been 
buried in the meantime which is not only desirable but necessary to bring the interpretation of 
specific rules of IHL back in line with the overarching balancing between humanitarian and 
military considerations.  
In fact, the exclusive recourse to an “intended design and effects-based approach” to 
examining the legality of weapons under the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons has 
resulted in favouring military over humanitarian considerations in respect of conventional 
weapons. Accordingly, a way to make the general prohibition of indiscriminate weapons more 
than an empty shell in respect of conventional weapons would be to have recourse not only to 
the intended design and effects but also the actual effects of a weapon through the history of 
concrete use as a yardstick. The adoption of the CCM also pointed at the fact that generally, a 
better balance between military and humanitarian considerations must be adopted towards the 
use of weapons under IHL. After all, if a consistent record of humanitarian harm is not acted 
upon in respect of a specific weapon the need for disarmament for countering the 
inadequacies of IHL rules as well as their implementation will again arise. 
 Secondly, the prohibition on cluster munitions may reinvigorate discussions on setting 
a norm requiring states with accurate weapon capabilities to use these capabilities in civilian 
residential areas. Until recently, a majority of authors were against the proposition that there 
is a legal obligation to use precision-guided weapons in or around civilian areas if the 
militaries concerned possess such technology.1123 The CCM, again in particular the exclusion 
from the definition of prohibited cluster munitions under Art. 2 (2) (c), while not establishing 
such an obligation would seem to constitute a legal presumption that the use of miniaturised 
explosive unguided munitions with an area effect is inconsistent with the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks. Most importantly, this leads to an expectation that the choice of 
unguided conventional weapons with an area effect is incompatible under the obligation to 
take all feasible precautions in attack.  After all, one major motivating factor behind 
                                                 
1122 See supra p. 247. 
1123 See, for example, C. B. Puckett, “In this Era of “Smart Weapons,” Is a State Under an International Legal 
Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?”, 18 Emory International Law Review 645-
723 (2004); Schmitt, “Precision attack and international humanitarian law”, supra note 1039, at 461; D. L. 
Infeld, “Precision guided munitions demonstrated their pinpoint accuracy in Desert Storm: But is a country 
obligated to use precision technology to minimize collateral civilian injury and damage”, 26 George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics 109, 140-141 (1992). On the contrary, albeit, tentative view that 
customary international law as analysed against the background of armed conflicts in the 1990s, ranging from 
Operation Desert Storm to Allied Force, recognises an obligation to use precision-guided munitions in urban 
settings, see S. W. Belt, “Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use 
of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas”, 47 Naval Law Review 115, 174 (2000). 
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prohibiting cluster munitions was the tendency to blanket populated areas in an indiscriminate 
manner rather than accurately attacking single target objects. Whereas this is not the same as 
outlawing all use of unguided weapons in and around civilian areas, it would go towards 
specifying that attackers would have to use weapons accurate enough to engage single target 
objects rather than targeting wide areas especially in locations containing both military and 
civilian targets.1124 However, significant challenges remain as noted by the UN Secretary-
General in his 2009 report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, expressing his 
concern about “the use in densely populated environments of explosive weapons that have so-
called “area effect” in Sri Lanka and Gaza.1125 
 This tendency of creating ever-more stringent norms relating to the core obligations of 
distinction and taking of precautionary measures may invite the criticism of adding a legal 
asymmetry to the operational asymmetries prevailing in contemporary warfare. As a matter of 
fact, the CCM only legally binds the armed forces of states, not non-state armed groups. 
However, this first difficulty is remedied somewhat by the Preamble of the CCM which reads: 
“Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under 
any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this 
Convention.”1126 While this does not create a hard and fast obligation as such, it is to be 
understood as a clear mandate also to monitor the activities of non-state armed groups.1127  
Still, even during the negotiations in Dublin there have been critical voices about the 
exclusion under Art. 2 (2) (c) since the effect may be to increase the technology gap between 
militaries in developed and less developed countries. As a matter of law, such arguments are 
irrelevant, since the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid and at least minimise 
civilian harm is as such a standard which takes into account different technological 
capabilities. Thus understood, this obligation is the more stringent the more advanced a state’s 
                                                 
1124 See, in this sense also R. Moyes, “Implications of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for developing a 
norm against area-effect use of explosive weapons”, Landmine Action Research Paper, 23 July 2008, 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/The%20CCM%20and%20area-
effect%20use%20of%20explosive%20weapons.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1125 UN Secretary-General, Report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 29 May 2009, UN Doc. 
S/2009/277, at paras. 36-37. It should be noted that in Gaza, cluster munitions were not used, in Sri Lanka 
cluster munition use still has not been confirmed. 
1126 Preamble, para. 12, Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
1127 In this regard, the activities of Geneva Call are noteworthy. Geneva Call is a humanitarian NGO committed 
to ensuring implementation of IHL by non-state armed groups. The most important activity so far has been the 
drawing up of so-called Deeds of Commitment by means of which non-state armed groups may subscribe to the 
norms contained in the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Antipersonnel Mines, thus compensating for the structural 
deficit that they cannot formally become parties to international conventions. See 
http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm (last visited 26 January 2010). Arguably, the CCM in its Preamble 
constitutes an entry point for Geneva Call for possible engagement with non-state armed groups in respect of 
cluster munitions. 
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weapon capabilities are. However, recent armed conflicts in which technologically advanced 
armies participated showed a steady increase in the use of more accurate weapons. This 
means that they are available in greater numbers than before. As a result, acquisition of such 
more accurate weapons than cluster munitions such as certain laser-guided and munitions 
possessing GPS is less costly than before.1128 The reality may be that the CCM through the 
exclusion of technologically advanced sub-munition based weapons under Art. 2 (2) (c) may 
trigger increased production and proliferation of the SMart 155s and BONUS currently only 
available to very few armies. But it may also simply be a matter of time until these weapons 
are more widely available at lower costs also to less developed countries. 
It has been argued that the more advanced one party to the armed conflict is in terms 
of precision-guided capabilities, the more likely it is that an inferior opponent resorts to 
practices blatantly violating its own obligations to preserve the distinction between civilian 
and military targets such as the use of human shields. This scenario, according to a prominent 
commentator, would entail the danger that the more technologically advanced party will 
perceive IHL increasingly as disadvantaging it, which may spark a cycle of lawlessness.1129 
Besides the reliance on a notion of reciprocity that does not accord with IHL, since Art. 51 (8) 
API does not release an attacker of its own obligations under IHL when it encounters an 
opponent violating IHL, such pitfalls should not lead to a downward spiral in IHL 
implementation but to increased engagement with non-state armed groups alongside requiring 
armed forces to use more accurate weapons in and around civilian areas.1130  
With regard to HRL, the major achievement is without any doubt the action-orientated 
obligations to provide victim assistance which constitutes a major advancement compared to 
the weakly worded obligation under the 1997 Ottawa Convention. This is directly due to the 
influence of specific HRL entrenched in the latest conventions, especially the CRPD and the 
2006 Convention on Enforced Disappearances, but also in the earlier 1984 Convention 
Against Torture. The characteristic feature of such HRL is that these conventions enshrine the 
general and specific HRL obligations in more detailed fashion whereas before only the treaty 
                                                 
1128 Compare the figures given by Belt in 2000: While for a modern precision-guided Joint Direct Attack 
Munition the price at the beginning of the 1990s was 50,000 U.S. dollars at a minimum, at the end of the 1990s it 
had dropped to around 18,000 U.S. dollars. See Belt, “Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision 
Munitions in Urban Areas”, supra note 1123, at 168. 
1129 M. N. Schmitt, “Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law”, 62 Air Force Law Review 1, 
42 (2008). 
1130 As the UN Secretary-General noted in his latest report on protection of civilians in armed conflict, “while 
engagement with non-State armed groups will not always result in improved protection, the absence of 
systematic engagement will almost certainly mean more, not fewer, civilian casualties in current conflicts.” See 
UN Secretary-General Report on Protection of Civilians, supra note 1125, at para. 40. 
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monitoring bodies like the CESCR fleshed out rather generally worded human rights treaty 
law in their own interpretations of the respective treaty, for example, in General Comments. 
Besides the specific implementation-orientated obligations under the CCM and the CRPD, in 
particular, the specifically prescribed division of responsibilities between the affected 
territorial state and the rest of the international community of state parties are testimony to 
this. In this regard, the general obligation under Art. 2 (1) of the ICESCR according to which 
states parties must take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, with a view to achieving progressively economic, social and cultural rights, finds 
a specific contextual expression with the obligations of states parties in a position to do to 
assist the territorial state under Art. 6 of the CCM. This flows from the understanding that it 
may not be legally and morally justified to leave an affected state alone in its endeavour to 
remedy the existing consequences from past cluster munition use on its territory, since in 
many cases that state has not caused the humanitarian problem in the first place.  
While the links to HRL are strong, the CCM does not create an individual complaints 
procedure presumably on the basis to avoid duplication with already existing fora, in 
particular the CRPD, since the Optional Protocol to the CRPD which already entered into 
force already creates such a classical HRL mechanism. Neither does the CCM establish 
individual victim rights but is rather addressed to states only. However, the human rights-
infused components of the CCM which were fundamentally designed to deal with 
inadequacies under IHL are new evidence of a trend to adopt an increasingly remedial 
approach towards the consequences of past armed conflicts (with the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention, the 2003 Protocol V and the 2008 CCM) alongside a preventive approach. This 
constitutes progressive thinking under IHL which is traditionally weak in providing remedies 
for victims of armed conflict and demonstrates a growing convergence between IHL and 
HRL. 
Beyond these legal implications of the CCM, one may legitimately ask what practical 
importance the treaty is likely to have. It is clear that any undertaking to treat this question at 
this point in time requires some “looking through the crystal ball”. However, one does not 
need to be a prophet to state that the ability of the treaty to provide lasting protection to 
civilians from cluster munitions depends firstly on a humanitarian-minded implementation of 
the CCM by states parties. Currently, this is especially true for the controversial issue of 
interoperability with states that will not become parties to the CCM in the foreseeable future, 
especially the United States. Unfortunately, the existence of this provision is another example 
of aggressive U.S. unilateralism (among others like the 1997 Ottawa Convention and the 
 363
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) with the aim of actively undermining any 
multilateral norm setting or implementation effort among others where these norms are 
perceived to threaten U.S. interests. 
If states parties were to interpret Art. 21 (3) of the CCM too broadly in favour of 
military considerations then the entire object and purpose of the CCM to eliminate civilian 
suffering once and for all could be fundamentally undermined. After all, it may again be 
recalled that many notorious instances of cluster munition use occurred during coalition 
operations far away from the territories of coalition partners, including during the 1991 
Operation Desert Storm, the 1999 Operation Allied Force, the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom. The question of the relationship between the 
prohibition of assistance under Art. 1 (1) (c) and the provision on relations with states not 
party under Art. 21 of the CCM is of great practical significance, as the United States was 
particularly active in recent months to get an increase of troop strength from their allies for its 
combat efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Indeed there have been discouraging signs from Oslo process participants that have 
signed and/or ratified the CCM and have adopted or are in the process of adopting 
implementing legislation. Ireland, for example, one of the Oslo core group members, host of 
the negotiations of the CCM and state party, adopted legislation that excludes the application 
of the prohibition of assistance, encouragement or inducement to acts prohibited to a state 
party for any act or omission performed in joint military operations with states not party to the 
CCM, save for the prohibition found in Art. 21 (4) (d) of the CCM.1131 Thus, the 
implementing legislation would on its face be even more permissive than the CCM and may 
completely undermine Ireland’s implementation of the prohibition of assistance under Art. 1 
(1) (c) of the CCM. 
Another state party, Germany, an influential NATO member and traditional close U.S. 
ally, while not expressly including a provision in its implementing legislation of the CCM in 
its Explanatory Comments on the CCM annexed to the implementing legislation stated its 
view that  
                                                 
1131 Section 7 (4) of the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008 states that the prohibition of 
assistance does not apply to any act or omission made by any person in the course of his or her duties in the 
planning or conduct of operations by an International United Nations Force or in the planning or conduct of 
operations with a state that is not a Cluster Munitions Convention state. Section 7 (5) of the same Act 
categorically prohibits the express request of the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions 
used is within his or her exclusive control. See Ireland, An Bille Um Chnuas-Mhuinisin Agus Mianaigh 
Fhrithphearsanra 2008/Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008, 
http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/uploads/documents/Political%20Division/a2008.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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“a mere relaying of an order for a mission involving cluster munitions within a command structure does 
not contravene the provisions of the Convention. This does not constitute assistance, encouragement or 
inducement to activities that are generally prohibited to a state party under Art. 1.”1132 
  
Thus, under this interpretation arguably, a state party to the CCM could knowingly 
tolerate or acquiesce in the cluster munition use by a state not party in a common military 
operation. 
New Zealand, another core group member, state party to the CCM and ally of the 
United States, in its national interest analysis in the lead-up to its national implementing 
legislation required to ratify the convention, did not acknowledge the prohibition of assistance 
as a core prohibition of the CCM; at the same time, New Zealand expressed its discomfort 
with the unambiguous prohibition under Art. 21 (4) (d) of the CCM of expressly requesting 
the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions is within a state party’s 
exclusive control, stating that there  
“may be some risk associated with how this obligation and its operational impact would be perceived by 
New Zealand’s military partners which are not Party to the Convention […].”1133 
  
In addition, New Zealand viewed the positive obligations to promote the Convention 
to states not party and to make its best efforts to discourage states not parties from using 
cluster munitions as entailing potential costs and/or disadvantages.1134 
Subsequently, some of these concerns were confirmed by the 2009 New Zealand 
Cluster Munitions Prohibitions Act.1135 The Act does not contain any reference to the positive 
obligations under Arts. 21 (1) and (2) of the CCM. On the other hand, under its Section 11 (3)  
the Act only enshrines as an absolute prohibition in multinational military operations that a 
member of the New Zealand Armed Forces must not expressly request the use of cluster 
munitions in cases where the choice of munitions is within his/her exclusive control. 
However, without the obligation to discourage states not parties from using cluster munitions, 
this absolute prohibition would be extremely narrow and would allow, for instance, an express 
                                                 
1132 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag 16. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 16/12226, Denkschrift, 12 March 2009, at 41,  
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/122/1612226.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010) 
1133 New Zealand, International treaty examination of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, done at Dublin 19-30 May 2008, Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee, March 2009, at Annex B, National Interest Analysis,  para. 21, 
http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/9BC976BD-5A1F-44D1-8266-
438956298E31/103915/DBSCH_SCR_4371_Internationaltreatyexaminationofthe.pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
1134 Ibid., at para. 20. 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/0068/latest/viewpdf.aspx?search=ts_act_Cluster+Munitions+Pro
hibition_resel&p=1 (last visited 26 March 2010). 
1135 Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act 2009, Public Act No. 68, Date of Assent: 17 December 2009,  
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request for cluster munition use where the choice of munitions is not under the requesting 
state’s control. 
 A very broad view of the permission to cooperate militarily with states not party and a 
narrow interpretation of the prohibition of assistance was also reflected in the Australian 
National Interest Analysis for national implementing legislation. It was stated there that Art. 
21 (3) allows states parties to continue to effectively participate in coalition operations in 
which an ally may be using cluster munitions. Then, the analysis went on to say that Art. 21 
(4) of the CCM reaffirms that certain obligations on states parties still apply in these 
circumstances.1136 Therefore, Australia is arguably of the view that the list of prohibitions 
under Art. 21 (4) is exhaustive in the sense that were it not for Art. 21 (4) the prohibition of 
assistance would not apply in coalition operations. 
However, these positions are based on the presumption that such interoperability 
problems are inevitable. To reiterate this author’s view this is far from clear. In any event, 
such rigid positions disregard the potential of Art. 21 (2) of the CCM that conflicts between 
Art. 1 (1) (c) and Arts. 21 (3) and (4), thus interoperability problems may be avoided at the 
outset. As this author has already argued elsewhere, the practical effect of the obligations to 
notify states not party to the CCM and to make best efforts to discourage use of cluster 
munitions by states not party depends on how seriously states parties take the implementation 
of these obligations.1137 This author also argued in this respect that the obligation to make its 
best efforts to discourage cluster munition use by states not party should be read to prevent 
states parties to agree to RoE which contemplate cluster munition use.1138 While it may be 
difficult to reach a common understanding of all states parties on the meaning of Arts. 1 (1) 
(c) and 21 (3) and (4) of the CCM, they would more probably have less difficulty in fleshing 
out what measures are practically required under Art. 21 (2) of the CCM. 
To the credit of some of these states mentioned here, they also sent positive signals by 
advocating an interpretation of the CCM that would not reduce Art. 21 (2) to an empty shell. 
Ireland, for example, provided a statement of clarification regarding its legislation in which it 
emphasised that permitted activities in the framework of military cooperation is not only 
limited by Art. 21 (4) of the CCM but also by Art. 21 (2) and the rule on international treaty 
                                                 
1136 Australia, National Interest Analysis, 11 March 2009, at para. 15, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/12march2009/treaties/munitions_nia.pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
1137 See A. Breitegger, “Von Grimsby bis Oslo: Ein Ende von über 60 Jahren Leid für Zivilisten durch 
Streumunitionen?” in S. Wittich/A. Reinisch/A. Gattini (eds.), Kosovo – Staatsschulden – Notstand – EU-
Reformvertrag–Humanitätsrecht: Beiträge zum 33. Österreichischen Völkerrechtstag 2008 in Conegliano, at 
223, 236 (2009). 
1138 Ibid. 
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interpretation that treaties must be performed in good faith. In this regard, it noted that any 
deliberate assistance in the commission of an act prohibited by the CCM in the context of 
military cooperation with a state not party would be inconsistent with the obligation to make 
best efforts to discourage the use of cluster munitions by the latter. Moreover, interpreted in 
good faith, the CCM does not allow states parties to arrange for states not parties to take 
prohibited actions on their behalf. Ireland further specified how it would operationalise the 
obligation to make its best efforts to discourage cluster munition use by states not party in 
joint military operations. It stated its intention to make every effort in the elaboration of codes 
of conduct, rules of engagement, caveats and similar agreements prepared for the mission to 
ensure that there is no prospect of cluster munition use.1139 Moreover, appropriate orders 
would be issued to Irish peacekeepers that under no circumstances they would deliberately 
assist, encourage or induce the commission of an act prohibited by the CCM by a state not 
party and any breach of such orders would constitute an offence punishable under military 
law.1140  
In a similar vein, Germany stated that Art. 21 represents an opportunity, preferably 
together with partners in the lead-up to military operations with states not party, to actively 
request the latter to comply with the provisions of this Convention even if there is no 
guarantee of success for such compliance. Thus, besides constant promotion of accession to 
the Convention, the German government will emphatically make an effort in the planning of 
common operations, for instance with EU or NATO partners, that cluster munition use will 
not be contemplated.  Germany further emphasised that it will prompt states not party to 
comply with the highest standards in line with the objectives of the Convention even in 
exceptional situations such as for force protection. Finally, Germany stated that the transport 
of and assistance to such transport of cluster munitions was not permitted by the 
interoperability provision. The German government has already implemented these two 
offences by decree to the German Armed Forces.1141 
                                                 
1139 Ireland, Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Bill 2008, Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 
Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin, 4 November 2008, 
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/DDebate.aspx?F=DAL20081104.xml&Page=1&Ex=892#N892 (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
1140 Ireland, Letter of Clarification to the Cluster Munition Coalition, 11 March 2009, quoted in Human Rights 
Watch, “Staying True to the Ban on Cluster Munitions: Understanding the Prohibition on Assistance in the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions”, June 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2009.06%20Arms%20Interop%20Paper%20Final.pdf 
(last visited 26 January 2010). 
1141 See Germany, Deutscher Bundestag Denkschrift, 12 March 2009, at 41, supra note 1132. 
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Also Austria remains one of the countries that maintain the highest standard of 
implementation in respect of interoperability despite the fact that the CCM as subsequently 
adopted could not do without an express provision on this particular concern.1142 
Interestingly, even before the adoption of the CCM, the FPÖ addressed a series of 
parliamentary questions to the Minister of Defence on interoperability, such as: Do any 
accords exist between the Republic of Austria and its ESDP or NATO PfP partners in respect 
of cluster munition use in joint missions, in particular whether any such accords exist in 
respect of the deployment of Austrian soldiers in Chad? Which consequences must an 
Austrian soldier expect who is member of a multinational brigade if this multinational brigade 
uses cluster munitions?1143 The answers provided by the Minister of Defence shed light on 
how to pragmatically solve interoperability problems: As has already been stated supra, the 
legal mandate of the Chad mission would not have excluded offensive use of force and thus, 
provision was made for robust combat action. In these circumstances, theoretically the 
prospect of cluster munition use could arise.  
However, already then Austria issued a caveat for the deployment of the Austrian 
contingent in EUFOR Chad/RCA both in the phase of drawing up the concept of operations as 
well as upon declaration of placing themselves under EU orders. In this regard, the European 
Union was informed that due to national legislation the transport, handling and use of cluster 
munitions was not permitted to Austrian soldiers.1144 Thus, the capacity of Austria 
participating in multinational operations such as that in Chad remains although it adopts a 
strict stance in respect of possibly assisting other states’ nationals in the use, transfer or 
stockpiling of cluster munitions. The Austrian example is noteworthy in that it may be 
resorted to as an example of state practice in relation to notifying other states participating in 
joint military operations of its own obligations even if this example occurred before the 
adoption of the CCM. Further, it reconfirms that other states usually accept national 
                                                 
1142 With regard to the definition of prohibited cluster munitions, however, Austria lowered its previously stricter 
stance so as to bring its national legislation in line with the CCM, especially with the exclusions from the 
definition contained in Art. 2 (2).  This has the effect of keeping the door open for procurement of the SMArt 
155 sensor-fused munitions but until now, there are no concrete plans of procurement. Given Austria’s 
leadership role in the Oslo process, it is not to be expected that Austria will take any decision to allow sensor-
fused munitions for its armed forces lightly. For the amended Austrian Act on the Prohibition of Cluster 
Munitions, see Annexes, pp. 414-416. 
1143 Parliamentary Questions by MPs Strache, Dr. Haimbuchner and Colleagues to the Federal Minister of 
Defence Concerning the Possible Use of Cluster Munitions Within the Framework of ESDP (European Security 
and Defence Policy) Missions With the Participation of Austrian Soldiers, No. 3500/J, XXIII. GP, 31 January 
2008, http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/J/J_03500/fname_100309.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1144 Written Reply by Mag. Norbert Darabos to Written Parliamentary Questions by MPs Strache and 
Colleagues, No. 3392/AB, XXIII. GP, 21 March 2008, 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/AB/AB_03392/fname_104451.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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restrictions on the scope of possible deployment in such multinational missions without 
excluding states with such restrictions from the mission as a whole. 
NGO experts have echoed the approach that Art. 21 (2) of the CCM has the potential 
to avoid that the prohibition of assistance of anyone, including of states not party, is 
fundamentally undermined by the provisions of Arts. 21 (3) and (4).1145 
In any event, a lasting prevention of interoperability problems could best be secured 
by the universalisation of the CCM. Art. 21 (1) translates this goal into a binding treaty 
obligation for states parties. However, this is not a likely prospect at the moment given the 
resistance against the CCM on the part of some major users, producers and stockpilers of the 
weapon. With regard to both interpretation of controversial provisions in the CCM as well as 
its universalisation, the First Meeting of States Parties due to take place in Laos in November 
2010 will be significant in paving the future of the CCM. 
In the meantime, the United States, biggest user and producer of cluster munitions of 
all times, has until the present date advocated the CCW to be the appropriate forum to address 
cluster munitions. For instance, in April 2009, at the end of the meeting of governmental 
experts, the United States was of the view that the most recent version of a Draft Protocol VI 
to the CCW would have a major positive humanitarian impact, as the text would require that 
many, if not most cluster munitions that currently exist would have to be removed. In the case 
of the United States, this would apply to over 95 % of their stocks.1146 However, it is unclear 
whether this is accurate in view of the vague prohibitions that the Draft Protocol lays down. 
For instance, munitions which are exclusively designed for use by direct fire delivery systems 
would not fall under the definition of prohibited weapons and those cluster munitions which 
are capable of being delivered accurately to a pre-defined target area and each explosive 
submunition possesses at least one of the following technical features: a self-destruction 
mechanism or an equivalent mechanism, including two or more initiating mechanisms; a self-
neutralisation mechanism; a self-deactivating feature; or the cluster munition incorporates a 
mechanism or design which, after dispersal results in no more than 1% unexploded ordnance 
across the range of intended operational environments. Besides proposing these technical 
criteria for exceptions to prohibitions which have been shown in the Oslo process to be 
                                                 
1145 E. Schwager, “The Question of Interoperability – Interpretation of Articles 1 and 21 of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (CCM)”, 21 (4) Humanitäres Völkerrecht/Journal of Peace and Armed Conflict 247-250 
(2008); Human Rights Watch, “Prohibition of Assistance in the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, supra note 
1140.  
1146 United States, Mission in Geneva, Closing Statement to the April 2009 session of the Group of governmental 
Experts to the CCW, 17 April 2009, http://geneva.usmission.gov/news/2009/04/17/ccwclosing/ (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
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unworkable and not live up to their promises in a combat environment, the Draft Protocol not 
only proposes a transition period during which even the most inaccurate and unreliable cluster 
munition types could still be used and any cluster munition produced after 1990 transferred 
but proposes still more exceptions for anti-ship and anti-runway munitions.1147 
Also Russia, India, China, Pakistan and Israel remain hostile to the CCM. Russia, for 
example, could still not even agree to a new internationally binding Protocol to the CCW on 
cluster munitions in November 2008. Mainly for that reason the meeting of the states parties 
to the CCW decided that the GGE will continue its negotiations to address urgently the 
humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and 
humanitarian considerations but did not specify at all what it is that states parties of the CCW 
should negotiate.1148 Meanwhile, like Israel, Pakistan and China, Russia supports ongoing 
informal discussions on the above-mentioned Draft Protocol VI, stressing that a consensus 
decision on a protocol with meaningful effect was attainable.  
India, for its part, has stressed on various occasions that a comprehensive universal 
ban on cluster munitions is not within the reach of the international community, neither within 
the CCW nor outside. It also expressed its scepticism on a partial prohibition on certain types 
of cluster munitions, which may in fact create space in the international market for more 
advanced types, thus making the technological upgrading of existing stocks expensive. India 
also rejected importing technical standards agreed in other international instruments 
negotiated outside the framework of the CCW;1149 while this can already be understood as 
directly referring to the CCM, this view was reportedly clarified by India going specifically 
on record, objecting to the wording of the latest Draft Protocol VI to the CCW which states 
that the rights and obligations of states parties to the CCM shall not be affected by a potential 
future CCW Protocol.1150  
This shows that there is not only reluctance by major users, producers and stockpilers 
to commit themselves to the CCM but that there is also no agreement on how to pursue an 
alternative approach within the framework of the CCW. Any attempt by the United States, for 
example, to push for a regulation of cluster munitions based on technological advances will be 
eyed with suspicion by China, India and Russia in particular which fear lagging behind in 
                                                 
1147 See Chair’s Consolidated Paper, Annex I, Cluster Munitions, 16 April 2009 (on file with the author), 
reproduced in the Annexes, at infra pp. 416-424. 
1148 See 2008 Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW, Report, UN-Doc. CCW/MSP/2008/4, 23 January 2009, 
at para. 34. 
1149 India, Statement at the GGE on Cluster Munitions, 14 April 2009, 
http://www.mea.gov.in/speech/2009/06/14ss01.htm (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1150 K. Harrison, “Update from the “end” of the 2009 CCW GGE on cluster munitions” (on file with the author). 
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cluster munition technology since it is assumed that these countries have large stockpiles of 
inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions and acquiring alternatives would be a highly 
costly exercise. However, the cost argument is not a particularly strong one for at least India 
and Russia, since both of these states are already equipped with sensor-fused weapons.1151 
Rather, the real problem with these states is their lack of political will and their insistence that 
cluster munitions represent a military capability they do not want to get rid of. 
While these dynamics between the major users, producers and stockpilers of the 
weapon already complicate the task within the framework of the CCW, the difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that some of the states parties to the CCW will have become states 
parties to the CCM by the time any new CCW Protocol might be concluded. In this respect, 
Oslo process states strongly expressed their opposition to any CCW Protocol that would be 
incompatible with the CCM.1152 This opposition is not only founded on political grounds but 
where Oslo process states have already signed the CCM, it would also be based on their 
customary international legal obligation not to defeat object and purpose of the CCM which 
is, inter alia, “to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster 
munitions …”1153 
However, if the Draft Protocol VI is adopted as stands at the moment, the result would 
precisely be to have one extremely ambitious convention on cluster munitions from a 
humanitarian point of view and one far less ambitious. A treaty concluded within the CCW 
would weaken rather than strengthen protection of civilians from the effects of cluster 
munitions. It has been claimed that a treaty adopted within the CCW would have a more 
                                                 
1151 For instance, India reportedly only in September 2008 was intending to acquire 510 CBU-105 air-dropped 
Sensor Fuzed Weapons from the United States in an arms deal valued at as much as $355 million. Russia already 
produces its own types of sensor fused weapons. See Human Rights Watch/Landmine Action/Landmine 
Monitor/International Campaign to Ban Landmines/Cluster Munition Coalition, “Banning Cluster Munitions: 
Government Policy and Practice”, May 2009, at 210, 235, 
http://lm.icbl.org/cm/2009/banning_cluster_munitions_2009.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1152 For instance, in the CCW GGE meeting in November 2008, Costa Rica delivered a statement on behalf of 
Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Holy See, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, 
Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Uruguay and Venezuela that the proposal as it then stood was “unacceptable” to 
these states, as it would set a precedent allowing the CCW to fall behind stronger existing standards [i.e. the 
CCM]. See Joint Statement to the Group of Governmental Experts of the CCW, 7 November 2008, 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/ccw-joint-statement-by-25-051108.pdf 
(last visited 26 January 2010). Even more recently, France stated at the end of the second session of the Group of 
Governmental Experts to the CCW on 17 April 2009 that “la question des définitions et de la compatibilité avec 
la CASM [Convention sur Les Armes à Sous-Munitions] est un point dur pour ma délégation.” See France, 
Statement to the Group of Governmental Experts to the CCW, 17 April 2009, http://www.delegfrance-cd-
geneve.org/IMG/pdf/Intervention_France_GGE_170409-2.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1153 Preamble, para. 2, CCM, supra note 33. In the penultimate preambular paragraph, it also states that the States 
Parties to this Convention are “determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and 
its full implementation.” 
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effective impact since it might include some of the major users, producers or stockpilers.1154 
As argued above the current draft is based on broad accuracy and reliability approaches 
towards defining prohibited weapons that either are excessively vague (“is capable of being 
delivered accurately to a pre-defined target area”) or have been shown during the Oslo 
process with credible field evidence to not provide sufficient humanitarian protection, i.e. 
regulations based on a certain failure rate or on self-destruct mechanisms. Accordingly, this 
mixture of definitions difficult to implement and those which are unworkable on the ground 
would not contribute towards improving protection of civilians. This would apply even if one 
assumed the de facto split in states parties to the CCM and a potential Draft Protocol VI for 
China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States in particular, and a resulting lack 
of incompatibility in substance between the two conventions.  
Another scenario contemplated was that a Protocol VI will be adopted with the same 
scope of prohibitions and definition of cluster munitions as the CCM. However, the 
bargaining chip for the major users, producers or stockpilers would be a lengthy transition 
period. This view accepts that the notion of a transition period would constitute a temporary 
legitimisation of cluster munitions. But the endorsement of the main users, producers and 
stockpilers would offset this disadvantage if certain additional provisions were included in a 
future Protocol, declaring the use of cluster munitions during that period as exceptional and 
preferably also enshrining an immediate prohibition on transfers.1155 It is the view of this 
author that this option is at present unlikely to materialise, given that at least Russia and India 
still remain very hostile to the CCM. Thus, any attempt to align standards of a potential 
Protocol VI will probably meet the fierce resistance of these countries.  
In addition, it is questionable how a subsequent treaty would not actively undermine 
the CCM adopted before, especially one effect that has so often been mentioned as the core 
rationale behind the conclusion of the CCM, notably to effectively stigmatise the weapon.1156 
                                                 
1154 See, for example, A. Deeks, “A Second Cluster Munitions Treaty?”, Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, 7 July 2008, http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080707_cluster_munitions.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
1155 D. Justen, “Das 21. Jahrhundert ohne Streumunition? Optionen für die Verhandlungen im Rahmen des VN-
Waffenübereinkommens in Genf”, Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik Aktuell 23, May 2009, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5948 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1156 For instance, the CMC in its newsletter of December 2008 stated in view of the failure of the November 
2008 CCW meeting to push through an agreement legitimising ongoing use of the weapon that “During the 
Geneva talks the CMC has welcomed the strong support demonstrated by the majority of states for the standards 
set by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is expected that the continued stigmatisation of this weapon 
around the world will accelerate with the widespread signature of the treaty in Oslo and that this will eventually 
lead to a vast reduction in its use, production and transfer, even by the limited group of states remaining outside 
its legal norms.” See Cluster Munition Coalition, “Newsletter November-December 2008”, 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/take-action/campaigners-in-action/?id=1104 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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The Oxford Dictionary defines “stigmatise” as “regard worthy of disgrace”.1157 With regard to 
the meaning of “stigmatisation” in the context of cluster munitions, the ICRC stated that the 
“norms established by this Convention will also have an effect on the practice and positions of 
States that have not yet adhered to it. With the adoption and impending entry into force of this 
treaty, cluster munitions are already considered a stigmatized weapon by many countries, the 
media and the public. It will be difficult for anyone to use cluster munitions in the future.”1158 
Thus, it is hoped that the CCM if it cannot be universalised in the near future will produce 
what has been termed “second-best responses”1159 by states reluctant to formal adherence to 
the convention as states parties, i.e. de facto compliance with CCM key norms. 
 In that sense, the model invoked is the 1997 Ottawa Convention to which the same 
states have not become states parties that still oppose the CCM, in particular China, India, 
Pakistan, Russia or the United States. Yet, as has been already shown supra, China and the 
United States have neither used nor exported anti-personnel mines, and Russia has not 
exported anti-personnel mines since the 1990s.1160  
In addition, as further evidence of the stigmatisation of antipersonnel mines, the 
renunciation of production by companies was mentioned, as well as the practice of some 
states not party to provide reports on their stockpiles and mined areas as well as efforts to 
destroy mines under their jurisdiction or control.1161 Commentators have explained these 
effects observable on the national level of states not party of the 1997 Ottawa Convention by 
a social rather than purely legal understanding of rules that are socially enforced, be it through 
law or social condemnation.1162 Accordingly, this corresponds to the notion of social 
internalisation coined by Harold Hongju Koh which occurs when a norm acquires so much 
                                                 
1157 See Oxford Dictionaries Online, 
http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=dict&freesearch=stigmatization&branch=13842570&textsearchtype=e
xact (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1158 ICRC, “The Convention on Cluster Munitions – frequently asked questions”, 13 January 2009, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/cluster-munitions-questions-and-answers-130109 (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
1159 L. Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Reponses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: 
The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty”, 20 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 561 (2003). 
1160 See supra pp. 195-196, notes 688-690. 
1161 For instance, as part of the stigmatisation of antipersonnel landmine production, the United States Campaign 
to Ban Landmines named 47 producer companies in a report. As a result, 17 producers renounced production just 
because of being named in the report. See United States Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Exposing the Source: 
U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines”, April 1997, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/general2974.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010); B. Rappert, “A 
convention beyond the Convention: Stigma, humanitarian standards and the Oslo Process”, Landmine Action, 
May 2008, http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/A_convention_beyond(1).pdf (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
1162 See, for example, P. Herby & K. Lawand, “Unacceptable Behaviour: How Norms Are Established” in 
Williams et al. (eds.), Banning Landmines, supra note 403, at 199, 200. 
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public legitimacy that there is widespread obedience to it.1163 On the international level, 
especially with regard to IHL, this concept seems particularly appropriate, since the “public 
conscience” is precisely one of the terms employed by the Martens Clause which may be 
regarded as codifying pre-legal natural law values into positive international law. Moreover, 
both the Ottawa Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions expressly have 
recourse to the “public conscience” in their preambles, mentioning in particular UN agencies, 
the ICRC, the ICBL and the CMC.1164  
In the present cluster munition context, a few examples may already be mentioned to 
show that the prohibition of the use, transfer, stockpiling and production of cluster munitions 
has an impact beyond those that have already signed and/or ratified the CCM. 
For instance, Singapore, although it will not become party to the CCM at the moment, 
has declared an indefinite moratorium on cluster munitions in November 2008 in order to 
“ensure that Singapore’s cluster munitions will not be transferred to other parties who might 
use them in an irresponsible and indiscriminate manner. Through this imposition, we help 
stem the proliferation of cluster munitions.”1165 Also state not party Argentina has forsworn 
any future production of cluster munitions. Finland, Poland and Romania restrict any future 
potential use of cluster munitions to the defence of their own territories, i.e. will not use 
cluster munitions in multinational operations outside of their own territories.1166 
With regard to the United States, the cluster munition policy of the U.S. Department of 
Defence still valid now was released on 19 June 2008.1167 While the United States recognised 
the need to minimise the unintended harm to civilian targets associated with unexploded 
ordnance from cluster munitions, she emphasises that cluster munitions are legitimate 
weapons with clear military utility. In particular, in the view of the United States, there 
remains a military requirement to engage area targets that include massed formations of 
enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise locations 
are not known, and time-sensitive and moving targets. Consequently, the loss of the ability to 
employ cluster munitions would create a capability gap for indirect fire of area targets and 
                                                 
1163 H. H. Koh, “Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?”, 106 Yale Journal of International 
Law 2599, 2656 (1997). 
1164 See Preamble, para. 8, 1997 Ottawa Convention, supra note 224; Preamble, para. 17, Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, supra note 33. 
1165 Singapore, “Joint Press Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence: Singapore 
Imposes Export Moratorium on the Export of Cluster Munitions”, 26 November 2008, 
http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=4543 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1166 Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munitions Information Chart”, November 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/17/cluster-munition-information-chart (last visited 26 March 2010). 
1167 United States, Secretary of Defence, “DoD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians”, 
19 June 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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require an increase in other resources. The policy only prohibits the use and transfer of cluster 
munitions that after arming, result in more than 1 % unexploded ordnance across the range of 
intended operational environments after 2018.1168 Accordingly, the U.S. military may use any 
type of cluster munition, even the most unreliable ones, for almost another decade. This 
currently prompts 24 U.S. Senators to back a Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Bill which 
would require the 1% reliability for all U.S. cluster munitions with immediate effect with the 
possibility of a presidential waiver if he certifies that any other use is vital to protect the 
security of the United States. However, within a period of 30 days, the President would have 
to specify what measures will be taken to protect civilians and whether or not the cluster 
munitions employed are fitted with fail safe mechanisms. 1169  
In contrast to its own potential use of cluster munitions, regarding exports, as part of 
the Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 which determined the U.S. budget, a section was 
included banning with immediate effect the export of cluster munitions by the United States, 
“unless the submunitions of the cluster munitions have a 99 percent or higher functioning 
rate; and the agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of the cluster munitions 
or cluster munitions technology specifies that the cluster munitions will only be used against 
clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be 
present.”1170  
This latter step is significant in view of the fact that the United States is believed to 
have transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of 
unreliable and inaccurate submunitions to at least 30 countries. Clearly, the more cluster 
munitions are transferred to other states the more likely they will get used, as has happened 
with U.S. cluster munitions by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in the Western 
Sahara, by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, and by the 
United Kingdom in Iraq. 1171 Moreover, it has been assumed that only a fraction of the current 
U.S. cluster munition stockpile would fulfil this standard.1172 
                                                 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act 2009: A bill to limit the use of cluster munitions, 111st Session of 
Congress, 11 February 2009, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h981/text (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1170 United States, 111th Congress, Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009, Section 7056 (b), signed by the U.S. 
President on 11 March 2009, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h1105enr.txt.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1171 Human Rights Watch/Landmine Action/Landmine Monitor/International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines/Cluster Munition Coalition, “Banning Cluster Munitions”, supra note 1151, at 260. 
1172 Human Rights Watch, “U.S. Cluster Bomb Exports Banned: Obama Should Initiate Review of US Stance on 
Treaty”, 12 March 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/12/us-cluster-bomb-exports-banned (last visited 
26 January 2010). 
 375
It is instructive to note that the current U.S. national position on cluster munitions – 
while significantly less ambitious than the standards set by the CCM – is stronger than the 
current text under discussion in the CCW for a potential Draft Protocol VI. This is because the 
U.S. prohibits any transfers of cluster munitions other than those for weapons with sub-
munitions that result in a “functioning rate” of 99% with immediate effect, while the Draft 
Protocol VI contemplates the possibility of a transition period in that respect. For the aim of 
the CCM to stigmatise the weapon this would be devastating, as the ultimate goal should be to 
pressure the United States and others into eventually replacing all cluster munitions that may 
scatter explosives indiscriminately over an area and leave behind large numbers of 
unexploded sub-munitions. One may cast legitimate doubts on whether such results may be 
achieved if the current U.S. policy is already given the stamp of legitimacy by a Protocol VI 
to the CCW.1173 
The process of stigmatisation not only affects states but also extends to important 
other sectors, such as arms manufacturers. One illustrative recent example involves the 
powerful German Diehl arms manufacturing company, the producer of SMArt 155, one of   
the types of “sensor fused munitions” to which the presumption of exclusion from the 
definition of prohibited cluster munitions in the CCM applies. Diehl deemed it necessary to 
sue an internet journalist based in Regensburg for saying that the SMArt 155 that Diehl 
produces is a “cluster munition”.1174 Accordingly, Diehl sought a permanent Court injunction 
to prohibit the designation of “cluster munition” for its SMArt 155 to silence criticism of 
these sensor fused weapons never used on the battlefield. The company threatened to ask a 
fine of up to 250.000 Euro had the journalist maintained his characterisation of SMArt 155 as 
a “cluster munition”.1175 The dispute was finally put to rest by an out of court settlement 
which resulted in the journalist accepting not to employ the designation of “cluster munition” 
for SMArt 155 any more and Diehl withdrawing its action in exchange. Irrespective of how 
                                                 
1173 The view that a future Protocol VI could play a similar role in relation to the CCM as Amended Protocol II 
in relation to the 1997 Ottawa Convention is an inaccurate analogy, since it overlooks the essential fact that with 
regard to anti-personnel mines, Amended Protocol II was concluded prior to the Ottawa Convention, not 
thereafter. Thus, Amended Protocol II could not have the effect of lowering standards of the Ottawa Convention. 
On the other hand, this danger is very real for a future Protocol VI in relation to the CCM.  
1174 The triggering event was an online article published by Stephan Aigner in the run-up to Bavarian elections in 
2008 in which he criticised the Diehl arms company on the occasion of the award of an order of merit to Werner 
Diehl, Vice CEO of Diehl Stiftung and Co KG, by then Bavarian Prime Minister Günther Beckstein. See S. 
Aigner, “Verdienstorden und Streubomben”, Regensburg-Digital, 25 July 2008, http://www.regensburg-
digital.de/?p=1411 (last visited 26 January 2010).  
1175 German-Foreign-Policy.Com, “Ban With Exemption”, 2 March 2009, http://www.german-foreign-
policy.com/en/fulltext/56230 (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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one would evaluate this settlement,1176 the very fact that one past producer company of cluster 
munitions would no longer want to be associated with these weapons, albeit for commercial 
reasons, shows that the stigmatisation process is well on its way. 
Naturally, this stigmatisation process is far from over. One first precondition that the 
CCM can have this effect is to get as many states parties within the shortest time possible to 
make sure that especially the demand side of cluster munitions dries up. The first step in this 
regard is the swift entry into force of the CCM on 1 August 2010. The second is to maintain 
pressure by civil society represented by the CMC which contributed greatly to build the 
stigma surrounding the weapon and to name and shame those shunning the CCM. In the 
context of the 1997 Ottawa Convention, ongoing pressure was exerted by the ICBL especially 
through yearly publication of the Landmine Monitor which is now respected as the most 
authoritative source of information on implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention.1177 A 
first global overview of the state of affairs entitled Banning Cluster Munitions: Government 
Policy and Practice in respect of cluster munitions was produced jointly by the CMC, the 
ICBL, Landmine Action, Human Rights Watch and Landmine Monitor in 2009.1178 
Arrangements are already in place to extend Landmine Monitor in 2010 to become the 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, thus also the civil society montoring tool for the 
CCM. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that this strategy of stigmatisation can only 
yield direct results with regard to those states that attach certain importance to their good 
standing in the international community. Accordingly, this author is of the view that in 
particular Russia and China will unlikely be impressed with “naming and shaming” 
techniques. As regards future use of cluster munitions, it is suggested that this has more 
negative relevance in terms of Russia, since Russia has been one of the biggest users of 
cluster munitions and use of these weapons remains a real prospect in light of recent Russian 
cluster munition use in Georgia. For China, a strategy that targets the demand side of cluster 
munitions will already yield significant results. Here, a lesson to be learnt from the recent past 
is to not only target state recipients of Chinese cluster munitions but also non-state actors as 
evidenced by Hezbollah’s use of Chinese cluster munitions. In this sense, universalisation 
                                                 
1176 Be it only noted here that the fact that the company Diehl attempted to monopolise the discussion on how to 
interpret the CCM and what to designate a cluster munition sparked significant uproar in some German media 
which saw this as an unjustifiable attempt to curtail the freedom of expression. For a compilation of critical 
German media reports on this case, see http://waffen-diehler.de/ (last visited 26 January 2010). 
1177 On Landmine Monitor as a civil society monitoring tool, see M. Wareham, “Evidence-Based Advocacy: 
Civil Society Monitoring of the Mine Ban Treaty” in Williams et al. (eds.), Banning Landmines, supra note 403, 
at 49-67. 
1178 Human Rights Watch et al., “Banning Cluster Munitions”, supra note 1151. 
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efforts should aim at getting almost all other states on board to make it economically less 
viable for Russia and China but also for India or South Korea to produce and export these 
weapons.   
Apart from these great powers, one major stumbling block towards universalising the 
CCM will constitute the traditional disarmament mindset of certain states which argue strictly 
on the basis of reciprocity. In that respect, they ask why they should become party to the 
CCM if their neighbouring states and/or enemies do not show any willingness in this regard. 
This is true for diverse countries like Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia or Qatar,1179 and in this 
author’s view, this would also account for fierce opposition to the CCM by India and Pakistan 
which in any event are known not to be overly committed to other pressing disarmament 
issues either.1180  
Significant efforts must be spent to change these traditional disarmament attitudes 
which seem to be still rooted in a Cold War perception of disarmament where efforts in this 
field could be explained by maintaining a balance of deterrence capabilities between states. 
The CCM, however, is above anything else an initiative to protect individuals from some 
particularly objectionable effects of armed conflicts and any strategic arguments based on  
Cold War rhetoric seem to be misplaced in this context.  
 Finally, the broader inevitable question may be raised what lessons may be learnt 
from the conclusion of the CCM for other disarmament processes. While the exact content 
and structure of the CCM may not be easily replicated in other contexts, one fundamental 
lesson is that disarmament endeavours are necessary and may be ultimately successful where 
they are guided by a humanitarian instead of strategic rationale.1181   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1179 See ibid., in the respective country sections. 
1180 It is commonly known that both states are one of the few that never became party to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
1181 For instance, the current endeavour to conclude an Arms Trade Treaty as a means of especially halting the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons shares the objective of the better protection of civilians from the 
humanitarian consequences of such weapons as underpinning element with the CCM and the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention. However, the fact that private possession of small arms is considered lawful by some states and that 
these weapons are not only used in armed conflicts but also for peaceful law enforcement purposes raise 
additional complexities which are not present in the case of cluster munitions. See Borrie et al., “Learn, adapt, 
succeed”, supra note 1, at 19-26. 
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Annexes 
Lima Conference Discussion Text1182 
“Preamble 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1 – General obligations and scope of application 
Because of their unacceptable harm to civilians and civilian objects during and after use, each State Party 
undertakes never under any circumstances: 
a) To use cluster munitions as defined in Article 2. 
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster 
munitions as defined in Article 2. 
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under 
this convention. 
 
Article 2 – Definition 
The following weapons systems shall be considered prohibited cluster munitions under this treaty: 
Air carried dispersal systems or air delivered, surface or sub-surface launched containers, that are designed to 
disperse explosive sub-munitions intended to detonate following separation from the container or dispenser, 
unless they are designed to, manually or automatically, aim, detect and engage point targets, or are meant for 
smoke or flaring, or unless their use is regulated or prohibited under other treaties. 
 
Article 3 – Storage and stockpile destruction 
1. Each State Party undertakes to separate cluster munitions as defined in Article 2 from stocks for potential use, 
and keep in separate stockpiles for the purpose of destruction. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions as defined in Article 2 
under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than six years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions 
referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a 
Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions, for 
a period of up to ten years. 
4. Each request shall contain: 
a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
                                                 
1182 Chair’s Discussion Text for the Lima Conference, 23-25 May 2007, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_opdoc_chairslima.html (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means 
required for the destruction of all the cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1, 
c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed. 
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and 
voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article. 
 
Article 4 – Clearance of unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions 
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear all unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions in areas under its 
jurisdiction and control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party. 
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which cluster 
munitions are known or suspected to be present and shall ensure as soon as possible that all cluster munitions in 
such areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other 
means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all cluster munitions contained therein have been 
destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions 
referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a 
Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions, for 
a period of up to ten years. 
4. Each request shall contain: 
a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including: 
i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national clearing/demining programs; 
ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the cluster munitions; 
and 
iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the cluster munitions in 
contaminated areas; 
c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and 
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and 
voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
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information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article. 
 
Article 5 – International cooperation and assistance 
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, 
where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this 
Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of clearance equipment and 
related technological information for humanitarian purposes. 
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance of cluster munitions and related 
activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or 
regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis. 
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster 
munitions as defined in Article 2. 
5. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent 
intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national program to 
determine, inter alia: 
a) The extent and scope of the contamination of unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions; 
b) The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the program; 
c) The estimated number of years necessary to clear all unexploded ordnance in contaminated areas under the 
jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party; 
d) Awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by unexploded ordnance from cluster 
munitions; 
e) Assistance to victims from cluster munitions; 
f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-
governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program. 
6. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a 
view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs. 
 
Article 6 – Victim assistance 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with applicable international human rights standards, endeavour to take 
adequate steps such as providing medical care and rehabilitation as well as facilitating social and economic 
reintegration of victims of cluster munitions, in order to ensure the full realisation of their human rights and 
respect for their inherent dignity. 
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the medical care and rehabilitation as well 
as social and economic reintegration of victims of cluster munitions and for cluster munitions awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional 
or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and 
Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral 
basis. 
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Article 7 – Transparency measures 
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any 
event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on: 
a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9; 
b) The total of all stockpiled cluster munitions as defined in Article 2 owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type; 
c) To the extent possible, the location of all areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, unexploded ordnance 
from cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type 
and quantity of each type of cluster munitions in each affected area and when they were used; 
d) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions 
as defined in Article 2; 
e) The status of programs for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3, of cluster munitions as defined in 
Article 2, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites 
and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed; 
f) The types and quantities of all cluster munitions destroyed in accordance with Article 3, after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster 
munition destroyed; 
g) The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition as defined in Article 2 produced, to the extent 
known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such 
categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this 
information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and 
other information which may facilitate the clearance of unexploded ordnance caused by these munitions; and 
h) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas 
identified to be contaminated by unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions. 
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, 
covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 
April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties. 
 
Article 8 – Facilitation and clarification of compliance 
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States 
Parties with their obligations under this Convention. 
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all 
appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being 
taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in 
clarifying this matter. 
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit 
the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The 
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Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate 
information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be 
presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification 
requested. 
5. The Meeting of States Parties may consider and approve further procedures and mechanisms for determining 
instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention and on the steps that may be taken in such 
instances. 
 
Article 9 – National implementation measures 
Each State shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal 
sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by 
persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
Article 10 – Settlement of disputes 
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard 
to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before 
the Meeting of the States Parties. 
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems 
appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement 
procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 
 
Article 11 – Meetings of States Parties 
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or 
implementation of this Convention, including: 
a) The operation and status of this Convention; 
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 5 and 6; 
d) The development of technologies to clear unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions; 
e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8 and 10; 
f) Decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 3 and 4. 
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed 
Rules of Procedure. 
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Article 12 – Review Conferences 
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the 
entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review 
Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each 
Review Conference. 
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be: 
a) To review the operation and status of this Convention; 
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further meetings of the States Parties referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 3 and 4. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
 
Article 13 – Amendments 
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to 
all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to 
consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its 
circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment 
Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. 
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance 
with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review 
Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier. 
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present 
and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the 
States Parties. 
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have 
accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. 
Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of 
acceptance. 
 
Article 14 – Costs 
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences 
shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Article 7 and 8 of this Convention 
shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted 
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appropriately. 
 
Article 15 – Signature 
This Convention, done at (…), on (…), shall be open for signature at (…), by all States from (…) until (…), and 
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from (…) until its entry into force. 
Article 16 – Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories. 
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention. 
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
 
Article 17 – Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 20th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. 
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of 
the deposit of the 20th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter 
into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
 
Article 18 – Provisional application 
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply 
provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force. 
 
Article 19 – Reservations 
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
Article 20 – Duration and withdrawal 
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations 
Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this 
withdrawal. 
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the 
Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an 
armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. 
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law. 
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Article 21 – Depositary 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention. 
 
Article 22 – Authentic texts 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” 
 
 
Vienna Conference Discussion Text1183 
 
….. 
Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance for the medical care and rehabilitation, psychological support 
and social and economic inclusion of victims of cluster munitions, which inter alia include the persons directly 
affected, their families and communities; 
 
Determined to ensure the full realisation of the rights of victims of cluster munitions, and recognizing their 
inherent dignity; 
 
Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, inter alia, requires that States 
Parties to this Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 
disability. 
 
Mindful of the need to adequately coordinate efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of 
victims of various types of weapons 
…… 
 
Article 1 – General obligations and scope of application 
 
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 
a) Use cluster munitions. 
b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster 
munitions. 
c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention. 
 
Article 2 – Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, 
“Cluster munition” means a munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive sub-munitions, and 
includes those explosive sub-munitions. It does not mean the following: 
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) … 
 
“Explosive sub-munitions” means munitions that in order to perform their task separate from a parent munition 
and are designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or immediately after impact. 
 
                                                 
1183 Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, Discussion Text and Explanatory Annex, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_opdoc_chairsvienna.html#annex (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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 “Unexploded cluster munitions” means cluster munitions that have been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise 
prepared for use and used. They may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected, and should have exploded 
but failed to do so. 
 
“Abandoned cluster munitions” means cluster munitions that have not been used and that have been discarded 
or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that discarded or dumped them. Abandoned 
cluster munitions may or may not have been prepared for use. 
 
“Cluster munition remnants” means unexploded cluster munitions and abandoned cluster munitions. 
 
”Transfer” means the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory or the transfer of 
title to or control over cluster munitions, but does not include the transfer of territory containing cluster munition 
remnants. 
 
 
Article 3 – Storage and Stockpile Destruction 
 
1. Each State Party undertakes to separate cluster munitions from stocks for potential use and keep them in 
separate stockpiles for the purpose of destruction. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction 
or control, as soon as possible but not later than six years after the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international 
standards for protecting public health and the environment. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions 
referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a 
Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions for 
a period of up to ten years. 
4. Each request shall contain: 
a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means 
available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this Article; 
c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed. 
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties 
present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 the transfer of cluster munitions for the purpose of destruction is 
permitted. 
 
Article 4 – Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munition Remnants 
 
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of cluster munition 
remnants existing prior to entry into force of this Convention, in areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as 
possible but not later than 5 years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. 
2. As soon as feasible after entry into force of this Convention, each State Party that has been affected in the past 
or may be affected in the future by cluster munition use shall take the following measures, taking into 
consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance: 
(a) survey and assess the threat posed by cluster munition remnants; 
(b) assess and prioritise needs and practicability in terms of marking, protection of civilians and clearance and 
destruction and take steps to mobilise resources to carry out these activities. 
(c) ensure that all cluster munition remnants in such areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, 
monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. The marking 
shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, 
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
(d) clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants within its jurisdiction. 
3. In conducting the above activities State Parties shall take into account international standards, including the 
International Mine Action Standards. 
4. Where cluster munition remnants were delivered by a State Party before entry into force of this Convention to 
territory now under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party to this Convention, the former State Party 
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shall provide bilaterally, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to facilitate the 
marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants. 
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all 
cluster munition remnants, referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, within that time period, it may submit a 
request to a Meeting of the States Parties, or a Review Conference, for an extension of the deadline for 
completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants, for a period of up to 5 years. 
6. Each request shall contain: 
a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including: 
i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national clearance and demining programmes; 
ii) The financial and technical means available to, and required by, the State Party for the clearance and 
destruction of all cluster munition remnants; and 
iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the cluster munition remnants in 
contaminated areas; 
c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and 
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
7. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 6 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties 
present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
8. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article. 
 
Article 5 – Victim Assistance 
 
(1) Each State Party with respect to victims of cluster munitions in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in 
accordance with applicable international human rights standards, adequately provide for their medical care and 
rehabilitation, psychological support and social and economic inclusion. Each State Party should make every 
effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to victims of cluster munitions. 
(2) In fulfilling its obligation under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall take into consideration 
relevant guidelines and good practices in the areas of medical care and rehabilitation, psychological support as 
well as social and economic inclusion. 
 
Article 6 – International Cooperation and Assistance 
 
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance. 
2. All States Parties in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States 
Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such 
assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system; international, regional or national 
organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis. 
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. 
The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of clearance equipment and related 
technological information for humanitarian 
purposes. 
4. Each State Party in a position to do so and in particular a State Party that has used cluster munitions on the 
territory of another State Party, shall provide assistance for clearance of cluster munition remnants and 
information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists 
of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact of clearance of cluster munition remnants and related 
activities. 
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the clearance and destruction of stockpiled 
cluster munitions. 
6. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to State Parties affected by the use of cluster 
munitions to identify, assess and prioritize needs and practical measures in terms of marking, protection of 
civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4. 
7. States Parties may, with the purpose of developing a national action programme, request the United Nations, 
regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental 
institutions to assist its authorities to determine, inter alia: 
a) The extent and scope of the contamination of cluster munition remnants; 
b) The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the program; 
c) The estimated number of years necessary to clear all cluster munitions remnants in contaminated areas under 
the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party; 
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d) Awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants; 
e) Assistance to victims from cluster munitions; 
f) The coordination relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant 
governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, social and economic reintegration of victims of cluster munitions and for risk education 
and cluster munitions awareness activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations System, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-
governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis. 
9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds, in order to facilitate the 
provision of assistance under this Article. 
10. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a 
view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs. 
 
Article 7 – Transparency Measures 
 
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any 
event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on: 
a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9; 
b) The total of all stockpiled cluster munitions owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to 
include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type; 
c) To the extent possible, all other cluster munitions that are stockpiled on its territory; 
d) The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munitions produced, to the extent known, and those 
currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information 
as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include 
the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may 
facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants; 
e) To the extent possible, the location of all areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, cluster munition 
remnants, under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity 
of each type of cluster munitions in each affected area and when they were used; 
f) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions; 
g) The status of programs for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3, of cluster munitions, including details 
of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety 
and environmental standards to be observed; 
h) The types and quantities of all cluster munitions cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4, after the 
entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of 
cluster munitions cleared and destroyed; and 
i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas 
identified to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. 
j) The measures taken in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 to adequately provide for the medical care 
and rehabilitation, psychological support and social and economic inclusion of victims of cluster munitions as 
well as to collect reliable relevant data. 
k) In addition, each State Party shall provide the name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide 
information as described in this Article and of the institutions mandated to carry out the measures described in 
this Article. 
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, 
covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 
30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties. 
 
Article 8 – Facilitation and Clarification of Compliance 
 
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States 
Parties with their obligations under this Convention. 
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance 
with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be 
accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for 
Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall 
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provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information that would assist in clarifying the matter. 
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit 
the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate 
information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be 
presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification 
requested. 
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 the Meeting of the States Parties shall first 
determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States 
Parties concerned. If it does so determine the Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties 
concerned ways and means further to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of 
appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is 
determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 5. 
6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article the Meeting of States Parties 
may decide to adopt such other general procedures for clarification and resolution of instances of non-
compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate. 
 
Article 9 – National Implementation Measures 
 
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of 
penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention 
undertaken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality, or by any natural or legal person anywhere on 
its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
Article 10 – Settlement of Disputes 
 
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the 
dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of the States 
Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems 
appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement 
procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 
 
Article 11 – Meetings of States Parties 
 
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of 
any matter with regard to the interpretation, application or implementation of this Convention, including: 
a) The operation and status of this Convention; 
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6; 
d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants; 
e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10; 
f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4. 
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent Meetings shall be convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend these Meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed 
Rules of Procedure. 
 
Article 12 – Review Conferences 
 
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the 
entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review 
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Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each 
Review Conference. 
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be: 
a) To review the operation and status of this Convention; 
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
 
Article 13 – Amendments 
 
1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any 
proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties 
and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. 
If a majority of the States Parties notifies the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they 
support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which 
all States Parties shall be invited. 
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations 
or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance 
with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review 
Conference unless a majority of the States Parties requests that it be held earlier. 
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two thirds of the States Parties present 
and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the 
States Parties. 
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention that have 
accepted it upon deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. 
Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of 
acceptance. 
 
Article 14 – Costs 
 
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences 
shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention 
shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted 
appropriately. 
 
Article 15 – Signature 
 
This Convention, done at (…), on (…), shall be open for signature at (…), by all States from (…) until (…), and 
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from (…) until its entry into force. 
 
Article 16 – Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession 
 
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories. 
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention. 
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
 
Article 17 – Entry into force 
 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 20th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. 
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the 
deposit of the 20th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into 
force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or 
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accession. 
 
Article 18 – Provisional Application 
 
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply 
provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force. 
 
Article 19 – Reservations 
 
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
Article 20 - Duration and Withdrawal 
 
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations 
Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating 
withdrawal. 
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the 
Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an 
armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. 
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law. 
 
Article 21 – Depositary 
 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention. 
 
Article 22 – Authentic Texts 
 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
 
EXPLANATORY ANNEX 
 
Article 1: General obligations and scope of application 
 
Within the framework of the current phrasing on general obligations and scope, it should be noted that at the 
Lima meeting, some States proposed that specific provision needed to be made for military interoperability with 
non States Party. 
 
Article 2: Definitions 
 
At the Lima Meeting there appeared to be broad agreement that landmines would be excluded from the 
definition of “cluster munition” since they are already covered by other treaties. Some States also proposed that 
one or more of the following should be excluded: flare, smoke and chaff munitions and sub-munitions that are 
inert post impact. There were other proposals to exclude sub-munitions that aim, detect and engage point targets, 
and some States proposed to exclude cluster munitions which contain fewer than a specified number of explosive 
sub-munitions, sub-munitions with self destruct or self deactivation or other failsafe mechanisms, explosive sub-
munitions with a tested failure rate of less than a specified percentage, and that the age of the sub-munition 
should be relevant. Some other States opposed some or all of these elements, with some proposing a 
comprehensive prohibition on all cluster munitions. 
 
Article 3: Stockpile Destruction 
 
At the Lima Meeting some delegations raised the possibility of permitting the retention of cluster munitions (or 
sub-munitions) to facilitate the development of clearance and disposal capabilities. Other delegations expressed 
the view that such retention was neither necessary nor justified. A range of views was expressed as to the time-
frame that should be permitted 
for stockpile destruction. 
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Wellington Discussion text1184 
Draft Cluster Munitions Convention 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
 
Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to suffer most from armed conflict, 
Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by the use of cluster munitions that 
kill or maim innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and 
reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
humanitarian consequences that can persist for many years after use, 
Concerned that cluster munition remnants can undermine international efforts to build peace and security, as 
well as implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to resolving the 
challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to assure their destruction, 
Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for 
operational use in national inventories, and determined to ensure the speedy destruction of these stockpiles, 
Determined to ensure the full realisation of the rights of victims of cluster munitions, and recognizing their 
inherent dignity, 
Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance for the medical care and rehabilitation, psychological support 
and social and economic inclusion of victims of cluster munitions, 
Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, inter alia, requires that States 
Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 
disability, 
Mindful of the need adequately to coordinate efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of 
victims of various types of weapons, and resolved to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of 
weapons, 
Welcoming the global support for the international norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel mines, enshrined 
in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, 
Welcoming also the entry into force on 12 November 2006 of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, and wishing to enhance the 
protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments, 
Welcoming furthermore the steps taken in recent years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aimed at prohibiting, 
restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions, 
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call 
for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by 
the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous 
other non-governmental organisations around the world, 
                                                 
1184 http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_opdoc_chairswellington.html (last visited 26 January 
2010). 
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 Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which States inter alia committed 
themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer 
and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and to establish a framework for 
cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and their 
communities, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education and destruction of stockpiles, 
Guided by the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and in particular on the general rule that parties to a conflict must 
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, 
 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
Article 1 - General obligations and scope of application 
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 
(a) Use cluster munitions; 
(b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster 
munitions; 
(c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention. 
2. This Convention does not apply to “mines” as defined by the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. 
 
Article 2 - Definitions 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
“Cluster munition victims” means persons who have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, 
social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster 
munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their families and 
communities; 
“Cluster munition” means a munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive sub-munitions, and 
includes those explosive sub-munitions. It does not mean the following: 
(a) a munition or sub-munition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; 
(b) a munition or sub-munition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects; 
(c) … 
“Explosive sub-munitions” means munitions that in order to perform their task separate from a parent munition 
and are designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact; 
“Unexploded cluster munitions” means cluster munitions that have been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise 
prepared for use and which have been used. They may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected, and 
should have exploded but failed to do so. 
 “Unexploded cluster munitions” includes both unexploded parent munitions and unexploded explosive sub-
munitions; 
“Abandoned cluster munitions” means cluster munitions that have not been used and that have been discarded or 
dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that discarded or dumped them. They may or may 
not have been prepared for use; 
“Cluster munition remnants” means unexploded cluster munitions and abandoned cluster munitions; 
“Transfer” means the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory or the transfer of 
title to or control over cluster munitions, but does not include the transfer of territory containing cluster munition 
remnants. 
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Article 3 - Storage and stockpile destruction 
1. Each State Party undertakes to remove all cluster munitions from stockpiles of munitions retained for 
operational use and keep them in separate stockpiles for the purpose of destruction. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions under its 
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than six years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply 
with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster 
munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within that time period it may submit a request to a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing 
the destruction of such cluster munitions for a period of up to ten years. 
4. Each request shall contain: 
(a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and 
technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article; and 
(c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed. 
5. The meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors 
contained in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States 
Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention the transfer of cluster munitions for the 
purpose of destruction is permitted. 
 
Article 4 - Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants 
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction, of cluster munition 
remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows: 
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as 
possible but no later than 5 years from that date; 
(b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster 
munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be 
completed as soon as possible but no later than 5 years after such cluster munitions became cluster munition 
remnants. 
2. In fulfilling the obligations set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall as soon as possible take 
the following measures, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding 
international cooperation and assistance: 
(a) Survey and assess the threat posed by cluster munition remnants; 
(b) Assess and prioritise needs and practicability in terms of marking, protection of civilians and clearance and 
destruction, take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities; 
(c) Ensure that all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-
marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. The 
marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to have Indiscriminate Effects; 
(d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; an(e) 
Conduct risk education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around areas in which cluster munition 
remnants are located of the risks posed by such remnants. 
3. In conducting the above activities each State Party shall take into account international standards, including 
the International Mine Action Standards. 
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State 
Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it and have become cluster munition remnants located in 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for 
the latter. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party 
shall provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, 
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either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the UN system or other relevant 
organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants. Such 
assistance shall include information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of 
cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located. 
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all 
cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within that time period it may submit a 
request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants for a period of up to 5 years. 
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to 
the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall 
contain: 
(a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including: 
(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national clearance and demining programmes; 
(ii) The financial and technical means available to, and required by, the State Party for the clearance and 
destruction of all cluster munition remnants; and 
(iii) Circumstances that impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in 
areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
(c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and 
(d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained 
in paragraph 6 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and 
voting whether to grant the request for an extension period. 
8. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article. 
 
Article 5 - Victim Assistance 
1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in 
accordance with international human rights law, adequately provide for their medical care and rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect 
reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims. 
2. In fulfilling its obligation under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall take into consideration 
relevant guidelines and good practices in the areas of medical care and rehabilitation, psychological support as 
well as social and economic inclusion. 
 
Article 6 - International cooperation and assistance 
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance. 
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States 
Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such 
assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national 
organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions or on a bilateral basis. 
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. 
The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of clearance equipment and related 
technological information for humanitarian purposes. 
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State 
Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance of cluster munition remnants and information 
concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, 
expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance of cluster munition remnants and related activities. 
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster 
munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritize needs and practical measures in 
terms of marking, risk education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4. 
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants 
located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall 
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urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party. 
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, social and economic inclusion of all cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be 
provided, inter alia, through the United Nations System, international, regional or national organisations or 
institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and 
their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis. 
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social 
recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties. 
9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision 
of assistance under this Article. 
10. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations, 
regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental 
institutions to assist its authorities to determine, inter alia: 
(a) The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
(b) The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan; 
(c) The time estimated as necessary to clear all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction 
or control; 
(d) Risk education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by 
cluster munition remnants; 
(e) Assistance to cluster munition victims; and 
(f) The relationship between the Government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, inter-
governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan. 
11. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view 
to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes. 
 
Article 7 - Transparency measures 
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any 
event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on: 
(a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention; 
(b) The total of all stockpiled cluster munitions owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to 
include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type; 
(c) To the extent possible, all other cluster munitions that are stockpiled on its territory; 
(d) The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munitions produced, to the extent known, and those 
currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information 
as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include 
the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may 
facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants; 
(e) To the extent possible, the location of all areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, cluster munition 
remnants, under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity 
of each type of cluster munitions in each affected area and when they were used; 
(f) The status of programmes for the conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities for cluster 
munitions; 
(g) The status of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster 
munitions, including details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites 
and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed; 
(h) The types and quantities of cluster munitions destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, 
including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety 
and environmental standards observed; 
(i) Stockpiles discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in paragraph 7(h) of this 
Article; 
(j) The types and quantities of all cluster munitions remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 
of this Convention, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munitions remnants cleared 
and destroyed; 
(k) The measures taken to provide risk education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to 
civilians living in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which cluster munition remnants are located; 
(l) The measures taken in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention adequately to provide 
for the medical care and rehabilitation, psychological support and social and economic inclusion of victims of 
cluster munitions as well as to collect reliable relevant data; and 
(m) The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the 
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measures described in this paragraph. 
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties 
annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not 
later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties. 
 
Article 8 - Facilitation and clarification of compliance 
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States 
Parties with their obligations under this Convention. 
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance 
with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be 
accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for 
Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall 
provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information that would assist in clarifying the matter. 
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit 
the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate 
information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be 
presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification 
requested. 
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article the Meeting of the States 
Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted 
by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine the Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the 
States Parties concerned ways and means further to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including 
the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at 
hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the 
States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in 
Article 5 of this Convention. 
6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article the Meeting of States Parties 
may decide to adopt such other general procedures for clarification and resolution of instances of non-
compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate. 
 
Article 9 - National implementation measures 
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of 
penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention 
undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
Article 10 - Settlement of disputes 
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the 
dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of the States 
Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems 
appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement 
procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 
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Article 11 - Meetings of States Parties 
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of 
any matter with regard to the interpretation, application or implementation of this Convention, including: 
a) The operation and status of this Convention; 
b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention; 
d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants; 
e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and 
f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention. 
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations 
or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed 
Rules of Procedure. 
 
Article 12 - Review Conferences 
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the 
entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review 
Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each 
Review Conference. 
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be: 
a) To review the operation and status of this Convention; 
b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and 
c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention. 
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations 
or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
 
Article 13 - Amendments 
1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any 
proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties 
and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. 
If a majority of the States Parties notifies the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they 
support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which 
all States Parties shall be invited. 
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations 
or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-
governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance 
with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review 
Conference unless a majority of the States Parties requests that it be held earlier. 
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present 
and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the 
States Parties. 
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention that have 
accepted it upon deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. 
Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of 
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acceptance. 
 
Article 14 - Costs 
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences 
shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention 
shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted 
appropriately. 
 
Article 15 - Signature 
This Convention, done at (…), on (…), shall be open for signature at (…), by all States from (…) until (…), and 
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from (…) until its entry into force. 
 
Article 16 - Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories. 
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention. 
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
 
Article 17 - Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 20th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. 
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the 
deposit of the 20th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into 
force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
 
Article 18 - Provisional application 
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply 
provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force. 
 
Article 19 - Reservations 
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
Article 20 - Duration and withdrawal 
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations 
Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating 
withdrawal. 
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the 
Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an 
armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. 
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4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law. 
 
Article 21 - Depositary 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention. 
 
Article 22 - Authentic texts 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
 
Declaration of the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions1185 
States met in Wellington from February 18 to 22, 2008, to pursue an enduring solution to the grave humanitarian 
consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions. They are convinced that this solution must include the 
conclusion in 2008 of a legally binding international instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians. 
 
In that spirit they affirm that the essential elements of such an instrument 
should include: 
 
• A prohibition on the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, 
• A framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate 
provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities, 
clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, and destruction of 
stockpiles. 
 
The following States: 
 
encouraged by the work of the Wellington Conference, and 
previous Conferences in Vienna, Lima and Oslo; 
 
encouraged further by numerous national and regional 
initiatives, including meetings in Brussels, Belgrade and 
San José, and measures taken to address the humanitarian 
impact of cluster munitions; 
 
encouraged by the active support given to this subject by the 
United Nations, and in other fora; 
 
encouraged, finally, by the active support of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and 
numerous other Non-Governmental Organisations; 
 
welcome the convening of a Diplomatic Conference by the 
Government of Ireland in Dublin on 19 May 2008 to negotiate 
and adopt a legally binding instrument prohibiting cluster 
                                                 
1185 Wellington Declaration on Cluster Munitions, 22 February 2008, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/wellingtondeclaration.pdf (last visited 26 January 2010). 
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munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians; 
 
also welcome the important work done by participants engaged 
in the cluster munitions process on the text of a draft Cluster 
Munitions Convention, dated 21 January 2008, which contains 
the essential elements identified above and decide to forward it 
as the basic proposal for consideration at the Dublin Diplomatic 
Conference, together with other relevant proposals including 
those contained in the compendium attached to this Declaration 
and those which may be put forward there; 
 
affirm their objective of concluding the negotiation of such an 
instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable 
harm to civilians in Dublin in May 2008; 
 
invite all other States to join them in their efforts towards 
concluding such an instrument. 
 
 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR 
THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION 
ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS  
 
DUBLIN 19 – 30 MAY 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions1186 
 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
 
Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear 
the brunt of armed conflict, 
 
Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster 
munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they 
are abandoned, 
 
Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women 
and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of 
livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national 
and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other 
severe consequences that can persist for many years after use, 
 
Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of 
cluster munitions retained for operational use and determined to ensure their rapid 
destruction, 
 
Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to 
resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the 
world, and to ensure their destruction, 
 
Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition 
victims and recognising their inherent dignity, 
 
Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing 
for their social and economic inclusion, 
 
                                                 
1186 Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 33. 
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Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster 
munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups, 
Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, 
inter alia, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and 
promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability, 
 
Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to 
address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and resolved to 
avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons, 
 
Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles 
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience, 
 
Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, 
under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
Party to this Convention, 
 
Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting 
anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, 
 
Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and wishing to 
enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in 
post-conflict environments, 
 
Bearing in mind also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, 
peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on children 
in armed conflict, 
 
Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years 
aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and 
transfer of cluster munitions, 
 
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as 
evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster 
munitions and recognising the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and 
numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world, 
 
Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, 
inter alia, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster 
munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding 
instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework 
for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and 
rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education 
and destruction of stockpiles, 
 
Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this 
Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its 
universalisation and its full implementation, 
 
Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in 
particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods 
or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at 
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all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against 
military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall 
be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the 
civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations, 
 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
 
Article 1 
General obligations and scope of application 
 
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 
(a) Use cluster munitions; 
(b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; 
(c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, mutatis mutandis, to explosive bomblets 
that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to 
aircraft. 
3. This Convention does not apply to mines. 
 
Article 2 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
1. “Cluster munition victims” means all persons who have been killed or 
suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or 
substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster 
munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well 
as their affected families and communities; 
2. “Cluster munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to 
disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and 
includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following: 
(a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, 
pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air 
defence role; 
(b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic 
effects; 
(c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the 
risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following 
characteristics: 
(i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions; 
(ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; 
(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a 
single target object; 
(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdestruction 
mechanism; 
(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdeactivating 
feature; 
3. “Explosive submunition” means a conventional munition that in order to 
perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to 
function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact; 
4. “Failed cluster munition” means a cluster munition that has been fired, 
dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed 
or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so; 
5. “Unexploded submunition” means an explosive submunition that has been 
dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has 
failed to explode as intended; 
6. “Abandoned cluster munitions” means cluster munitions or explosive 
submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and 
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that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. 
They may or may not have been prepared for use; 
7. “Cluster munition remnants” means failed cluster munitions, abandoned 
cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets; 
8. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster 
munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over 
cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster 
munition remnants; 
9. “Self-destruction mechanism” means an incorporated automaticallyfunctioning 
mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of 
the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is 
incorporated; 
10. “Self-deactivating” means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by 
means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is 
essential to the operation of the munition; 
11. “Cluster munition contaminated area” means an area known or suspected 
to contain cluster munition remnants; 
12. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground 
or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or a vehicle; 
13. “Explosive bomblet” means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 
kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is 
dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an 
explosive charge prior to, on or after impact; 
14. “Dispenser” means a container that is designed to disperse or release 
explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or 
release; 
15. “Unexploded bomblet” means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, 
released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as 
intended. 
 
Article 3 
Storage and stockpile destruction 
 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all 
cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for 
operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster 
munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later 
than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each 
State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable 
international standards for protecting public health and the environment. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within 
eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a 
request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to 
four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional 
extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number 
of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under 
paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4. Each request for an extension shall set out: 
(a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
(b) A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the 
financial and technical means available to or required by the State 
Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional 
circumstances justifying it; 
(c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed; 
(d) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions 
held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and 
any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered 
 405
after such entry into force; 
(e) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions 
destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; 
and 
(f) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions 
remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the 
annual destruction rate expected to be achieved. 
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into 
consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request 
and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant 
the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter 
extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as 
appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months 
prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be 
considered. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention 
or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions 
for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition 
detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster 
munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions 
retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for 
these purposes. 
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of 
cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for 
the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted. 
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or 
explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this 
Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster 
munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If 
cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for 
these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report 
shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or 
transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year. 
 
Article 4 
Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education 
 
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and 
destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated 
areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows: 
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its 
jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed 
as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date; 
(b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, 
cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in 
areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction 
must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after 
the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions 
became cluster munition remnants; and 
(c) Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of 
compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties. 
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party 
shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the 
provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and 
assistance: 
(a) Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition 
remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
(b) Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, 
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clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and 
develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where 
appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies; 
(c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated 
areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored 
and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective 
exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking 
readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in 
the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous 
area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, 
durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly 
identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within 
the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered 
to be safe; 
(d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under 
its jurisdiction or control; and 
(e) Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians 
living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks 
posed by such remnants. 
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each 
State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used 
or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that 
State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under 
the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this 
Convention for the latter. 
(a) In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States 
Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, inter 
alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the 
latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third 
party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant 
organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of 
such cluster munition remnants. 
(b) Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types 
and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster 
munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are 
known to be located. 
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the 
clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State 
Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference 
for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such 
cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension 
shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete 
its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article. 
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or 
a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine 
months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to 
be considered. Each request shall set out: 
(a) The duration of the proposed extension; 
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, 
including the financial and technical means available to and required 
by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster 
munition remnants during the proposed extension; 
(c) The preparation of future work and the status of work already 
conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during 
the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and 
any subsequent extensions; 
(d) The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry 
into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional 
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areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry 
into force; 
(e) The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry 
into force of this Convention; 
(f) The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be 
cleared during the proposed extension; 
(g) The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to 
destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its 
jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability 
during the proposed extension; 
(h) The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of 
the proposed extension; and 
(i) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed 
extension. 
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into 
consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, inter 
alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and 
decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the 
request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension 
than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. 
8. Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the 
submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. 
In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted 
pursuant to this Article. 
 
Article 5 
Victim assistance 
 
1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its 
jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian 
and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide 
for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to 
collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims. 
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party 
shall: 
(a) Assess the needs of cluster munition victims; 
(b) Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and 
policies; 
(c) Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out 
these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing 
national disability, development and human rights frameworks and 
mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of 
relevant actors; 
(d) Take steps to mobilise national and international resources; 
(e) Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or 
between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries 
or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be 
based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic 
needs; 
(f) Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and 
their representative organisations; 
(g) Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of 
matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and 
(h) Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including 
in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, 
as well as social and economic inclusion. 
 
Article 6 
International cooperation and assistance 
 408
 
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right 
to seek and receive assistance. 
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and 
financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the 
implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be 
provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or 
national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, 
or on a bilateral basis. 
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate 
in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological 
information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties 
shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other 
such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes. 
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 
of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for 
clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning 
various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as 
lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and 
destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities. 
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the 
destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to 
identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk 
reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided 
in Article 4 of this Convention. 
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have 
become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of 
a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency 
assistance to the affected State Party. 
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the 
implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to 
adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, 
rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic 
inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, 
through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or 
institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental 
organisations or on a bilateral basis. 
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to 
the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in 
affected States Parties. 
9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in 
order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article. 
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate 
measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this 
Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and 
equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into 
consideration international best practices. 
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, 
request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or 
other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its 
authorities to determine, inter alia: 
(a) The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas 
under its jurisdiction or control; 
(b) The financial, technological and human resources required for the 
implementation of the plan; 
(c) The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster 
munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
(d) Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to 
reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition 
remnants; 
(e) Assistance to cluster munition victims; and 
 409
(f) The coordination relationship between the government of the State 
Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or 
non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the 
plan. 
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this 
Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of 
agreed assistance programmes. 
 
Article 7 
Transparency measures 
 
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force 
of this Convention for that State Party, on: 
(a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this 
Convention; 
(b) The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a 
breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each 
type; 
(c) The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced 
by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to 
the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, 
where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may 
facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a 
minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other 
information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition 
remnants; 
(d) The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or 
decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions; 
(e) The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in 
accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, 
including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will 
be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the 
applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed; 
(f) The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive 
submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this 
Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the 
location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and 
environmental standards observed; 
(g) Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, 
discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in 
sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in 
accordance with Article 3 of this Convention; 
(h) To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much 
detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of 
cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used; 
(i) The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and 
destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants 
cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, 
to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated 
area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster 
munition remnant cleared and destroyed; 
(j) The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in 
particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in 
cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control; 
(k) The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under 
Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gendersensitive 
assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic 
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inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant 
data with respect to cluster munition victims; 
(l) The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide 
information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph; 
(m) The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in 
kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this 
Convention; and 
(n) The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and 
assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention. 
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and 
reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each 
year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports 
received to the States Parties. 
 
Article 8 
Facilitation and clarification of compliance 
 
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of 
cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this 
Convention. 
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions 
relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another 
State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a 
Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be 
accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from 
unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party 
that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that 
would assist in clarifying the matter. 
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the 
Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied 
by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States 
Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States 
Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested. 
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this 
Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that 
matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties 
concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the 
States Parties concerned ways and means further to clarify or resolve the matter under 
consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with 
international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States 
Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative 
measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention. 
6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, 
the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or 
specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of 
instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
Article 9 
National implementation measures 
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Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to 
implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and 
suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by 
persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
Article 10 
Settlement of disputes 
 
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall 
consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the 
Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute 
by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling 
upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and 
recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 
 
Article 11 
Meetings of States Parties 
 
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where 
necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or 
implementation of this Convention, including: 
(a) The operation and status of this Convention; 
(b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this 
Convention; 
(c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 
of this Convention; 
(d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants; 
(e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this 
Convention; and 
(f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this 
Convention. 
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The 
subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations annually until the first Review Conference. 
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other 
relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be 
invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of 
procedure. 
 
Article 12 
Review Conference 
s 
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further 
Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval 
between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States 
Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference. 
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be: 
(a) To review the operation and status of this Convention; 
(b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of 
States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this 
Convention; and 
(c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in 
Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention. 
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3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other 
relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be 
invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed 
rules of procedure. 
 
Article 13 
Amendments 
 
1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments 
to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and 
shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to 
consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support 
further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. 
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other 
relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be 
invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the 
agreed rules of procedure. 
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting 
of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties 
request that it be held earlier. 
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of twothirds 
of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The 
Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States. 
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that 
have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of 
the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it 
shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its 
instrument of acceptance. 
 
Article 14 
Costs and administrative tasks 
 
1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the 
Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to 
this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessment adjusted appropriately. 
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under 
Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 
administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an 
appropriate United Nations mandate. 
 
Article 15 
Signature 
 
This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo 
by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in 
New York until its entry into force. 
 
Article 16 
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
 
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the 
Signatories. 
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2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention. 
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the Depositary. 
 
Article 17 
Entry into force 
 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after 
the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession has been deposited. 
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first 
day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
 
Article 18 
Provisional application 
 
Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry 
into force for that State. 
 
Article 19 
Reservations 
 
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
Article 20 
Duration and withdrawal 
 
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other 
States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such 
instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating 
withdrawal. 
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the 
instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that sixmonth 
period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the 
withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. 
 
Article 21 
Relations with States not party to this Convention 
 
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, 
accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence 
of all States to this Convention. 
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this 
Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this 
Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to 
discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in 
accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, 
may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this 
Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party. 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party: 
(a) To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions; 
(b) To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions; 
(c) To itself use cluster munitions; or 
(d) To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the 
choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control. 
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Article 22 
Depositary 
 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary 
of this Convention. 
 
Article 23 
Authentic texts 
 
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention 
shall be equally authentic. 
 
 
 
Comparison between Original Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions and 
the Federal Act as amended 
 
 
Original Version Amended Version1187 
§ 1. For purposes of this Federal Act,  
 
1.   “Cluster munitions” are containers including 
explosive submunitions which are intended to disperse 
these submunitions over an area in order to detonate 
them before, on, or after impact; however, this 
definition shall not comprise flare and smoke 
ammunitions, pyrotechnical chemicals or munitions 
used to set off avalanches. 
2.    “procurement” is a transaction by which an 
Austrian citizen or a legal person, partnership or 
trading company registered in Austria or any other 
person, partnership or trading company that becomes 
active from within Austria is 
 
a) negotiating a legal transaction 
that involves the transfer of 
cluster munitions from a third 
country to another third country, 
or 
b) arranging such a legal 
transaction to be accomplished, 
or 
c) buying or selling cluster 
munitions if that causes its 
transfer from a third country to 
another third country, or 
d) arranging a transfer of cluster 
munitions over which they hold 
property from a third country to 
another third country. 
 
§ 1. For purposes of this Federal Act,  
 
1. “Convention” means the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions. 
2. “Cluster Munitions” are conventional 
munitions in accordance with Art. 2 (2) of 
the Convention 
3. “procurement” is a transaction by which an 
Austrian citizen or a legal person, 
partnership or trading company registered in 
Austria or any other person, partnership or 
trading company that becomes active from 
within Austria is 
 
a. negotiating a legal transaction that 
involves the transfer of cluster 
munitions from a third country to 
another third country, or 
b. arranging such a legal transaction to 
be accomplished, or 
c. buying or selling cluster munitions 
if that causes its transfer from a third 
country to another third country, or 
d. arranging a transfer of cluster 
munitions over which they hold 
property from a third country to 
another third country. 
 
                                                 
1187 Federal Act Amending the Federal Act on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions, Austrain Federal Law 
Gazette I, No. 41/2009, published on 8 April 2009, entry into force on 9 April 2009  
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2009_I_41/BGBLA_2009_I_41.pdf (last visited 26 
January 2010). 
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§ 2. The development, production, acquisition, sale, 
procurement, import, export, transit, use and 
possession of cluster munitions are prohibited. 
§ 2. The development, production, acquisition, 
relinquishment, procurement, import, export, transit, 
use and possession of cluster munitions are prohibited. 
§ 3. The prohibitions laid down under § 2 shall not be 
applicable to 
 
1. cluster munitions which are 
envisaged exclusively for instruction of the 
Austrian Armed Forces or of demining or 
clearance services; 
2. the import, export, transit, 
possession and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions for purposes of their immediate 
decommissioning or other destruction. 
 
§ 3. The prohibitions laid down under § 2 shall not be 
applicable to 
 
1. the acquisition, the import, the 
possession and the use of cluster munitions 
which are envisaged exclusively for 
instruction of the Austrian Armed Forces or 
of demining or clearance services, as well as 
the export and transit of cluster munitions to 
another state party of the Convention 
exclusively for purposes of military 
instruction or demining and clearance; 
2. the acquisition, relinquishment, 
import, possession and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions for purposes of their immediate 
decommissioning or other destruction, as 
well as the export and transit of cluster 
munitions to another state party of the 
Convention for these purposes. 
 
 
 
§ 4. Existing stockpiles of cluster munitions prohibited 
under § 2 must be reported to the Federal Ministry of 
Defence within one month after the entry into force of 
this Federal Act and must be destroyed against 
reimbursement of costs by the Ministry of Defence 
within a maximum period of three years. 
 
§ 4. Existing stockpiles of cluster munitions prohibited 
under § 2 must be reported to the Federal Ministry of 
Defence and Sports within one month after the entry 
into force of this Federal Act and must be destroyed 
against reimbursement of costs by the Ministry of 
Defence and Sports within a maximum period of three 
years. For cluster munitions which date back to a 
time before 1955, the reporting duty is owed to the 
Ministry of the Interior which is competent to further 
secure and destroy these cluster munitions in 
accordance with § 42 (5) of the Law on Weaponry, 
Federal Law Gazette I, No. 12/1997. 
 
§ 5. Anybody who, even if merely negligently, 
violates § 2 of this Federal Law shall be punished by a 
court of law either with a prison sentence of up to two 
years or with a fine of up to 360 daily rates 
[Tagessätze], provided that the act is not subject to 
more severe punishment under other federal 
legislation. 
 
Unchanged 
§ 6. (1) Cluster munitions used to commit an act 
punishable under § 5 shall be seized by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of 
cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 can be declared 
forfeit by a court of law. At the expense of the owner, 
it must be ensured that they can no longer be used in 
violation of the prohibitions laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the 
prohibitions laid down in § 2 can be declared forfeit 
by a court of law.  
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 shall pass 
to the ownership of the Federation [Bund]. Items 
seized according to para. 1 shall pass to the ownership 
of the Federation and are to be reported to the Federal 
Ministry of Defence for destruction pursuant to § 4. 
§ 6. (1) Cluster munitions used to commit an act 
punishable under § 5 shall be seized by a court of law. 
(2) Machines and facilities for the production of 
cluster munitions prohibited under § 2 can be declared 
forfeit by a court of law. At the expense of the owner, 
it must be ensured that they can no longer be used in 
violation of the prohibitions laid down in § 2. 
(3) Means used to transport items subject to the 
prohibitions laid down in § 2 can be declared forfeit 
by a court of law.  
(4) Items forfeit according to paras. 2 and 3 shall pass 
to the ownership of the Federation [Bund]. Items 
seized according to para. 1 shall pass to the ownership 
of the Federation and are to be reported to the Federal 
Ministry of Defence and Sports, and the Federal 
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 Ministry of the Interior, respectively, for destruction 
pursuant to § 4. 
 
§ 7. This Federal Act shall be implemented by 
 
1. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the  
Federal Minister of Defence with regard to § 3, 
       2. the Federal Minister of Defence with regard to   
§ 4, 
3.  the Federal Minister of Justice with regard to § 
5 and § 6 paras. 1 to 3, 
4. the Federal Minister of Justice and the Federal 
Minister of Defence with regard to § 6 para. 4, 
5. the Federal Minister of the Interior with regard 
to the remaining provisions. 
 
 
§ 7. This Federal Act shall be implemented by 
 
1. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the  
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports with 
regard to § 3, 
       2. the Federal Minister of the Interior and the 
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports with 
regard to § 4, 
3.  the Federal Minister of Justice with regard to § 
5 and § 6 paras. 1 to 3, 
4. the Federal Minister of Justice,  the Federal 
Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister 
of Defence and Sports with regard to § 6 para. 4, 
5. the Federal Minister of the Interior with regard 
to the remaining provisions. 
 
§ 8. This Federal Act shall enter into force upon 
 Expiry of the day of publication in the Austrian 
 Federal Law Gazette. 
 
 
§ 8. (1) This Federal Act shall enter into force upon 
 expiry of the day of publication in the Austrian 
 Federal Law Gazette. 
(2) §§ 1-4 of the version Federal Law Gazette I, No. 
41/2009 of the Federal Act  shall enter into force 
 upon expiry of the day of publication of the 
 Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
(3) For war material which only falls under the  
definition of “cluster munitions” by virtue of the 
 entry into force of § 1 (2) of the version Federal Law 
 Gazette I, No. 41/2009 of the Federal Act, the time  
limits specified in § 4 start to run as of that time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group of Governmental Experts to the CCW: Consolidated Draft on a Protocol on 
Cluster Munitions, as of 16 April 20091188 
 
Article 1. General provision and scope of application 
 
1. In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of International Humanitarian Law and 
other rules of international law applicable to them, the High Contracting Parties agree to comply with 
the obligations specified in this Protocol , both individually and in cooperation with other High 
Contracting Parties, to address the humanitarian impact caused by cluster munitions. 
 
2. This Protocol shall apply in all situations referred to in Article 1, paragraphs 1 to 6, of the Convention, 
as amended on 21 December 2001, and to all situations resulting from conflicts referred therein. 
 
3. This Protocol shall not affect any rights or obligations Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
done at Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008 and opened for signature in Oslo, Norway, on 3 December 
2008, have under that Convention. 
 
4. This Protocol shall not apply to mines, booby-traps and other devices as defined in Article 2 of the 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to this Convention on Prohibitions or Restrcitions on the Use of 
                                                 
1188 Copy on file with the author. 
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Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (the Convention). 
 
5. This Protoocl does not apply to munitions or explosive submunitions that are exclusively designed as 
anti-ship munitions for use at sea when used against ships which are at sea at the time of the attack. 
 
6. This Protocol does not apply to munitions which are designed exclusively as anti-runway munitions and 
that disperse or release explosive sub-munitions each of which weighs more than five kilograms, when 
used against hard-stand runways, constructed from mass concrete, reinforced concrete, asphalt or a 
combination of these, or from equivalent material which yields the same progressive strength. 
 
7. The provisions of Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12 of this Protocol shall apply to the 
munitionsdescribed in Article 2, paragraph 2 (d). 
 
 
Article 2. Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
 
1. “Cluster munition” means 
 
(a) A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or relaease explosive submunitions, and includes 
those explosive submunitions; or 
(b) A munition consisting of a container, affixed to an aircraft, which is designed to disperse or release 
multiple explosive submunitions, other than self-propelled explosive submunitions and includes those 
explosive submunitions. 
 
2. “Cluster munition” does not mean or include: 
 
(a) munitions or submunitions designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics, or chaff; 
(b) munitions or explosive submunitions designed exclusively for an air defence role; 
(c) munitions or submunitions designed to produce electrical or electronic effects; 
(d) munitions that, in order to avoid indiscriminate effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, 
have all of the following characteristics: 
(i) each munition contains fewer than 10 explosive submunitions; 
(ii) each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; 
(iii) each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; 
(iv) each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction 
mechanism; 
(v) each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature. 
 
(e) munitions which are exclusively designed for use by direct fire delivery systems. 
 
3. “Explosive submunition” means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, that in order 
to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an 
explosive charge prior to, on or after impact. 
 
4. “Failed cluster munition” means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or 
otherwise delivered during an armed conflict, and which should have dispersed or released its explosive 
submunitions but did not do so as intended. 
 
5. “Unexploded submunition” means an explosive submunition which has been dispersed or released by, 
or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition during an armed conflict and has failed to explode as intended. 
 
6. “Abandoned cluster munitions” means cluster munitions and explosive submunitions that have not been 
used during an armed conflict, that have been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict or in a 
situation arising directly from an armed conflict, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left 
them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use. 
 
7. “Cluster munition remnants” means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions and 
unexploded submunitions. 
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8. “Military objective” means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature location, 
purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
 
9. “Civilian objects” are all objects, which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 8 of this 
Article. 
 
10. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national 
territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory 
containing cluster munition remnants. 
 
11. “Self-destruction mechanism” means an incorporated or attached automatically-functioning mechanism 
which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the 
munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached. 
 
12. “Self-neutralisation mechanism” means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which 
renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated. 
 
13. “Self-deactivating” means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible 
exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition. 
 
14. “Cluster munition victims” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or 
psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their 
rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions 
as well as their affected families and communities. 
 
15. “Cluster munition contaminated area” means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition 
remnants. 
 
 
Article 3. Protection of civilians, the civilian population and civilian objects 
 
1. In implementing this Protocol, each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall ensure full 
compliance with all applicable principles and rules of international humanitarian law. 
 
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as detracting from, or otherwise prejudicing, other principles 
and rules of international humanitarian law. 
 
 
Article 4. General prohibitions and restrictions 
 
1. It is prohibited for a High Contracting Party to use, develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster 
munitions that do not meet the criteria in paragraph 2. 
 
2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply if: 
 
(a) The cluster munition is capable of being delivered accurately∗ to a pre-defined target area and each 
explosive submunition possesses one/two or more of the following safeguards that must effectively 
ensure with a high degree of reliability that unexploded submunitions will no longer function as 
explosive submunitions: 
 
(i) a self-destruction mechanism or an equivalent mechanism, including two or more initiating 
mechanisms; 
(ii) a self-neutralisation mechanism; 
(iii) a self-deactivating feature; 
 
or 
 
                                                 
∗ This does not mean that the cluster munition is necessarily equipped with a guidance system. 
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(b) The cluster munition is capable of being delivered accurately to a pre-defined target area and 
incorporates a mechanism or design which, after dispersal, results in no more than 1% unexploded 
ordnance across the range of intended operational environments. 
 
3. A High Contracting Party may defer compliance with the prohibition of use for a transition period not 
exceeding X years from the Protocol’s entry into force for it. This deferral shall be announced by declaration at 
the time of its notification to be bound by this Protocol. In case a High Contracting Party is unable to comply 
with paragraph 1 of this Article within that transition period, it may notify a Conference of the High Contracting 
Parties that it will extend this period of deferred compliance for a period of up to X additional years. 
 
4. Notwithstanding a High Contracting Party’s deferral pursuant to paragraph 3 of the prohibition of use in 
paragraph 1, each High Contracting Party undertakes, immediately upon entry into force: 
 
(a) To use cluster munitions that do not meet the criteria in paragraph 2 only after approval by ots highest-
ranking operational commander in the area of operations/by the appropriate politically mandated 
operational authority, in accordance with national procedures; 
(b) To use only cluster munitions with the lowest possible unexploded ordnance rate, consistent with 
military requirements; 
 
 
5. Each High Contracting Party undertakes, immediately upon entry into force of the Protocol for it: 
 
(a) Not to develop new types of cluster munitions/or produce cluster munitions which do not meet the 
requirements of paragraph 2; 
(b) To take steps in any design, procurement or production of cluster munitions to minimise the unexploded 
ordnance rate or incorporate additional safeguard mechanisms or designs; 
(c) To improve to the extent possible the accuracy of their cluster munitions and submunitions which meet 
the requirements of paragraph 2; 
(d) To complete an evaluation of the military requirements and remove the stocks of cluster munitions in 
excess of these requirements from active inventory as soon as possible and designate these stocks for 
destruction. 
 
 
5 bis It is prohibited to use munitions or explosive submunitions that are exclusively designed as anti-ship 
munitions for use at sea, against targets other than ships which are at sea at the time of the attack. 
 
5 bis It is prohibited to use anti-runway munitions against targets other than hard-stand runways, constructed 
from mass concrete, reinforced concrete, asphalt or a combination of these, or from an equivalent material which 
yields the same compressive strength. 
 
6. The obligations in this Article do not apply to cluster munitions acquired or retained in a limited number 
for the exclusive purpose of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, or for the development 
of cluster munitions countermeasures. 
 
7. The High Contracting Parties in a position to do so are encouraged, through bilateral or multilateral 
mechanisms established between them, to facilitate the exchange of equipment, material, and scientific 
and technological information that will lessen the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. 
 
 
Article 5. Stockpile, storage andf destruction 
 
Each High Contracting Party undertakes: 
 
(a) To remove all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control that do not meet the standards 
provided for in Article 4 (2) from its operational stocks, separate them from munitions retained for 
operational use, mark and safely secure them, in accordance with national procedures; 
(b) To destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control that do not 
meet the standards provided for in Article 4 (2), as soon as feasible after the entry into force of this 
Protocol, starting no later than: 
- 5 years after the entry into force of the Protocol for the High Contracting Party; or 
- The end of the transition period referred to in article 4 if applicable to the High Contracting 
Party; 
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(c) To create and/or maintain a stockpile surveillance and management program to ensure the operational 
quality and reliability of weapons permitted under this Protocol. In implementing this provision, the 
High Contracting Parties shall make use of, where appropriate, existing mechanisms, tools, and 
databases within the Convention’s framework and other relevant instruments and mechanisms. 
 
 
Article 6. Transfers 
 
1. It is prohibited for a High Contracting Party to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet the requirements 
of Article 4 (2). 
 
2. A High Contracting Party may defer compliance with the prohibition of transfer for a transition period not 
exceeding X years from the Protocol’s entry into force for it. 
 
3. Notwithstanding a High Contracting Party’s deferral, pursuant to paragraph 2, of the prohibition of transfer, 
each High Contracting Party undertakes, immediately upon entry into force: 
 
(a) Not to transfer any cluster munition manufactured before 1990 except pursuant to patterns of 
cooperation/security cooperation agreements existing at the time of the entry into force of the Protocol; 
(b) Not to transfer any cluster munition that has been significantly degraded from its original specifications; 
(c) Not to transfer any cluster munition or submunition to any recipient other than a State or State agency 
authorised to receive such transfers; 
(d) To prevent unauthorised transfers, from areas under its jurisdiction or control, of any cluster munition 
or submunition, 
(e) To ensure that any transfer in accordance with this Article takes place in full compliance, by both the 
transferring and the recipient State, with the relevant prohibitions of this Protocol. 
 
4. A High Contracting Party that has deferred the application of paragraph 1 shall, during the period of 
deferral, not transfer any cluster munition or submunition that does not meet the requirements of Article 4 
(2), unless the recipient State agrees to apply this Protocol with respect to the transferred items. 
 
5. This Article does not apply to transfers for the purpose of destruction, retrofitting in order to comply with 
the criteria set forth in Article 4, development of training in detection and clearance, and for the 
development of cluster munition countermeasures. 
 
 
Article 7. Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munition Remnants 
 
1. Each high Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall bear the responsibiluties set out in this 
Article with respect to all cluster munition remnants in territory under its control. In cases where a user of cluster 
munitions which have become cluster munition remnants does not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, 
after the cessation of active hostilities, provide where feasible, inter alia technical, financial, material or human 
resources assistance, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations 
system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster 
munition remnants.  
 
2. After the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, each High Contracting Party and party to 
an armed conflict shall mark and clear, remove or destroy cluster munition remnants in affected territories under 
its control. Areas affected by cluster munition remnants which are assessed pursuant to paragraph 3 of this 
Article as posing a serious humanitarian risk shall be accorded priority status for clearance, removal or 
destruction. 
 
3.  After the cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, each High Contracting Party and party 
to an armed conflict shall take the following measures in affected territories under its control, to reduce the risk 
posed by cluster munition remnants: 
 
(a) Survey and assess the threat posed by cluster munition remnants; 
(b) Assess and prioritise needs and practicability in terms of marking and clearance, removal or destruction 
taking into account the impact from other explosive remnants of war and landmines; 
(c) Mark and clear, remove or destroy cluster munition remnants; and 
(d) Take steps to mobilise resources to carry out these activities. 
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4. In conducting the above activities, the High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall 
take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards. 
 
5. The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate, where appropriate, both among themselves and with other 
states, relevant regional and international organisations and non-governmental organisations on the provision of 
inter alia technical, financial, material or human resources assistance including, in appropriate circumstances, the 
undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfill the provisions of this Article. 
 
 
Article 8. Recording, retaining and transmission of information 
 
1. High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall to the maximum extent possible and as 
far as practicable record and retain information on the use or abandonment of cluster munitions, to facilitate 
rapid marking and clearance, removal or destruction of cluster munition remnants, risk education and the 
provision of relevant information to the party in control of the territory and to civilian populations in that 
territory. 
 
 
2. High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict which have used or abandoned cluster 
munitions which may become cluster munition remnants shall, without delay after cessation of active hostilities 
and as far as practicable, subject to these parties’ legitimate security interests, make available such information 
to the party or parties in control of the affected area, bilaterally or through the United Nations or another 
mutually agreed third party or, upon request, to ther relevant organisations which the party providing the 
information is satisfied are or will be undertaking risk education and marking and clearance, removal or 
destruction of cluster munition remnants in the affected area. 
 
 
Article 9. Protection of humanitarian missions and organisations from the effects of cluster munitions 
 
1. Each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall: 
 
(a) Protect, as far as feasible, from the effects of cluster munition remnants, humanitarian missions and 
organisations that are or will be operating in the area under the control of the High Contracting Party or party to 
an armed conflict and with that party’s consent. 
 
(b) Upon request by such a humanitarian mission or organisation, provide, as far as feasible, information on the 
location of all cluster munition remnants that it is aware of in territory where the requesting humanitarian 
mission or organisation will operate or is operating.  
 
2.  The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to existing International Humanitarian Law or other 
international instruments as applicable or decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations which provide 
for a higher level of protection. 
 
 
 
Article 10. Victim Assistance 
 
 
1. High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall, in accordance with domestic laws and 
procedures, as well as their obligations under applicable international law provide or facilitate the provision of 
appropriate and adequate assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, and 
assistance for social and economic inclusion to cluster munition victims in territories under their jurisdiction or 
control. Each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall make every effort to collect reliable 
data with respect to cluster munition victims. 
 
2. High Contracting Parties shall not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between 
cluster munition victims and other victims of armed conflict/ERW and other persons with disabilities. 
Differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs, 
taking into account age and gender sensitivities. 
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3. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Article, each High Contracting Party shall take, among 
others, the following measures, as appropriate:  
a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;  
b. Develop, implement and enforce national laws and policies;  
c. Develop, where it does not already exist, in accordance with national procedures, a national 
plan, with provision of adequate assistance, including timeframes to carry out these activities, 
with a view to incorporating them within applicable national health, disability, development 
and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and 
contribution of relevant actors in the field of assistance and rehabilitation of victims of cluster 
munitions;  
d. Seek to mobilise national and international resources;  
e. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative 
organisations;  
f. Designate, in accordance with national procedures, a focal point within the government for 
coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and  
g. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical 
care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.  
 
Article 11. Cooperation and assistance 
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Protocol, each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and 
receive assistance and each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shal, provide such assistance in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
2. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the marking and 
clearance, removal or destruction of cluster munition remnants, and for risk education to civilian populations and 
related activities inter alia through the United Nations system, other relevant international, regional or national 
organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent 
societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis. 
3. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance, including to develop 
national capacities, for the care and rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of victims of cluster 
munitions and cluster munition remnants. Such assistance may be provided inter alia through the United Nations 
system, relevant international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-
governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis. 
4. Where, after entry into force of this Protocol, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants 
located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a High Contracting Party, each High Contracting Party in a 
position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected High Contracting Party. 
5. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall contribute to trust funds within the United 
Nations system, or other relevant trust funds, or by other means, to facilitate the provision of assistance under 
this Protocol. 
6. Each High Contracting Party shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, material, services and scientific and technological information other than weapons related 
technology, necessary for the implementation of this Protocol. High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate 
such exchanges in accordance with national legislation and shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision 
and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian 
purposes. 
7. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shal, facilitate the development and use of 
technology and equipment for the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, including as appropriate 
through the use of trust funds established for that purpose or other means, in order to reduce the humanitarian 
impact of cluster munitions and cluster munition remnants. 
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8. Each High Contracting Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in 
order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Protocol, in particular its humanitarian 
objectives, including through the timely collection and release of relevant data and information, and the 
facilitation of the entry and exit of assistance-related personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent 
with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices. 
9.  Each High Contracting Party undertakes to provide information to the relevant databases on mine action 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies 
of clearance of cluster munition remnants, lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on 
clearance of cluster munition remnants and, on a voluntary basis, technical information on relevant types of 
explosive ordnance. 
10. High Contracting Parties may submit requests for assistance substantiated by relevant information to the 
United Nations, to other appropriate bodies or to other states. These requests may be submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to all High Contracting Parties and to relevant 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations. 
11. In implementing the provisions of this Article, High Contracting Parties shall make use of, where 
appropriate, existing mechanisms, tools and databases within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
framework and other relevant instruments and mechanisms. 
12. In the case of requests to the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within the 
resources available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, may take appropriate steps to assess the 
situation and in cooperation with the requesting High Contracting Party and other High Contracting Parties, 
recommend the appropriate provision of assistance. The Secretary-General may also report to High Contracting 
Parties on any such assessment as well as on the type and scope of assistance required, including possible 
contributions from the trust funds established within the United Nations system. 
13. High Contracting Parties in a position to provide assistance shall, where appropriate, cooperate to 
develop coordinated strategies for the effective and efficient provision of assistance. 
 
Article 12. Consultations of High Contracting Parties 
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult and co-operate with each other on all issues related 
to the operation of this Protocol. For this purpose, Conferences of High Contracting Parties shall be held as 
agreed to by a majority, but no less than eighteen High Contracting Parties. 
 
2.  The work of the Conferences of High Contracting Parties shall include: 
 
(a) Review of the status and operation of this Protocol; 
(b)  Consideration of matters pertaining to cooperation and assistance and national implementation of this 
Protocol, including national reporting or updating on an annual basis; and 
(c) Preparation for review conferences. 
2bis. The High Contracting Parties shall provide annual reports on the implementation of this Protocol to the 
Depositary who shall circulate them to all High Contracting Parties in advance of the Conference.∗  
 
3. The costs of the Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be borne by the High Contracting Parties and 
States not parties participating in the Conference, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment 
adjusted appropriately. 
 
                                                 
∗ A High Contracting Party which has availed itself of a deferral period referred to in this Protocol is encouraged 
to provide a voluntary report on the implementation of the applicable Article during that deferral period. 
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Article 13. Compliance 
1. Each High Contracting Party shall take all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, 
to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. 
2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article include appropriate measures to ensure the 
imposition of penal sanctions against persons who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions 
of this Protocol, wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians and to bring such persons to justice. 
3. Each High Contracting Party shall require that its armed forces and relevant agencies or departments 
issue appropriate instructions and operating procedures and that its personnel receive training consistent with the 
relevant provisions of this Protocol. 
 
4.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult each other and to co-operate with each other 
bilaterally, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations or through other appropriate international 
procedures, to resolve any problems that may arise with regard to the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of this Protocol. 
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Abstract 
 
Über einen Zeitraum von über 60 Jahren haben Streumunitionen unzählige Opfer unter der 
Zivilbevölkerung aufgrund der flächendeckenden Wirkung und Ungenauigkeit während 
bewaffneter Konflikte und aufgrund von Blindgängern, die oft lange nach dem Ende von 
Kampfhandlungen zurückbleiben, verursacht. Ursprünglich konzipiert, um großflächige und 
schnell bewegliche Ziele wie Flugfelder oder eine große Anzahl von gegnerischen Soldaten 
oder Panzern fernab von zivilen Zielen bekämpfen zu können, zeigt die Realität von Schäden 
an der Zivilbevölkerung in vorangegangenen bewaffneten Konflikten, dass Streumunitionen 
de facto nicht so eimgesetzt wurden. 
Daher stellt sich zunächst die Frage, warum generelle Regelungen des humanitären 
Völkerrechts und Protokoll V zur Konvention zu Konventionellen Waffen (KKW)  sich als 
inadäquat erwiesen haben, um einen besseren Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung zu gewährleisten. 
Der Autor argumentiert, dass die generellen Regeln des humnitären Völkerrechts teils 
ungenügend (was auch für Protokoll V zur KKW gilt),  teils nicht genügend umgesetzt 
wurden. Aus diesem Befund ergibt sich die zentrale These dieser Arbeit, dass ein spezifischer 
internationaler Abrüstungsvertrag mit einer starken humanitären Komponente zum besseren 
Schutz von Zivilisten notwendig war.  
Eine solche humanitäre Komponente wird durch die Bezugnahme auf Menschenrechte 
erleichtert. Nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Eignung von Menschenrechten, für bereits geschehene 
Schädigungen Individuen Genugtuung zu verschaffen, sind Menschenrechte eine 
willkommene Ergänzung im Bereich der Abrüstung, der traditionell eher zukünftige Schäden 
verhindern will. Der Abschluss der Konvention zu Streumunitionen 2008 rechtfertigt diese 
menschenrechtliche Betrachtungsweise, denn im Vertragstext findet sich eine Bestimmung 
mit den bis dato umfassendsten Verpflichtungen hinsichtlich bereits bestehender Opfer von 
Streumunitionen.  
In der Arbeit wird auch analysiert, warum für die Schaffung eines neuen 
Streumunitionsverbotsvertrages ein alternativer diplomatischer Prozess außerhalb des 
traditionellen Forums der KKW erforderlich war. Eine der zentralen Schlussfolgerungen auf 
diese Frage, aber auch für die gesamte Arbeit ist, dass Abrüstungsverhandlungen dort 
erfolgreicher sind, wo sich Verhandler statt von traditionell strategischen von humanitären 
Gesichtspunkten leiten lassen. 
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